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ABSTRACT 
The Republic of China in Taiwan is a maritime nation situated in Southeast Asia, with well- 
developed fishing technology, and which has become one of the most important fishing nations 
in the world. However, Taiwan cannot negotiate with other states on fishery issues because of 
political difficulties associated with its international status. Nevertheless, most states know 
Taiwan is too important to be ignored. These circumstances only delay the resolution of 
disputes occurring between Taiwan and other states. This research focuses on the resolution of 
maritime disputes of the South China Sea in which Taiwan is one of the parties concerned. 
This research is organised into four parts. Part One has two chapters. Chapter 1 defines 
the aims and scope of the research. Chapter 2 analyses the recent development of international 
law of the sea. It also discusses restrictions on freedom of fishing on the high seas, namely the 
issues of driftnet fishing and straddling stocks and highly migratory species. 
Part Two considers the issue of disputes in the South China Sea. Chapter 3 provides a 
historical introduction and legal discussion of the international status of Taiwan. Chapter 4 
illustrates Taiwan's and its neighbours' maritime claims and the overlapping maritime 
jurisdiction in the South China Sea. Following on this, Chapter 5 reviews fisheries problems in 
the South China Sea. Part Two suggests that a non-boundary-based resolution, provisional 
arrangements and co-operations, could be presented as a feasible solution. 
Part Three looks at the impacts of non-recognition on Taiwan, which are statelessness, 
the inability to participate in international organisations, and the inability to conclude 
agreements with other states. Part Three concludes that Taiwan is capable of negotiating with 
other states, even if they do not recognise Taiwan as a state. 
The author concludes, in Part Four, that without determining the ownership or 
jurisdiction over the islands and waters in the South China Sea at present stage, the claimant 
states can derive the most beneficial use of the South China Sea by co-operating in the 
management of fishery resources, because fishery resources management is a crucial starting 
point towards co-operation. A well-working case, the Anglo-Argentine fisheries regime, is 
introduced to demonstrate this conclusion. In addition, fishery co-operation can be a confidence 
building method. Its experience can offer a beneficial effect in other fields of co-operation. The 
author further suggests that all the relevant states, including Taiwan, should be included in the 
co-operation system, not only because it has the capabilities and will to join in the co-operation, 
but also because broad inclusion is one of the basic elements of achieving a successful co- 
operative mechanism. 
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AIMS AND SCOPE OF THIS RESEARCH 
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea by its geographic structure. The littoral 
states should co-operate to create an environment so that the regional stability and 
development can be maintained. This is not the current state of affairs, however. 
Different political systems, different legal systems, different maritime claims, and 
distrust between the littoral states weave a situation of disputes. The aim of this 
research is twofold: firstly, the author would like to offer a resolution to the disputes in 
the South China Sea with a special reference to the idea of fishery co-operation. 
Secondly, as one of the five littoral states of the South China Sea and one of the 
important fishery nations in the region as well as in the world, Taiwan should play an 
integral role in resolving the disputes. Linked by the South China Sea, all the littoral 
states are bound together by political, legal, jurisdictional, and economic 
considerations. The author holds that fishery co-operation can help resolve the disputes 
of the South China Sea and that all littoral states should be included. 
In order to clarify and develop these aims, the following questions will be 
discussed in the following chapters: 
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" What is the latest development in international law of the fisheries, 
especially in the field of high seas fishery? 
" What is the status of Taiwan in the international law prospects? 
9 What is the impact of non-recognition on Taiwan? 
" What is the motivation that causes disputes in the South China Sea? 
" How can the concept of co-operation apply to the South China Sea? 
The following approach is used to achieve the aims of this research and 
respond to the above questions. First of all, in Part One, Chapter 2, a study on the 
international law of fisheries is discussed. This is to provide a background to the latest 
developments in the international law of the sea to best understand fisheries in the 
territorial sea, in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and on the high seas. Two latest 
developments on restrictions to the freedom of fishing on the high seas, driftnet fishing 
and the issue of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks are also discussed. 
Secondly, Part Two discusses Taiwan's international status and the disputes in 
the South China Sea. This part can be divided into three chapters: Chapter 3 provides a 
historical introduction and legal discussion of the international status of Taiwan. Due 
to political considerations, Taiwan is not recognised by most of the states. Chapter 4 
analyzes the relevant development of maritime claims in the South China Sea, 
including individual national declaration of maritime claims related to the South China 
Sea and overlapping claims in the region. Chapter 5 exposes the fisheries problems in 
the region and the idea of fishery co-operation within a legal framework. The author 
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discusses several other possible co-operative efforts including military co-operation 
and joint development of hydrocarbon resources. 
Part Three discusses the impacts incurred by Taiwan since it is not recognised 
as a sovereign state by a majority of sovereign states and regional or international 
organisations. Taiwan is treated as stateless, is unable to participate in international 
organisations, and is unable to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements. Applying 
the relevant case studies, the author demonstrates that Taiwan faces the above- 
mentioned three major obstacles because of its lack of an international legal status, but 
in reality Taiwan is not necessarily to be hindered to exercise its rights as a state. 
Part Four concludes by comparing the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas fishery 
co-operation model to suggest that fishery co-operation in the South China Sea is 
feasible and would lead to a resolution of the disputes among the South China Sea's 
littoral states. 
The scope of this research is limited to two main bodies: Taiwan and the littoral 
states of the South China Sea. 'Taiwan' refers to the Republic of China in Taiwan that 
was established in 1911 and its capital is Taipei. Another key littoral state is the 
People's Republic of China (or the PRC) that was established in 1949 with its capital in 
Beijing. As to the term 'China', it denotes both the PRC and the ROC according to the 
context. Other littoral states are Vietnam, Kampuchea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Brunei, and the Philippines. But, given that disputes in the South China Sea centre on 
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the Spratly Islands, this research is limited to those that have juridical disputes over the 
Spratly Islands, namely, Taiwan, the PRC, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. 
CHAPTER TWO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of freedom of the sea was advocated by a Dutch lawyer, Hugo Grotius. 
Grotius contended, in his treatise Mare Liberum, that the sea cannot be state property, 
because it could not be taken into possession through occupation, and " that 
consequently the sea Evas by nature free from the sovereignty of any state. 1 This started 
the argument on the sovereignty over the seas. 2 Two centuries later, the principle of 
freedom of the open sea was recognised in theory and practice in the 19th century. 3 
1 Grotius expressed this idea in his book, De Jure Praedae, although this 
book was published anonymously in 1608. Mare Liberum was the twelfth chapter of 
De jure praedae. See Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (1983) pp. 
77-89; Johnston, The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy- 
Oriented Inquiries (1987) p. 165-166; O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, 
Vol. I (1982) p. 9,52n; Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 
1, Parts 2 to 4,9th Edition (1992) p. 721, § 278. 
2 The most important work defending maritime sovereignty was Seldon's 
Mare Clausum. Seldon wrote this book at the behest of the British Crown. He tried to 
prove that the kings of England had perpetually exercised exclusive jurisdiction in the 
surrounding seas as part of their territory and preserved the right to prohibit fishing and 
even navigation by foreigners in these waters. See Anand, ibid, pp. 105-107; Jennings 
and Watts, ibid., p. 721, § 278. 
3 During this period of time, freedom of the seas played a prevalent role, 
such as Bynkershoek's De Dominio Maris. See Anand, ibid., pp. 232-233; Jennings 
and Watts, ibid., p. 722. § 279. 
This principle was discussed in the 1958 UNCLOS 1.4 Moreover, the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas, Article 2 provides 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by 
these articles and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter 
alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States: 
(1) Freedom of navigation; 
(2) Freedom of fishing; 
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. 
In the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter cited as LOSC), 
two more freedoms were added: freedom to construct artificial islands and other 
installations permitted under international law and freedom of scientific research. 5 It is 
worth noting, however, that the freedoms, whether those expressly stated in the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas or in the 1982 LOSC, are enjoyed based on the 
qualification that they 'shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests 
of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas. '6 This means that in the 
exercise of any of the freedoms, due regard must be had to the enjoyment by other 
states not only of that particular freedom, but of others of the freedoms.? 
4 UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 4 (1958), pp. 113,124. The 
International Law Commission discussed this matter before the UNCLOS I, however it 
did not include any provision in its final draft in 1956. See ILC Yearbook (1956) Vol. 1, 
p. 29, et seq. 
5 LOSC, Article 87. 
6 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 2(2); 1982 LOSC, 
Article 87(2). 
7 Jennings and Watts, supra note 1, p. 729. It is worth noting that'reasonable 
regard' was used in the High Seas Convention, but its significance is unclear. 
According to Churchill and Lowe, 'due regard' protects not only the interests of others 
exercising the freedom of the high seas but also the rights under the LOSC with respect 
to activities in the Area. See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea (1988) p. 146. 
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To further the purpose of this research, this Chapter discusses the freedom of 
fishing on the high seas. Within the freedoms of the high seas, fishing is one of the 
most important and long recognised freedoms. 8 This freedom is recognised in Article 
2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 87 of the 1982 LOSC. The 
freedom of fishing on the high seas is based upon the supposition that the stocks of 
high seas fisheries were reasonably adequate to sustain fishing it, therefore vessels of 
all states enjoyed the freedom to fish on the high seas. However, after the Second 
World War, with the rapid improvement of science and maritime technology and the 
increased demand for the seas resources, developed countries with distant water 
fishing capabilities, such as Japan and the Soviet Union, created and made use of the 
technology to further explore and exploit the stocks of the high seas. This placed 
technically lesser developed states at a considerable disadvantage. 9 
In addition, most developing and lesser developed countries, given their lack of 
technology and capital, would be at a competitive disadvantage. This would lead to 
obsolete economies and permanent economic dislocation. Therefore, they were 
8 See Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration Award 1893; Moore, History and 
Digest of the International Arbitration to which the United States Has Been A Party, 
Vol. 1 (1898) p. 755. 
9 Dean, "The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight 
for Freedom of the Seas, " 54 AJIL (1960) pp. 761-762; Kaczynski, "Alternatives 
Facing Distant-Waters Fishing States in the North-East Pacific, " 6 ODIL (1979) pp. 
73-102; Kwiatkowska, "Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles in Light of the Law of 
the Sea Convention and State Practice, " 22 ODIL (1991) pp. 153-187; Ouchi, "A 
Perspective on Japan's Struggle for its Traditional Rights on the Ocean, " 5 ODIL 
(1978) pp. 107-135; Tanaka, "Japanese Fisheries and Fishery Resources in the 
Northwest Pacific, " 6 ODIL (1979) pp. 103-163. Cf. UNCLOS I, Official Records 
(1958), Second Committee, 9th Meeting, paras. 29,38 (per Peru); also Third 
Committee, 9th Meeting, para. 4 (per Ecuador). 
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convinced that the rules of the international legal system were unable to meet their 
interests and needs. 10 By extending their jurisdiction further seawards, they could 
protect domestic fishing concerns from foreign competition; prohibit or restrict 
exploitation of resources until there could be greater participation in its extraction or 
downstream economic exploitation. " Therefore, broader jurisdiction would be a 
bargaining chip for lesser developed countries when they negotiated with developed 
states. It would also form a basis upon which to develop their own economies. Under 
such circumstances, more and more coastal states sought to extend their authority over 
maritime zones adjacent to their coasts and establish different zones with different 
functions. 12 The nature of coastal states' claims to jurisdiction in extended maritime 
zones varied from state to state. Some states viewed the zones as an extension of their 
10 Anand, "Role of the New Asian-African Countries in the Present 
International Legal Order, " 56 AJIL (1962) p. 383; Copes, "Optimising the Use of 
Ocean Fish Resources in the Context of Extended National Jurisdictions, " in English 
and Scott, eds., Renewable Resources in the Pacific, Proceedings of the 12th Pacific 
Trade and Development Conference (1982) pp. 33-36; Dahmani, The Fisheries 
Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (1987) p. 21. 
11 Oxman, "The Two Conferences, " in Oxman, Caron, and Buderi, eds., Law 
of the Sea: US. Policy Dilemma (1983) p. 138; Scovazzi, "Explaining Exclusive 
Fishery Jurisdiction, " 9 Mar. Pol. (1985) pp. 121-122; Alexander, "The Ocean 
Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Perspective, " 20 SDLR (1983) pp. 561-594; 
Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987) pp. 1-31,39-41. 
12 There are five different kinds of maritime zones each with different 
function: territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, exclusive fishery 
zone, and continental shelf. For detailed data about national claims to these maritime 
zones, see 25 LOS Bulletin (June 1994). 
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territorial sea, with full territorial sovereignty. 13 Other states claimed fishery zones, 
with only the right to exploit and manage the living resources located within. 14 
However, no matter what kind of zones they are called, by taking away fishing, they 
obviously lack an important part of the high seas freedom. Then this raised the 
question of the compatibility of such zones with international law, that is, can these 
zones be recognised by international law? 
The ICJ's finding in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases clarified this doubt. 15 
Since fishing has always been an important economic activity and source of income for 
its nationals, the Icelandic government extended its 4-mile exclusive fishery zone to 12 
13 One of the most famous cases about this is the Santiago Declaration on the 
Maritime Zone, which was signed in 1952 by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. In the Santiago 
Declaration, the signatories claimed that a 200-mile 'maritime zone' was established 
from their respective coasts, within which they would exercise sovereignty and 
jurisdiction over the conservation of all living resources. See Declaration of Santiago, 
18 August 1952. In Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. and eds., New Directions in 
the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 231. 
14 See 1972 Declaration of Santo Domingo and 1972 Conclusions in the 
General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea. 
Reprinted in Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, eds., ibid, Vol. I (1973) pp. 247,250. In 
the latter document, it reads: 
The African States have equally the right to establish beyond the territorial 
sea an Economic Zone over which they will have an exclusive jurisdiction 
for the purpose of control, regulation and national exploitation of the 
living resources of the sea. 
15 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (UK v. Iceland) I. C. J. Reports 1974, p. 3; also 
Churchill, "The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the International 
Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries Rights, " 24 ICLQ (1975) pp. 
32-105; Katz, "Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, " 22 ICLQ (1973) pp. 
83-108. 
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miles in 1958.16 This measure resulted in a dispute with the UK and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, whose fishing vessels had traditionally fished in the area and a 
number of incidents took place between the Icelandic naval craft and British fishery 
protection vessels. Furthermore, Iceland again extended its exclusive fisheries zone 
from 12 miles to 50 miles on 14 July 197217 under the following considerations: 18 
[B]ecause the continental shelf, the platform under the sea, on which the 
50-mile limit was staged, was an integral part of the country territory and 
the fish stocks were a natural resource in precisely the same way as oil 
beneath the sea-bed ... 
[B]ecause Iceland has no other natural resources to speak of. Due to a 
work of nature, all her natural wealth lay in her coastal waters. 
The UK objected to Icelandic government's decision on account of, according 
to a 1961 agreement between the UK and Iceland, 19 the British government shall be 
16 Jonsson, Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Iceland Cod Wars and the Law of 
the Sea (1982) pp. 83-84. 
17 Jbid., p. 130. 
18 Government of Iceland, Press Release, 20 August 1971, p. 1. Cited from 
Jonsson, ibid., p. 126. 
19 The controversial clause of this agreement is: 
The Icelandic Government will continue to work for the ... extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland, but shall give to the United Kingdom 
Government six months' notice of such extension... 
See Exchange of Note between the UK and Iceland, 11 March 1961. In UN, 
National Legislation and Treaties relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, 
the Continental Shelf, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the Sea (1970) pp. 898-900. 
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given six-month notice of any extension of fisheries jurisdiction around Iceland. 20 
This matter was referred to the ICJ by the UK. The ICJ stated: 21 
[T]he law evolved through the practice of States on the basis of the 
debates and near-agreements at the [1960] Conference. Two concepts 
have crystallised as customary law in recent years arising out of the 
general consensus revealed at that Conference. The first is the concept of 
the fishery zone, the area in which a State may claim exclusive fishery 
jurisdiction independently of its territorial sea; the extension of the fishery 
zone up to a 12-mile limit from the baselines appears now to be generally 
accepted. The Second is the concept of preferential rights of fishing in 
adjacent waters in favour of the coastal State in a situation of special 
dependence on its coastal fisheries. 
It is clear that the ICJ accepted as lawful the establishment of 12-mile exclusive 
fishing zones even where the territorial sea was less than 12 miles. It accepted, 
furthermore, that in the case of the "coastal State in a situation of special dependence 
on its coastal fisheries", the coastal state might enjoy preferential or prior rights in 
adjacent seas beyond the 12-miles. 22 In practice, this concept was widely accepted and 
the establishment of EEZs and exclusive fishery zones became popular in the 1970's. 23 
20 Fisheries Dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland, 14 July 
1971-19 May 1973. Cmnd. 5341, p. 9. 
21 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 15, para. 52. 
22 Jennings and Watts, supra note 1, p. 788. 
23 EEZ and EFZ claims of states are shown in the following table: 
1960's 1970's 1980's 1990's TOTAL 
EEZ - 49 32 15 96 
EFZ 1 19 - - 20 
See Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1994) pp. 246-247; and 
the latest update from R. Smith, see information at http: //nisp. ncl. ac. uk/lists. fj/int- 
boundaries/ 1996-02/0006. html. 
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Another development in the international law of the sea that gains clarification 
is the conservation and management of certain fish stocks. This is because states had 
acknowledged that marine resources, especially living resources, were considered 
inexhaustible. However, there is an incompatibility between traditional rights of free 
access, competitive fisheries, and a sensible utilisation of the fish stocks. Each 
individual fisherman is helpless to alter the course of the stocks and faces aggressive 
competition from other fishermen. His best strategy is to try to grasp his share as 
quickly as possible while the resource is still large enough to yield some profits. 
Naturally, this leads to reduced output and loss of economic benefits in ocean fisheries 
because the stocks being chased are over-exploited or even depleted by excessive 
fishing efforts engendered by economic competition. In other words, allowing for free 
access to the living resources of the sea has resulted in a well known phenomenon of 
economic inefficiency, over-capitalisation, over-exploitation and resource depletion. 24 
This results in the development of the concept of conserving and managing living 
resources in the EEZ as well as in the high seas. The following sections focus on the 
fishing rights in three different zones: territorial sea, the EEZ, and the high seas. 
24 Amason, "Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International 
Developments, " 17 Mar. Pol. (1993) pp. 334-335; Burke, The New International Law 
of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond (1994) pp. 2-3; Christy and Scott, The 
Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (1965); Knight, Managing the Sea's Living 
Resources (1977); McDougal and Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans (1962) pp. 
461-482,933-941. 
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2. FISHERIES IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA 
Coastal state jurisdiction is recognised to extend to all fisheries within one's national 
territory, embracing internal waters and the territorial sea. It is also universally agreed 
that a coastal state enjoys sovereignty over all living resources found within the limits 
of its state territory, including the territorial sea. Access to territorial sea resources by a 
foreign vessel requires authorisation by the coastal state. On the contrary, foreign 
vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, although this 
right can be lost "if they do not observe such laws and regulations as the coastal State 
may make and publish in order to prevent these vessels from fishing in the territorial 
sea. "25 This stipulation was further detailed in the LOSC. In Article 19(2), it reads: 
Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, 
good order or security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages 
in any of the following activities: 
(i) any fishing activities; 
However, because 'any fishing activities' is not clearly defined, it is up to the coastal 
states to define it at their own discretion. Therefore, a vessel whose fishing gear is not 
stowed could be treated as non-innocent. 
The question of the breadth of a state's territorial sea has long been an issue in 
international law of the sea. This issue was addressed at the UNCLOS I, but no 
agreement was reached. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
25 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 
Article 14(5). 
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Contiguous Zone was silent on the question. In this Convention, only Article 6 
stipulates that 
The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a 
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the 
territorial sea. 
In 1960, the UNCLOS II was convened with the aim of solving the outstanding 
issues of the outer limit of the territorial sea and the extent of fisheries jurisdiction. 26 
Although the proposal that a six-mile territorial sea plus a six-mile fishery zone 
measured from the same baseline was accepted widely during the UNCLOS II, this 
compromise formula failed to be approved by only one vote and the issue of the 
territorial sea breadth still remain unresolved. 27 In international practice, however 
more and more states have accepted the 12-nm territorial sea while publicly claiming 
so. Until 1960,24 states had claimed the 12-nm territorial sea. By 1 January 1980,80 
states had claimed 12 nm territorial sea, with this figure rising to 121 by 31 January 
1996.28 
The issue of the breadth of the territorial sea was resolved in the UNCLOS III. 
Article 3 of the LOSC reads: 
Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to 
a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines 
determined in accordance with this Convention. 
26 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13fL. 56,27 April 1958. 
- 27 Anand, supra note 1, pp. 185-190; Churchill and Lowe, supra note 7, p. 
13; Dean, supra note 9, pp. 751-789. 
28 Smith, Exclusive Economic Zone Claims (1986) pp. 730-731. Also the 
latest update from R. Smith, see supra note 23. 
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Therefore, a coastal state can enjoy sovereignty over all living resources within its 12 
nm territorial sea. 
3. FISHERIES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE 
Mentioning the development of the EEZ, US President Truman's two proclamations, 
'Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and 
Seabed of the Continental Shelf29 and 'Policy of the United States with Respect to 
Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas'30, are the keystones. They 
influenced and stimulated an international movement on extending maritime 
jurisdiction. The former proclamation asserted the US right to claim jurisdiction and 
control over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf 
adjacent to the US; the latter asserted the US authority to establish fishery conservation 
zones in the high seas adjacent to its coasts. It is noteworthy that both were aimed at 
acquiring control over the resources of the continental shelf, but not sovereignty over 
it. The US maintained a positive attitude towards the character of high seas and the 
freedom of navigation. This is completely different from the subsequent responses by 
many other states 31 Some countries, especially the Latin American states which were 
29 U. S. Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, reprinted in Lay, Churchill, and 
Nordquist, eds., supra note 13, pp. 106-107. 
30 U. S. Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, ibid., pp. 95-96. 
31 Selak, "Recent Development in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction under the 
Presidential Proclamation of 1945, " 44 AJIL (1950) pp. 647-657; Johnston, supra note 
1, pp. 232-233; Burke, supra note 24, p. 7. Cf. Supra note 13 and its accompanying 
text. 
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encouraged by the Truman Proclamations declared to extend their jurisdiction beyond 
their territorial seas unilaterally32 or multilaterally33, and requested to share the 
technology, capital, facilities, and benefits from developed countries 34 These trends 
ultimately culminated in the formation of the EEZ. As of January 1996,114 states 
claimed EEZ or EFZ. 35 
Except for the international practice, the ICJ also recognises the development 
of the EEZ. In Tunisia/Libya Case, 36 the ICJ referred to 
the concept of the exclusive economic zone ... may be regarded as part of 
modem international law. 
32 See Argentina, Decree No. 14708,11 October 1946; Chile, Presidential 
Declaration Concerning the Continental Shelf, 23 June 1947; El Salvador, 
Constitution of 1950,7 September 1950; Peru, Presidential Decree No. 781,1 August 
1947; Venezuela, Act on the Territorial Sea, the Continental Shelf, Protection of 
Fisheries and Air Space, 22 July 1956. For discussion, see Extavour, The Exclusive 
Economic Zone (1979) pp. 73-80; Garcia-Amador, "The Latin American Contribution 
to the Development of the Law of the Sea, " 68 AJIL (1974) pp. 33-50; Hollick, "The 
Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, " 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 494-500; Szekely, "A Study 
of the Contribution of the Latin American States to the Development of the 
International Law of the Sea Since 1945, " in idem, Latin American and the 
Development of the Law of the Sea, Part I (1986); Zacklin, ed., The Changing of the 
Sea: Western Hemisphere Perspectives (1974). 
33 E. g., Declaration of Santiago, 18 August 1952; Montevideo Declaration on 
the Law of the Sea, 8 May 1970; Lima Declaration of the Latin American States on the 
Law of the Sea, 8 August 1970; Report of the Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea of 
the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Colombo, 27 January 1971; 
Declaration of Santo Domingo, 9 June 1972; Conclusions in the General Report of the 
African States Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaounde, 30 June 1972; 
Organisation of African Unity Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, Addis 
Ababa, 24 May 1973. 
34 Anand, supra note 1, pp. 162-163; Attard, supra note 11, pp. 17-26. 
35 R. Smith's research result, supra note 23. 
36 Tunisia/Libya Case, para. 100. 
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Similarly, in Libya/Malta case, 37 the ICJ expressed that it was 
incontestable that ... the institution of the exclusive economic zone, with its rule on entitlement by reason of distance, is shown by the practice of 
States to have become a part of customary law. 
Hence, there is no doubt that the general concept of the EEZ has been accepted into the 
body of customary international law. 38 
Codification of the rights and duties associated with the EEZ is found in 
Articles 55 to 75 of the LOSC. Under the LOSC, the EEZ is defined as "an area beyond 
and adjacent to the territorial sea" whose maximum extent shall not exceed 200 nm. 39 
Within its EEZ, a coastal state enjoys, inter alia, the basic legal entitlement to all living 
resources located within its EEZ. 40 With regards to conservation of the living 
37 Libya/Malta Case, para. 34. Also Jan Mayen Case, para. 47. 
38 Cf. Bernhardt, "Custom and Treaty in the Law of the Sea, " 205 Hague 
Recueil (1987-V) pp. 293-298; Kwiatkowska, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone 
in the New Law of the Sea (1989) pp. 27-37. 
39 LOSC, Articles 55-57. 
40 LOSC, Article 56(1)(a) provides: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving 
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the 
waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and 
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and 
exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds; 
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention 
with regard to: 
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; 
(ii) marine scientific research; 
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
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resources, 41 
1. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living 
resources in its exclusive economic zone. 
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence 
available to it, shall ensure through proper conservation and management 
measures that the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive 
economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation ... 
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore 
populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the 
maximum sustainable yield ... 
Once the allowable catch has been determined, the coastal state is under 
obligation to promote the optimum utilisation of the living resources. 42 The coastal 
state may determine its own capacity to harvest resources within the EEZ. In the event 
that the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it 
must grant other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch. 43 
Another development during the evolution of EEZ is the exclusive fishery 
zone. Basically, the EFZ was created specifically for regulating fishery activities. The 
1958 Geneva Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas stipulates: 44 
A coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity 
of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial 
sea. 
41 LOSC, Article 61(1)-()). 
42 LOSC, Article 62. 
43 LOSC, Article 62(2). For the discussion about MSY, see Burke, supra 
note 24, pp. 45-55. 
44 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, Article 6(1). 
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Obviously, this would encourage the coastal state to extend its fishery jurisdiction over 
the area beyond its territorial sea. However, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
defines the high seas as "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or 
in the internal waters of a State. "45 It continues to provide that the freedom of fishing 
as included in the freedom of the high seas. 46 Therefore, it seems paradoxical that the 
creation of exclusive fishing zones is not compatible with what the Geneva 
Convention regulated. 47 
After the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 48 the extended fishing zone took its 
place in international practice. Nonetheless, the EFZ is different from the EEZ. In one 
way an EFZ claims less than the EEZ does, because it is confined to living resources of 
the water column. But in another way the EFZ might seem to claim more, for it does 
not per se import any treaty obligation to ensure the preservation or optimum 
utilisation of fishery resources, or indeed concern for the interests of other states or of 
the international community at large. 49 
The, discussion of fisheries in the EEZ illustrates that the concept of 200-mile 
EEZ had been a customary international law and a coastal state has sovereign rights to 
explore, exploit, conserve, and manage the natural resources within its EEZ. However, 
45 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 1. 
46 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 2. 
47 Jennings, "General Course on Principles of International Law, " 121 Hague 
Recueil (1967-II) pp. 380-382. 
48 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 15. 
49 Jennings and Watts, supra note 1, p. 804, §345. 
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this right is not unlimited. It is necessary to safeguard the rights and duties of other 
states. The coastal state, in exercising its rights and performing its duties, shall have 
due regard for the rights and duties of other states and shall act in a manner compatible 
with the provision of the LOSC. 50 
After examining fisheries in the territorial sea and the EEZ, we will focus on 
the right of freedom of fishing in the following section. 
4. FISHERIES IN THE HIGH SEAS 
Freedom of fishing is one of the important freedoms of the high seas. Nonetheless, 
fishing without restriction would result in the depletion of the sea's living resources. 
Thus, in the 1960 UNCLOS II, participants had noticed the importance of conserving 
living resources in the high seas. Preventing the depletion of fishery resources from 
over-exploitation forms the main spirit of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. The Convention includes two 
general restrictions51 on the high seas fishing, although it recognised that all states 
have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas. These 
restrictions are: 
50 LOSC, Article 56(2). As for the rights and duties of other states, see 
Article 58. 
51 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas, Article 1. 
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1. The interest and rights of the coastal state as provided for in the Convention. This 
means a coastal state has a special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the 
living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea. 52 
Furthermore, any coastal state may, with a view to the maintenance of the productivity 
of the living resources of the sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation 
appropriate to any stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas 
adjacent to its territorial sea. 53 
2. The provisions of the Convention concerning conservation of the living resources 
in the high seas. These provisions stipulate that any state which, even if its nationals 
are not engaged in fishing in an area of the high seas not adjacent to its coast, has a 
special interest in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas in that area, 
may request the state or states whose nationals are engaged in fishing there to take the 
necessary measures of conservation under Articles 3 and 4 respectively. 54 
The development of fishing rights from the high seas freedom of fishing to the 
recognition, of the 'special interest' of the coastal states is a first step on the way to 
general recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal state over fisheries 
beyond its territorial sea. 55 Nonetheless, this Convention has proved to be largely a 
dead letter. Although it entered into force in 1966, it achieved significantly fewer 
52 Ibid., Article 6(1). 
53 Ibid, Article 7(1). 
54 Ibid., Article 8(1). 
55 Extavour, supra note 32, p. 121. 
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ratifications (only 36 signature states ratified) than the other 1958 Geneva Conventions 
on the Law of the Sea. 56 It was thought to go too far beyond customary law and to have 
been made redundant by the work of regional and national fishery commissions in 
various parts of the world. 57 Moreover, distant water fishing states, such as Japan and 
the former USSR, chose not to become parties to the Convention on Fishing and 
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas. These fishing states opted to 
use the principle of freedom of the high seas to justify their continued exploitation of 
global fishery resources. 58 
The aforementioned developments of fisheries and other pressure of 
establishing an effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor 
beyond national jurisdiction59 urged the adoption of two UN General Assembly 
resolutions: Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor and the 
Subsoil thereof beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (Resolution 2749()=))60 
and Resolution 2750 (XXV) by which it was decided to convene a conference on the 
56 The Convention on the High Seas had 57 ratifications; the Convention on 
the Territorial Sea had 46 ratifications; and the Convention on the Continental Shelf 
had 54 ratifications. See Churchill and Lowe, supra note 7, Appendix I. 
57 Shearer, "High Seas: Drift Gillnets, Highly Migratory Species, and Marine 
Mammals, " in Kuribayashi and Miles, eds., The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A 
Frameworkfor Further International Cooperation (1992) p. 240. 
58 Jacobson, "International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, " 45 Louisiana LR 
(1985) p. 1173. 
59 Anand, supra note 1, pp. 195-197. 
60 GAOR, 25th Session, Supplement, A/8028,17 December 1970, p. 24. 
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law of the sea in 1973.61 The former, in endorsing the concept of the common heritage 
of mankind, emphasised the necessity to establish the precise outer limits of the 
national jurisdiction of coastal states over the seabed and subsoil of submarine area; 
the latter provides the necessary forum for the elaboration of a compromise containing 
the desirable accommodation of conflicting interests. 62 
After a long and detailed discussion, UNCLOS III produced the LOSC which 
maintains the principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas but subjects its 
enjoyment to certain respects in the interests of coastal states. Article 87 of the LOSC 
states: 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by 
the Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter 
alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:... 
(a) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2. 
Obviously, freedom of fishing is for all states, including coastal and land-locked states. 
There are some conditions, however, in enjoying this freedom, which are outlined in 
Section 2 of the LOSC. Section 2, Article 116 commences with a restatement of 
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas by providing that "All States have the right for their 
nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas ... ", but it immediately specifies that the 
enjoyment of this right is subject to the following conditions: 63 
61 Ibid., p. 25. 
62 Extavour, supra note 32, p. 174. 
63 LOSC, Article 116. Cf. infra notes 149-150 and the accompanying text. 
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(a) their treaty obligations; 
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided 
for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67; 64 and 
(c) the provisions of this section. 
This means that the high seas fishing states are obliged to recognise the interest 
of the coastal state as provided in Article 63(2) and thus accept the participation of 
coastal states in co-operative arrangements regarding transboundary and associated 
species between the EEZ of the coastal state and the adjacent high seas area. 65 
These conditions are counter to the traditional thinking concerning freedom of 
high seas fishing. In the traditional view of freedom of fishing, such freedom extends 
to all species and to all types of fishing gear. Nonetheless, this situation has 
fundamentally changed due to the extension of the territorial sea, the establishment of 
the EEZ, and the allocation of management competence over certain species. 
Therefore, two major restraints to the freedom of fishing on the high seas becomes 
apparent in recent years: the use of certain fishing gear and the fishing of certain fish 
species. 66 
64 Article 63(2) concerns stocks occurring within the EEZ of two or more 
coastal states or both within the EEZ and in an area beyond and adjacent to it; Article 
64 concerns highly migratory species; Article 65 concerns marine mammals; Article 
66 concerns anadromous stocks; and Article 67 is dealing with catadromous species. 
See Burke, "Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, " 14 ODIL (1984) 
pp. 273-314; Idem, "Anadromous Species and the New International Law of the Sea, " 
22 ODIL (1991) pp. 95-131. 
65 Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries 
Resources (1989) p. 55. 
66 Burke lists four restraints: particular fish species, marine mammals, the 
use of certain gear, and catch and effort levels. See Burke, supra note 24, p. 84. For the 
purpose of this research, the author confines them to fishing gear and fish species. 
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5. RESTRICTIONS TO THE FREEDOM OF FISHING 
ON THE HIGH SEAS 
5.1. ISSUE OF DRIFTNET FISHING 
Driftnet is a simple fishing method, and it is so simple that it may well have been 
developed . early and 
independently in different parts of the world. According to 
research, 'herring driftnet fishing was established around much of the North Sea by the 
11th and 12th centuries. This method was expanded in the 16th and 17th centuries by 
the Dutch, who. developed large industrial vessels for driftnetting on the high seas. 67 
The North Sea herring driftnet fishery expanded further during the 18th and 19th 
centuries, so that by 1908 it was estimated that more than half a million tonnes of 
herring were being taken annually by the driftnet fleets. In the autumn of 1913, there 
were over 1,700 drifters operating from just two English ports, each deploying around 
3 km of netting, 11 metres in depth, in the southern North Sea every night. 68 
As regards the modem driftnet fishing, it uses nylon monofilament nets 
allowing them to suspend vertically in the water to depths of approximately 30 feet, 
and forms a curtain which can be from 7 miles to 30 miles in width. Those nets drift 
independently, but are usually accompanied by a vessel which drifts with the nets 
attached to it. The fish, mostly free swimming pelagic species, such as herring, sardine, 
67 Northridge, Driftnet Fisheries and Their Impacts on Non-Target Species: 
A Worldwide Review, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 320 (1991) p. 2. 
68 Ibid. 
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anchovy, menhaden, mackerel, tuna, and salmon, swimming in shoals strike against 
the nets and are entangled by the gills in the meshes. 69 Because driftnetting is such a 
simple and fuel efficient way of fishing, it is widely accepted by many fishing nations 
in different fisheries. According to Northridge's report, 70 in Asia, Bangladesh, the 
PRC, Gulf states, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, 
and Thailand are using driftnets; in North and South America, Brazil, Chile, Peru, 
Trinidad, and the US are using this method; in Africa, Ghana, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria deploy driftnets; and in Europe, France, Greece, Greenland, Ireland, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK also use driftnets. 
However, no matter how great the advantages that driftnet has, in view of the 
conservation and preservation of natural resources as well as the protection of the 
marine environment, its role would probably have become negative because of its 
environmental impact. 71 The points that concern environmental protectionists in 
general and the South Pacific countries in particular are: 
69 Everhart and Youngs, Principles of Fishery Science, 2nd Edition (1981) p. 
43; Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/650,1 November 
1989, paras. 114-117. 
70 Northridge, supra note 67. 
71 Nonetheless, some scholars dispute this view. See Burke, Freeberg, and 
Miles, "United Nations Regulations on Driftnet Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent 
for High Seas and. Coastal Fisheries Management, " 25 ODIL (1994) pp. 127-186; 
Burke, supra note 24, pp. 272-274. 
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1. A threat to existing systems designed for the management and the conservation of 
those commercial species targeted by high seas driftnet vessels, e. g., tuna, salmon, and 
squid. The relative economic efficiency of driftnets when used to fish dispersed 
resources has also been taken to suggest that resource over-exploitation may occur. 
more easily. Thus it may be claimed that as a fish stock is depleted, if it becomes more 
dispersed, while catch rates of other gears fall off rapidly, driftnet catch rates may 
continue, at a level which is still economical, thereby enabling driftnet fisheries to 
deplete a species more quickly. 72 
2. With a low species selectivity, driftnet is easily characterised as a threat to wildlife 
or as the catch of non-target resources which is a waste of resources. Research 
confirms that the 41 million non-target species taken in conjunction with the Japanese 
1990 harvest of 106 million squid was a number that appeared prominently in nearly 
every condemnation of the driftnet fisheries. This non-target harvest consisted of 
approximately 39 million fish, 700,000 blue sharks, 270,000 seabirds, 141,000 
72 Northridge, supra note 67, p. 87; Sumi, "International Legal Issues 
concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special Emphasis on Japanese Practices and 
Responses, " in FAO, The Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas: Legal 
Issues, FAO Legislative Study, No. 47 (1991) p. 60. 
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salmon, 26,000 marine mammals, and 406 sea turtles. 73 
3. A threat to ecosystems caused by'ghost' nets that have been lost or discarded. Those 
nets may continue to entangle marine living resources, such as fish and marine 
mammals, at the surface or on the seabed for a period of time. This is especially serious. 
where large enough amounts of netting are being deployed, even a relatively small 
discard or loss rate may result in large amounts of lost netting, and concern has been 
expressed that such netting may continue to ensnare animals for some time, as the 
nylon is resistant to decay. According to estimates, more than 17 km of netting might 
be lost every night in the North Pacific, amounting to several thousand kilometres of 
netting per year. 74 
4. A threat to all vessels whose rudders, engines, or gear may become entangled and 
seriously damaged by lost or abandoned driftnets, because the non-biodegradable 
73 Sumi, ibid, p. 58; Burke, Freeberg, and Miles, supra note 71, pp. 144-145; 
Carr and Gianni, High Seas Ecosystems, Large-Scale Driftnets and the Law of the Sea 
(1991); Northridge, supra note 67, p. 2; Mizukami, "Fisheries Problems in the South 
Pacific Region, " 15 Mar. Pol. (1991) p. 118; South Pacific Commission, Report of the 
Third South Pacific Albacore Research Workshop, Noumea, New Caledonia, 9-12 
October 1990; Wright and Doulman, "Drift-net Fishing in the South Pacific: From 
Controversy to Management, " 15 Mar. Pol. (1991) p. 313-314; "High Seas Drifting 
Nets Raise Fears for an Ocean's Fish, " The New York Times (21 March 1989) pp. C6- 
7; "Strip-mining the South Seas, " Time (19 March 1990) pp. 42-43. 
74 Eisenbud, "The Pelagic Driftnet, " 27(4) Oceanus (1985), p. 76; FAO, 
Report of the Expert Consultation on Large-Scale Driftnet Fishing, FAO Fisheries 
Report, No. 434 (1990) p. 9; Sumi, ibid., p. 66; Northridge, ibid., p. 98. 
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nature of the nets, those lost or abandoned nets become a form of marine pollution in 
their own sight. 75 
The following discussion will deal with the actions taken by the South and 
North Pacific Ocean countries and the UN against driftnet fishing. 
A. ACTIONS FROM SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN STATES 
The South Pacific island states are spread over an enormous sea area but with minute 
land area. There are about 7,500 islands which at present form twenty-three political 
entities. 76 The total land area is only 550,044 km2, but in terms of the EEZ area for all 
island states here, the total EEZ area is 30,428,000 km2. With such a huge area which is 
full of abundant living and non-living resources, the establishment and expansion of 
jurisdiction over this vast sea area becomes an important task for them. In addition, 
with abundant fishery resources, especially tuna, the development of the fishing 
industry plays an important role in their individual economies. 77 
75 Jacobson, "Future Fishing Technology and Its Impact on the Law of the 
Sea" in Christy, et al., eds., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond (1975) p. 237; Joyner 
and Frew, "Plastic Pollution in the Marine Environment, " ODIL (1991) p. 33; 
Johnston, "The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal Considerations and 
Diplomatic Options, " 21 ODIL (1990) pp. 9-10; Walls, "Oceans Apart over Tuna, " 
FEER (6 April 1989) p. 89. 
76 Buchholz, "Development Tasks of Peculiar States: The Small Island 
Countries of the South Pacific, " in Idem, ed., New Approaches to Development Co- 
operation with South Pacific Countries (1987) pp. 21-22. 
77 For the fishing industry of the South Pacific island states, see Doulman, 
"An Overview of the Tuna Fishery and Industry in the Pacific Islands Region, " in 
Buchholz, ed., ibid., pp. 149-161. 
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The large-mesh driftnet fishery was initiated as a result of Japanese exploratory 
driftnet fishing for slender tuna between 1982 and 1987.78 Starting with about 10 to 20 
Japanese vessels operating between 1983 and 1988,64 Japanese vessels participated in 
this fishery in the 198 8/89 season. 79 Then Taiwanese driftnet vessels entered the South 
Pacific Ocean in December 1987 while there were only 7 Taiwanese drifters operating 
in this region. 80 Attracted by an abundant harvest, about 60 to 130 Taiwanese drifters 
operated in the South Pacific in the 1988/89 fishing season. 81 As far as the catch size is 
concerned, a total surface fishery catch of 33,559 tons of albacore was estimated for 
the 1989/89 season. 82 Of this, 73% (or 24,447 tons) was estimated to have been 
harvested by driftnet fishing. The fast increasing efforts and production of driftnet 
fishing aroused great concern from the South Pacific states. They enacted their own 
legislation to prohibit the practice of driftnet fishing. 
(A) INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS 
In 1979, Australia had prohibited any fishing by'trammel net, tangle net or gill net' off 
the coasts of New South Wales and Tasmania. 83 In 1986, driftnets were further 
78 South Pacific Commission, Report of the Second South Pacific Albacore 
Research Workshop, Suva, Fiji, 14-16 June 1989, p. 3. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., pp. 4,10. 
81 South Pacific Commission, supra note 73, pp. 31-32. 
82 Ibid, p. 31. 
83 Fisheries Notice No. 88 (19 July 1979) and No. 113 (4 August 1983). 
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prohibited in northern Australian waters in the area from Broome to Cape York. 84 On 
20 July 1989, the Australian Prime Minister announced the prohibition of the use of 
driftnets longer than 2.5 km in the entire Australian Fishing Zone and their carriage 
through the zone unless appropriately stowed. 85 Besides, on 19 July 1991, Australia 
passed legislation prohibiting any combination of driftnets exceeding a total length of 
2.5 km. 86 
The Cook Islands moved to prohibit driftnet fishing with its Marine Resources 
Act 1989.87 According to the Act, driftnet fishing activities are defined as "fishing 
with the use of a driftnet and any related activities including transporting, transhipping, 
and processing any driftnet catch, and provision of food, fuel, and other supplies for 
vessels used or outfitted for driftnet fishing. "88 "No fishing vessel is to be used for or 
assist in any driftnet fishing activities in the Cook Islands or Cook Islands fishery 
waters and no fishing vessels registered in the Cook Islands is to be used for or may 
assist in driftnet fishing activities. "89 Finally, the Minister responsible for issuing 
foreign fishing licenses may deny an application for a license to any fishing vessel 
which has engaged in any driftnet fishing activities. 90 
84 Fisheries Notice No. 182 (2 December 1986). 
85 Fisheries Notice No. AFZ 1 (20 July 1989). 
86 Australian Fisheries Management Act of 1991. 
87 Marine Resources Act, No. 33 (1989). 
88 Ibid., Section 2. 
89 Ibid., Section 15. 
90 Ibid., Section 16. 
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New Zealand enacted the Driftnet Prohibition Act in 1991.91 Under this Act, 
New Zealand nationals and vessels are prohibited from engaging in driftnet fishing 
within the Wellington Convention Area92 and any vessel or person is prohibited from 
driftnet fishing within New Zealand's fishery waters. 93 
(B) COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
In addition to the individual states' legislations against driftnet fishing these states also 
took collective actions. On 11 July 1989, the member states of the South Pacific Forum 
Fisheries Agency (hereinafter cited as FFA)94 convened at Tarawa, Kiribati, and 
proclaimed the Tarawa Declaration. 95 In the Tarawa Declaration, the member states96 
91 Driftnet Prohibition Act, 1991 NZ Stat. No. 18 (1991). 
92 For Wellington Convention Area, see infra notes 101-102, and the 
accompanying text. 
93 Supra note 91, Sections 4 and 5. Also see Davidson, "New Zealand: 
Driftnet Prohibition Act 1991, " 6 IJECL (1991) pp. 264-271. Text is reproduced in 31 
ILM (1992) p. 214. 
9' 'The FFA was established under a convention signed by 12 South Pacific 
Forum member states. The convention reflects the common concern of member states 
on -matters of conservation, optimum use and coastal states' sovereign rights over the 
region's living marine resources. Its governing body is the Forum Fisheries Committee 
(FFC) which decides the FFA's annual budget and work programmes. The member 
States of the FFA are as follows: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. About 
FFA, see generally Swan, "Highly Migratory Species: The South Pacific Forum 
Fishing Agency, " in Soons, ed., Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention 
through International Institutions (1990) pp. 318-343. 




recognising the crucial dependence of the Pacific Island peoples on 
marine resources; 
profoundly concerned at the damage now being done by pelagic drift net 
fishing to the economy and environment of the South Pacific region; 
determines ... to convene an urgent meeting of regional diplomatic, legal 
and fisheries experts to develop a Convention to give effect to its common 
resolve to create a zone free of drift net fishing; 
commends the Republic of Korea for its decision to cease drift net fishing 
in the region; 
calls on Japan and Taiwan to follow this example, and abandon 
immediately their damaging drift net operations. 
In October 1989, a Resolution concerning Pelagic Driftnet Fishing in the South 
Pacific Commission Area97 was adopted at the 29th South Pacific Conference in 
Guam-98 The Resolution called for "an immediate ban on the practice of pelagic 
drift-gillnet fishing in the region to prevent severely adverse, perhaps irremediable, 
effects on South Pacific Commission region fisheries. "99 
97 Members of the South Pacific Commission include: Australia, Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, New Caledonia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands Tonga, Tuvalu, UK, USA, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna, and 
Western Samoa. Its governing body is the South Pacific Conference, consisting of 
representatives from member governments and administrations. Wright and Doulman, 
supra note 73, p. 317,69n. 
98 Resolution concerning Pelagic Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific 
Commission Area (Guam Resolution) was reprinted in Wright and Doulman, supra 
note 73, pp. 329-330. Members of the South Pacific Commission are Australia, Cook 
Islands, Federated State of Micronesia, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, New Caledonia, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, UK, USA, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna, and 
Western Samoa. 
99 Guam Resolution, ibid., Article 4. 
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Four months after the Tarawa Declaration, a meeting was held in Wellington, 
New Zealand, on 23 November 1989. Member states of the FFA adopted the 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific 
(also known as Wellington Convention) and two Protocols. 100 
The Wellington Convention has several significant points which demonstrate 
the will of these South Pacific Ocean island states. First, the'Convention Area' shall be 
"the area. lying within 10 degrees North latitude and 50 degrees South latitude and 130 
degrees East longitude and 120 degrees West longitude, and shall also include all 
waters under the fisheries jurisdiction of any party to this Convention. "101 This Area 
actually covers a massive maritime area including high seas and waters under the 
fisheries jurisdiction of the parties. 102 
Secondly, 'driftnet' is defined as "a gillnet or other net or a combination of nets 
which is more than 2.5 kilometres in length the purpose of which is to enmesh, entrap 
100 'Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South 
Pacific (Wellington Convention), text reprinted in 291LM(1990) p. 1449; Final Act to 
the Wellington Convention, text reprinted in 29 ILM(1990) p. 1453; Protocol 1 to the 
Wellington Convention reprinted in. 29 ILM (1990) p. 1462; Protocol 2 to the 
Wellington Convention reprinted in 29 ILM (1990) p. 1463. Signatories to the 
Wellington Convention are: Australia, Cook Islands, France, Kiribati, Federated States 
of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Solomon Islands, 
Tokelau, Tuvalu, the US, and Vanuatu. The US also signed Protocol 1. Canada and 
Chile signed Protocol 2. The Wellington Convention entered into force on 17 May 
1991,19 LOS Bulletin (October 1991) p. 41. 
101 Wellington Convention, Article 1(a)(i). 
102 About the justification of the 'Convention Area', see Hewison, "The 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, " 25 
Case W. Res. J. Intl L. (1993) pp. 465-470. 
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or entangle fish by drifting on the surface of or in the water. "103 This became a 
standard definition of driftnet and started a trend in state practice. 104 
Thirdly, the driftnet fishing activities are defined as the actual or attempted 
catching, taking, or harvesting of fish with the use of a driftnet and in addition any 
support operations, including searching for or locating fish (including operations of 
placing, searching for, or recovering fish aggregating devices or associated electronic 
equipment such as radio beacons), transporting, trans-shipping, or processing any 
catch, or supplying provisions to driftnet fishing vessels (including the use of aircraft 
for this purpose). 105 Parties agreed to undertake to 'prohibit its nationals and vessels 
documented under its laws from engaging in driftnet fishing activities with the 
Convention Area. '106 Parties also agreed to take measures consistent with international 
law to restrict driftnet fishing activities, this includes prohibition in areas under their 
jurisdiction of the use of driftnets, the transhipment, landing and processing of driftnet 
catches, and the possession of driftnets on fishing vessels. Besides, parties restrict port 
access and port servicing facilities for driftnet fishing vessels. 107 
A regional consensus to ban driftnetting had gained momentum in this region. 
In terms of unilateral legislation, South Pacific Ocean states enact laws on banning 
103 Wellington Convention, Article 1(b). 
104 Law of the Sea, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/650, I 
November 1989, p. 5, para. 10. 
105 Wellington Convention, Article 1(c). 
106 ]bid., Article 2. 
107 Ibid., Article 3. 
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driftnet fisheries. As for collective actions, the South Pacific Ocean states together 
adopted a declaration and a convention to prohibit driftnet fishing. Obviously, a legal 
web of prohibiting driftnet fishery was formed in the South Pacific Ocean region. Not 
only for this, the actions from the states in the South Pacific Ocean also produced 
pressure in the international forum, the UN, on banning driftnetting. We shall look at 
this later. 
B. ACTION FROM NORTH PACIFIC OCEAN STATES 
As to the North Pacific, driftnet is one of the oldest forms of industrial capture for 
salmon, dating from the beginning of the commercial era in the mid-19th century. 108 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan had driftnet fishing vessels operating in this 
region. '09 
As far as distant water fishing is concerned, Taiwan has employed two fishing 
methods in this area. Firstly, it is the squid driftnet fisheries. Driftnet for squid was 
108 Cooley, Politics and Conservation: The Decline of the Alaska Salmon 
(1963) p. 43. Cited from Johnston, supra note 75, p. 6. Cf. Suzuki, "Description of 
Japanese Pelagic Driftnet Fisheries and Related Information, " in FAO, Report of the 
Export of the Expert Consultation on Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing, FAO 
Fishery Report, No. 434 (1990) p. 37; Northridge, supra note 67, p. 6. 
109 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 104; also Report of the 
Secretary-General, Large-Scale Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on Living Marine 
Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, UN Doc. A/46/615,8 November 1991; 
FAO Legislative Study, No. 47 (1991), The Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High 
Seas: Legal Issues. 
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initiated by Japanese vessels in the autumn of 1978 in northwest Pacific waters. 110 The 
Taiwanese fishing industry adopted this method and began operations in 1980 
increasing from 12 vessels in 1980 to 166 in 1988.111 Secondly, large mesh driftnet 
fishery was involved in the driftnet fishing in the north Pacific. The origin of this 
fishery has been traced to a coastal driftnet fishery which began off the Pacific coast of 
Japan in the 1840's, targeting bluefm tuna. This method once disappeared in 1940 
because of the decline of the bluefin tuna stock. After the Second World War, driftnet 
fishery was revived and continued to operate largely in coastal Japanese waters until 
the 1970's. During the 1970's, the fishery expanded from Japanese Pacific coastal 
waters to Japan's other coastal waters, and to offshore areas including the South China 
Sea and Yellow Sea. The range of target species was also expanded to include marlin, 
skipjack, and other tunas. In the late 1970's and the early 1980's, the fishery expanded 
further east in the Pacific and onto albacore stocks. 112 Details about Taiwanese vessels 
participating in this fishery is unknown. Nonetheless, it is reported that Taiwan started 
this fishery during the 1980's with 128 Taiwanese vessels operating in the Pacific. 113 
110 Fisheries Agency of Japan, Squid Drift Gillnet Fishery, Document 
submitted to the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (1982), cited from 
Northridge, supra note 67, p. 29. 
111 Northridge, ibid., pp. 31,33. 
112 Northridge, ibid., p. 46; also Fisheries Agency of Japan, Marlin and 
Others Drift Gillnet Fishery, Document submitted to the International North Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (1982). 
113 Northridge, ibid. 
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The premier forum for international discussion of the high seas driftnet 
problem in the North Pacific is the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(INPFC), which was established by Canada, Japan, and the US pursuant to the 
International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean of 
1952.114 The INPFC was mainly designed to regulate the Japanese salmon fishery on 
the high seas of the North Pacific, because Japan had begun intensive fishing activities 
in the region since 1930's and had developed new technologies, such as floating 
canneries, in salmon fishing. 115 In addition, Japan had developed its high seas driftnet 
fishery for salmon since 1952, which present a serious menace to Canadian and 
American fishing industries which consider the Pacific salmon stocks a valuable fish 
resource. 116 During the process of the UNCLOS III, a consensus arose that the states in 
whose rivers anadromous stocks originate have the primary interest in and 
responsibility for such stocks. 117 This caused the INPFC to restructure itself in 1978 
114 205 UNTS 80; Koers, International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A 
Study of Regional Fisheries Organizations (1973) pp. 97-100. 
115 Johnston, supra note 1, pp. 273-274; Jessup, "The Pacific Coast 
Fisheries, " 33 AJIL (1939) p. 129; Bingham, "The Continental Shelf and the Marginal 
Belt, " 40 AJIL (1946) p. 175. 
116 Copes, "The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish 
Stocks, " 4 ODIL (1977) p. 237; Cooley, supra note 108. 
117 This principle is provided in the 1982 LOSC, Article 66(1). For the 
discussion in the UNCLOS, see Nordquist, et al., eds., United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. II (1993) pp. 667-679. For the 
discussion on anadromous stocks, see Hey, supra note 65, pp. 63-66; Islam, "The 
Proposed 'Driftnet-Free Zone' in the South Pacific and the Law of the Sea 
Convention, " 40 ICLO (1991) pp. 186-188; Mirovitskaya and Haney, "Fisheries 
Exploitation as a Threat to Environmental Security: The North Pacific Ocean, " 16 
Mar. Pol. (1992) p. 253. 
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and a displacement of Japanese vessels which withdrew them from the US fishery zone 
and certain high seas areas of the Bering Sea. 118 Originally, driftnet fishing was 
confined to Japanese vessels in the high seas areas of the North Pacific designated by 
the INPFC, but this fishery has expanded in scale and location, especially after the 
participation of two important distant water fishing states, Taiwan and South 
Korea. 119 Neither of them are member states of the INPFC, so were not restricted by 
the Commission. Obviously, there is no appropriately broad-based, regulatory 
instrument for driftnet fishery in this area. 
Although driftnet fishing concerns high seas fishing, from the view point of 
Canada and the US, they are convinced that driftnets would produce an adverse impact 
on the stocks migrating in their EEZs. To prevent any negative impact, Canada and the 
US took action. Canada banned high-seas-type driftnet within the limits of its 200 nm 
EEZ. 120 The US adopted a legislative and judicial avenue to enforce relevant 
regulations: 
118 Protocol amending the International Convention for the High Seas 
Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, Annex, Article 1,30 United States Treaties and 
Other International Acts Series 9242; also Hey, ibid., pp. 271-274. 
119 Johnston, supra note 75, p. 12. 
120 Johnston, ibid., p. 13. 
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(1) The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.121 The 
Magnuson Act was designed to preserve US marine resources for US fishermen. 
Through the Magnuson Act, the US government assumed complete jurisdiction in 
managing the marine resources within its 200-mile coastal zone and the anadromous 
species spawned from its rivers. 
(2) The Fishermen's Protection Act of 1967.122 The US executive branch is required to 
negotiate agreements with states that use high seas pelagic driftnets for the purpose of 
producing information about the impact of such fishing upon US marine resources, 
which are considered by the US to include fish that migrate beyond its 200-mile EEZ 
to the high seas. If these negotiations do not produce agreements with the designated 
nations by a certain date, the US President may place an embargo on fish and fish 
products from the nation concerned. 123 
(3) The Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987 (the 
121 16 U. S. C. 1801-1882 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). For Magnuson Act, see 
Aikman, "Island Nations of the South Pacific and Jurisdiction over Highly Migratory 
Species, " 17 VUWLR (1987) pp. 101-124; Finch, "Fishery Management under the 
Magnuson Act, " 9 Mar. Pol. (1985) pp. 170-179; Turgeon, "Fishery Regulation: Its 
Use under the Magnuson Act and Reaganomics, " 9 Mar. Pol. (1985) pp. 126-133; 
Miller, Hooker, and Fricke, "Impression of Ocean Fisheries Management under the 
Magnuson Act, " 21 ODIL (1990) pp. 263-287. 
122 22 U. S. C. 1971-1980 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
123 Burke, supra note 24, p. 129. 
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Driftnet Act). 124 Under the Driftnet Act, it identified driftnetting as the key culprit in 
depleting the US marine resources, in particular, the salmon stock. The Driftnet Act 
requires the Secretary of Commerce, through the Secretary of State and in consultation 
with the Secretary of Interior to initiate 
negotiations with each foreign government that conducts, or authorizes its 
nationals to conduct, driftnet fishing that results in the taking of marine 
resources of the United States in waters of the North Pacific Ocean outside 
of the exclusive economic zone and territorial sea of any nation, for the 
purpose of entering into agreements for statistically reliable co-operative 
monitoring and assessment of the numbers of marine resources of the 
United States killed and retrieved, discarded, or lost by the foreign 
government's driftnet fishing vessels. 125 
Furthermore, the Secretary of State is required to initiate negotiations with 
foreign high seas driftnet fishing nations in order to enter into agreements "for 
effective enforcement of laws, regulations, and agreements applicable to the location, 
season, and other aspects of the operations" of the foreign driftnet fishing vessels. 126 If 
a foreign government failed to enter into and implement an agreement under the 
sections mentioned above, the Secretary of Commerce must certify such facts to the 
124 The Driftnet Impact Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987, 
Public Law No. 100-200,16 U. S. C. 1822 (Supp. V 1987). 
125 Driftnet Act, Section 4004(a). 
126 Driftnet Act, Section 4006(a). 
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President, who has the authority under Section 8(a) of the Fishermen's Protective Act 
of 1967, to decide whether to place an embargo on products from that nation. 127 
C. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS ON 
DRIFTNET FISHING 
Under the, influence of the US and the South Pacific Ocean states, two important 
resolutions were adopted by the UN General Assembly. In November 1989, the US 
tabled a resolution in the Second Committee of the UN General Assembly, calling for a 
complete ban on drifinet fishing in the South Pacific Ocean. 128 At the same time, 
Japan also tabled another resolution on driftnet fishing, calling for conclusive 
scientific evidence to be produced prior to the consideration of the driftnet ban and 
urging co-operation among states concerned with respect to regulation and monitoring 
to mitigate adverse effects. 129 
127 Song, "United States Ocean Policy: High Seas Driftnet Fisheries in the 
North Pacific Ocean, " 11 CYILA (1991-92) pp. 107-108. Another similar act, Marine 
Mammal Protection Act, also stipulates mandatory trade sanctions provisions. With 
this act, the US imposed trade restrictions on tuna imports from Mexico. However, a 
GATT dispute settlement panel ruled that the U. S. embargo on imports of Mexican 
yellowfin tuna constituted a trade barrier. See "Dispute Settlement Panel Report on 
United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, " 30 ILM (1991) p. 1594. Cf. 
Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark (Danish Bottles 
Case) [1988] E. C. R., p. 4607. 
128 UN Doc. A/C. 2/44/L. 30, Rev. 1,1989. It was cosponsored by Australia, 
Bahamas, Canada, Fiji, Mauritania, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, 
Solomon Islands, Sweden, Vanuatu, and Zaire. 
129 UN Doc. A/C. 2/44/L. 28,1989. 
43 
After debate in the General Assembly, on 22 December 1989, the Second 
Commission of the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus Resolution 44/225130 
which calls on all members of the international community to implement 
(A) Moratoria on all large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing on the high seas 
by 30 June 1992, with the understanding that such a measure will not 
be imposed in a region or, if implemented, can be lifted should 
effective conservation and management measures be taken based 
upon statistically sound analysis to be jointly made by concerned 
parties of the international community with an interest in the fishery 
resources of the region, to prevent unacceptable impacts of such 
fishing practices on that region and to ensure the conservation of the 
living marine resources of that region; 
(B) Immediate action to reduce progressively large-scale pelagic driftnet 
fishing activities in the South Pacific region leading to the cessation 
of such activities by 1 July 1991, as an interim measure, until 
appropriate conservation and management arrangements for South 
Pacific albacore tuna resources are entered into by the parties 
concerned; 
(C) Further expansion of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing on the high 
seas of the North Pacific and all the other high seas outside the Pacific 
Ocean should cease immediately, with the understanding that this 
measure will be reviewed subject to the conditions in paragraph 4 (a) 
of the present resolution. 
Resolution 44/225 is a compromise between US and Japanese sponsored 
groups. In the Japanese view, the impact of this resolution is rather weak because 
Japan has more fishing interests in the North Pacific than in the South Pacific and such 
interest was secured. 131 Nonetheless, for the South Pacific states and territories, they 
are not satisfied with the result of this resolution, because they wanted an immediate 
130 UN Doc. A/C. 2/44/L. 81,22 December 1989. 
131 Burke, Freeberg, and Miles, supra note 71, p. 142. 
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termination of driftnet fishing in the region as expressed in the Tarawa Declaration and 
the Guam Resolution. 132 
Another resolution (46/215) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 
December 1991,133 in which a definite date was set to terminate the driftnet fisheries:. 
3. Calls upon all members of the international community to ... [take] the following actions: 
(a) Beginning on 1 January 1992, reduce fishing effort in existing 
large-scale pelagic high seas drift-net fisheries by, inter alia, 
reducing the number of vessels involved, the length of the nets and 
the area of operation, so as to achieve, by 30 June 1992, a 50 per 
cent reduction in fishing effort; 
(b) Continue to ensure that the areas of operation of large-scale 
pelagic high seas drift-net fishing are not expanded and, beginning. 
on 1 January 1992, are further reduced in accordance with 
paragraph 3 (a) of the present resolution; 
(c) Ensure that a global moratorium on all large-scale pelagic drift-net 
fishing is fully implemented on the high seas of the world's oceans 
and seas, including enclosed seas and semi-enclosed seas, by 31 
December 1992. [brackets added] 
UN resolutions are only recommendations to its members, as the ICJ states in 
the Voting Procedure Case, 134 
[I]t is in the nature of recommendations that, although on proper occasions 
they provide a legal authorisation for Members determined to act upon 
them individually or collectively, they do not create a legal obligation to 
comply with them. [brackets added] 
132 Wright and Doulman, supra note 73, p. 319. For Tarawa Declaration, see 
supra note 95; for Guam Resolution, see supra note 98. 
133 United Nations General Assembly Resolution on Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans 
and Seas, reproduced in 31 ILM(1992) p. 241. 
134 Voting Procedure Case, 1. C. J. Reports 1955, p. 115. About the effect of 
the UN resolutions, see Sloan, "General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years 
After), " 58 BYIL (1987) pp. 39-150. 
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However, Preamble paragraph 8 of the Resolution 44/225 asserts that all members of 
the world community have a duty to co-operate in the conservation and management of 
the living resources of the high seas, and a duty to take, or to co-operate with others in 
taking, such measures for their nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of 
the living resources of the high seas. 135 Moreover, the acceptance of the two 
resolutions by high seas fishing states also provides strong confirmation that 
conservation measures on the high seas are considered as least formally obligatory. 136 
D. REMARKS 
The development and the diminishment of the driftnet fisheries is a good example for 
the recent development of the Law of the Sea. Owing to the fishing technology and 
capital, driftnetting became an economical and beneficial high seas fishing method in 
the 1980's. Environmental protection led, however, to driftnetting being nicknamed 
'Wall of Death' and banned in the early 1990's. The whole procedure illustrates the 
freedom of fishing on the high seas is not unrestricted, distant water fishing states who 
enjoy this freedom have to pay due regard to the rights and interests of the coastal 
states. Otherwise, the depletion of stocks in the high seas could impact the adjacent 
EEZs and the coastal states which claim such zones. This would lead to another issue, 
the straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, which we will discuss in the following 
section. 
135 Supra note 130. 
136 Burke, supra note 24, p. 103. 
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5.2. ISSUE OF STRADDLING AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS 
According to the stipulation in the LOSC, straddling stocks are defined as stocks of 
associated species occurring both within the EEZ and in an area beyond and adjacent to 
it. 137 As for highly migratory species, there is no operational definition on such species 
but a list of seventeen highly migratory species is provided in Annex I to the LOSC. 
Nonetheless, some species can be treated as either straddling or highly migratory 
species, depending upon the view point. 138 
The issue of straddling stocks and highly migratory species focuses on the 
conservation of living resources in the high seas area, which involves conflicting 
interests of the coastal states and the high seas fishing states. The coastal state's interest 
in a straddling stock differs from that of a state exercising the high seas freedom of 
fishing in the area. The interest of the latter may be primarily in the exploitation of the 
resource on the high seas. This may be a short-term or a long-term interest depending 
on the structure of that state's fishing fleet and the extent of the straddling stock 
available for exploitation. By contrast, the coastal state, whether or not it is interested 
in the high seas exploitation of the straddling stock, will always have an interest in the 
long-term viability of the stock. This may result from its interest in the exploitation of 
the stock by its nationals or others within 200 miles, or from its specific 
responsibilities under the LOSC in respect of the conservation and management of that 
137 LOSC, Article 63(2). 
138 Such as the conflicts between the US and Mexico and several central 
American states, see infra note 144 and its accompanying text. Also see FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper, No. 337 (1994) pp. 4-8. 
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stock. 139 Therefore, the underlying issue is coastal state's interest in the fisheries 
beyond the EEZ and in stocks which are inseparable from such zone in terms of 
management and conservation. 140 
The straddling and highly migratory fish stocks issues have become pressing. 
issues that attracted international attention since the late 1980's. These matters affect 
the interests of various coastal states in different maritime areas. In the case of the 
Northwest Atlantic, 141 the catch of cod and other species on the Grand Banks by some 
distant water fishing states, mainly from the EU, 142 beyond Canadian 200-mile fishing 
139 UN, The Regime for High-Seas Fisheries, Status and Prospects (1992) p. 
30, para. 98. 
140 Burke, supra note 24, p. 84; Vicuna, "Towards an Effective Management 
of High Seas Fisheries and the Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea: 
The View of Developing Countries Ten Years after the Signature of the Law of the Sea 
Convention, " in Miles and Treves, eds., The Law of the Sea: New Worlds, New 
Discoveries (1993) p. 415. 
141 Applebaum, "The Straddling Stocks Problem: The Northwest Atlantic 
Situation, International Law, and Options for Coastal State Action, " in Soons, ed., 
supra note 94, pp. 282-317; Burke, supra note 24, p. 85; FAO Fisheries Technical 
Paper, No. 337 (1994) pp. 54-59; Miles and Burke, "Pressures on the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The 
Problem of Straddling Stocks, " in Clingan and Kolodkin, eds., Moscow Symposium on 
the Law of the Sea (1991) pp. 218-220. 
142 Meltzer, "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks: The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, " 25 ODIL (1994) pp. 
297-305. On 9 March 1995, Canada arrested a Spanish trawler fishing for Greenland 
halibut off the Grand Banks. This incident caused conflict between Canada and the 
EU. See The Times (11 March 1995) p. 11 and (17 April 1995) pp. 1,7. On 28 March 
1995, Spain submitted this case to the ICJ. See ICJ Communique, No. 95/9,29 March 
1995. However, the EU and Canada reached an Agreement on Fisheries (Greenland 
halibut) 16 April 1995. See 28 LOS Bulletin (1995) p. 34. 
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zone has interfered with Canadian conservation and management measures for the 
same stocks within its fishing zone. 
In the high seas area of the central Bering Sea, the catch of pollack has 
allegedly reduced the abundance of such species in the adjacent EEZs of the US and 
Russia and is inconsistent with conservation measures established on the same stock 
within these adjacent zones. 143 
In the East Central Pacific region, the issue concerns the access to tuna between 
the US and some Central American states. On the one hand, the US maintains that the 
coastal states may not manage tuna within their EEZs, because tuna falls into a class of 
highly migratory species. From this view point, effective conservation is not possible 
except within the context of a regional organisation that includes both coastal and 
distant water fishing states. Moreover, the coastal states may not manage tuna within 
their EEZs except pursuant to and in conformity with decisions adopted by the 
appropriate regional organisation. On the other hand, Mexico and other Central 
American states reject this view and insist on the right to manage all highly migratory 
species, including tuna, within their EEZs. Furthermore, Mexico sees the tuna conflict 
143 Burke, supra note 24, p. 84; Idem, "Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut: 
Straddling Stocks and the New International Law of Fisheries, " 16 Ecology Law 
Quarterly (1989) pp. 285-310; Canfield, "Recent Developments in Bering Sea 
Fisheries Conservation and Management, " 24 ODIL (1993) pp. 257-289; Meltzer, 
ibid., pp. 283-290; Miles and Burke, supra note 141, pp. 226-228; Miovski, "Solutions 
in the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Problem of Overfishing in the Central 
Bering Sea: Analysis of the Convention Highlighting the Provisions Concerning 
Fisheries and Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, " 26 SDLR (1989) p. 537. 
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with the US as a straddling stock problem. For this reason, the major controversy 
centres on the allocation of the benefits of fishing, rather than conservation alone. 144 
In the area off Chilean and Peruvian coasts, Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus 
murphyi) is the main target of Russia and some Eastern European countries. The 
Chileans suspect that the fishery conducted beyond 200 miles by foreign fishing fleets 
may be of larger adult fish, whereas the fishery within 200 miles may be of younger 
fish of the same stock. Such a situation would cause depletion of this stock. 145 
In other areas, Argentina is addressing the issue of harvesting of the southern 
blue whiting and poutassou stocks on the Patagonian shelf, 146 while New Zealand 
concerns itself with the harvest of the orange roughy stock from off the west coast of 
the South Island of New Zealand. 147 
A. THE LOSC REGIME ON HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 
Article 87 of the LOSC sets out the traditional principle of freedom of fishing on the 
high seas, embodied in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and well 
144 Meltzer, ibid., pp. 313-315; Miles and Burke, ibid., pp. 220-223; Burke, 
"Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, " 14 ODIL (1984) pp. 273-314. 
145 Miles and Burke, ibid, p. 224; Dalton, "The Chilean Mar Presencial: A 
Harmless Concept or a Dangerous Precedent, " 8(3) Marine and Coastal Law (1993) 
pp. 399-403; Joyner and De Cola, "Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: Implications for 
Straddling Stocks and the International Law of Fisheries, " 24 ODIL (1993) pp. 99-121. 
146 Meltzer, supra note 142, pp. 273-274; Miles and Burke, ibid., pp. 225-226. 
147 Supra note 139, p. 22; Meltzer, ibid., pp. 294-296. 
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established in customary international law. This freedom is available to the nationals 
of all states and it implies a right to have the opportunity to share in the resources of the 
high seas. But Article 87, paragraph 2, also makes clear that the freedoms provided are 
to be exercised with'due regard' for the interests of other states in their exercise of the 
freedoms of the high seas, 148 and freedom of fishing on the high seas is expressly 
subject to the obligations set out in Part VII, Section 2, Article 116 of the LOSC: 
All States have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high 
seas subject to: 
(a) their treaty obligations; 
(b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provided 
for, inter alia, in article 63, paragraph 2, and articles 64 to 67; and 
(c) the provisions of this section. 
Pursuant to this article, two limitations are clear. First, it provides that states "have the 
right for their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas", thereby entitling the 
nationals of any state to participate in the activity of high seas fishing, but it does not 
guarantee fishing in all areas of the high seas at any time. Instead, it subjects this 
freedom to other treaty obligations and 'subject to' certain specified provisions of the 
LOSC. Secondly, those fish stocks specified in paragraph (b) also come under 
limitations. In other words, those straddling and high migratory stocks are not within 
the scope of high seas freedom. Therefore, the freedom to fish on the high seas is not 
absolute-149 In view of exploitation and conservation for high seas fisheries, the high 
148 Supra note 7. 
149 Supra note 139, p. 8; Burke, supra note 24, p. 95; Hey, supra note 65, pp. 
53-68. 
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seas fishing state is not solely competent to decide, but a coastal state is a necessary 
associate. 150 
The obligation of states to co-operate in the conservation and management of 
living resources is set out in Article 118. More specifically, in terms of straddling and 
highly migratory species, according to LOSC, 151 Article 63(2) places an obligation on 
the coastal states and states that are engaged in fishing on the high seas for stocks that 
'occur both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to 
that zone' to seek to agree on conservation measures necessary for the conservation of 
these stocks in the adjacent area. This co-operation may be effected through bilateral or 
other agreements or may take place through appropriate subregional and regional 
organisations. In effect, Article 63(2) envisages co-operation between these states as 
the mechanism for the conservation of these resources in an area of high seas adjacent 
to the EEZ. 152 Article 64 imposes an obligation on coastal states and 'other states 
whose nationals fish in the region' for high migratory species. This co-operation is 
designed to ensure conservation and promote 'the objective of optimum utilisation' of 
these species 'both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone'. If no appropriate 
international organisation exists for ensuring such co-operation, Article 64 provides 
150 Burke, ibid., pp. 132-133. 
151 LOSC, Articles 63 and 64. 
152 Supra note 139, p. 10. 
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that the coastal state and other states that fish the species 'shall co-operate to establish 
such an organisation and participate in its work'. 153 
It should be clear that in order to keep the best interest in fisheries, both coastal 
states and high seas fishing states have the obligation to co-operate in the conservation 
and management of the straddling and highly migratory species. However, it remains 
unclear precisely how the rights and obligations of states are to be met. 154 This 
obscurity leads to the following conferences, in which the participants wanted to 
clarify the rights and obligations. 
B. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES SINCE 1990 
Various countries concerned elaborated on management and conservation in the 
Conference on Conservation and Management of High Seas Living Resources held in 
St. John, Terranova, in 1990. They emphasised the adoption of measures to avoid 
adverse effects of high seas fisheries on living resources under coastal state jurisdiction 
together with the concept that management of straddling stocks in the high seas must 
be consistent with the management regime applied in the EEZ. 155 
153 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
154 Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change, FAO 
Fisheries Circular, No. 853 (1993) p. 40. 
155 Vicuna, supra note 140. 
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Another meeting of experts from Canada, Chile, and New Zealand, held in 
Santiago on 17 May 1991, was followed by a larger gathering that met in New York on 
26 July 1991 with the participation of Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, New Zealand, and the FFA. The scope of these meetings was broader since they, 
addressed a wWe range of issues relating to the conservation and management of 
living resources of the high seas above and beyond the question of straddling 
stocks. 156 
An International Conference on Responsible Fishing was held in Cancun, 
Mexico, 6-8 May 1992, and was attended by delegations from 77 states. The 
Conference defines 'responsible fishing' in its Declaration: 157 
the sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources in harmony within the 
environment; the use of capture and aquaculture practices which are not 
harmful to ecosystems, resources or their quality; the incorporation of 
added value to such products through transformation processes meeting 
the required sanitary standards, the conduct of commercial practices so as 
to provide consumers access to good quality products. 
The -freedom of States to fish on the high seas must be balanced with the 
obligation to co-operate with other States to ensure conservation and 
rational management of the living resources, in accordance with relevant 
provisions of UNCLOS. 
[T]o call upon the Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United 
Nations to draft in consultation with relevant international organisations, 
an International Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing, taking into 
account this Declaration. [brackets added] 
156 Ibid., p. 424. 
157 UN Doc. A/CONF. 151.15, Annex. 
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The FAO led the drafting of an international code of conduct for responsible fishing 
which resulted in a Draft Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries on 29 September 
1995.158 
One month after the Cancun Conference, the United Nations Conference on . 
Environment and Development (UNCED) was held on 3-14 June 1992, in Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 159 its agenda being to develop a comprehensive programme for 
nations in pursuing sustainable development. 160 Nonetheless, this purpose was not 
achieved in the UNCED. From the view of the coastal states, high seas fishing must be 
conducted with no adverse impact on stocks found within coastal states jurisdiction. 
This view rests on the notion that there is a relationship between outside fishing, 
whether for highly migratory or straddling stocks, and the abundance of the same or 
associated stocks within the EEZ. 161 On the other hand, from the view of those high 
seas fishing states, all states must observe the provisions of the LOSC on high seas 
fishing. This position was reinforced at the Conference by insisting that the exclusive 
right to prescribe for flag state fishing vessels on the high seas is an indispensable 
element of national sovereignty that cannot be modified even by consent. 162 
158 See document at gopher: //gopher. undp. org: 70/00/unearch/organizations 
/fao/databases. 
159 Also known as Rio Conference. 
160 Scully, "Report on UNCED, " in Miles and Treves, eds., supra note 140, p. 
97 
161 UNCED Doc. A/CONF. 151/PC/WG. II/L. 16/Rev. 1,16 March 1992; 
Burke, "UNCED and the Oceans, " 17 Mar. Pol. (1993) pp. 522-523. 
162 Burke, ibid., p. 524. 
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Therefore, more attention was paid to the marine environment protection issue 
in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.163 The seven programme areas of Chapter 17 illustrate 
this situation: 
1. Integrated management and sustainable development of coastal areas, including 
EEZs. 
2. Marine environmental protection. 
3. Sustainable use-and conservation of marine living resources of the high seas. 
4. Sustainable use and conservation of marine living resources under national 
jurisdiction. 
5. Addressing critical uncertainties for the management of the marine environment 
and climate change. 
6. Strengthening international, including regional, co-operation and co-ordination. 
7. Sustainable development of small islands. 
Apart from this, Agenda 21 also called for subsequent UN actions to convene 
international conferences164 
[W]ith a view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks ... The work and the results of the 
conference should be fully consistent with the provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular the rights and 
obligations of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas. [brackets 
added] 
Following the UNCED, the UN General Assembly, with Resolution 47/192, 
approved an intergovernmental conference on straddling and highly migratory fish 
163 For text, see Johnson, ed., The Earth Summit: The United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) (1993) pp. 307-331. 
164 UNCED, Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Development 
(1993) p. 155. 
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stocks which convened in 1993.165 The Conference aimed to accomplish the 
following tasks: (A) Identify and assess existing problems related to the conservation 
and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks; (B) 
Consider means of improving fisheries co-operation among States; (C) Formulate 
appropriate recommendations. Starting from April 1993, six sessions were held at the 
UN headquarters. 1 46 The participating states can be categorised into three main groups 
based on different national interests. First, the coastal states group (Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru) linked with activist coastal states (Canada, Argentina, and 
Norway). Secondly, the high seas fishing group (Japan, Korea, Poland, and the PRC). 
Thirdly, the moderate reformist coastal states (Australia and New Zealand). 167 
During the meetings, several issues emerged as focal points: 168 
1. The nature of conservation and management measures to be established through 
co-operation; 
2. The mechanisms for international co-operation; 
3. Regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements; 
4. Flag state responsibilities; 
165 UN General Assembly Resolution 47/192,22 December 1992. 
166 First session: 19 to 23 April 1993; Second session: 12 to 30 July 1993; 
Third session: 14 to 31 March 1994; Fourth session: 15 to 26 August 1994; Fifth 
session: 27 March to 12 April 1995; Sixth session: 24 July to 4 August 1995. 
167 Barston, "United Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, " 19 Mar. Pol. (1995) p. 160. Although as a major fishing state, Taiwan 
was not invited to the Conference. For discussion on Taiwan's international status, see 
Chapter 3, especially Sections 4 and 5; for discussion on Taiwan's inability to 
participate in international organisations and conclude agreements with other states, 
see Chapters 7 and 8. 
168 Chairman's Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/13,30 July 1993. 
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5. Compliance and enforcement of high seas fisheries, conservation and 
management measures; 
6. Port state responsibilities; 
7. Non-parties to a subregional or regional agreement or arrangement; 
8. Dispute settlement; 
9. Compatibility and coherence between national and international conservation 
measures for the same stocks; 
10. Special requirements of developing countries; 
11. Review of the implementation of conservation and management measures. 
The positions of the coastal states and high seas fishing states were often quite 
divergent. Among the most contentious issues was that of compatibility and 
coherence. Many high seas fishing states argued that the conference should consider 
conservation and management measures for the fish stock as a biological unit over its 
entire range of distribution, not divided along political boundaries. This view led to the 
argument calling for compatibility between conservation and management measures in 
EEZs and on the high seas, denying any special interests of coastal states to ensure that 
measures on the high seas are consistent with the conservation and management 
measures within the adjacent EEZ. On the other hand, many coastal states considered 
this position as compromising their sovereign rights over the living resources within 
the EEZ as provided for under the LOSC. Delegates from coastal states questioned the 
mandate of the conference to consider conservation and management of fish stocks 
within the EEZ and not just on the adjacent high seas beyond national jurisdiction. 169 
169 Meltzer, supra note 142, p. 326. Also reports in ENB, document at 
http: //wNvw. iisd. ca/linkages/vo107/0716021. html. 
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This argument was clarified when an agreement of this conference was adopted 
on 4 August 1995.170 Article 7, paragraph 1, of the Agreement explicitly stipulated the 
compatibility of conservation and management measures: with respect to straddling 
stocks, coastal states and high seas fishing states shall seek to agree upon the measures 
necessary for the conservation of these stocks; with respect to highly migratory 
species, coastal' states and high seas fishing states shall co-operate with a view to 
ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of such 
stocks throughout the region. It also requires, inter alia, that conservation and 
management measures within EEZs and the high seas shall be compatible, and 
describes the factors to be accounted for in determining compatibility. 
Paragraph 2 continues to provide that conservation and management measures 
established for the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction 
shall be compatible in order to ensure conservation and management of the straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, coastal states 
and high seas fishing states have a duty to co-operate for the purpose of achieving 
compatible measures in respect of such stocks. This result was just as Chairman Satya 
Nandan mentioned: 171 
170 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation 
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 164/37,8 September 1995. 
171 Statement of the Chairman, Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, on 4 August 
1995, Upon the Adoption of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/35,20 September 1995. 
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The conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks must, taking into account their biological unity, be 
the responsibility of all States concerned in a particular fishery. Improved 
standards for management are to be applied both within and beyond 
national jurisdiction. In respect of areas under national jurisdiction, there 
is an identifiable and accountable authority, that is, the coastal State. The 
responsibilities of the coastal State are clearly stated in the Convention 
[LOSC] and these have been further elaborated and reinforced in this 
Agreement in terms of better management standards and practices that are 
to be applied. 
One of the -cornerstones of the Agreement is the provision to ensure 
compatibility of conservation and management measures throughout the 
range of stocks. In this sense, the scope of the Agreement is broad enough 
to embrace resources as a whole, while fully respecting the different 
jurisdictional responsibilities. No one should escape from the 
conservation and management principles of the Agreement. [brackets 
added] 
C. REMARKS 
During the past decade, the management of high seas fisheries has appeared as a 
significant international problem. This results primarily from a state extending its 
jurisdiction over an enlarged maritime zone, which necessitates other states to shift or 
transfer their high seas fishing activities outside of the new jurisdiction. Nonetheless, 
those stocks which are caught in the high seas area could adversely impact the coastal 
state's conservation or management measures in its EEZ. 
The UN Conference on the Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks mainly dealt with this issue. The Agreement reached on 4 August 1995 is built 
on three main pillars: 172 
172 Ibid. 
60 
First, it sets out principles on which conservation and management of the 
stocks must be based and establishes that such management must be based 
on the precautionary approach and the best available scientific 
information. 
The second pillar ensures that the conservation and management measures 
are adhered to and complied with, and that they are not undermined by 
those who fish for the stocks. For this purpose, the primary responsibility 
of the flag State is reaffirmed and the framework for action by States other 
than the flag States is set out with clear safeguards against abuse. 
The third pillar is the provision for peaceful settlement of disputes. While 
providing for various possibilities of non-binding settlement, in the end 
result every dispute can be submitted to a court or tribunal for a binding 
decision. 
6. OBSERVATIONS 
The extension of fisheries jurisdiction over the past several decades is an important 
evolution in the law of the sea. In 1945 two Truman proclamations initiated this 
extension trend. Each coastal state had its own formula to extend its jurisdiction over 
marine resources. Nonetheless, the freedoms of the high seas, especially the high seas 
fisheries, are still respected by most of the countries until UNCLOS III. 
Starting from the 1970's, a new jurisdiction area, the EEZ, was established and 
became a customary international law. In addition, some of the conditions, based on 
the conservation and management of fishery resources, were included in the provisions 
of high seas fisheries of the LOS C. This changed the nature of the freedom of high seas 
fisheries. Coastal states are conferred with certain rights to conserve and manage their 
marine resources and the distant water fishing states are obliged to abide by the 
regulations set by the coastal states in their EEZs. 
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At this stage, 'distance' is still the basic factor to measure the coastal states' 
jurisdiction, for instance, 200 nm of EEZ. Nonetheless, since the late 1980's, such 
jurisdiction has extended to fish species. In other words, 'distance' is not the only factor 
to measure jurisdiction over resources. Therefore, the issue of straddling and highly 
migratory species is raised. Along with this issue, the use of fishing gear became 
another consideration in the concept of freedom of high sea fisheries. Conservation 
and management, but not utilisation, are the prevalent considerations in making marine 
policy. 
As for the issue of straddling and highly migratory species, it is understandable 
that coastal states want to extend their jurisdiction over certain species which migrate 
out of their EEZs because the reason of conserving and managing living resources. 
Without a co-ordinated management, fishing outside of a state's EEZ could prejudice 
both its conservation measures and the economic preferences accorded its fishermen 
within the zone. 173 It is still arguable, however, whether this approach towards the 
conservation and management of high seas living resources constitutes creeping 
jurisdiction. Some argue that such an approach prevents creeping jurisdiction, because 
"it is conceived within the framework of the Law of the Sea Convention, subject to 
perfecting the meaning and extent of some of its provisions. "174 On the contrary, to 
173 Stevenson and Oxman, "The Future of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, " 88 AJIL (1994) p. 497. 
174 Vicuna, supra note 140, pp. 423-424. 
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other scholars, such an approach is considered creeping jurisdiction. Professor Lagoni 
takes the opinion that the jurisdiction to the EEZ is not a case of territorial jurisdiction, 
but of functional jurisdiction. A state's extension of its law beyond 200 miles is against 
the package deal which forms the basis of the LOSC. 175 
In retrospect of the development of the law of the sea, from extending 
jurisdiction in terms of the distance, i. e. 12 nm territorial sea and 200 nm EEZ, to 
jurisdiction over certain species in the high seas, i. e. straddling and highly migratory 
species, it is apparent that not only the area of high seas will be diminished but also the 
freedom of fishing on the highs seas will be limited. 
As a distant water fishing state, Taiwan had adjusted itself to the new climate in 
order not to lose any competitive advantage in fishery production. Nonetheless, not 
being recognised as a state, 176 Taiwan has encountered difficulties in dealing or 
negotiating with other states. We shall take a further look at the difficulties Taiwan has 
faced, how these difficulties affect fishery negotiations between Taiwan and other 
states, and how we can reduce or eliminate these difficulties in the following chapters. 
175 Lagoni, in Discussion, Miles and Treves, supra note 140, p. 453. Also see 
Ball, "The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans, " 27 ODIL (1996) pp. 
106-108; Stevenson and Oxman, supra note 173, p. 498. 
176 See infra Chapter 3. 
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PART II. 
TAIWAN AND THE DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
The purpose of Part II is to examine the following two problems: the international 
status of Taiwan and the overlapping maritime claims in the South China Sea region. 
Due to the international non-recognition of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Taiwan is 
unable to negotiate with its neighbouring states, although it is one of the parties to the 
South China Sea conflicts. Furthermore, owing to the complicated political, economic, 
and jurisdictional conditions in this region, such conflicts cannot be solved in a simple 
way. Under such circumstances, a non-boundary-based and functional resolution is the 
most feasible method to solve the conflicts in the South China Sea. These matters will 
be discussed in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF TAIWAN 
Taiwan is an island situated 124 miles off the eastern shores of Chinese mainland. 
Owing to its strategic location, 1 725 miles south of Japan and 207 miles north of the 
Philippines, Taiwan used to play a key role in the Cold War period and was praised as 
an'unsinkable aircraft carrier'2 during the Korean War (1950-1953). 
Taiwan's international legal status has been an issue since 1949. In December 
1949, due to its defeat in civil war with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the 
government of the Republic of China (ROC) retreated to Taiwan whilst the CCP 
established the People's Republic of China (PRC). Since then, two Chinese regimes 
have existed, both of which claim to be the sole legal representative of the whole 
Chinese people and to be entitled to the territory of China. 
1 Shaw, "Modern History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account, " in Chiu, 
ed., China and the Taiwan Issue (1979) p. 7; Hsieh, Taiwan - Ilka Formosa: A 
Geography in Perspective (1964) pp. 7-8; Sih, Taiwan in Modern Times (1973) p. 1. 
2 US General Douglas MacArthur stated during his visit to Taiwan on 31 
July 1950. About Taiwan's strategic status in confronting Chinese communist in the 
1950's, see Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (1959), 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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This chapter will examine the history of Taiwan and the issue of international 
recognition of Taiwan. 
1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES 
The ROC is comprised of four divided groups of islands: Taiwan island, Penghu 
islands, Kinmen (Quemoy) islands, and Matsu islands 3<See Map 1> 
Taiwan, the main and largest island, is a leaf-shaped island with a coastline 
over 1,566 km in length and situated on the margin of the Chinese continental shelf. 
Taiwan stretches about 386 km from north to south and 137 km across its widest points 
from east to west. The land area is about 36,000 km2, about two thirds of which is 
covered with forested mountains and only one third made up of plains and small hills. 
Penghu, also known by its Portuguese name 'Pescadores' ('fishermen'), is an 
archipelago of 64 small islands located in the Taiwan Strait off the west coast of 
Taiwan. The total area of these islands is 126.86 km2. However, only twenty of them 
are inhabited. According to the Penghu County government, there are 54,766 
fishermen in Penghu, which is about 55% of the population. Makung, the capital city, 
is 76 nm from Kaohsiung and 95 nm from Keelung. 
3 The following account on Taiwan and other islands is based on Sung, 
Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book (1989) pp. 162-194. 
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Map 1 Taiwan: Geographical Features 
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Source: Shen, Agricultural Development on Taiwan Since 
World War It (1964). Amended by the Author. 
Kinmen (Quemoy) includes twelve islets, covering an area of 150.45 km2 off 
the south-eastern coast of Chinese mainland. It controls the mouth of Amoy Bay. 
Kinmen is 82 nm west of the Penghu islands and 18 nm east of Amoy. It is 198 nm 
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from Keelung in northern Taiwan and 155 nm from Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan. 
The shortest distance from Kinmen to Chinese mainland is only 1.25 nm. 
The Matsu Islands are made up of nineteen islets. The total area of the island 
group is 28.8 km2. This group of islands lies at the mouth of the Min River, Chinese 
mainland. The main island, Matsu, is 114 nm northwest of Keelung, and is the same 
distance north of Kinmen. Kaoteng, one of the islets, is only 5.5 nm from Chinese 
mainland. 
2. HISTORIC BACKGROUND 
Although human life in Taiwan dates back to ten thousand years ago, 4 Taiwan was still 
largely unknown until the early seventeenth century. Only a few Chinese traders from 
the harbours of Guangdong and Fujien, on the southeastern coast, braved the dangers 
and made a decent profit from Taiwanese deer hides and crushed deerhom, and 
established small settlements in the southwest of the island. Chinese and Japanese 
pirates also found havens along the same coast. 5 
4 Only a few aborigines inhabited Taiwan at that time. Most anthropologists 
believe that the aborigines hail from Southeast Asia and are related to the present-day 
Malay people. See Copper, Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (1990) p. 17; 
Davidson, The Island of Formosa: Past and Present (1977) pp. 2-4; Knapp, ed., 
China's Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan (1980) Part I. 
5 Spence, The Search for Modern China (1990) pp. 53-58. 
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In the 1620's Taiwan first began to feature in global politics and attracted the 
attention of European powers. It was the Portuguese who first explored the island and 
gave it the name 'Ilka Formosa', meaning 'Beautiful Island'. Then the Spaniards 
established a small base in the north at Keelung, and the Dutch came to establish a fort 
in 1624 in the south at Tainan. By the 1640's the Dutch had driven out both the 
Spaniards and the last Japanese pirates, and a profitable trade developed between the 
island, the Dutch Empire in the East Indies (now Indonesia), and the merchants and 
administrators on China's east coast. 6 In 1646, a Ming loyalist, Zheng Chenggong, 
fought the Dutch military and expelled them.? 
By the 1850's, in the wake of a series of internal rebellions (White Lotus 
Rebellion, 8 the Taiping Revolution, 9 the Nien Rebellion, 10 and the Muslim Revoltsl l) 
6 Ibid., p. 54; Campell, Formosa under the Dutch (1903). 
7 Spence, supra note 5, pp. 53-58. 
8 For White Lotus Rebellion in 1770's, see ibid., pp. 112-114,165; Hsu, The 
Rise of Modern China (1990) pp. 128-129. 
9 For the Taiping Revolution, see Spence, supra note 5, pp. 170-178; Hsu, 
ibid., pp. 226-253; Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions (1990) pp. 52-76; Hsiang, et al., 
eds., Taiping Tienkuo (The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom) Vol. 2 (1952) p. 632; Teng, 
New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion (1950); Shen, "Hung Hsiu-chuan 
and the Taiping Revolution, " 1 Historical Research (1963) pp. 49-94; Shih, The 
Taiping Ideology: Its Source, Interpretations and Influences (1967). 
10 For the Nien Rebellion, see Spence, ibid, pp. 184-188; Fan, et al., eds., 
Nien-Chun (The Nien Army) (1953); Teng, The Nien Army and Their Guerrilla 
Warfare 1851-1868 (1961). 
11 For the Muslim Revolts, see Pai, ed., Hui-min chi-i (The Righteous 
Uprising of the Muslems) (1953); Wang, Hsien-Tungyun-nan hui-min shih-pien (The 
Yunnan Muslem Rebellion During the Hsien feng and the Tung-chih Periods) (1968); 
Spence, ibid., pp. 189-193. 
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and the pressure of a rising population, 12 millions of Chinese chose to move northeast, 
first to the settled arable regions of Liaodong, Jilin and Heilongjiang (the northeastern 
area of China). Others braved the short sea passage to swell the number of immigrants 
on Taiwan, which had become thoroughly opened to Chinese settlement and 
agriculture by the 1850's and was named a full province in 1885.13 
In 1895, following the defeat of China (the Ching Dynasty) in the war with 
Japan for the protection of Korea, 14 the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed by both 
parties on 17 April 1895.15 According to the Treaty, China recognised "the full and 
complete independence and autonomy of Korea, " which under the circumstances, 
effectively made Korea a Japanese protectorate. Also, under the provision of Article II 
of the Shimonoseki Treaty, 16 it provided that 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon:... 
(b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or 
belonging to said island of Formosa... 
I 
12 China's population had probably reached 430,000,000 by 1850, see 
Spence, ibid., p. 210. Cf. Lo, "The Question of Population Pressure in the Pre-Taiping 
Revolution Years, " 8 Collected Writings on Chinese Society and Economics, 
Academia Sinica (1939) pp. 20-80. 
13 Spence, ibid. 
14 Hsu, supra note 8, pp. 332-341. 
15 Treaty of Peace between Japan and China, 1895 (Treaty of Shimonoseki). 
Text reprinted in MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning 
China, 1894-1919 (1921) pp. 18-25. About the settlement of Shimonoseki Treaty, see 
Cheng, ed., Chung-Kuo nei-luan wai-huo li-shih tsung-shu (A Historical Series on 
China's Internal Disorder and External Trouble) Vol. 5 (1936). 
16 MacMurray, ibid., p. 19. 
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Therefore, Taiwan, the Pescadores, as well as the Liaodong region of southern 
Manchuria were ceded to Japan, and four more treaty ports17 were opened to Japan. 
From then, Taiwan was under Japanese occupation for fifty years till the end of the 
Second World War. 
Under the lead of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the Ching Dynasty was overthrown in 1912 
and the ROC was established. 18 Nonetheless, the foray from Japan did not cease. 
Japan continued to extend its hold over Manchuria and even created a puppet regime, 
Manchukuo, there. 19 The Japanese invasion of Chinese territory inevitably resulted in 
the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). 
During the Second World War, two important documents concerning Taiwan 
were drawn up. Both of these documents are important for the latter discussion of 
Taiwan's legal status. On 1 December 1943, Chinese General Chiang Kai-Shek, 
17 Those ports are Shahshih, Chungking, Suchow, and Hangchow. See 
MacMurray, ibid, p. 20. In the treaty ports, Japanese residents were under their 
consul's legal jurisdiction, i. e. they had the rights of extraterritoriality. See Fairbank 
and Reischauer, China: Tradition and Transformation (1979) pp. 283-289. 
18 For the establishment of the ROC, see Hsieh, Chinese Historiography on 
the Revolution of 1911 (1975); Cantlie and Jones, Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of 
China (1912). 
19 For the Manchukuo, see Lattimore, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (1932); 
Merley, ed., The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933- 
1941 (1983); Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy: 
1931-1932 (1964); Shen, Japan in Manchuria: An Analytical Study of Treaties and 
Documents (1960); Smith, The Manchurian Crisis: 1931-1932 (1948); Thorne, The 
Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931- 
1932 (1972); Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations 
(1935). 
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British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
met in Cairo, and issued a Declaration which said: 20 
It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the 
Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First 
World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the 
Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be 
restored to the Republic of China. 
The second document is the Potsdam Proclamation. On 26 July 1945, Chiang, 
Churchill, and Roosevelt made a proclamation21 which affirmed that 
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese 
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, 
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determined. 
The Second World War in the east ended when Japan surrendered on 14 
August 1945. The Instrument of Surrender was signed on board the U. S. S. Missouri in 
Tokyo Bay by the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and General Yoshijiro 
Umezu on 2 September 1945.22 Simultaneously, in accordance with the General Order 
No. 1, issued by the Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, the 
Japanese forces within China and Taiwan surrendered to General Chiang Kai-Shek. 23 
On 25 October 1945, the ROC government accepted Japan's surrender at Taipei and 
placed the people, territory, and administration of Taiwan and Penghu under the 
20 The Cairo Declaration, US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 232 
(4 December 1943) p. 393. 
21 Paragraph (8) of the Potsdam Proclamation. See Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law, Vol. 3 (1964) p. 484. 
22 Ibid., pp. 486-487. 
23 Ibid., pp. 487-488. 
73 
sovereignty of the ROC. 24 From the next day, Taiwan was administrated as a province 
of the ROC. 25 
The Sino-Japanese War was over, but the civil war between the Kuomintang 
(KMT, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party), the ruling party of the Chinese" 
government, led by Chiang Kai-Shek, and the CCP, led by Mao Tse-Tung, was still 
under way. 26 Due to the eight-year war with Japan, which completely exhausted the 
government militarily, financially, and spiritually, the KMT government forces simply 
collapsed. 27 
By 1 October 1949, the CCP controlled most of the Chinese mainland, and the 
government of the PRC proclaimed itself the central government of China. On 8 
December 1949, the government of the ROC moved to Taiwan and established its 
capital at Taipei. 28 The establishment of the PRC was recognised by the Eastern 
24 Chiu, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis 
(1973) pp. 211-213. 
25 Lien, President Chiang and the Recovery of Taiwan (1967) p. 82. 
26 Hsu, supra note 8, pp. 630-633; Chen, Mao. and the Chinese Revolution 
(1965); Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949 (1971); 
Loh, The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? (1965); Pepper, Civil 
War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (1978); United States Relations with 
China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 (1949). 
27 Hsu, ibid., pp. 639-643. 
28 Eastman, Chen, Pepper, and Van Slyke, The Nationalist Era in China 
1927-1949 (1991) pp. 352-353. 
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European communist countries, 29 such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), immediately. 30 
Therefore, since 1 October 1949, there have been two Chinese governments. 
The government of the ROC claimed its sovereignty over Taiwan on the basis of the 
Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, in the light of its having taken over 
the island from Japan in 1945. It also maintains the ROC Constitution and its original 
government structure. Hence, its sovereignty is over the whole Chinese mainland as 
well as Taiwan, and it is still the legitimate Chinese government. On the other hand, 
the PRC government argues that it controls the enormous Chinese mainland and the 
majority of the population. Hence, it is the government of all of China, with Taiwan 
being a part of its domain which is now under the control of rebels. 
Both the Chinese governments claim a'One China Policy', under which there is 
only one China and Taiwan is a part of China. 31 Therefore, the ROC government and 
29 By the end of 1949, there were thirteen countries which recognised the 
PRC. They are Albania, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
India, Poland, Romania, Soviet Union, North Korea, Mongolia, and Yugoslavia. See 
Zhong-kuo Bai-ke Nien-Chien: 1992 (Yearbook of Chinese Encyclopaedia: 1992) 
(1993). 
30 'Telegram from Mr. Gromyko, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, to Chou En-Lai, Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China, 
Announcing the Recognition of the Central People's Government by the Government 
of the USSR, 2 October 1949. ' See Carlyle, ed., Documents on International Affairs 
1949-1950 (1953) pp. 539-541. On the same day, the USSR terminated relations with 
the ROC. 
31 Brenhardt, ed., Encyclopaedia of Public International Law, Vol. 10 (1987) 
p. 127. Also, Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problems, " in Gross, ed. International 
Law in Twentieth Century (1969) p. 605. 
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the PRC government have jointly created a new topic of study in international law -- 
'One China, Two Governments'. That is to say, within the state of one China there are 
two separate regimes, one in the Chinese mainland and the other in Taiwan. They 
reject any suggestion or chance which could possibly lead to the creation of two 
Chinas. Doubtless, such a policy produces a disadvantageous situation for the ROC, 
because the PRC controls most of the resources, that is the population and the territory. 
Paradoxically, the ROC cannot abandon its One China Policy, because the PRC 
declared that force would be used against Taiwan if it were to declare itself to be a 
separate state. During the mid-1980's, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping expressed 
that China would employ force to unify the country under the following 
circumstances: 32 
If Taipei leaned toward Moscow instead of Washington; if Taipei decided 
to build nuclear weapons; if Taipei claimed to be an independent state; if 
Taipei lost internal control as a result of the succession process; or if 
Taipei continued to reject reunification talks for a long period of time. 
32 See Huan, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing, " 63(5) Foreign Affairs (1985) 
p. 1068; The New York Times (12 October 1984) p. A8. Also, a high-ranking Chinese 
Communist Politburo member Li Rui-Huan said that "the PRC won't budge an inch on 
its one China policy and will take all possible means to prevent the independence of 
Taiwan. " Foreign Broadcast Information Service, China, 30 October 1992, p. 47. 
Cited from Chiu, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China, revised 
version (1992) p. 8. In another more recent example, Chinese President and 
Communist Party General Secretary, Jiang Zemin, states'[O]ne thing we are certain: If 
separatism emerges on Taiwan, whether stemming from international hostile forces or 
from local separatist forces, then we might use non-peaceful means to achieve 
reunification. ' See U. S. News & World Report (23 October 1995). 
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3. DIPLOMATIC WARFARE BETWEEN TWO CHINESE 
GOVERNMENTS 
3.1. TAIWAN: STATUS UNDETERMINED? 
Although the Second World War ended in 1945, the Treaty of Peace between the 
Allied Powers and Japan was not signed until 8 September 1951 in San Francisco. 33 
China was not invited to be a party to the Peace Treaty. The reason was that opinions 
were seriously divided about which Chinese government could represent China. 34 The 
Office of Public Affairs of the US Department of State in September 1951, in a 
pamphlet entitled 'Background of Japanese Peace Conference, San Francisco, 
September 1951' presented the situation as follows: 35 
China was not invited for a reason as practical as it was obvious. Roughly 
half of the participating countries would not agree to sign any treaty at the 
same table with the National Government, the Republic of China. The 
other half, including the United States, would not sign with the Chinese 
Communist regime. 
Due to the international political situation, particularly the outbreak of the 
Korean War, in which the PRC sent troops to aid North Korean Communists, the 
33 136 UNTS 48. 
34 The US initially planned to invite the ROC to the peace conference, but the 
UK and other countries which recognised the PRC objected to this suggestion. See The 
Relationship between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Sino-Japanese Peace 
Treaty (1966) pp. 76-82; Chiu, supra note 24, pp. 124-126. 
35 The New York Herald Tribune (28 September 1951). 
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Peace Treaty between the ROC and Japan36 was signed at Taipei on 28 April 1952. 
Regarding the question of Taiwan, Article 2 of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty states: 
It is recognised that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan37 
signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on 
September 8,1951, Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to 
Formosa and the Pescadores as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel 
Islands. 
The aiigument, that Taiwan's status is undetermined, is based on the 'cession' 
provision in the aforementioned two Peace Treaties. It is argued that the status of 
Taiwan is undetermined, because in two peace treaties Japan just renounced its title 
and claim to Taiwan and Penghu but without specifying the recipient. Thus the Peace 
Treaties left sovereignty over Taiwan undetermined. 38 The US Secretary of State 
Dulles observed that39 
[T]echnical sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores has never been 
settled ... [T]he 
future title is not determined by the Japanese peace treaty, 
nor is it determined by the peace treaty which was concluded between the 
Republic of China and Japan. 
The UK government took a similar position on this issue, 40 
36 138 UNTS 38; Also, Treaty between the Republic of China and Foreign 
States (1927-1957) (1958) pp. 248,250. 
37 With respect to the issue of Taiwan, Article 2, Paragraph (b) of the 1951 
Peace Treaty stipulates that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and 
the Pescadores. " Supra note 33. 
38 Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (1979) p. 149; Jain, 
"The Legal Status of Formosa, " 57 AJIL (1963) pp. 25-26; O'Connell, "The Status of 
Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, " 50 AJIL (1956) pp. 409-413; Wright, 
"The Status of Communist China, " 11 J. Intl Affairs (1957) p. 181; idem, "Non- 
Recognition of China and International Tensions, " 34 Current History (1958) p. 153. 
39 31 Department of State Bulletin (1954) p. 896. 
40 HC Debs., vol. 536, Written Answers, col. 159: 4 February 1955. 
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Under the Peace Treaty of April, 1952, Japan formally renounced all right, 
title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores; but again this did not 
operate as a transfer to Chinese sovereignty, whether to the People's 
Republic of China or to the Chinese Nationalist authorities. Formosa and 
the Pescadores are therefore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, 
territory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain or undetermined. 
However, the ROC government contests that view and draws different 
conclusions concerning the legal status of Taiwan from the Peace Treaties. According 
to the first paragraph of the Instrument of Surrender, 41 
The Japanese Government, and the Japanese Imperial General 
Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the 
heads of Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on 
July 26,1945, at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as 
the Allied Powers. 
Obviously, nothing was mentioned about Taiwan, but it states that Japan accepted the 
provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation which itself refers to the terms of the Cairo 
Declaration, which did declare that Taiwan and the Pescadores would be restored to 
China. 
Nonetheless, some may argue that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam 
Proclamation are only binding on those signature states, that is, China, France, the 
Soviet Union, the UK, and the US. "[T]hey could hardly comprise transactions out of 
which follow rights and duties of other states. "42 The ROC government holds that 
those documents, the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, are not only 
41 Whiteman, supra note 21, pp. 486-487. 
42 Lauterpacht, ed., Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1,7th 
Edition (1952) pp. 872-873. 
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binding on the signatories, but are also binding upon Japan once it accepted the 
provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation subject to the Instrument of Surrender. 43 
Furthermore, Articles 4 and 10 of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty provide: 
Article 4 
It is recognised that all treaties, conventions and agreements concluded 
before December 9,1941, between China and Japan have become null and 
void As a consequence of the war. 
Article 10 
For the purpose of the present Treaty, nationals of the Republic of China 
shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of 
Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants 
who are of the Chinese nationality in accordance with the laws and 
regulations which have been or may hereafter be enforced by the Republic 
of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores); and juridical' 
persons of the Republic of China shall be deemed to include all those 
registered under the laws and regulations which have been or may 
hereafter be enforced by the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and 
Penghu (the Pescadores). 
Hence, although there is no clear reference as to who will be the recipient, it is clear 
from these articles, especially Article 4, that the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki44 
naturally became null and void. Therefore China reacquired its sovereignty over 
Taiwan, Penghu, and other related islands. Furthermore, Article 10 also implies that 
Taiwan and Penghu are under the sovereignty of the ROC. 
43 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROC, News Conference of 16 October 1959. 
44 Supra note 15. 
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Some international scholars justify the ROC's sovereignty on Taiwan with the 
principle of occupation in international law. Arthur Dean argued45 
From the standpoint of customary international law, at least, no cession is 
required. Nationalist China (ROC) may have already acquired legal title to 
Formosa and the Pescadores by occupation or possibly by subjugation. 
D. P. O'Connell holds the opinion that46 
[T]he dereliction of the territories by Japan without provision for their 
ultimate disposition ... left them available for appropriation by the nations 
competent to manifest their sovereignty over them. From this view it 
follows that the belligerent occupants, namely ... China in Formosa and 
the Pescadores, acquired sovereignty in the moment when Japanese 
dereliction terminated their status as belligerent occupants. 
In addition, it is a fact that the ROC government has effectively occupied and 
controlled Taiwan and Penghu since 25 October 1945; such occupation clearly 
indicates an intention and will to act as a sovereign. 47 It may be fair to say that the 
ROC had already acquired legal title to Taiwan and Penghu, although no cession 
provisions are clearly made in the Peace Treaty. 
45 Dean, "International Law and Current Problems in the Far East, " AJIL 
Proceedings (1955) pp. 86,95-96. 
46 O'Connell, International Law, Vol. 1,2nd Edition (1970) p. 448. Cf. 
Morello, The International Legal Status of Formosa (1966) p. 92: 
47 The PCIJ pointed out in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case that 
acquisition of title by occupation involves 'the intention and will to act as sovereign 
and some actual exercise or display of such authority. ' 
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3.2. CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS 
The UN is probably the most important international organisation in the world. The 
main purpose of the UN itself is of a political character: the maintenance of 
international peace and security, an endeavour which obviously can be realised first of 
all by the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, the settlement of international 
disputes by peaceful means, the development of friendly relations among nations, and 
the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems. 48 It is 
deeply involved with world affairs and its functions covers almost all international 
activities. For this reason, Chinese representation in the UN inevitably became a bone 
of contention between the two Chinese governments. 
After the establishment of the PRC, on 18 November 1949, its Foreign 
Minister Chou En-Lai sent statements to the President of the General Assembly and 
the Secretary-General stating that the delegation appointed by the Nationalist 
government had no authority to speak for the Chinese people. 49 The General Assembly 
was in session at the time but the credentials of the Chinese representatives had already 
been approved, and no action was taken. 50 Following the PRC's statement, the Soviet 
48 Charter of the United Nations, Article 1; Also see Bailey, The Procedure 
of the UN Security Council, 2nd Edition (1988); Bokor-Szego, The Role of the Untied 
Nations in International Legislation (1978); Roberts and Kingsbury, eds., United 
Nations, Divided World: the UN's Roles in International Relations (1993); Cassese, 
ed., UNPeace-Keeping (1978); Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution 
(1971); Gutteridge, The UN in a Changing World (1969). 
49 UN Doc. A/1123,21 November 1949. 
50 Bailey, supra note 48, p. 150. 
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representative raised the question of Chinese representation at a meeting of the 
Security Council held on 29 December 1949. He said he supported the Chinese 
government and the Soviet government would not regard the KMT representative as 
being empowered to represent the Chinese people. 51 
On 8 January 1950, Chou En-Lai sent another note to the Secretary-General as 
well as one to the members of the Security Council, protesting at the Council's failure 
"to expel the illegitimate representative of the Chinese Kuomintang reactionary 
clique. " On 10 January, with the representative of the ROC in the chair, the Soviet 
representative repeated his opposition to the presence in the Council of a 
representative of the ROC, and formally proposed that his credentials be not 
recognised and that he be excluded from the Council. The President put his ruling to 
the vote, and it was upheld by eight votes to two (Soviet Union and Yugoslavia), with 
India abstaining. The Soviet representative declared that he could not participate in the 
work of the Council or take part in the meeting until the KMT representative was 
excluded, then he left the Council chamber and commenced a boycott. 52 
4 
On 25 June 1950, the Korean War broke out when a force of North Korean 
troops crossed the 38° north latitude and invaded South Korea. In the absence of the 
Soviet Union, the other members of the UN Security Council acted swiftly to condemn 
the North Koreans and to urge UN members to give necessary assistance to stabilise 
51 SCOR, 4th year, 458th meeting, 29 December 1949, pp. 1-3. 
52 Bailey, supra note 48, pp. 150-151. 
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the situation in the Korean Peninsula. 53 Also, the US President Truman ordered the US 
Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait, which meant that the PRC could not invade 
Taiwan even if it was ready to do so. 54 
The Soviet representative did not resume participation in the Security Council 
until it was his turn to preside over meetings of the Council in August 1950.55 Since 
then, the Soviet representative has raised the question of Chinese representation on 
four subsequent occasions: 10 November 1951,56 31 January 1955,57 8 September 
1955,58 and 24 May 1967.59 
The question of Chinese representation was also raised in the General 
Assembly. Cuba first raised the matter in the General Assembly in 1950, and the 
Assembly adopted an inconclusive resolution. 60 Between 1951 and 1953, the 
Assembly decided to postpone consideration of proposals on Chinese 
53 UN Security Council, Resolution 82(S/1501), 25 June 1950; Bailey, supra 
note 48, p. 245. 
54 "President Truman's Statement on the Mission of the U. S. Seventh Fleet in 
the Formosa Area, June 27,1950" in American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic 
Documents, Vol. 2 (1957) p. 2468. 
55 Bailey, supra note 48, p. 154. 
56 SCOR, 6th year, 566th meeting, 10 November 1951, para. 1. 
57 SCOR, 10th year, 689th meeting, 31 January 1955, paras 1-27. 
58 SCOR, 10th year, 700th meeting, 8 September 1955, paras. 1-5. 
59 SCOR, 22nd year, 1341st meeting, 24 May 1967, paras. 8-59. 
60 UN Resolution 490(V), 19 September 1950. 
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representation, 61 and between 1954 and 1960 decided 'not to consider' such proposals 
on numerous occasions. 62 From 1961-1970, the Assembly considered proposals to 
seat the PRC, on seven occasions (1961 and 1965-1970), voting also that any proposal 
to change the Chinese representation would be 'important', within the meaning of 
Article 18 of the Charter, thus requiring a two-thirds majority. In 1966,1967, and 
1968, the Assembly rejected proposals to set up committees to study the question. 63 
<Figure 1> indicates the change in voting patterns on the representation of 
China in the General Assembly. As we can see, the support for the PRC had increased 
steadily. In contrast, the ROC did not get constant support during the 1950's and 
1960's. Although its support did rise considerably between 1960 and 1968, this 
situation did not last long. From 1968, the support for the ROC declined, leading to its 
eventual defeat on the question of representation in 1971. 
. 
61 UN Resolution 501(V), 5 November 1951; UN Resolution 800(VIII), 15 
September 1953. 
62 UN Resolution 903(IX), 21 September 1954; UN Resolution 990(X), 20 
September 1955; UN Resolution 1108(XI), 16 November 1956; UN Resolution 
1135(XII), 24 September 1957; UN Resolution 1239(XIII), 23 September 1958; UN 
Resolution 1351(XIV), 22 September 1959; UN Resolution 1493(XV), 8 October 
1960. 
63 UN Resolution 1668(XVI), 15 December 1961; UN Resolution 
2025(XX), 17 November 1965; UN Resolution 2159(XXI), 29 November 1966; UN 
Resolution 2271(XXII), 28 November 1967; UN Resolution 2389(XXIH), 19 
November 1968; UN Resolution 2500(XXIV), 11 November 1969; UN Resolution 
2642(XXV), 20 November 1970. Also Bailey, supra note 48, pp. 150-155. 
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Figure 1 United Nations General Assembly Voting on the Issue of Representation of 
China 








1950 1951 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Source: Djonovich, ed., United Nations Resolutions (Oceana Publications, Inc.: Debbs 
Ferry, New York, 1990). 
In 1971, when the situation in the General Assembly was unfavourable to the 
ROC, the US proposed a draft resolution providing for the Dual Representation of 
China in the UN. 64 That draft resolution stated that 
1. [T]he UN should take cognisance of the existence of both the People's 
Republic of China and the Republic of China ... [I]t should not be 
required to take a position on the respective conflicting claims ... 
pending a peaceful reconciliation of the matter as called for by the 
Charter. 
2. Thus the People's Republic of China should be represented and at the 
same time provision should be made that the Republic of China is not 
deprived of its representation. [brackets added] 
64 UN. Doc. A/8442; 10 ILM (1971) p. 1100. 
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This could have been a turning point for the ROC to maintain its membership 
in the UN. However, the draft resolution was not put to the vote, 65 because both 
Chinese governments rejected any possibility which could create two Chinas. 
On 25 October 1971, the General Assembly of the UN adopted a resolution, 
Resolution 2758(XXVI), 66 by 76 votes to 35 with 17 abstentions, which read 
The General Assembly, 
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's 
Republic of China is essential both for the protection of the Charter of the 
United Nations and for the cause that the United Nations must serve under 
the Charter, 
Recognising that the representatives of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the 
United Nations and that the People's Republic of China is one of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, 
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of China and to 
recognise the representatives of its Government as the only legitimate 
representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel forthwith the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-Shek from the place which they, unlawfully 
occupy at the United Nations and in all the organisations related to it. 
Consequently, the ROC representatives were expelled from the UN and the 
related specialised organisations. 67 From that time, the PRC took the Chinese seat in 
the UN, including permanent membership of the Security Council. 
65 11 ILM (1972) pp. 5 61-573. 
66 Yearbook of the United Nations: 1971, Vol. 25 (1973) pp. 126-137; also 
Remz, comp., Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1971-1972 (1973) p. 54. 
67 See Chiu, Chen, and Lee, "Contemporary Practices and Judicial Decisions 
of the Republic of China Relating to International Law [1979-1981]" 1 CYILA (1981) 
pp. 142-143; also 11 ILM(1972) pp. 561-562; 12 ILM(1973) pp. 1526-1527; 20 ILM 
(1981) pp. 774-781. 
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3.3. RECOGNITION BY STATES 
According to the PRC, the ROC government which was ruled by the KMT, had been 
overthrown by the Chinese people and sovereignty had been transferred to the PRC 
government. The ROC, either as a state or as a government, has not existed since 1949. 
Consequently, recognition can only be conferred upon the PRC. Following this logic, 
the PRC has'tried to establish official diplomatic relations with other states, and at the 
same time it has asked states to terminate their diplomatic relations with the ROC. 
To illustrate this situation, it is worth looking at the procedure whereby 
diplomatic relations were established between France and the PRC. In October 1963, 
General de Gaulle sent a special mission to China to discuss the subject of establishing 
diplomatic relations. On 27 January 1964, France and the PRC announced that they 
would establish diplomatic relations, with ambassadors to be exchanged over the 
following three months. The ROC embassy filed a strong protest over this unfriendly 
act, but did not sever diplomatic relations. However, under strong pressure from the 
PRC, it is reported that France urged the ROC to withdraw its embassy voluntarily, 
otherwise the latter would face expulsion from France. Having no other choice, the 
ROC terminated diplomatic relations with France on 10 February 1964.68 
Under such circumstances, the diplomatic competition between the ROC and 
the PRC is a zero-sum game; none of the states can grant recognition to both 
68 Cohen and Chiu, People's China and International Law: A Documentary 
Study, Vol. 1 (1974) pp. 237-239. Also, see Shen, "The Taiwan Issue in Peking's 
Foreign Relations in the 1970's: A Systematic Review, " 1 CYILA (1982) pp. 77-78. 
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governments. Due to the'One China Policy', the ROC has great difficulty in combating 
the PRC, because the PRC occupies the territory, which is synonymous with'China' in 
traditional thinking, exercising jurisdiction and control over its vast population. 
Another important point is, as D. P. O'Connell pointed out, that a government 
is only recognised for what it claims to be. 69 With a small land area of an island and 
comparatively small population, Taiwan is hardly in a position to persuade other states 
to recognise the ROC in Taiwan as the representative of whole China. 70 Furthermore, 
as the PRC replaced the ROC as one of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council in 1971, the PRC holds far greater international political power, and has much 
greater influence in international affairs. Moreover, as far as international relations in 
the 1970's and 1980's are concerned, following the detente between Eastern and 
Western (or Communist and Democratic) countries, Taiwan's strategic importance 
was fading. All these advantages helped the PRC persuade states to recognise it as the 
sole Chinese government. 71 
69 O'Connell, supra note 38, p. 415. 
70 Because the ROC government never seeks recognition as 'Taiwanese 
Government'. In the ROC constitution, Taiwan is administratively categorised as a 
province. 
71 This may be compared with the situation of succession between Russia and 
the Soviet Union. Because there were a variety of crucial arms control and 
disarmament treaties with the Soviet Union, the Western states were willing to take the 
view that there was a continuity of statehood between Russia and the Soviet Union, 
and, with the agreement of the Commonwealth States, agreed that Russia took the 
Soviet Union's seat in the UN. See Warbrick, "Current Development: Public 
International Law, " 41 ICLQ (1992) p. 481; Rich, "Recognition of States: The 
Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, " 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 58-60. 
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Theoretically, a state is free to decide whether it wants to accord recognition to 
another state in accordance with international law. There is no centralised authority to 
prescribe what states should do or should not do. Besides, international law is a 
decentralised legal system, thus the accordance of recognition ultimately depends on a 
state's discretion. 72 In international practice, a state's decision to recognise another 
state is treated as a matter of policy and is exercised in order to protect its own national 
interest. Thus, recognition of states becomes a political function of the executive 
department of a government. In other words, during the process of making foreign 
policy, political considerations are of greater importance than theoretical ones. 73 
As we can see, the decision of a state to recognise an entity as a state is a highly 
political issue and it is natural for a state to pursue its own national interests. This helps 
explain why the number of states recognising the ROC has continued to decrease since 
it withdrew from the UN. As of 23 May 1972,50 countries had diplomatic relations 
with the ROC and 71 had established or had announced establishment of diplomatic 
72 O'Connell, supra note 46, p. 132. 
73 Brierly, The Law of Nations, 6th Edition (1963) p. 140; Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, 4th Edition (1990) p. 92; Idem, "Recognition 
in Theory and Practice, " 53 BYIL (1982) p. 201; Lauterpacht, ed., Hersch 
Lauterpacht's International Law, Vol. 1 (1970) pp. 323-324; Jennings and Watts, eds., 
Oppenheim's International Law, Vol. 1, Parts 2 to 4,9th Edition (1992) pp.. 132-133. 
Also see infra page 99 about the recognition of newly independent states from 
Yugoslavia. 
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relations with the PRC. There are now only 29 countries with formal diplomatic 
relations with the ROC74 and 147 countries with the PRC. 75 
Following the ROC's withdrawal from the UN and the decrease in the number 
of states recognising the ROC, a question arises: If, let us suppose, there is no state . 
which recognises the ROC, is the ROC still a state? What is its international 
personality? Relating to this question, it is necessary to examine recognition theory in 
international law. 
4. IS TAIWAN A STATE? - 
A VIEW FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As explained, the ROC is not recognised as a state by most countries, nor is it a 
member state of the UN. Nonetheless, the ROC provides the effective government of 
the state which is based in Taiwan. What, if any, is the ROC's international status? We 
shall look at this issue from the international law perspective and international lawyers' 
opinions in the following sections. 
74 They are Bahamas, Belize, Centrafricaine (Central African Republic), 
Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nauru, 
Nicaragua, Niger, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. 
Vincent & Grenadines, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Tonga, and 
Tuvalu. See 11 CYILA (1991-92). As for relations between other states and Taiwan, 
Taiwan maintains good relations, although not official, with them. See infra note 99 
and the accompanying text. 
75 Zhong-kuo Bai-ke Mien-Chien: 1992, supra note 29. 
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4.1. RECOGNITION CRITERIA 
The traditional 'requirements' of statehood, the criteria of a state's characteristics, 76 are 
enumerated in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: 77 
Article 1 
The State as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a 
Government; and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other States. 
These criteria will be discussed as follows: 
(A) population: There are no requirements for the size of the population, 78 but 
obviously it must be a permanent population. This criterion is intended to be used in 
association with that of territory, and connotes a stable community. Evidentially it is 
important, since in the absence of the physical basis for an organised community, it 
will be difficult to establish the existence of a state. 79 The population of 21,715,000 
inhabitants on Taiwan is stable with an annual growth rate of 2.17% in 1993 and there 
is no meaningful migration or other movement of people into or out of Taiwan. 80 
76 However, the requirements in the 1933 Montevideo Convention illustrate 
a basic list for recognition criteria. New requirements are produced in different 
situations and in different cases. Cf. Those requirements mentioned in the "Guidelines 
on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union by the EC 
member states". See infra note 103-106 and the accompanying text. 
77 LNTS, Vol. 165, p. 19. 
78 Crawford, supra note 38, p. 40. Actually, there are many micro states with 
little population are recognised by other states. Such as Andorra with population of 
63,930, Liechtenstein with population of 30,281, and Monaco with population of 
31,278. See CIA World Factbook, at gopher: //hoshi. cic. sfu. ca: 70/00/dlam/cia/all. 
79 Brownlie, supra note 73, p. 73; Crawford, supra note 38, p. 40. 
80 Taiwan Statistical Data Book: 1993. 
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(B) Defined territory: There must be a reasonably stable political community and this 
must be in control of a certain area, no matter the size of the area. It is clear from past 
practice that the existence of fully defined frontiers is not required and that what 
matters is the effective establishment of a political community. 81 Some may argue that 
the ROC government's claim to mainland China, which is not under its control, would 
give the ROC no defined territory. However, the ROC's loss of control of mainland 
China can be considered the loss of part of its territory due to civil war. 82 Moreover, 
after 1945, the ROC government has effectively controlled Taiwan, Penghu Islands, 
Kinnen Islands, and Matsu Islands, with a land area of 35,981 km2,83 for forty-six 
years. It can therefore be considered that the ROC maintains a stable and defined 
territory. As Jessup stated, 84 
One does not find in the general classic treatment of the subject any 
insistence that the territory of a state must be exactly fixed by definite 
frontiers. We all know that historically, many states have long begun their 
existence ... Both reason and history demonstrate that the concept of 
territory does not necessarily include precise delimitation of the 
boundaries of the territory. The reason for the rule that one of the 
necessary attributes of a state is that it shall possess territory: one cannot 
contemplate a state as a kind of disembodied spirit. 
81 For example, Israel is accepted by the majority of nations as well as was 
admitted to the UN in spite of dispute over its borders. Brownlie, supra note 73,. p. 73; 
Whiteman, supra note 21, Vol. 1, pp. 230-231. Cf. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 
p. 33. 
82 Supra notes 26-28, and the accompanying text. 
83 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 17,15th Edition (1982) p. 995. 
84 Friedman, et al, Cases and Materials in International Law (1969) pp. 
155-156. Cf. The Unification of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in August 1990. See Treaty on the Establishment of German 
Unity, 31 August 1990, in 30 ILM (1991) p. 498. 
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However, it is still an argument that Taiwan's international legal status relating 
to its authority over the territory. In view of this, the ROC government has adopted a 
pragmatic measure to demonstrate Taiwan's practical jurisdiction. This can be seen 
from the following example: 
In view of its rapidly growing economy, the ROC felt its standing would be 
damaged if it did not join General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). On 1 
January 1990, Taiwan officially notified the Director-General of the GATT of its 
decision to accede to the GATT 85 
In fact, the ROC government, on behalf of China, signed the GATT on 30 
October 1947 and deposited its Instrument of Acceptance of Provisional Application 
of the GATT on 21 April 1948, and became one of the 23 original contracting parties 
to the GATT on 7 May 1948.86 After the ROC government moved to Taiwan in 1949, 
it found that it would be impossible to continue the rights and obligations under the 
GATT and it notified the Secretary-General of the UN of its decision to withdraw from 
GATT membership on 6 March 1950.87 
There are three methods by which a government can be a contracting party to 
the GATT, namely original membership, accession under Article XXXIII, and 
85 'Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime of the Customs Territory of 
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Submitted by the Republic of China to the 
General Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade, January 1,1990. ' in 9 CYILA (1989) p. 224. 
86 GATT, Final Act, 55 UNTS (1947) p. 194. 
87 'Communication from Secretary-General of United Nations Regarding 
China'. GATT Doc. CP/54,6 March 1950. 
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accession through sponsorship under Article XXVI(5)(c). 88 Under the first method, 
because the PRC had already requested to resume China's status as an original 
contracting party to the GATT on 14 July 1986,89 there would be a direct conflict with 
the PRC if Taiwan chose this method. 
As for the third method, Article XXVI(5)(c)90 stipulates that 
If any of the customs territories, in respect of which a Contracting Party 
has accepted this Agreement, possesses or acquires full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement, such territory shall, upon sponsorship 
through a declaration by the responsible Contracting Party establishing the 
above-mentioned fact, be deemed to be a Contracting Party. 
Hong Kong followed this method to get its GATT membership through the 
sponsorship of the UK. 91 If this method were to be taken, Taiwan would have had to 
wait for the solution of the PRC's GATT membership problem in order to seek 
sponsorship, because the PRC reiterated its 'One China Policy' and the position that 
88 For the GATT text, see Jackson and Davey, 1989 Documents Supplement 
to Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 2nd Edition (1989) pp. 1-67. 
89 'Communication from the People's Republic of China'. GATT Doc. 
L/6017 (14 July 1986). Also, see Feng, "China's Membership of GATT: A Practical 
Proposal, " 22(6) JWT (1988) pp. 53-70; Wang, "China's Return to GATT: Legal and 
Economic Implications, " 28(3) JWT (1994) pp. 51-65. 
90 Jackson and Davey, supra note 88, p. 39. 
91 "Hong Kong Joins GATT, Separate Membership to Continue Even Under 
Chinese Sovereignty, " 3(18) Intl Trade Rept. (30 April 1986) pp. 581-582. 
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Taiwan should only become a GATT member under the sponsorship of the PRC as its 
customs territory under Article XXIV(5)(c). 92 
The second method, Article XXXffl of the GATT, provides 
A government not party to this Agreement, or a government acting on 
behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external commercial relations and of the other matters 
provided for in this Agreement, may accede to this Agreement, on its own 
behalf or on behalf of that territory, on terms to be agreed between such 
government and the Contracting Parties. Decisions of the Contracting 
Parties under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds majority. 
Obviously, the ROC government chose this method to accede to the GATT. In 
addition, in order to avoid pressure and opposition from the PRC, the ROC took a 
delicate position in this decision. It applied to GATT not as a nation state, but as a 
separate customs territory, the Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu. This title was used in order to avoid unnecessary issues being raised by the 
PRC. On the one hand, 'ROC could be opposed by the PRC in terms of 'two Chinas'. 
On the other hand, 'Taiwan' could imply independence, which is both contrary to the 
ROC national policy and provocative to the PRC. 94 Nonetheless, under the separate 
92 Cai, "China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues, " 
26(1) JWT (1992) pp. 50-52; Williams and Moore, "Who Goes First? Taiwan's GATT 
Application Angers Peking, " FEER (1 February 1990) p. 36; "Mainland Official on 
Taiwan Joining GATT, " Being Review (27 August -2 September 1990) p. 2; "Taiwan 
Province as a Part of China Has No Right to Join the GATT by Itself, " People's Daily 
(20 October 1989) p. 1. 
93 Jackson and Davey, supra note 88, p. 44. 
94 Chiu, "Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade, " 10 CYILA (1990) p. 201. 
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customs territory title, the fact that the ROC government has effective jurisdiction over 
a defined territory can be distinct. 
(C) Government: The shortest definition of a state for present purposes is perhaps a 
stable political community, supporting a legal order, in a certain area. The existence of 
effective government, with centralised administrative and legislative organs, is the best 
evidence of a stable political community. 95 International law defines 'territory' not by 
adopting private law analogies of real property, but by reference to the extent of 
governmental power exercised, or capable of being exercised, with respect to some 
area and population. Territorial sovereignty is not ownership of, but governing power 
with respect to, territory and the population in it. 96 Taiwan is under the effective 
control of the ROC government, which was established in 1911 and had its 
constitution drawn up in 1947. The ROC government has provided the people in 
Taiwan with a successful political democracy and prosperous economy. These 
achievements illustrate that the government in Taiwan is an effective government. 
95 Brownlie, supra note 73, p. 73; Guggenheim, 80 Recueil des cours 
(1952-I) p. 83. 
96 Crawford, supra note 38, p. 42. N. A. Maryan Green also points out three 
conditions for a government: 1. it must represent the state, in the sense that it speaks in 
the name of the population; 2. it must be able to govern this population, in the sense 
that it can impose its will; 3. it must have some likelihood of permanence, in that, even 
if the actual - government loses office it will be replaced by another. See Green, 
International Law (1987) p. 43. 
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(D) Capacity to enter into relations with other states: This is the most important 
requirement for a state. A state must have the capacity to maintain external relations 
with other states. This would distinguish states from other lesser political 
components. 97 So far as Taiwan's capacity to enter into relations with other states is. 
concerned, Taiwan keeps official relations with 29 states, 98 it is a member state of 
some international or regional organisations, it maintains semi-official and unofficial 
relations with more than 140 states in the world, with some Taiwanese representatives 
still known as 'Representative of the ROC'. 99 Most of these offices are in fact staffed 
with government officials authorised to execute the normal tasks of diplomatic 
missions and enjoy certain privileges and immunities. In fact, this has become standard 
practice between the ROC and other non-official relations countries. In 1972, when 
Japan recognised the PRC, an Interchange Association was established in Taipei to 
represent the Japanese government, although this was not made public. A counterpart 
authority, Association of East Asian Relations, was established in Tokyo by the ROC 
97 Such as the Free City of Danzig, which was created in the Treaty of Peace 
with Germany in 1919, and the Free Territory of Trieste, which was created in the 
Peace Treaty with Italy in 1947. See Brownlie, supra note 73, pp. 61-62. 
98 Supra note 74. 
99 They are Trade Mission of the Republic of China, Fiji; Trade Mission of 
the Republic of China, Papua New Guinea; Trade Mission of the Republic of China, 
Bahrain; Commercial Office of the Republic of China to Dubai, United Arab Emirates; 
Commercial Office of the Republic of China to the State of Kuwait; Commercial 
Office of the Republic of China, Libya; Trade Mission of the Republic of China, 
Mauritius; Oficina Commercial-Consular de la Republica de China, Bolivia; and 
Oficina Comercial de la Republica de China, Ecuador. See 30(10) IAS (1991) 
Appendix, pp. 136-139. And Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait (1993) pp. 
117-119. 
98 
government. 100 In 1975, when the Philippines recognised the PRC, the Philippines 
established an Asian Exchange Centre in Taipei, whilst the ROC established a Pacific 
Economic and Cultural Centre in Manila. 101 After the US recognised the PRC in 1978, 
the former American embassy in Taiwan was replaced by the American Institute in 
Taiwan and the ROC embassy in the US was replaced by the Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs. 102 These facts sufficiently demonstrate Taiwan's capacity. 
However, as Professor Brownlie has pointed out, "[N]ot all the conditions are 
peremptory, and in any case further criteria must be employed to produce a working 
legal definition of statehood. "103 New recognition criteria appear in accordance with 
different times and different states. The recognition of states following the break up of 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia illustrates Professor Brownlie's opinion. 104 The EC's 
100 Morley, "The Japanese Formula for Normalisation and Its Relevance for 
US-China Policy, " in Chiu, Normalising Relations with the People's Republic of 
China: Problems, Analysis and Documents (1978) pp. 121-136; Rowe, Informal 
Relations: The Case of Japan and the Republic of China, 1972-1974 (1975). The 
Association of East Asian Representative Office was renamed as Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Representative Office in Japan in April 1992. 
101 Lotilla, "Reflections on the Framework of Manila-Taipei Relations and 
Current Bilateral Ocean-Use Disputes, " 64 Philippine Law Journal (1989) pp. 1-20. In 
December 1989, Asian Exchange Centre was renamed as Manila Economic Cultural 
Office and Pacific Economic and Cultural Centre was renamed as Taipei Economic 
and Cultural Office. 
102 See 'Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities between the 
American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American 
Affairs, October 2,1980'. Text reprinted in 1 CYILA (1981) pp. 235-240. 
103 Brownlie, supra note 73, p. 72. 
104 About the independence movements that occurred in Yugoslavia, see 
Warbrick, supra note 71, pp. 473-482; Weller, "The International Response to the 
Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, " 86 AJIL (1992) pp. 
569-607; Zametica, The Yugoslav Conflict (1992). 
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position on the independence movements and the recognition of those new states was 
settled in a 'Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union' made on 16 December 1991.105 In the Guidelines, 
several requirements for recognition were set out: 
[The Community and its Member States] affirm their readiness to 
recognise, subject to the normal standards of international practice and the 
political realities in each case, those new States which, following the 
historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a 
democratic basis, have accepted the appropriate international obligations 
and have committed themselves in good faith to a peaceful process and to 
negotiations. 
Therefore, they adopted a common position on the process of recognition 
of these new States, which requires: 
1. Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the- 
Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy 
and human rights; 
2. Guarantees for the rights of the ethnic and national groups and 
minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the 
framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; 
3. Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed 
by peaceful means and by common agreement; 
4. Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament 
and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional 
stability; 
5. Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by 
recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes. 
The Community and its Member States will not recognise entities which 
are the result of aggression. They would take account of the effect of 
recognition on neighbouring States. 
The commitment to these principles opens the way to recognition by the 
Community and its Member States and to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. It could be laid down in agreements. 
105 31 ILM (1992) pp. 1485-1487. For discussion, see Mullerson, 
International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern Europe and the CIS 
(1994) pp. 125-135; Rich, supra note 71, pp. 36-65. 
100 
The Guidelines points out several requirements to be recognised by EC 
member states: respect for the rule of law, respect for democracy, respect for human 
rights, respect for the inviolability of all frontiers, maintenance of regional stability, 
and peaceful settlement of disputes. The Guidelines end with "The commitment to 
these principles opens the way to recognition by the Community and its Member States 
and to the establishment of diplomatic relations. " These requirements are different 
from those stipulated in the Montevideo Convention and obviously political 
consideration plays an important role in recognition. 106 
With regard to 'criteria' or'requirements' of statehood, there is no doubt that the 
ROC fulfils the objective elements contained in the criteria of statehood in the 
Montevideo Convention. Therefore, the ROC on Taiwan could be accepted as an 
independent state and be recognised by other states, but the reality is otherwise. As has 
been said: there are only 29 countries which have official relations with the ROC. It is 
not a member state in the UN either, not to mention being a member of the specialised 
organisations which are subordinate to the UN. Some international lawyers have 
expressed their opinions on the issue of Taiwan's international status. 
L. Henkin, et at., described Taiwan asIO7 
106 For discussion on the Guidelines and recognition, see Bieber, "European 
Community Recognition of Eastern European States: A New Perspective for 
International Law? " ASIL Proc. (1992) pp. 374-377; Rich, ibid., pp. 42-44,55; Turk, 
"Recognition of States: A Comment, " 4 EJIL (1993) pp. 68-69; Weller, supra note 
104, p. 589. 
107 Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, International Law: Cases and 
Materials (1987) p. 278. 
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"[I]t was acknowledged that Taiwan was under the de facto authority of a 
government that engaged in foreign relations and entered into 
international agreements with other governments. " 
Gerhard von Glahn said108 
"From a factual point of view, the Republic of China continues, of course, 
to exist as an independent entity, even though it was recognised by only 
twenty-two members of the family of the nations. " 
Ian Brownlie remarked that109 
"[T]he case of territory the title to which is undetermined, and which is 
inhabited and has an independent administration, creates problems. On the 
analogy of belligerent communities and special regimes not dependent on 
the existence of the sovereignty of a particular state ..., communities 
existing on territory with such a status may be treated as having a modified 
personality, approximating to that of a state. On one view of the facts this 
is the situation of Taiwan. " 
J. Crawford stated that110 
"[I]ts status is that of a consolidated local de facto government in a civil 
war situation ... 
It is a party to various conventions binding its own 
territory. Courts faced with specific issues concerning its status may treat 
it on a de facto basis as a 'well defined geographical, social, and political 
entity (with)... a government which has undisputed control of the island'... 
Internationally the Government of Formosa is a well established de facto 
government, capable of committing the State to at least certain classes of 
transaction. " 
108 von Glahn, The Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public 
International Law, 6th Edition (1986) p. 63. 
109 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2nd Edition (1973) pp. 
68-69. However, Professor Brownlie does not mention this issue in the later editions of 
his books. 
110 Crawford, supra note 38, pp. 151-152. 
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Obviously, there is a gap between recognition theory in international law and 
practical international politics. 111 The following section will expound upon this gap 
attempting to find a means to narrow the differences. 
4.2. RECOGNITION THEORIES 
Theories of recognition are often advanced as either constitutive or declaratory 
theories. With respect to the constitutive theory, the political act of recognition is seen 
as a necessary precondition to the existence of the capacities of statehood or 
government. In other words, the international personality of a state depends on the 
political decision of other states, thus recognition is said to 'constitute' the state or 
government. 112 
According to the declaratory view, the legal effects of recognition are limited, 
since recognition is a mere declaration or acknowledgement of an existing state of law 
and fact, legal personality having been conferred previously by operation of law. 113 In 
other words; the act of recognition is not decisive to the state's claim to statehood, and 
111 The recognition of new states independent from Yugoslavia can 
demonstrate this gap. 
112 Jennings and Watts, eds., supra note 73, p. 133; Lauterpacht, 3 Mod L. 
Rev. (1939-40) pp. 1-20; Brierly, supra note 73, p. 138; Crawford, supra note 38, pp. 
17-20; Wright, "Some Thoughts about Recognition, " 44 AJIL (1950) p. 548. 
113 Alloff, Eunomia: New Orderfora New World (1990) pp. 306-308; Brierly, 
ibid., p. 139; Brownlie, supra note 73, pp. 88-89; Crawford, ibid., pp. 20-23; 
O'Connell, supra note 46, pp. 129-132; Waldock, 106 Hague Recueil (1962-11) pp. 
147-151. 
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a state's international legal personality does not depend on its recognition by other 
states. Brierly expressed the logic of the declaration theory as follows: 114 
A state may exist without being recognised, and if it does exist in fact, 
then, whether or not it has been formally recognised by other states, it has 
a right to be treated by them as a state. The primary function of recognition 
is to acknowledge as a fact something which has hitherto been uncertain, 
namely the independence of the body claiming to be a state, and to declare 
the recognising state's readiness to accept the normal consequences of that 
fact, namely the usual courtesies of international intercourse. 
The disadvantage of the constitutive theory is that an unrecognised state may 
not be subject to the obligations imposed by international law and may accordingly be 
free from such restraints as, for instance, the prohibition of aggression. As far as 
bilateral relations are concerned, a non-recognised state has no international 
personality in the view of a non-recognising state. However, it is more complicated 
and more ambiguous in multilateral relations, if a state were recognised by some states 
but not others; what would its international personality be then? 115 Hence, the 
constitutive theory creates more difficulties and problems than it solves in practice. 
In practice, the decision to recognise or to withdraw recognition from a state is 
a matter of political act. In other words, states use recognition as a tool to implement 
foreign policy. In Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State116 the 
German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal held the same opinion 
114 Brierly, ibid, p. 139. 
115 Such as Israel and several Arab states are member states of the UN, but 
these Arab states do not recognise Israel. Cf., supra note 81. 
116 5 Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases (1929-1930) p. 15. 
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[A]ccording to the opinion rightly admitted by the great majority of 
writers on international law, the recognition of a State is not constitutive 
but merely declaratory. The State exists by itself and the recognition is 
nothing else than a declaration of this existence, recognised by the States 
from which it emanates. 
Based on the above discussion, according to international practice, recognition 
is not a precondition for a state to exist. For example, the US did not recognise the 
USSR until October 1933,117 although the latter was established in 1922 and there 
were 26 states which had recognised it before the US did-118 The non-recognition of 
the US did not influence the Soviet Union's existence. The same effect also applies to 
Taiwan. 
In international practice, it is true that no official relations exist between State 
A and State B if State A does not recognise State B. Given this, State B cannot exercise 
all the capacities of statehood in international law in State A. Such capacities119 
include diplomatic intercourse, privileges, immunities, and the establishment of 
diplomatic missions. In the English law system, an unrecognised government or state 
cannot be a party to actions before an English municipal court. Hence all the actions 
117 'USSR-US Exchange of Communications between the President of the US 
and the President of the All Union Central Executive Committee, October 1933'. See 
28 AJIL (1934) Supplement, Official Documents, p. 1. 
118 Editorial Comment, Recognition of Russia, 28 AJIL (1934) p. 90. 
119 See 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 UNTS 95; UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 20/13. 
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made by it would be regarded as null and void. 120 Nonetheless, Lord Denning M. R. 
felt this would not be a fair situation for both parties. In Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v. 
Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd., he stated: 121 
"If it were necessary ... I would unhesitatingly hold that the courts of this 
country can recognise the laws or acts of a body which is in effective 
control of a territory even though it has not been recognised by Her 
Majesty's Government de jure or de facto at any rate, in regard to the laws 
which regulate the day to day affairs of the people, such as their marriages, 
their divorces, their leases, their occupations and so forth. " 
In the case of UK-ROC relations, for example, the UK government maintained 
diplomatic relations with the ROC government till the PRC was established. On 6 
January 1950, the UK government declared that122 
[H]aving completed their study of the situation resulting from the 
formation of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of 
China, and observing that it is now in effective control of by far the greater 
part of the territory of China, have this day recognised that government as 
the de jure government of China. 
120 See Lord Reid's opinion in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., 
[1967] 1 A. C. 853, p. 907. For the discussion on UK policy of recognition, see 
Symmons, "United Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Recognition of 
Governments: A Rose by Another Name? " (1981] Pub. L., p. 249; Talmon, 
"Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy and Practice, " 
63 BYIL (1992) p. 231. 
121 [1978] Q. B. 205 (C. A. ) at 218. Cf. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner and 
Keeler, Ltd. case, ibid. 
122 Note from the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin, to Chou En-Lai 
Announcing the Recognition of the Central People's Government as the DE JURE 
Government of China by the Government of the United Kingdom, 6 January 1950'. 
Cited from Cohen and Chiu, supra note 68, p. 213. 
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On the same day, the UK government also withdrew recognition of the ROC 
government and informed the Chinese Ambassador in London. 123 Nonetheless, the 
UK government still had certain legal relations, such as acceptance of passports, with 
the Taiwan authority and maintained a consulate in Tamsui, Taiwan until 1972.124 
Owing to the fact that the UK government recognises the PRC, the UK Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office stated, almost periodically, that the British government 
neither recognises Taiwan as a government nor has official dealings with the 
authorities there-125 Notwithstanding, these official statements do not prevent the UK 
government from having unofficial contacts with the ROC government in Taiwan 
whereby British interests can be protected. 126 As the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs remarked in response to the question of what 
machinery existed to enable communication between Taiwan and the British 
123 The Times (7 January 1950). 
124 Crawford, supra note 38, pp. 143-152; 6 ICLQ (1957) pp. 507-508; British 
Practice in International Law (1964) p. 25; HC, Debs., vol. 833, col. 35: 13 March 
1972; and Clough, Island China (1978) p. 154. 
125 See HC Debs., vol. 988, Written Answers, col. 41: 7 July 1980; HC Debs., 
vol. 17, Written Answers, col. 279: 8 February 1982; HC Debs., vol. 55, Written 
Answers, col. 226: 29 February 1984; HC Debs., vol. 71, Written Answers, col. 549: 
24 January 1985; HC Debs., vol. 81, Written Answers, col. 149: 19 June 1985; HC 
Debs., vol. 160, Written Answers, col. 119: 14 November 1989; HC Debs., vol. 170, 
Written Answers, col. 705: 4 April 1990; HL Debs., vol. 521, col. 1786: 26 July 1990; 
HC Debs., vol. 184, Written Answers, col. 692: 1 February 1991;, HC Debs., vol. 191, 
Written Answers, col. 342: 20 May 1991; HC Debs., vol. 196, Written Answers, col. 
293: 18 October 1991. Cf. Luigi Monta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co. Ltd., [1956] 2 
Q. B. 552. 
126 HC Debs., vol. 191, Written Answers, col. 342: 20 May 1991. 
107 
government, "We have no governmental dealings with the authorities in Taiwan. There 
are established unofficial means through which British interests are promoted. "127 
Between 1972 and 1992 the UK had no diplomatic service personnel stationed 
in Taiwan. Consular and other quasi-diplomatic relations were carried out through the 
Anglo-Taiwan Trade Committee (ATTC), which had offices in both London and 
Taipei. Run principally by businessmen, its main purpose was to promote trade 
between Britain and Taiwan. 128 In terms of trading relations, UK trade with Taiwan is 
roughly equal in value to UK trade with the PRC, if re-exports via Hong Kong are 
taken into account. The UK's trade with Taiwan grew faster over the past twelve years 
from 1981 to 1992 inclusive than it did with the PRC. Over this period UK imports 
from Taiwan grew in value terms by 434%, whilst UK exports to Taiwan grew by 
464%. 129 In addition, a Visa Handling Office was established within the ATTC in 
Taipei in 1989 to deal with visa issuing affairs. 130 In 1992 a diplomat from the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office was seconded as the new Director of the ATTC. In October 
127 Ibid. 
128 HC Debs., vol. 159, Written Answers, col. 348: 3 November 1989; First 
Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Commons, Session 1993-94, 
Relations Between the United Kingdom and China in the Period Up to and Beyond 
1997, Vol. I (1994) para. 70. 
129 Relations Between the United Kingdom and China in the Period Up to and 
Beyond 1997, ibid., paras. 108-111. 
130 HC Debs., vol. 201, Written Answers, col. 712: 17 January 1992. The UK 
Visa Handling Office in Taipei had issued 78,782 visas by 1991. 
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1993 the ATTC was renamed the British Trade and Cultural Office, with a deputy- 
director seconded from the Department of Trade and Industry. 131 
As far as the non-recognised state's municipal law is concerned, Taiwanese law 
can be accepted by the UK government if it is based on reciprocity. In reply to a. 
question on the subject of copyright piracy in Taiwan, the Minister of State, 
Department of Trade and Industry, wrote: 132 
It is not possible for the Government to make representations direct to the 
authorities in Taiwan, which the United Kingdom does not recognise. 
Taiwan has, however, recently introduced a new copyright law which will 
protect foreign works if they are registered in Taiwan, provided that the 
country of which the authors of those works are nationals gives reciprocal 
copyright protection. To ensure eligibility of works of United Kingdom 
authors for registration in Taiwan, the United. Kingdom made an Order in 
Council on 18 November 1985 providing the necessary protection in the 
United Kingdom for works originating in Taiwan. No further action is 
contemplated unless there is evidence that the new Taiwan law is failing to 
protect United Kingdom works against copyright piracy. 
As for US-ROC relations, the situation is similar. After the US announced its 
recognition of government of the PRC in December 1978 and withdrew its recognition 
of the ROC government on Taiwan from 1 January 1979,133 it still enacted the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) of 1979134 to treat Taiwan as a state: 
131 Relations Between the United Kingdom and China in the Period Up to and 
Beyond 1997, supra note 128, para. 70. 
132 HC Debs., vol. 82, Written Answers, col. 190: 19 March 1986. 
133 18 ILM (1979) pp. 272-275. 
134 For text of Taiwan Relations Act 1979,18 ILM (1979) p. 873; 73 AJIL 
(1979) pp. 669-677. 
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Sec. 4 (b) 
(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign 
countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms 
shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan. 
Also, in order to maintain US commercial, cultural, and other relations with 
Taiwan without official representative, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) was 
established to fulfil those functions under the stipulation of the TRA: 
Sec. 6 (b) 
Whenever the President or any agency of the United States government is 
authorised or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to 
enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction 
relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, 
performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the 
President, by or through the Institute. 
Hence, the AIT actually performs most of the same functions that were previously 
performed by the US embassy in Taiwan. 
Therefore, from the view of international law and practice, recognition should 
not be a precondition to the existence of a state and the declaratory theory seems to 
provide a better answer on recognition issues. 
4.3., REMARKS 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that pressure from the PRC is a major 
influence in the interaction between the ROC and other countries. Even so, it is well 
known that Taiwan is under the full control of the de facto authority of a government 
which has, either formally or informally, engaged in foreign relations and enters into 
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international agreements with other governments. 135 Additionally, the population of 
Taiwan is under the jurisdiction of the ROC government, not the PRC government. 136 
In which case, it is undesirable that the population of such an area should be regarded 
as 'stateless' in law and the government which has jurisdiction over this area would be 
categorised as a subordinate province under another country. 
In theory, a non-recognised state cannot enjoy the full function that a state can. 
But, in practice, a non-recognised state is still a member of the international 
community, just as an international law scholar states: 137 
It is generally admitted that an unrecognised state cannot be completely. 
ignored. Its territory cannot be considered to be no-man's-land; there is no 
right to overfly without permission; ships flying its flag cannot be 
considered stateless, and so on. 
Therefore, the ROC government is still a legal government, although it is no 
longer recognised by certain countries which had recognised it before. Furthermore, 
the ties between Taiwan and all other states should be improved so that their mutual 
interests can be protected and promoted. This is of particular importance, when 
considering the fishery issues and disputes, which is the focus of this study. The 
135 Henkin, et al., supra note 107, p. 278; Crawford, supra note 38, p. 152. 
136 Reel v. Holder and Another [1981] 3 All E. R. 321, C. A.; also Sheng v. 
Rogers (1959) 54 AJIL (1960) p. 189. 
137 Mugerwa, "Subjects of International Law, " in Sorensen, ed., Manual of 
Public International Law (1968) p. 269. Compared with the situation of Serbia and 
Montenegro (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), although it is not recognised by most of 
the states and is not a member of the UN, its action still can not be ignored. See 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) I. C. J. 
Reports 1993, p. 3. 
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Taiwanese fishing industry represents one of the strongest distant-water fishing fleets 
in the world. Taiwan contributes to the global fishing industry, but it also has fishing- 
related disputes with other states. However, because of non-recognition, Taiwan has 
encountered several difficulties in resolving fishery disputes with other states. Even if 
the ROC is not recognised by other states, this does not preclude them from entering 
into agreements with Taiwan, especially in promoting and protecting fishery interests. 
We shall identify in the following section the impact of non-recognition of Taiwan in 
dealing with its international fishery disputes. 
5. THE IMPACTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION 
ON TAIWAN 
In this section, we will have a preview on the impact of the international recognition on 
Taiwan when it deals with international fishery disputes. The author will limit the 
discussion to three types of impact. 
5.1. STATELESSNESS138 
A stateless vessel is a vessel without nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel 
without nationality. A vessel is recognised as a stateless vessel under the following 
conditions: 
138 Statelessness can apply to individuals as well as vessels. In the former 
case, see 1961 United Nations Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, 11 ICLQ 
(1962). p. 1090; Mutharika, The Regulation of Statelessness Under International and 
National Law (1977). Due to the purpose of this research, the following discussion is 
focused on the statelessness of vessels. 
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(A) When a vessel sails under two or more different flags and uses them according to 
convenience. 139 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 6 reads: 
Article 6 
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in exceptional 
cases expressly provided for in international treaties or in these articles, 
shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas. A ship may 
not change its flag during a voyage or while in a port of call, save in the 
case of a real transfer of ownership or change of registry. 
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them 
according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in 
question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship 
without nationality. 
Similarly, the LOSC, Article 92 uses the same wording to regulate that a vessel only 
sails under one flag. 
(B) When a vessel has been deprived of the use of a flag by a country which the vessel 
claims as its flag or the vessels claimed state of nationality denies that such is the 
case. 140 
(C) When the state of the vessel is not recognised by the questioning state. 
In this chapter, we have already discussed Taiwan's international legal status. 
Given that Taiwan is not recognised by most countries, is it possible that its fishing 
vessels would be treated as a stateless ship on the high seas? In the case of Taiwan, as 
139 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 6(2) and 1982 LOSC, 
Article 92(2). 
140 Meyers, The Nationality of Ships (1967) pp. 313-315. 
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we are dealing with its status, condition (C) is at issue in this study, which is a fairly 
rare situation. 141 
In theory, if State A does not recognise State B, then a vessel of State B could 
be considered by State A as a ship without nationality. Therefore, a non-recognising 
state would treat a ship from the non-recognised state as stateless and would not allow 
this ship to enter its port, not to mention offering it any port services. In 1931, a letter 
from the US Secretary of State Moore to the US Secretary of Commerce Roper set out 
the attitude to be taken with respect to a ship which wanted to put into an American 
port while claiming Manchurian nationality. The Secretary of State wrote: 142 
[T]here is from the point of view of international relations no such thing as 
a Manchurian flag, nor would any document issued by Manchurian have 
any validity from any point of view. 
Hence, if the ship had entered an American port, the Secretary would therefore have 
considered it as stateless, because the US did not recognise Manchuria as a state. 143 If 
condition (C) is applied to Taiwan, Taiwanese fishing vessels, theoretically, may be 
considered as stateless vessels on the high seas or when they want to enter other states' 
ports. 
141 For full discussion on 'statelessness', see Chapter 6. 
142 Meyers, supra note 140, p. 311. 
143 Ibid. Cf. Molven v. Attorney General for Palestine Case, [1948] A. C. 351; 
also the Stimson Doctrine of Non-recognition, see Hackworth, Digest of International 
Law, Vol. 1 (1940) p. 334. 
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5.2. INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 
In 1971 the ROC was excluded from the United Nations and the PRC admitted in its 
place. 144 Since then, the ROC has not officially participated in any conference 
sponsored by the United Nations. In consequence, it lacks formal or official 
opportunity to present its views on controversial issues. Moreover, owing to the 
hostility between Taiwan and the PRC, 'One China Policy'145 becomes a very good 
reason for the latter to attempt to prevent the conclusion of any agreement between 
Taiwan and other countries, especially if such other countries have diplomatic 
relations with the PRC. Ever since its founding in 1949, the PRC has claimed to be the 
sole legal government of China. Because of the PRC's strong opposition, the ROC was 
unable to attend UNCLOS III, 146 even though the ROC did participate in UNCLOS I 
and II with its UN membership. 
However, the ROC's exclusion from UNCLOS III did not prevent it from 
seeking to negotiate with its neighbours in order to settle maritime boundary problems 
144 For the issue of the ROC's withdrawal from the UN and the issue of 
Chinese representative in the UN, see supra Sub-Section 3.2. Also, cf. infra Chapter 7. 
145 See supra Section 3. 
146 On 15 October 1973, when the UN Political and Security Committee 
discussed the question of a solution concerning the convening of UNCLOS III, the 
PRC delegate, Ling Ching, specifically emphasised that the "Chiang Kai-Shek clique 
should not be invited to attend the Conference on the Law of the Sea. " In 
"Recommendation for Holding United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, "45 
Hsinhua Weekly (5 November 1973) p. 22. Cited from Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward 
Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (1977) 
p. 14. 
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on the basis of the principles of international law. Its lack of progress in this matter lies 
largely in the absence of diplomatic relations with its neighbours. Following the 
diplomatic isolation of the ROC and the recognition of the PRC as the sole legal 
government of China, 147 the Philippines has been unwilling to discuss the maritime 
boundary problem in the Bashi Channel with the ROC. 148 The PRC has also 
repeatedly warned that no agreement concluded between any country and the ROC 
shall be recognised by it, and has also threatened to retaliate against any country which 
concludes any such agreements. 149 The political reality of non-recognition 
significantly constraints Taiwan when it seeks to participate in international 
conferences and organisations where it would potentially have to negotiate with other 
states. 
I 
147 The Philippines established official relations with the PRC on 9 June 1975 
and severed diplomatic relations with the ROC on the same day. 
148 It is reported that, after several fishery disputes happened between the 
ROC and the Philippines, A. M. Tolentino, Deputy Minister of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Philippines, expressed: 
"Taiwan is not a country, so it doesn't have the ability to declare an 
exclusive economic zone. Besides, owing to there is no diplomatic 
relations between us, we don't know which one we should negotiate 
with--Taiwan or PRC? " 
See China Times (7 September 1979) p. 3. 
149 For the PRC's point of view on the relations between the ROC and other 
countries, see supra Sub-Section 3.3. 
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5.3. INABILITY TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHER STATES 
As far as the capacity to conclude agreements or treaties is concerned, every 'state' 
possesses this capacity. 150 Again, statehood is an important element in obtaining this 
capacity. According to the International Law Commission's Commentary, 151 the term, 
'state' used in Article 6 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is 
[W]ith the same meaning as in the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Statute of the Court, the Geneva Convention on Diplomatic Relations; i. e. 
it means a State for the purpose of international law. 
Under this circumstance, Taiwan's capacity to conclude agreements is 
restricted if the other parties consider Taiwan is not a state. 152 In the case of a bilateral 
agreement, a non-recognising state could refuse to negotiate with Taiwan. In 
multilateral agreements, the non-recognised government will not be regarded by non- 
recognising states as competent to make its state a party to a multilateral treaty. Due to 
its recognising the PRC, the UK refused to regard the signature by the ROC 
government to the International Sugar Agreements of 1953 and 1958 as a valid 
signature on behalf of China. 153 The UK issued the following declaration: 
At the time of signing the present Agreement I declare that since the 
Government of the United Kingdom does not recognise the Nationalist 
authorities as the competent Government of China ... 
150 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 6 provides: "Every 
state possesses capacity to conclude treaties. " Also, The Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, Series 
A, No. I, p. 25. 
151 YILC (1966) Vol. 2, p. 192. 
152 Supra note 148. 
153 See Whiteman, supra note 21, vol. 2, pp. 53-54; 6 ICLQ (1957) pp. 302- 
303,508-509. 
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In the International Registration of Trade-Mark (Germany) Case, the judgement of the 
court make this point clear154 
In relation to other States which do not recognise it as a subject of 
international law, such an entity cannot be a party to a treaty ... 
Hence, under the non-recognition circumstances, it is difficult for Taiwan to 
conclude agreements with other states. 
6. OBSERVATIONS 
The ROC, by holding a tiny part of the so-called 'Chinese territory' and possessing a 
small population in relation to the huge population on mainland China, finds difficulty 
in being recognised by other states as the sole legitimate government of China. The 
ROC is discouraged from claiming, however, that it is a 'Taiwanese government', 
because this would inevitably provoke tense relations with or even a military invasion 
from the PRC. In recent years, the ROC government has taken pragmatic measures to 
demonstrate that two Chinese governments exist in China, each government with its 
own jurisdictional land and population. The ROC's political status situation is 
improving, although it is still not recognised by most states. 
In this chapter, we have identified the consequences of non-recognition, by 
which Taiwanese fishing vessels could be considered as stateless vessels on the high 
seas. It is difficult for Taiwan to enter into negotiations and conclude agreements with 
154 International Registration of Trade-Mark (Germany) Case, 28 ILR (1959) 
p. 82. Also Jennings and Watts, eds., supra note 73, p. 199. 
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other states. The impacts of such will be discussed in Part III. In the following chapter, 
we will analyse the maritime claims of the littoral states in the South China Sea region, 
in which Taiwan is a relevant party. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MARITIME CLAIMS OF THE LITTORAL STATES 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The development of the law of the sea is heavily influenced by national security 
interests and economic interests. 1 As regards security interests, a broad band of 
territorial sea offers a form of security which is as much a form of psychological or 
political security as it is a practical defence against an attack from a foreign country. 2 
In terms of economic interests, coastal states are primarily interested in gaining access 
to the resources of its marine areas. Therefore, extending territorial waters becomes a 
means to secure the coastal states' rights to the resources and the interest of security. 3 
On the other hand, major naval powers or distant-water fishing nations, which have 
1 Lewis M. Alexander puts forth four basic components of the national 
marine interests, namely accessibility, investment, dependence, and control. See 
Alexander, "Indices of National Interests in the Ocean, " 1 ODIL (1973) pp. 21-49. 
Nonetheless, they are still within the sphere of security and economic interests. 
2 Bowett, The Law of the Sea (1967) pp. 7-8; O'Connell, The Influence of 
Law on Sea Power (1975) pp. 16-21. 
3 Bowett, ibid., p. 10. 
stronger navigation interests tend to view international law in a functional way, 4 thus 
conflicts of interests between coastal states and naval powers or distant-water fishing 
nations become an inevitable phenomenon on high seas fisheries. The circumstances 
in the South China Sea is a good example of this situation. 
Since the 1970's, extending jurisdiction over adjacent maritime areas has 
become a major trend in the international law of the sea and is not a phenomenon 
limited to Taiwan and other Southeast Asian states. 5 The purpose of this Chapter is to 
present an outline of the maritime claims of the littoral states of the South China Sea. 
Besides, their claims to the island groups will also be presented. This then reveals the 
overlapping situation in this region. For the purpose of this research, only the states 
which have overlapping claims with Taiwan in the region will be introduced, rather 
than introducing the claims of all the littoral states of the South China Sea. 
4 For the interests of the naval powers, see Booth, Law, Force and 
Diplomacy at Sea (1985) pp. 61-72; Janis, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea (1976). 
Also J6nsson, Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Iceland Cod Wars and the Law of the 
Sea (1982). 
5 See Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3. 
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Map 2 South China Sea: The Area 
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Source: Chullasorn and Martosubroto, Distribution and Important Biological Features 
of Coastal Fish Resources in Southeast Asia (1986). 
I. I. GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
The South China Sea, with an area of more than one million square nautical miles, is 
not only the largest maritime area in the Southeast Asian region, but is also the 
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twenty-sixth largest basin in the world. 6 It is bounded on the east by the Philippine 
Deep and the Pacific Ocean, on the west by the Sunda Shelf and the Indian Ocean, on 
the south by the Indonesian archipelago, and on the north by the Taiwan Strait (also 
known as the Formosa Strait). <See Map 2> The littoral states, in clockwise order, are 
Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Vietnam, and the PRC. 
Geographically, the South China Sea's main axis stretches from Singapore in 
the southwest to Taiwan 1,500 nm away to the northeast. The shorter axis from 
Vietnam to Sabah measures about 480 nm. On the west lie two major gulfs, the Gulf of 
Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin.? 
As far as topography is concerned, the seabed can be divided into three zones. 
First, there is a broad, shallow continental shelf which occupies the entire Gulf of 
Thailand and continues southeastwards to the western tip of the island of Borneo. 
Secondly, this shelf continues with two arms skirting the sea shores. The section which 
follows the coast of Vietnam narrows to about 30 nm before broadening again to 
occupy the Gulf of Tonkin and extending more than 120 nm off Hongkong. The 
eastern continuation of the main continental shelf, along the north coast of Borneo, 
remains narrow throughout its length. The third zone occupies the main basin of the 
6 Isa and Noordin, The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China 
Sea (1993) p. 2; Morgan and Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast 
Asian Seas (1983) p. 4; Valencia, "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine 
Regionalism, " 2 Mar. Pol. (1978) p. 87. 
7 Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (1985) p. 210. 
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South China Sea, and represents an area of confused topography. Northeast of the main 
continental shelf the slope descends by a series of terraces covered with material 
derived from the continental shelf. This transition zone is succeeded by volcanic 
seamounts which are sometimes crowned by coral reefs and islands in the Spratly 
Group. To the northeast again, the mass of islands is replaced by an abyssal plain with 
depths of more than 4,000 metres. 8 
The region has an equatorial climate, modified by a monsoonal wind system. 
Surface water circulation within the region varies with the monsoons. During the 
northeast monsoon, water flows from the north along the mainland coast of Asia and 
into the South East Asian region, and this circulation is essentially reversed during the 
southeast monsoon. 9 
1.2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Since the 1930's, the island groups in the South China Sea, namely the Pratas Islands, 
Macclesfield Bank, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands, have been partly occupied or 
claimed by the United Kingdom, France, and Japan respectively. 10 
8 Ibid. 
9 Isa and Noordin, supra note 6, p. 2; Soegiarto, "The South China Sea: Its 
Ecological Features and Potentials for Developing Cooperation in Marine Scientific 
Research and Environmental Protection, " (1990) p. 84. 
10 Marston, "Abandonment of Territorial Claims: The Cases of Bouvet and 
Spratly Islands, " BYIL (1986) pp. 344-356. 
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The primary basis of the British claim was the visits made to the islands in 
1864 by Captain Ward on H. M. S. Rifleman; in 1877, by a ship crew; and in 1889, by 
Captain Kerr. 11 However, none of these visitors performed any act which could be 
regarded in international law as amounting to a claim to, or assertion of sovereignty, 
nor any alleged evidence providing proof of effective occupation by Britain as 
demanded by the standards of international law then current. 12 
Since the first French vessel, the Amphitrite, sailed to the South China Sea in 
1701, France had been interested in these waters. 13 During the 1850's, while China 
was drawn by its domestic rebellions14 and the invasions of other western powers, 
France extended its influence into South Vietnam and Southwest China. China had 
been aware of French ambition and in 1884, in order to maintain its suzerainty over 
Vietnam, China went to war with France. Nonetheless, China was defeated during the 
Sino-French War (1884-1885) and lost control over the South China Sea. As a result, 
foreign powers extended their influence to this area. 15 
11 Ibid., pp. 344,348. 
12 Yu, "Who Owns the Paracels and Spratlys? - An Evaluation of the Nature 
and Legal Basis of the Conflicting Territorial Claims, " 9 CYILA (1989) p. 9. 
13 White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands 
(1975) pp. 23-24. 
14 See Chapter 3, Section 2. 
15 Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea (1982) pp. 44-47. 
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Following the Japanese seizure of Taiwan after the Sino-Japanese War in 
1895,16 Japan extended its influence further southward to the South China Sea. Since 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the Japanese government had encouraged 
Japanese entrepreneurs to exploit and develop guano in some islands. 17 On 30 March 
1939, on the eve of the Second World War, Japan announced it was placing the 
Paracels and the Spratlys under its jurisdiction. 18 
Proclaiming annexation, the French government purported to extend its 
sovereignty not only over the Spratly and Amboyna Cay, but also over "all islands, 
islets and reefs in the area lying between latitude 7° and 12° North and west of the 
triangular zone reserved to the United States sovereignty by Article 3 of the treaty 
between that country and the Philippines of 10 December 1900. "19 Ignoring Chinese 
and Japanese protests, 20 France, in the spring of 1933, occupied two principal islands, 
Itu Aba and Spratly, and seven other islands of the Spratly archipelago. On 26 July 
1933, Paris publicly proclaimed the annexation of these nine islands. 21 In the ensuing 
Anglo-French negotiations on how to obstruct the ever increasing Japanese penetration 
of the region, France refused categorically to accept British sovereignty over, or to 
16 See Chapter 3, notes 14-17 and the accompanying text. 
17 Samuels, supra note 15, p. 53; Marston, supra note 10, pp. 351-352. 
18 Park, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (1983) p. 185. 
19 Marston, supra note 10, pp. 345-346. 
20 Heinzig, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels-Spratlys- 
Pratas-Macclesfield Bank (1976) p. 28. 
21 Ibid.; Keesing's (1937-40) p. 3521; Park, supra note 18, p. 185. 
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cede or lease, the Thi-tu or Itu Aba islands to Great Britain. 22 Amid this Anglo-French 
deadlock, Japan proceeded to occupy the Spratly group in 1938, and, early in the next 
year, all the other archipelagos north of it in the South China Sea. In its declaration of 
30 March 1939, Japan renamed all the island-groups it occupied as Sin Nan Islands and 
incorporated them into the territory under the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of 
Taiwan. 23 To this, whereas the ROC strengthened its efforts in waging the then on- 
going war against Japan which was to last until 1945, Great Britain protested strongly, 
saying, "If it comes to a conflict of claims, it should be recalled that His Majesty's 
Government had never formally abandoned the claim which they had at one time put 
forward to these islands ... "24 
After the Second World War, the Chinese government took over those islands 
occupied by Japan and placed them under its administration. Nonetheless, the littoral 
states, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Malaysia, gradually occupied some islands of 
these two groups of archipelagos. The littoral states were attracted by the abundant 
fishery resources and the high possibility of hydrocarbon resources in this area; and 
that the islands played important strategic roles because they controlled the sea routes 
between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. 25 For these reasons, the littoral states 
are encouraged to occupy the islands so that they can claim the rights to those islands 
22 Yu, supra note 12, p. 10. 
23 Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan (1931.1941) Vol. 2 (1943) 
pp. 278-280. 
24 Marston, supra note 10, p. 353. 
25 See infra Section 2. 
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and the maritime areas surrounding them in the future. These reasons will be examined 
in the following section. Owing to the scope of this research, the analysis of the 
importance of the South China Sea will focus on the fishery resources. 
2. IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
As mentioned in the previous section, 90% of the South China Sea is rimmed by land. 
As such, it can be viewed as a 'geopolitical lake' over which rival and overlapping 
claims to areas of seabed and to living resources bring nearly all of the littoral states 
into scenarios of conflict, negotiation, or co-operation, resulting in a web of 
interlocking interests. 26 This is why the South China Sea has long been an area of 
conflict among states, either littoral states or extra-regional powers. The following 
discussion will be on the reasons for such conflicts. 
2.1. STRATEGIC POINTS 
Owing to its heavy transport traffic, the South China Sea constitutes one of the busiest 
sea transport routes in the world. Because of this, some of the islands and straits have 
considerable strategic importance. 
26 Lim, "The South China Sea: Changing Strategic Perspectives, " in 
MacAndrews and Sien, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development (1981) 
pp. 230-231. 
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Exercise of sovereign control of the islands presents a potentially central and 
commanding position in this region. The Pratas Reef, the Paracel Islands, and the 
Spratly Islands are the important islands in the South China Sea. <See Map 3> Since 
the Spratly Islands were used as a staging area by the Japanese forces in launching their 
initial attacks on the Philippines, Filipinos believe that maintaining a hold on the 
Spratly Islands is important to their national security. It also serves as a base from 
which to combat smuggling activities. 27 
As regards straits, they are important not only because restrictions upon 
passage would seriously dislocate international commerce, 28 but also because 
controlling them permits a country to have influence over a much larger area on either 
side of the strait. 29 In the South China Sea, strategically vital sea lines of 
communication and transportation, which link the Indian and Pacific oceans via the 
Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits, run through several island groups. In the case of 
Indonesia, as one of the two archipelagic states in this region, controlling straits has 
long-term strategic significance. As <Map 3> illustrates, two traffic routes in the 
27 Ferndandez, The Philippines 200-Mile Economic Zone (1982) p. 76; 
Tolentino, The Philippines and the Law of the Sea: A Collection of Articles, 
Statements, and Speeches (1982) p. 24; Valero, "Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the 
Question of Sovereignty Still Relevant? " 18 Mar. Pol. (1994) p. 342. 
28 Leng, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea (1978), p. 20; Park, supra 
note 18, p. 182; Valencia and Marsh, "Access to Straits and Sealanes in Southeast 
Asian Seas: Legal, Economic, and Strategic Considerations, " 16 JMLC (1985) pp. 
537-542. 
29 Morgan, "Marine Regions and Regionalism in South-East Asia, " 8 Mar. 
Pol. (1984) pp. 302,307-309; Valencia and Marsh, ibid., pp. 542-549. 
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Map 3 South China Sea: Strategic Straits 
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South China Sea area link Europe and the Middle East and Asia. The Malacca Strait 
remains by far the most important passage through Indonesian waters, handling up to 
270 ships a day or 100,000 a year. Another route (Route 2 in Map 3) also plays an 
important role in the transportation, and it has been designed as a way of relieving 
congestion in the Malacca Strait. 30 
30 McBeth, "Troubled Waters: Proposed Sea Lanes Spark Concern, " FEER 
(29 December 1994) pp. 18-19. 
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In terms of international defence strategy during the Cold War, the South China 
Sea was important for the superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union. This can be 
proved by the presence of the US military at the Clark Air Base and the Subic Bay 
Naval Base in the Philippines, and the co-operation between Russia and Vietnam. 
Nonetheless, following the dissolution of the USSR and the withdrawal of US military 
bases from the Philippines in October 1992,31 it indicates that a power vacuum has 
appeared in this region. The regional military balance is in the process of being rebuilt. 
In addition, the littoral states want to strengthen their military capability to defend their 
own interests. 32 Under these circumstances, controlling strategic points is important to 
them. 
2.2. HYDROCARBON RESOURCES 
As regards non-living resources in the South China Sea, hydrocarbons are the most 
important and attractive ones. These hydrocarbon resources encouraged the littoral 
states to occupy islands in order to claim rights in future negotiations. In addition, 
a 
competition for resources could also trigger war. 
The Sunda Shelf and the Sahul Shelf mark the geological limits of Asia and 
Australia. Although now covered by 20-45 fathoms of water, both of these areas once 
31 Greene, ed., The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future (1988); 
Simon, "U. S. Interests in Southeast Asia: The Future Military Presence, " 31 AS (1991) 
p. 662; Bowring and McBeth, "Basis of Dependence, " FEER (12 April 1990) pp. 20- 
23. 
32 Infra Chapter 5, Sub-Section 4.1. 
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stood above sea level before the melting of the Quaternary ice which caused the sea 
gradually to rise to its present level. The seas above these shelves, the Malacca Straits, 
the southern part of the South China Sea, the Sunda Sea, and the Java Sea, are 
remarkable not only for their shallowness but also for the uniformity of their 
shallowness, which is mostly about 20 fathoms. 33 Beneath these areas, interest centres 
chiefly on the hydrocarbon resources. 34 Nonetheless, it is still unclear how great the 
hydrocarbon resources deposits are. 
According to Chinese surveys, hydrocarbon deposits in the continental shelf 
around the Spratly Islands amount to 25 billion cubic metres of natural gas, 370,000 
tons of phosphorous, and 105 billion barrels of petroleum. The James Shoal area 
contains another large deposit basin with an estimated 91 billion barrels of oil. 35 The 
Reed Bank, for example, promises to be a big reservoir of natural gas and oil. A World 
Bank-Asian Development Bank mission reported that "the country has relatively 
certain remaining recoverable reserves of between 100 to 500 million barrels in 
addition to the approximately 30 million barrels of discovered but still unproduced 
1 33 Leng, supra note 28, p. 12. 
34 DuBois, "Review of Principal Hydrocarbon-Bearing Basins of the South 
China Sea Area. " In Valencia, ed., The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon Potential and 
Possibilities of Joint Development (1981); Valencia, Southeast Asian Seas: Oil under 
Troubled Waters: Hydrocarbon Potential, Jurisdictional Issues, and International 
Relations (1985) pp. 81-83; Johnston and Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary 
Problems: Status and Solutions (1991) pp. 121-122. 
35 Garver, "China's Push through the South China Sea: The Interaction of 
Bureaucratic and National Interests, " 132 China Q. (1992) p. 1015. Xinhua Press, 
Beijing, 31 December 1988. Cited from Thomas, "The Spratly Islands Imbroglio: A 
Tangled Web of Conflict, " in International Boundaries and Boundary Conflict 
Resolution 1989 Conference Proceedings (1990) p. 421. 
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reserves in three offshore fields - Nido, Matinloc, and Cadlao. " The mission report also 
suggested that "there is a small chance that one more of the gigantic off-shore reefs 
would turn out to be oil-bearing and add one billion barrels or more to reserves. "36 
2.3. FISHERY RESOURCES 
As regards the living resources, the South China Sea is one of the most important areas 
for commercial fisheries in the world oceans. In this region, shared stocks, such as 
scads and mackerels, and highly migratory species, such as tuna, are the most common 
and important commercial stocks. In 1988,9.5% of the world's marine fisheries catch 
was from the Southeast Asian region. The total production of marine catch in the 
whole area of the South China Sea showed a steady increase from 6,664,000 tons in 
1984 to 8,291,000 tons in 1989.37 
There is sufficient evidence in the fishing activities of Southeast Asia to 
suggest that there are rich fishing grounds. Organic production and nutrient levels are 
generally high in coastal areas, especially around river mouths. 38 For example, the 
discharge from the Mekong River makes the southern portion of the South China Sea a' 
very rich fishing ground, stretching from the Gulf of Siam to Singapore. Similarly, the 
36 Ferndandez, supra note 27, p. 75. 
37 Isa and Noordin, supra note 6, p. 4. 
38 Ferndandez, supra note 27, p. 3. 
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rivers flowing through the volcanic areas of Sumatra and discharging into the Malacca 
Straits also encourage the growth of fish nutrients and, therefore, fish stocks. 39 
Inevitably, such abundant fishery resources have a deep influence on the 
Southeast Asian people's life, as it provides a source of food, is a major component of. 
the economy, and a source of employment. <Table 1> shows the consumption of fish 
for each of the littoral states in 1989. Except for China and Kampuchea, the per capita 
consumption of fish per year in Southeast Asia countries is equal to or above the world 
average. Compared with developed countries, the per capita supply of South China Sea 
littoral states is also more than that of developed countries. In addition, fish is the 
single most important source of animal protein for the people in this region. More than 
one-half of the total intake of animal protein by the average Southeast Asian person 
comes from fish. 40 
39 Leng, supra note 28, p. 31-32. 
40 Tansubkul and Fung-wai, "The New Law of the Sea and Development in 
Southeast Asia, " 23 AS (1983) p. 868. 
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Brunei 7,703 249(3.1%)* 30.9 
China 9,540,257 1,085,958(1.5%) 8.8 
Indonesia 2,519,377 177,437(2.1%) 14.2 
Kampuchea 70,934 7,849 -- 9.0 
Malaysia 474,648 16,988(2.5%) 27.9 
Philippines 2,012,622 59,456(2.4%) 33.9 
Singapore 78,350 2,648(1.7%) 29.6 
Taiwan(1989) 966,900 19,990(1.1%) 48.4 











Countries 34,948,010 3,878,595 9.0 
Developed 
Countries 33,148,192 1,234,959 26.8 
World 68,096,202 5,113,554 13.3 
* Figures in parentheses represent the population growth rate. 
Sources: FAO, FAO Yearbook: Fishery Statistics, Commodities, Vol. 71 (1990) pp. 
307-310. 
Council of Agriculture, Taiwan, Taiwan Food Balance Sheet (1990). 
In addition, fisheries also play an important role in Southeast Asian states' 
economies. Highly valued fish commodities such as tuna and shrimp are the major 
commodities exported from the region, primarily to Japan and the US. To put the 
fishery commodities exports of the ASEAN member states into perspective, in 1987, 
Thailand ranked seventh in global fish exports, Indonesia ranked twentieth, Singapore 
ranked twenty-seventh, the Philippines ranked thirtieth, and Malaysia ranked thirty- 
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fourth. 41 Moreover, the value of the fish catch to the Southeast Asian fisherman 
generally accounts for in excess of 2.5% of gross national product (GNP) and may 
exceed 5% in some cases, compared with the situation in many developed countries 
where the equivalent value is 1% or less. 42 
Given the importance of the fishery activities for the Southeast Asian people, 
we, therefore, have to examine the condition of fishery resources in this region. 
The fishery activities in this region can be divided into two distinct sub-sectors, 
namely coastal and deep-sea fisheries. Fisheries in the deep-sea region are generally 
less diverse than in the coastal waters. The high diversity of resources, and low 
dominance of any species, or species group, result in non-targeted, multi-species type 
fisheries. In the demersal sector, for instance, a single haul could include up to 200 
species. A similar situation exists in the Gulf of Thailand and Malaysian waters. 43 
Coastal pelagic fish is caught at the coastal areas of the central Philippines, the Gulf of 
Thailand, the Gulf of Tonkin, west coast of China, along the coasts of Vietnam, Hainan 
Island, Mindoro Island, Palawan Island, coastal areas of Sarawak and Brunei, Natuna 
Island and coastal areas of Taiwan 44 
41 FAO, FAO Yearbook: Fishery Statistics, Commodities, Vol. 65 (1987) p. 
26. 
42 Marr, Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia (1976) p. 10. 
43 Isa and Noordin, supra note 6, p. 4. 
44 Morgan and Valencia, supra note 6, p. 36. 
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As to the pelagic fisheries, various marine species are distributed throughout 
the South China Sea. The main species include the coastal tunas (Euthynnus, Thunnus 
and Auxis spp. ), mackerels (Rastrelliger spp. ), scads (Decapterus spp. ), king 
mackerels (Scomberomorus spp. ), anchovies (Stolephorus spp. ), sardines (Sardinella 
spp. ) and carangids. Pelagic fisheries are the most important of all in the South China 
Sea. Large tuna species, such as skipjack, are taken in the deeper-water areas, and 
smaller species are taken in the shallow-water areas. 45 
As mentioned above, most of the fishery resources in the South China Sea area 
are either shared stocks such as scads and mackerels that migrate across the EEZs of 
more than one coastal state, or highly migratory species, especially tuna, whose 
migratory patterns sometimes cover a vast area of the ocean. Other commercial stocks 
also include sardines, trevallies, shrimps and prawns. Common stocks of scads and 
mackerels are believed to occur along the coasts of the Gulf of Thailand and the eastern 
region of the South China Sea. The tunas that are found in the Philippine and 
Indonesian waters are thought to be from the same stocks that swim through the waters 
of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, and farther east. Other stocks can be found along 
the coastlines of the coastal states in the region. 46 
45 Isa and Noordin, supra note 6, pp. 4-6; Dwiponggo, "Project Proposal on 
Regional Fisheries Stock Assessment in the South China Sea" (1993) p. 1. 
46 Christy, Law of the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of 
Fisheries in Southeast Asia (1978) p. xiv. 
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Map 4 Geographic Distribution: Scads 
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Source: Isa and Noordin, "The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China Sea, " p. 
71. 
The following discussion provides more detailed information about these 
fishery resources: 
A. Scad 
Four fishing areas are recognised in the South China Sea area: they are the Philippine 
waters, Gulf of Thailand, Malaysian waters, and Indonesian waters. <See Map 4> Most 
of the catches were reported as combined catches of different scads and thus added 
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difficulty to the assessment of distribution and productivity by each species in the 
region. 47 
The scad fisheries in the Philippine waters are important, with annual catch 
levels varying around 209,821 mt in 1989. These fisheries depend on catching scad . 
when they are immature. In Thailand, the scad was of minor importance until the 
mid-1970's, when the annual catch in the Gulf of Thailand increased from around 500 
mt in 1972 to a peak of 131,000 mt in 1977, it fell to a more stable 28,000 mt in 1979. 
The annual catch level of scad in Malaysia increased from 5,000 mt in 1982 to 30,000 
rat in 1991. As to Indonesia, the only pelagic fisheries that have more or less targeted 
one 'species' are those exploiting scad and mackerel. 48 
B. Mackerel 
Similar to scads, the information about mackerels is incomplete. There are problems 
regarding species identification, catch statistics, and life history, as well as assessments 
of the stocks of mackerels in the area. Nonetheless, the information provided by the 
South China Sea Program (SCSP) Workshop perhaps allows more understanding of 
these resources than that of scads. 49 To assess the status of the stocks, the SCSP 
Workshop on Biology and Resources of Mackerels proposed a subdivision of the 
47 Hongskul, "The Allocation of Scads and Mackerels, " in Christy, ibid., p. 1. 
48 Isa and Noordin, supra note 6, p. 8. 
49 Hongskul, supra note 47, p. 4. 
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Map 5 Geographic Distribution: Mackerels 
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Source: Isa and Noordin, "The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China Sea, " p. 
70. 
South China Sea area into eight local units. 50 The preliminary assessments based on 
the available data indicate that increase on mackerel catch can be expected from the 
region. 51 
50 SCSP, Report of the Workshop on the Biology and Resources of Mackerels 
(Rastrelliger spp. ) and Round Scads (Decapterus spp. ) in the South China Sea, Part I, 
South China Sea Fisheries Department and Co-ordinating Program, 1978, 
SCSP/GEN/78/ 17. 
51 Hongskul, supra note 47, p. 5. 
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Many traditional fishing grounds for mackerels, however, show signs of 
overexploitation, particularly in the northern Malacca Strait, the Western coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia, and the Western coast of the Gulf of Thailand. 52 <See Map 5> 
C. Tuna 
Owing to its abundant production and high value, tuna fishing is an important industry 
for the littoral states of the South China Sea. Tunas are widely distributed throughout 
the South China Sea and larger Indo-Pacific region. Tagging studies in the Western 
Pacific Ocean conducted by the South Pacific Commission indicate that portions of the 
western Pacific skipjack stocks migrate westward from the waters of north of Papua 
New Guinea into eastern Indonesia, migrate westward from Micronesia into the waters 
of the southern Philippines, and migrate northward from Micronesia to the east of the 
Philippines towards Taiwanese waters. 53<See Map 6> 
A more speculative study of skipjack migration suggests that skipjack may also 
migrate north from Philippine waters east of Taiwan into Japanese waters, and may 
i 
move eastward from eastern Indonesia waters into the waters north of Papua New 
Guinea. 54 
52 Ibid. 
53 Morgan and Valencia, supra note 6, pp. 58,61; Cf. Bardach and Matsuda, 
"Fish, Fishing, and Sea Boundaries: Tuna Stocks and Fishing Politics in Southeast 
Asia and the South Pacific, " 4(5) GeoJournal (1980) pp. 467-469. 
54 Morgan and Valencia, ibid. 
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Map 6 Geographic Distribution: Tunas 
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Source: Isa and Noordin, "The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China Sea, " 
p. 76. 
Based on changes in hooking-rates and size of catch, it has been speculated that 
yellow-fin tuna migrate in and out of southern Philippine waters moving to and from 
the central portions of the South China Sea. They may also migrate in the Indian Ocean 
from the Bay of Bengal south along the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and southeast 
and northeast along the Indonesian archipelagic waters, moving in and out of the 
waters of eastern Indonesia and northern Australia. 55 
55 Ibid. 
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As for bluefin tuna, they are also reported to migrate northward from 
Australian waters into eastern Indonesian waters. Based on Philippine catch data, 
fishermen interviews, and larval distribution patterns, migrations of mixed tuna 
species such as skipjack and yellowfin tuna, both juveniles and adults, are found 
throughout Philippine waters south into Indonesian archipelagic waters and the waters 
of Papua New Guinea. 56 
The most important fishing grounds for tunas are the Sulu Sea, Moro Gulf, and 
the adjacent waters of the Celebes Sea. 57 The Moro Gulf and, to a lesser extent, the 
Sulu Sea appear to be the nursery areas for skipjack and yellowfin tunas and both 
species move through the Sulu Sea where they spend about another year. 58 
The above-mentioned motives for conflict illustrate the importance of the 
South China Sea, both in politics and economics. In this respect, it is understandable 
that the littoral states would like to claim all or part of the islands in this area. 
Accordingly, their claims inevitably produce conflicts. However, in the post-cold war 
era, conflict: or confrontation is no longer the means to solve disputes. This tendency is 
further strengthened by the inter-dependent economic relations and the emphasis on 
peaceful settlements of disputes. We shall look at these developments in turn in the 
following section. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Aprieto, Fishery management and Extended Maritime Jurisdiction: The 
Philippine Tuna Fishery Situation, Research Report No. 4 (1981) p. 8. 
58 Simpson and Chikuni, Progress Report on Fishing for Tuna in Philippine 
Waters by FAO Chartered Purse Seiners, SCS/GEN/77/1 1, p. 102. 
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3. LITTORAL STATES' MARITIME CLAIMS 
3.1. CHINESE MARITIME CLAIMS 
Being a land empire, 'China' was considered by the ancient Chinese Emperors to be the. 
centre of the world, and all the land and oceans surrounding it to be their domain. 
Accordingly, the term 'territorial sea' is not a native term for Chinese people, but one 
which comes from the West. 59 
Although some early provisions concerning China's jurisdiction over adjacent 
sea areas can be found in the agreements which the Chinese Ching Dynasty (1644- 
1911) concluded with a number of western countries, the term 'territorial sea' was not 
clearly presented in these agreements. For example, Article 26 of the Sino-American 
Trading Agreement (1844) refers to "... the waters over which the Chinese government 
exercise jurisdiction ... "; 
60 Article 26 of the Sino-Norwegian Trading Agreement 
(1847) refers to "... the coast of China"; 61 and Article 19 of the Sino-Anglo Tientsin 
59 See debate between Grotius's Mare Liberum and Seldon's Mare Clausum, 
in Chapter 2, notes 1-3 and the accompanying text. Also Huang, China and Its 
Territorial Sea (1970) p. 2; Fitzgerald, Europe and China: An Historical Comparison, 
Annual Lecture delivered to Australian Humanities Research Council, November 
1968 (1969) pp. 8-9. 
60 Treaties and Conventions between China and Foreign States, Vol. 1,2nd 
Edition (1917) pp. 67-68. 
61 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 58-59. 
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Treaty (1858) speaks of "... within the Chinese waters... ". 62 However, there is no 
further explanation or definition about those terms. 
During the Ching Dynasty, the official attitude toward the breadth of territorial 
sea was obscure. There is, however, an important provision in the 1899 Sino-Mexican 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation which stipulated: 63 
Article 11 
The two contracting parties agree upon considering a distance of three 
marine leagues, measured from the line of low tide, as the limit of their 
territorial waters for everything relating to the vigilance and enforcement 
of the Custom-house Regulations and the necessary measures for the 
prevention of smuggling. 
This treaty implied three things: First, the very use of the term 'territorial waters' shows 
the then Chinese government acknowledged the concept of territorial waters; 
Secondly, the then Chinese government recognised the breadth of territorial sea and 
the method of measuring it, which shows the government had accepted the then current 
general rules of international law related to the law of the sea; Thirdly, the Chinese 
government understood part of the territorial sea functions. 64 
62 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 410. 
63 Hertslet, ed., Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, 3rd Edition (1908) pp. 
403-404. 
64 Compare with another case concerning a peace treaty between China and 
Prussia, as a result of which China secured Prussian surrender of Danish vessels, 
which had been seized in China's'inner ocean'. See Greenfield, China's Practice in the 
Law of the Sea (1992) p. 16. 
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A. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(A) TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIM 
In 1911, the year that the Ching Dynasty was overthrown by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the ROC 
Ministry of Marine Force, taking national security into consideration, suggested that65 
According to international practice, the limitation of territorial sea is three 
marine miles. This is correspondent to the range of cannon-shot66 used to 
be. Nevertheless, the more progressive of science is, the longer the range 
of cannon-shot will be. In fact, the most powerful cannon can reach ten 
marine miles. Consequently, in order to protect our rights, the width of our 
territorial sea should be extended to this range. 
But the ROC central government offered no clear response to the Ministry's 
suggestion. 
In May 1924, about one hundred Japanese fishing boats were engaged in 
fishing along the coast of Shantung Province, China. They even destroyed the nets and 
equipment of the nearby Chinese fishermen. The Chinese government entered into 
negotiations with the Japanese government over this issue, but the Japanese claimed 
that their boats were fishing on the high seas, and that they were not intruding in the 
Chinese territorial sea. The situation worsened during 1929-1931 and the local 
65 Files on Foreign Relations, Vol. 31, No. C-1-6 (10 July 1911). 
66 The Dutch jurist Bynkershoek propounded the cannon-shot doctrine that 
the power of the territorial sovereign extended to vessels within the range of cannon 
mounted on the shore. During and after the Napoleonic wars the British and American 
prize courts translated the cannon-shot rule into the three-mile rule. See Brownlie, 
Principles of Public International Law, 4th edition (1990) p. 182; O'Connell, The 
International Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1982) pp. 124-129; Kent, "The Historical Origins 
of the Three-Mile Limit, " 48 AJIL (1954) pp. 537-553; The Anna (1805) 165 E. R. 809. 
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governments of the coastal provinces requested the central government to establish the 
territorial sea scheme and settle upon its breadth. 67 
At the Hague Conference on Codification of International Law of 1930, the 
ROC, with nineteen other states, took the position that the breadth of the territorial sea " 
should be three nm, measured from the low-water marks along the coast, and that 
within that area it enjoyed full sovereignty, subject to the right of foreign vessels to 
innocent passage. 68 
The breadth of the territorial sea was probably the most controversial topic 
considered by the 1930 Hague Conference. General agreement on the law of the sea 
was reached at the Conference, such as the high seas being free for the use of all; a 
narrow belt, generally three nm in width, of territorial sea was subject to the 
sovereignty of the coastal state; and a contiguous zone was recognised for the control 
of sanitary, defence, immigration and smuggling problems. 69 
Taking into account national security, the livelihood of fishermen, and in 
accordance with its position in the Hague Conference, the ROC government declared 
the breadth of territorial sea to be 3 run. In addition, it also declared there to be an 
67 Lee and Chu, History of Chinese Fishery (1970) pp. 188-209. 
68 24 AJIL (1930) Supplement, pp. 234-235,254; Hackworth, Digest of 
International Law (1940) p. 628; cf. Colombos, International Law of the Sea, 6th rev. 
Edition (1967) p. 99; Wu, ed., China -A Handbook: Theory and Practice of 
International Law with Respect to Selected Issues (1973) p. 400. 
69 24 AJIL (1930) Supplement, p. 253. 
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additional zone of 12 nm, measured from the territorial sea baselines, with which there 
existed jurisdiction with regard to the arrest of smuggling with Act No. 1612 of 20 
April 1931.70 
Following on the international expansion of maritime jurisdiction after the 
Truman Proclamations in 1945, the ROC government also became aware of the 
development of the law of the sea and took consideration of the 12 nm territorial sea. 
The Chinese delegate to the UN International Law Commission, 71 Mr. Shuhsi Hsu, 
said that the 12 nm territorial sea would meet the demands of most states. 72 
Because of the wide divergence of opinion concerning the breadth of the 
territorial sea in international practice, and although UNCLOS I successfully drafted 
four conventions on the law of the sea, 73 the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone was silent on the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea. 74 Article 6 
of the Convention merely stipulates that 
70 Gazette of the Ministry of Communications, No. 244,9 May 1931, pp. 1- 
2. 
71 Although the PRC was established in 1949, the ROC still kept its 
membership status in the UN and other related organisations till 1971. The ROC 
assigned all Chinese representatives to the UN and other related organisations. See 
Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.2. 
72 YILC (1952) Vol. 1, p. 153, para. 80; p. 158, para. 54; and (1955) Vol. 1, p. 
154, para. 61; pp. 172-173, para. 15; p. 186, para. 43. 
73 These Conventions are the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the 
Convention on the Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the Convention on the High 
Seas. The ROC is one of the signatories of these four Conventions. 
74 UNCLOS I, Official Records, Vol. 3 (1958) p. 249. 
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The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a 
distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the breadth of the 
territorial sea. 
The 1960 UNCLOS H also failed to produce any consensus on this matter. 75 
Following the beginning of UNCLOS III from 1973, the issues of the breadth 
of territorial sea, the establishment of the EEZ, and several other important matters 
were central elements of the discussions. The ROC government anticipated the 
development of the international law of the sea and the impact on its fishing industry. 
Accordingly, on 9 December 1974, the ROC Executive Yuan76 held a meeting on the 
issues of law of the sea with other related authorities. Following this meeting, art ad- 
hoc committee, the Committee on the Territorial Sea Issues, was established to study 
those issues under the lead of the Ministry of Interior. 
The problems presented to the ROC by these international developments in the 
law of the sea are peculiarly difficult because of the adverse diplomatic situations 
confronting it. Not only was the ROC excluded from UNCLOS III, but also it did not 
have diplomatic relations with many countries. In the face of these difficulties merely 
to negotiate any solution to such disputes that arise from time to time makes it 
75 Dean, "The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight 
for Freedom of the Sea, " 54 AJIL (1960) p. 751. 
76 The Executive Yuan is the highest administrative organ of the ROC in 
Taiwan, and is lead by the Premier. 
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desirable for the ROC to take a cautious position to claim rights or privileges for 
itself. 77 
Nevertheless, the ROC was still threatened by other coastal states' extending 
territorial sea and establishing EEZs, especially after the Philippine President Marcos 
declared Presidential Act No. 1599 which established an EEZ on 11 June 1979.78 The 
Philippine Presidential Act No. 1599 had a tremendous influence on Taiwan. After 
serious consideration, the ROC Executive Yuan declared the extension of its territorial 
sea from 3 nm to 12 nm and the establishment of the 200 nm EEZ on 6 September 
1979. The Declaration was as follows: 79 
1. The territorial sea of the Republic of China shall be measured from the 
baselines and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of twelve 
nautical miles from such baselines. 
2. The exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China shall be 
measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured 
and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of two hundred 
nautical miles from such baselines. 
A. The Republic of China shall have in the exclusive economic zone 
sovereign rights for purposes of exploitation, conservation and 
utilisation of the natural resources, and such jurisdiction the 
exercise of which are recognised under international law. 
77 Dellapenna and Wang, "The Republic of China's Claims Relating to the 
Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zones: Legal and 
Economic Aspects, " 3(2) Boston College ICLR (1980) p. 357. Cf. infra note 91 and its 
text. 
78 Smith, Exclusive Economic Zone: An Analysis and Primary Document 
(1986) pp. 369-370. For the Philippine establishment of EEZ, see infra Sub-Section 
M. C. 
79 Document released at the Government Information Office press 
conference, 6 September 1979. 
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B. Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China 
extends over any part of the exclusive economic zones as 
proclaimed by other states, the boundaries shall be determined by 
agreement between the states concerned or in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of international law on delimitation. 
C. Other states may enjoy in the exclusive economic zone of the 
Republic of China the freedom of navigation and overflight and of 
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and engage in such 
other activities with respect to navigation and communication as 
permitted by international law. 
3. The sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the 
continental shelf contiguous to its coast as recognised by the Convention 
on the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of 
international law shall not be prejudiced in any manner by the 
proclamation of the present exclusive economic zone or the establishment 
of such zones by any other state. 
This Declaration was submitted to the President Chiang Ching-Kuo, and was 
approved by Presidential Decree No. 5046 of 8 October 1979 and ordered to be 
executed. The Presidential Decree indicated the following three orders: 80 
1. The territorial sea of the Republic of China shall be measured from the 
baselines and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of 
twelve nautical miles from such baselines. 
2. The exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China shall be 
measured from the baselines from which the territorial sea is measured 
and shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of two hundred 
nautical miles from such baselines. 
3. the sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the 
continental shelf contiguous to its coast shall not be prejudiced in any 
manner by the proclamation of the present exclusive economic zone or 
the establishment of such zones by any other state. 
This Declaration inevitably creates an overlapping area with the Philippines in 
the Bashi Channel. Besides, owing to its claim on the sovereignty of the Paracel 
Islands and the Spratly Islands, Taiwan also has overlapping claims with Malaysia, the 
80 Gazette of the Presidential Office, No. 3575,10 October 1979, p. 2. 
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Philippines, the PRC, and Vietnam in the South China Sea region. 81 There is no 
specific delimitation method mentioned in the declaration, but, according to paragraph 
2(B) of the declaration, "the boundaries shall be determined by agreement between the 
states concerned or in accordance with generally accepted principles of international 
law on delimitation. " This illustrated the ROC government's aspiration on negotiating 
with those conflicting states. 
(B) CONTINENTAL SHELF CLAIM 
Although the continental shelf had been an important issue in the field of international 
law of the sea and an international practice since the Truman proclamations, the 
scholars and the government of the ROC did not pay much attention to this topic. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile examining the Taiwanese fishery industry's attitude 
toward the continental shelf. 
When the 1956 International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Law of the 
Sea were sent to the member states of the UN for comments, the Taiwanese fishery 
industry expressed the view that the sea area of the continental shelf should be 
considered a part of the territorial sea and the coastal state should have the preferential 
right and duty with respect to the living resources therein. 82 However, the ROC 
81 See infra Section 4. 
82 "Our Fishing Industry's Recommendation on the Law of the Sea, " 74 Yu- 
Yo (Fishermen's Friends) (August 1957) p. 13; Huang, "The Republic of China and the 
Regime of Continental Shelf, " I Man and Society (August 1973) pp. 50,56. 
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government did not adopt this view and made no comments on those articles 
concerning the regime of the continental shelf. 83 
The ROC signed the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf on 29 
April 1958 without reservation. Nonetheless, no action was taken to ratify the, 
Convention until the late 1960's. This attitude did not last after the release of the UN 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East report. In that report, it is said that "a 
high probability exists that the continental shelf between Taiwan and Japan may be one 
of the prolific oil reservoirs in the world. "84 This report caused a great sensation 
among all the relevant coastal states abutting the continental shelf in the region, 
including the ROC. Soon after this, the ROC government first asserted its claim to the 
continental shelf adjacent to China. On 17 July 1969, the Executive Yuan of the ROC 
issued a declaration as follows: 85 
The Republic of China is a State signatory to the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf which was adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea in 1958. For the purposes of exploring and exploiting natural 
resources and in accordance with the principles embodied in the said 
Convention, the Government of the Republic of China declares that it may 
exercise its sovereign rights over all the natural resources of the seabed 
and subsoil adjacent to its coast outside its territorial sea. 
83 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/5/Add 2,29 January 1958. 
- 84 Emory, et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the 
East China Sea and the Yellow Sea, " 2 Technical Bulletin, Technical Advisory Group 
Report (1969) pp. 39-40. 
85 Chiu, "Chinese Contemporary Practice and Judicial Decisions Relating to 
International Law, 1968-1970, " 7 The Annuals of the Chinese Society of International 
Law (1970) p. 84. 
153 
In early 1970, the Executive Yuan decided that in ratifying the Convention, the 
ROC should make the following reservation to Article 6: 86 
With regard to the determination of the boundary of the continental shelf 
as provided in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 of the Convention, the 
Government of the Republic of China considers: 
1. that the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to two or more 
States whose coasts are adjacent to and/or opposite each other shall be 
determined in accordance with the principle of the natural 
prolongation of their land territories; and 
2. that in determining the boundary of the continental shelf of the 
Republic of China, exposed rocks and islets shall not be taken into 
account. 
With respect to the reservation that the ROC made, its main point was on the 
Tiao-yu-tai issue with Japan. 87 Both the ROC and Japan claim sovereignty over. the 
Tiao-yu-tai Islets, which are situated on the edge of the continental shelf extended from 
the China mainland and Taiwan. From the Chinese view, both the PRC and the ROC, 
these islands are continental, appertaining to Taiwan, as distinct from the oceanic 
Ryukyus in the east, therefore claiming a continental shelf on the basis of natural 
prolongation would be favourable to them. 88 On the contrary, the Japanese 
86 Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, Vol. 59, No. 64,22 August 1970, p. 3. 
87 Tiao-yu-tai Islands are also known as Senkaku Gunto in Japanese. About 
the discussion of the issue of Tiao-yu-tai Islands, see Park, "Oil under Troubled 
Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy, " in Idem, East Asia and the Law of 
the Sea (1983) p. 1; Greenfield, supra note 64, pp. 127-149; Johnston and Valencia, 
supra note 34, pp. 104-115; Ma, "Foreign Investment in the Troubled Waters of the 
East China Sea, " 1 CY1LA (1981) p. 35; Idem, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary 
Delimitation in the East China Sea (1984). 
88 However, the importance of the natural prolongation principle had been 
played down in the later cases. See Tunisia-Libya Case, para. 68. For discussion, see 
Evans, Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (1989) pp. 107-111. 
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government takes the position that the status of Tiao-yu-tai islands should be decided 
by median line principle which would place those islands on their side. By denying that 
exposed rocks or islets could be used as a basis for claiming continental shelf, the ROC 
apparently was preparing its second line of defence, i. e. even if the ROC lost in the 
territorial dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai, it would still deny Japan's right to claim the 
continental shelf for those islets. On the other hand, it must be pointed out that such a 
reservation would have had the undesirable effect of weakening the ROC claim for a 
continental shelf in respect of its South China Sea mid-ocean islands, namely, the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands. 89 
The Legislative Yuan ratified the Convention with the proposed reservation 
and the ROC President issued an instrument of ratification on 23 September 1970, 
which was deposited with the UN Secretariat on 14 October 1970.90 
(C) EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIM 
In view of the EEZ, the ROC was reluctant to accept it at an early stage, although it had 
noticed the development of the EEZ in the international community. The Executive 
Yuan held two meetings to examine the issues of the EEZ. Both meetings concluded 
89 Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and its Implication on 
Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (1977) pp. 9-10. 
90 101LM (1971) p. 452. 
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that it was not proper to establish an EEZ or an Exclusive Fishery Zone at that moment. 
Their reasons were as follows: 91 
1. The deep-sea fishery plays an important role in the ROC fishing 
industry. The Government deeply wishes that other states would not 
establish EEZs. Therefore, the ROC Government would not establish 
its own EEZ; 
2. When the ROC government ratified the Convention on the Continental 
Shelf, she declared that the delimitation of continental shelf boundary 
should correspond with the principle of natural prolongation of the 
land territory of coastal states. 
3. If the ROC Government establishes EEZ, the disputes of delimitation 
would be arisen between it and Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. At 
this moment, none of those states had established any similar zone. 
Thus, the ROC should not establish any similar zone either. 
Nonetheless, due to the Philippine Presidential Act No. 1599 of 11 June 
1979,92 the ROC government had to respond to this declaration from the Philippines. 
On 6 September 1979, the ROC declared its 200 nm EEZ. 93 The declaration of EEZ 
was welcomed domestically, especially by the fishing industry. The general feeling at 
the time was that it seemed overdue, because its neighbouring states, such as Japan, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines, had already claimed similar zones. Thus the declaration 
made by the ROC government would also serve as a counter measure to protect its 
fishing fleets, which had often been fined or seized by neighbouring states in disputed 
waters. Although the brief announcement did not immediately solve the problems of 
delimitation and fishery disputes, it did serve the purpose of notifying the 
neighbouring states of its serious concern over these issues. 
91 China Daily News (7 September 1979) p. 3. 
92 Smith, supra note 78, pp. 369-370. 
93 Supra notes 79 and 80 and the accompanying text. 
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(D) ATTEMPTED CODIFICATIONS 
A clear and unambiguous law or regulation not only can make fishery operators 
understand what the government's policy is, but also can clarify the fishery executives' 
direction when they deal with fisheries administration. 
Furthermore, it might be observed that the declaration of establishment of the 
EEZ is one thing, while establishing and carrying out its administration is another. 
Having examined the ROC's establishment of EEZ and without further relevant 
legislation, it is easy to see its shortcomings. 
The ROC government declared the extension of territorial sea and the 
establishment of EEZ on 6 September 1979, but there was no appropriate law or 
regulation to apply to these areas to regulate Taiwanese fishermen's activities with 
regard to exploration and exploitation, conservation and management of the natural 
resources within its EEZ and territorial sea. Moreover, without appropriate 
regulations, the relevant authorities are not authorised to visit, examine, detain, try, and 
punish those who intrude in the ROC's EEZ. For example, it is recorded that Japanese 
fishing fleets intrude in and operate in the ROC's EEZ every year. On 19 September 
1984,40 Japanese fishing vessels were found operating in the EEZ of Pen-Chia-Yu 
Island. 94 
94 Pen-Chia-Yu is an island which is located in the northeast sea area of 
Taiwan. The sea area around that island provides an excellent fishing ground. The 
Taiwanese Navy had expelled those Japanese fishing vessels. See United Daily News 
(20 September 1984) p. S. 
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Due to the growing concern over the lack of jurisdiction or authority to take 
action in the EEZ, the ROC Ministry of the Interior convened an ad hoc committee, the 
Committee on Base Points and Baselines and Law of EEZ and Territorial Sea, to study 
and draw up those issues on 11 September 1989. This Committee was chaired by the 
Minister of the Interior, and constituted the staff from the Secretariat of the Executive 
Yuan, the Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Justice, Economic 
Affairs, Communications, Council of Agriculture, Administration of Environmental 
Protection, and scholars. 95 After almost two years' discussion and research, this 
Committee produced two drafts and sent to the Legislative Yuan. 96 
On 25 June 1991, the'Draft of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone' was 
promulgated by the Ministry of the Interior. The important contents of that Draft are as 
follows: 97 
Article 1 
The sovereignty of the ROC extends to the territorial sea, the air space 
over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 
Article 4 
The territorial sea of the ROC shall be measured from the baselines and 
shall extend to the outer limits of the water area of twelve nautical miles 
from such baselines. 
Article 5 
95 Taiwan Daily News (10 September 1989) p. 2. 
96 The Legislative Yuan is the highest legislative organ of the state, it 
exercises legislative power on behalf of the people. The function of the Legislative 
Yuan of the ROC is similar to the function of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. 
97 China Daily News (22 November 1990) p. 4; Central Daily News (26 June 
1991) p. 1. All of the draft provisions are unofficial translations. 
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Median line and equidistance line are the principles for delimiting the 
territorial sea between the ROC and its neighbouring countries which are 
opposite or adjacent to each other. If there is a dispute, it shall be referred 
to an agreement. 
Article 6 
All foreign ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea of the ROC. The innocent passage of foreign warships is in accordance 
with the regulations which are initiated by the Ministry of National 
Defence. 
Article 7 
Based on the reason of the national coast security and national interests, 
the ROC government may suspend temporarily in specified areas of its 
territorial sea for the innocent passage of foreign ships. The specified areas 
and the period of suspensory is in accordance with the regulations which 
are initiated by the Ministry of National Defence. 
Article 9 
The Ministry of National Defence shall take the necessary steps to prevent 
any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to internal- 
waters or such a call is subject. 
Article 10 
The contiguous zone of the ROC is the water area contiguous to its 
territorial sea. Its width is 12 nautical miles measured from the outer limit 
of the territorial sea. 
Article 11 
The authorities shall exercise the control in the contiguous zone necessary 
to: 
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
laws and regulations within its territorial sea; 
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed 
within its territorial sea. 
Article 13 
Punitive provisions concerning 
(a) unable to comply with all laws and regulations about innocent 
passage; 
(b) infringement of navigating in designated or prescribed sea lane; 
(c) navigating in the temporarily suspended areas; 
(d) infringement of the provisions of Article 9. 
159 
On the same day, the'Draft of EEZ and Continental Shelf was released as well. 
The important parts in this Draft are: 98 
A. The EEZ of the ROC is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial 
sea, its width is 200 nautical miles measured from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
B. The delimitation of the EEZ or continental shelf between the ROC and 
its neighbouring countries with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of equitable principle. 
C. In the EEZ and continental shelf, the ROC has all the rights for 
exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural 
resources, whether living or non-living, production of energy from the 
water; the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and 
structures; marine scientific research; and the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment. 
D. The ROC government may take measures, including boarding, 
inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, to ensure compliance with 
its laws and regulations. The Government may undertake right of hot 
pursuit. 
The meaning of the two drafts is declarative rather than practical. Owing to the 
Committee's consideration that the ROC's sovereignty and jurisdiction reaches the 
Chinese Mainland, the baselines are drawn from the mouth of Yalu River99 in the 
northeast along the coastal islands to the mouth of Peilun River in the southeast. 100 It 
also covers. Taiwan area, Nansha Chun-Tao (Spratly Islands) in the South China Sea, 
and Tiao-yu-tai Islands in the East Sea. Undoubtedly, the declaration on the 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over Chinese Mainland and Taiwan is a reiteration of its 
'One China Policy'. 101 As to the island groups in the South China Sea and the East 
98 Central Daily News (26 June 1991) p. 1. 
99 The Yalu River is the border river between China and North Korea. 
100 Peilun River is the border river between China and Vietnam. 
101 About'One China Policy', see Chapter 3, Section 3. 
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Sea respectively, these drafts also serve as a declaration of jurisdiction over them, 
because there is no sign of a resolution concerning delimitation or negotiation being 
reachable at the moment, even in the near future. With regard to the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea, it is well-known that there are five countries, namely China, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, claiming ownership over the whole 
or part islands in that area-102 As to the Tiao-yu-tai islands, China, Japan, and Taiwan 
claim sovereignty over them. 103 The ROC declaration of the baselines of the territorial 
sea and its sovereignty over those areas would help it to strengthen its position in 
negotiating with its neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the shortcoming would be 
that it is impractical to declare the ROC's sovereignty and jurisdiction to be over the 
whole Chinese mainland. In fact, it is impossible for the ROC government to exercise 
its jurisdiction over what happened in mainland China, and vice versa. 
Nonetheless, the two Drafts are still waiting for the Legislative Yuan's 
ratification, because the term 'law' or 'act' as used in the Constitution denotes any 
legislative bill passed by the Legislative Yuan and promulgated by the President. 
Being a powerful distant-water fishing nation, the ROC is unique in that it has 
few relevant condifications concerning the law of the sea. Among the possible reasons 
for this are the following: 
102 See infra Section 4. 
103 See supra note 87. 
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First, Taiwan has been isolated from the international community for decades. This 
made Taiwan very sensitive and hesitant when dealing with other states, especially 
with its neighbouring countries. This hesitation can be seen from its decisions on 
territorial sea and EEZ. 104 
Secondly, owing to its national policy, 'One China Policy', Taiwan is in a dilemma over 
making its baselines system. It is unrealistic to declare its baseline system to include 
the coast of Chinese mainland, because Taiwan does not have jurisdiction over that 
area. On the other hand, it is against its own policy if it declares the baseline system as 
only around the Taiwan area. 
In view of such considerations, the codification of relevant acts has been 
seriously delayed. 
104 
Country TS (Date) EEZ (Date) FZ (Date) 
Brunei 12 nm (01/01/1983) 200 nm(01/01/1983) 
China (PRC) 12 nm (04/09/1958) 
Indonesia 12 nm (18/02/1960) 200 nm (21/03/1980) 
Japan 12 nm (01/07/1977) 200 nm(01/07/1977) 
South Korea 12 nm (30/04/1978) - 
Malaysia 12 nm (02108/1969) 200 nm (1984) 
Philippines Treaty Limits 200 nm (11/06/1978) 
Taiwan (ROC) 12 nm (06/09/1979) 200 nm (06/09/1979) 
Thailand 12 nm (06/10/1966) 200 nm (23/02/1981) 
Vietnam 12 nm (12/05/1977) 200 nm (12/05/1977) 
Source: UN, Baselines: National Legislation with Illustrative Maps (1989); UN, 
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction: Excerpts of Legislation and Table 
of Claims (1992). 
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B. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
The PRC established its territorial sea on 4 September 1958 with a Declaration on 
China's Territorial Sea. 105 In its declaration, 106 
The breadth of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China shall be 
twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to all territories of the 
People's Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and its 
coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu 
Islands, the Tungsha Islands (Pratas Islands), the Hsisha Islands (Paracel 
Islands), the Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), the Nansha Islands 
(Spratly Islands) and all other islands belonging to China which are 
separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas. 
[brackets added] 
This 12 nm territorial sea claim met with immediate rejections by the US107 
and the UK. 108 In justifying their claim, the PRC put forward three arguments. 109 
Firstly, there is the assertion that the determination of the territorial limit is an exercise 
of sovereignty which does not require explanation or justification. The second 
argument is that each nation is free to determine its territorial limit because there has 
never been any universally recognised breadth of the territorial sea under international 
law. Thirdly, it argued that the three nm limit, although once commonly accepted, has 
long become obsolete, as shown by many countries' practice. 
105 Text reproduced in 8 ICLQ (1959) p. 182. 
106 Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, Paragraph 1. 
107 Cheng, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea, " 63 AJIL (1969) pp. 
47-48. 
108 Time (6 September 1958) p. 6. 
109 For the following three arguments, see Cheng, supra note 107, pp. 54-55. 
Cf. Greenfield, supra note 64, pp. 58-61. 
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The PRC's 1958 declaration plays an important political role in promoting its 
claim on territorial integrity and national defence. 110 This document is an 
administrative order, however, lacking the legal status of a law adopted by China's 
legislature. In order to repair this shortcoming, the State Oceanic Administration 
established an inter-departmental group to draft a new law on the territorial sea in 
1984.111 After eight years of work, the National People's Congress adopted the Law on 
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone on 25 February 1992.112 Article 2 of the 
1992 Law states 
The territorial sea of the People's Republic of China is the sea belt adjacent 
to the land territory and the internal waters of the People's Republic of 
China. 
The land territory of the People's Republic of China includes the mainland 
of the People's Republic of China and its coastal islands; Taiwan and all 
islands appertaining thereto including the Diaoyu Islands; 113 the Penghu 
Islands; the Dongsha Islands (Pratas Islands); the Xisha Islands (Paracel 
Islands); the Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and the Nansha 
Islands (Spratly Islands); as well as all the other islands belonging to the 
People's Republic of China. [brackets added] 
110 Fu, "Concerning the Question of Our Country's Territorial Sea, " in Cohen 
and Chiu, eds., People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study (1974) 
pp. 470-473. 
111 Wang and Pearse, "The New Legal Regime for China's Territorial Sea, " 25 
ODIL (1994) p. 434. 
112 Text reproduced in 21 LOS Bulletin (August 1992) p. 24. About the 
analysis of the Chinese territorial sea law, see Kim, "The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea 
Law in the Light of the UN Convention, " 43 ICLQ (1994) p. 894; Wang and Pearse, 
ibid., pp. 431-442. 
113 See supra note 87. 
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On 15 May 1996, China ratified the LOSC and announced a set of straight 
baselines of its territorial sea. 114 According to this announcement, two things are 
noteworthy: Firstly, two Taiwan controlled island groups, Quemoy and Matsu, are 
enclosed by this baseline system. <Map 1> This would create other jurisdictional 
disputes between China and Taiwan. On this point, the ROC Premier stated that 
China's announcement is disputable and the ROC will not accept it. 115 Secondly, this 
set of baselines composes part of the Chinese territorial sea adjacent to the mainland 
and the Paracel Islands. In other words, neither Taiwan Island or Penghu Islands are 
included in this baseline system, nor are the Spratly Islands. This might imply that 
there could have been negotiation between China and Taiwan, although'One China' is 
their basic policy. It also implies negotiation took place between China and other 
South China Sea littoral states, although China treats the South China Sea as its 
historic waters. 
Vietnam immediately protested the Chinese announcement. The Vietnamese 
government issued a prompt riposte: 116 
China's delineation of the base line in the Paracel Archipelago is a new 
severe violation of Vietnam's territorial sovereignty and runs counter to 
international law. 
114 Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 15 May 1996. 
115 China Times (16 May 1996) p. 2. 
116 "Statement of Spokesperson for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, " Voice 
of Vietnam, 16 May 1996. Text reprinted at http: //www. mailbase. ac. uk/lists-f-j/int- 
boundaries/ 1996-05/0017. html. 
165 
3.2. MALAYSIAN MARITIME CLAIMS 
Malaysian claims can be divided into three steps. Firstly, on 2 August 1969, Malaysia 
proclaimed its 12 nm territorial sea system under Emergency Ordinance No. 7, 
1969.117 Section 3(1) of the Ordinance reads: 
The breadth of the territorial waters of Malaysia shall be twelve nautical 
miles and such breadth shall except in the Straits of Malacca, the Sulu Sea 
and the Celebes Sea be measured in accordance with Articles 3,4,6,7,8, 
9,10,11,12 and 13 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone (1958) ... 
The three exceptions stated in the Section 3(1) were inserted because all three maritime 
areas were less than 24 nm in width separating Malaysia from another coastal state. It 
was felt that a solution by way of bilateral agreement was preferable. 118 
Secondly, in terms of the non-living resources of its continental shelf, the 
Malaysian government adopted a Continental Shelf Act in 1966 which proclaimed119 
'continental shelf means the seabed and subsoil of submarine areas 
adjacent to the coast of Malaysia but beyond the limits of the territorial 
waters of the States, the surface of which lies at a depth no greater than 
two hundred metres below the surface of the sea, or, where the depth of the 
superjacent water admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the 
said areas, at any greater depth. 
117 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 7,1969. Excerpts in UN, 
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, supra note 104, p. 78. 
118 Tangsubkul, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea (1982) p. 11. 
119 Text reproduced in UN, National Legislation on the Continental Shelf 
(1989) p. 152; 36 Limits in the Sea (revised edition, 1985) p. 111. Cf. Keesing's (1984) 
p. 32785. 
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Map 7 Malaysia's Baselines around Sabah and Sarawak 
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Source: Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (1985) p. 
216. 
Therefore, Malaysian sovereign rights over the resources in its continental shelf, 
beyond the territorial sea limits, freedom of navigation and overflight was still 
recognised,, and fishing activities were not affected. 120 This situation did not change 
6 
until the Malaysian government promulgated an Exclusive Economic Zone Act in 
1984.121 With this Act, the Malaysian government carried out the third step which 
extended its sovereign rights over the water area. 
120 Tangsubkul, supra note 118. 
121 Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, ACT No. 311. Excerpts in UN, 
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, supra note 104, p. 78. 
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Because of the stipulations in the Continental Shelf Act, Malaysia claims that 
some reefs of the Spratly Islands are within its continental shelf, which leads to 
overlapping claims with Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, and the PRC. 122 <See Map 
7> 
3.3. THE PHILIPPINE MARITIME CLAIMS 
The Philippines is composed of more than 7,000 islands, lying proximate to each other. 
Most of these islands are separated by distances of less than 24 miles, a few by more 
than 50 miles but no one island lies more than 83 miles from another. 123 As a mid- 
ocean archipelagic state, some of the Philippine islands lie at a distance of more than 
12 nm from each other. The sea has always played an important role in the life of the 
Filipinos. Because of the desire for exclusive control over all resources and activities 
within the area enclosed by straight baselines and also national security concems, 124 
the Philippines has claimed a unique territorial sea system and had been one of the 
states which supported the archipelagic doctrine since the early 1950's. 125 The 
discussion in this section will start from the Philippine territorial sea claim. 
122 Cf infra Sub-Section 4.2. 
123 Mendoza, "The Base-lines of the Philippine Archipelago, " 46 Philippine 
Law Journal (1971) p. 634. 
124 Dellapenna, "The Philippines Territorial Water Claim in International 
Law, " 5 Journal of Law and Economic Development (1970) pp. 51-52; Mendoza, ibid., 
pp. 632,635. 
125 Tangsubkul, supra note 118, p. 6; Tolentino, supra note 27, p. 13. The 
Philippine delegates also support this doctrine at the UNCLOS III, see UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 62/C. 2/L. 24/Rev. I and UN Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 46. 
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Map 8 The Philippine Treaty Limits and Archipelagic Baselines 
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(1986) p. 115. Amended by the author. 
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A. TERRITORIAL SEA CLAIM 
On 7 March 1955, the Philippines Permanent Mission to the UN sent a note verbale to 
the Secretary-General which set out the Philippine position with regard to the 
territorial sea and archipelagic theory. It reads as follows: 126 
All waters around, between and connecting different islands belonging to 
the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, are 
necessary appurtenances of the land territory forming an integral part of 
the national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Philippines. All other water areas are embraced within the lines described 
in the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, the Treaty concluded at 
Washington, D. C., between the United States and Spain on 7 November 
1900, the Agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom 
of 2 January 1930 and the Convention of 6 July 1932 between the United 
States and Great Britain, as reproduced in section 6 of the Commonwealth 
Act. 
Article 3 of the 1898 Treaty of Paris defined the area of the Philippine 
territorial sea or 'Treaty Limits' as follows: 127 
Article III 
Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine 
Islands and comprehending the islands lying within the following lines: 
A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of 
north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, 
front the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and 
twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, 
thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian 
of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty- 
five minutes (4°45') north latitude, thence along the parallel of four 
degrees and forty-five minutes (4°45') north -latitude to its intersection 
with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and 
thirty-five minutes (119°35') east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian 
of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes 
126 See the note verbale of 7 March 1955 from the Philippines government to 
the UN Secretary-General. In 2 YILC (1956) p. 69. Also Coquia and Defensor- 
Santiago, Public International Law (1984) p. 329. 
127 Castro, ed., The Philippines and the Law of the Sea (1983) pp. 15-21. 
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(119°35') east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and 
forty minutes (7°40') north to its intersection with the one hundred and 
sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence 
by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of 
north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree 
meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and thence along the one 
hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of 
Greenwich to the point of beginning. 
The Philippine 'Treaty Limits', those lines of latitude and longitude mentioned 
in the 1898 Treaty of Paris, embraces vast areas of the western Pacific and of the South 
China Sea, such as the Sulu Sea. The width of the Philippine territorial sea boundary as 
established by these treaties varies from 270 miles offshore into the Pacific Ocean to 
147 miles offshore on the South China Sea side and diminishes to less than two miles 
in width at its narrowest part in the southwest corner. By traditional practice, territorial 
sea is a belt of waters, while the Philippine 'Treaty Limits' is roughly rectangular in 
shape. 128 <See Map 8> A territorial sea claim of this nature is quite unique in 
international law and international practice. As Philippine Senator Tolentino stated, 
128 Drigot, "Oil Interests and the Law of the Sea: The Case of the Philippines, " 
12 ODIL (1982) p. 32. In Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone 1958, Article 1(1) stipulates, 
The sovereignty of a state extends, beyond its land territory and its internal 
waters to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea. 
[emphasis added] 
In LOSC, Article 2(1), it also provides, 
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and 
internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic 
waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea. [emphasis 
added] 
171 
"The Philippines is sui generis, and cannot be covered by any general rule that may 
now be formulated on the breadth of the territorial sea. "129 
B. ARCHIPELAGIC CLAIM 
Several states had claimed a special regime for the waters of their archipelagos before 
the completion of UNCLOS 111.130 The Philippines and Indonesia are two of those 
claiming such a regime in Southeast Asia. 131 As early as 1955, the Philippine 
government had stated its position on the archipelagic doctrine. In a position paper 
dated March 1955, the Philippines stated that132 
All waters around, between and connecting different islands belonging to 
the Philippine archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimension, are 
necessary appurtenances of the land territory forming an integral part of 
the national or inland waters, subject to the exclusive sovereignty of the 
Philippines. 
129 Tolentino, Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Verbatim Record of the Committee of the Whole, p. 77. 
130 They include Antigua and Babuda, Maritime Areas Act, 1982; Cape 
Verde, Decree-Law No. 126/77 of 31 December 1977; Comoros, Law No. 82-005 
Relating to the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones, 28 July 1982; Fiji, Marine Spaces 
Act, 1977 and Marine Spaces (Archipelagic Baselines and Exclusive Economic Zone) 
Order, 27 November 1981; Indonesia; Papua New Guinea, National Seas Act, 1977; 
The Philippines; Sao Tome and Principe, Decree-Law No. 48/82,14/78,15/78; 
Solomon Islands, Declaration of Archipelagos of Solomon Islands, 1979 and 
Declaration of Archipelagic Baselines, 1979; Vanuatu, The Maritime Zones Act, 1981. 
131 For Indonesia's claim, see Announcement on the Territorial Waters of the 
Republic of Indonesia of 14 December 1957, in Whiteman, Digest of International 
Law, Vol. 4 (1965) p. 284. 
132 Supra note 126. 
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The Philippines advanced this position in UNCLOS I. During the preparatory work for 
UNCLOS I, the Philippines submitted proposals to treat mid-ocean archipelagos as 
one whole unit. 133 However, this concept was not adopted at the Conference and this 
was instrumental to the Philippines deciding to refuse to sign the four Geneva. 
Conventions of 1958.134 
On 14 March 1973, the Philippine delegation joined with the delegations of 
Fiji, Indonesia and Mauritius in proposing the Guidelines of the Archipelagic 
States: 135 
1. An archipelagic state, whose component islands and other natural 
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, 
and historically have or may have been regarded as such, may draw 
straight baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost 
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago from which the extent of 
the territorial sea of the archipelagic state is or may be determined. 
2. The waters within the baselines, regardless of their depth or distance 
from the coast, the seabed and the subsoil thereof, and the superjacent 
airspace, as well as all their resources, belong to and are subject to the 
sovereignty of the archipelagic state. 
3. Innocent passage of foreign vessels through the waters of the 
archipelagic state shall be allowed in accordance with its national 
legislation, having regard to the existing rules of international law. 
Such passage shall be through sea lanes as may be designated for that 
purpose by the archipelagic state. 
133 UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/18,1958. 
134 Tolentino, supra note 27, p. 19. 
135 UN Doc. A/AC. 138/SC. II/L. 15. Also see UN, Archipelagic States, 
Legislative History of Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(1990) p. 7. 
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In order to secure the concept of archipelagic states during the processing of 
UNCLOS III, the Philippine representative reiterated the importance of this idea to his 
country-136 
In the domestic legislation setting, the Philippine Republic Act No. 5446 of 18 
September 1968,137 which amended Section 1 of the Republic Act No. 3046,138 
defined the eighty baselines of territorial sea by connecting with straight lines the 
outermost points of the outermost islands of the Philippine archipelago. It declared that 
[A]II waters within the Treaty Limits have always been regarded as part of 
the territory of the Philippine Islands; all the waters around, between and 
connecting the various islands of the Philippine archipelago, irrespective, 
of their width or dimension, have always been considered as necessary 
appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland or internal 
waters of the Philippines; all the waters beyond the outermost islands of 
the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in the 
aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the 
Philippines. [brackets added] 
Under this Act, by drawing the eighty straight baselines joining the outermost 
points of the outermost islands and drying reefs, the total area of the Philippines, 
including the waters which are considered as being internal waters, is approximately 
136 UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. I (1975) Second Session, 31st 
Meeting, paras. 47-53; Vol. II (1975) Second Committee, 36th Meeting, paras. 57,65, 
and 66; Vol. XIV (1982) 138th Meeting, paras. 112 and 116; Vol. XVI (1984) 162nd 
Meeting, paras. 101-103. 
137 UN, Baselines: National Legislations with Illustrative Maps, supra note 
104, p. 251. 
138 Ibid., p. 250. 
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212,745 m2. The largest enclosed body of water which claimed as internal waters is the 
Sulu Sea with an area of 86,000 m2.139 <See Map 8> 
C. EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE CLAIM 
An EEZ is established in consideration of the resources which it may offer the 
controlling state. To the Philippines, the main reason for the EEZ is the economic 
exploration and exploitation of the resources, namely oil and fisheries, within the zone. 
We shall have a look at these reasons. 
About 95% of Philippine oil consumption is dependent on imported oil from 
the Middle East and Indonesia. 140 However, the hundreds of petroleum and gas 
seepages in several parts of the Philippines are generating hopes that eventually oil 
could be found and produced in commercial quantities. This possibility is further 
strengthened by the geologic structure of the Philippines, which is similar to that of its 
neighbouring states in this region. According to geologists, one similarity is that the 
thick marine sediments found in several areas in the Philippines correlate with similar 
deposits in Borneo, Sumatra, and Java. Another positive geological factor is that most 
of the petroleum found in the ASEAN region comes from long and narrow 
139 Coquia, "Analysis of the Archipelagic Doctrine in the New Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, " 8 Philippine Yearbook of International Law (1982) pp. 28-29; 
Idem., "The Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, " Philippine International Law Journal 
(1962) p. 148. Cf. Dubner, The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos 
and Archipelagic States (1976) pp. 61-62. 
140 Chanda, "South China Sea: Treacherous Shoals, " FEER (13 August 1992) 
p. 16. 
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geosynclinal basins similar to those found in the Philippines. 141 The new discoveries 
of crude oil, such as the wells off Palawan, are estimated to bring the Philippines' 
dependence on import oil down to about 85%. 142 
In terms of the fishing resources, tuna resources, particularly yellowfin and . 
skipjack, should be a major objective and remain one of the resources with a promising 
potential for increased exploitation for the Philippines. 143 With a good management 
system in the EEZ, the Philippines could benefit from the following aspects: 144 
A. Certain characteristics of the tuna fisheries and the industry make tuna an ideal 
object for a variety of business arrangement with foreign investors, especially those 
who can provide additional capital and improved fishing and processing 
technology. Through a properly designed joint venture system, the Philippines 
could obtain capital and technology. This would be a good source of foreign 
currency helping Philippine national development. 145 
141 Rajaretnam, Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia, Field 
Report Series No. 6 (1973) p. 21; Tangsubkul, supra note 118, p. 86. 
142 Chanda, supra note 140. 
143 See supra Sub-Section 2.3. 
144 Cited from Aprieto, Fishery Management & Extended Maritime 
Jurisdiction (1981) pp. 44-49. Cf. Ronquillo, "The Allocation of Tuna Fisheries, " in 
Christy, ed., Law of the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of Fisheries in 
Southeast Asia, Proceedings of the ICLARM/ISEAS Workshop on the Law of the Sea 
(1978) p. 10; Ferndandez, supra note 27, p. 61. 
145 See Saisunthorn, Fisheries of the ASEAN States: Transition in the 200- 
Mile EEZ Regime (1988) p. 38; SEAFDEC Fishery Statistical Bulletin for South China 
Sea Area, Bangkok, Thailand (1985). 
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B. The distant water fishing nations, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have 
been harvesting annually a catch estimated to be from 50,000 mt to 100,000 mt a 
year within the Philippine territorial waters and its EEZ. The determination of the 
total allowable catch and the maximum sustainable yield has to be undertaken in 
collaboration with all nations fishing and undertaking stock assessment studies in 
the region. Therefore, the relevant data could be obtained from foreign vessels. 
Consequently, following the consolidation of the concept of the EEZ in 
UNCLOS III, the Philippine government considered establishing its EEZ to ensure its 
economic survival and development. Under such circumstances, the Philippines 
declared a 200-mile EEZ on 11 June 1979.146 
3.4. VIETNAMESE MARITIME CLAIMS 
On 12 May 1977, Vietnam proclaimed its maritime zones: a 12 mit territorial sea, a 12 
nm contiguous zone, and a 200 run EEZ. Within this, its territorial sea has "a breadth of 
12 nautical miles measures from a baseline which links the furthest seaward points of 
the coast and the outermost points of Vietnamese offshore islands, and which is the 
low-water line along the coast. "147 On 12 November 1982, a much more radical 
146 The Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1599, Establishing An Exclusive 
Economic Zone and for Other Purposes. Text reproduced in UN, National Legislation 
on the Exclusive Economic Zone (1993) pp. 268-269. 
147 Vietnamese Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977. For the 
Statement, see UN, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, -supra note 104, pp. 
141-142. 
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baseline system was announced. 148 The baseline extends from the Gulf of Thailand, 
southeast of Ko Way, to the coast of Vietnam at the entrance of the Gulf of Tonkin, at 
17° 10' north latitude. <See Map 9> 
The Vietnamese baseline system uses nine turning points, two of which are . 
more than 80 nm offshore, while three others are more than 50 nm offshore. The four 
longest of the ten baselines are 162,161,149, and 105 nm long, enclosing a water area 
of 27,000 nm2 in all. Sections of this baseline are plainly in breach of existing rules for 
drawing straight baselines. Since the sections concerned are not deeply indented the 
lines must be based on the concept of fringing islands. 149 Vietnam's claims were 
protested by Thailand in 1985 and by Singapore in 1986 as contrary to the established 
rules of international law of the sea. 150 
148 Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Vietnam, in UN, Baselines: 
National Legislation with Illustrative Maps, supra note 104, pp. 384-387. 
149 Kittichaisaree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in 
South-East Asia (1987) pp. 16-17; Prescott, supra note 7, p. 212; Reisman and 
Westerman, Straight Baselines in International Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
(1992) pp. 106-107,133-136; Valencia and Van Dyke, "Vietnam's National Interests 
and the Law of the Sea, " 25 ODIL (1994) pp. 221-223. 
150 For Thailand's protest, see Statement by Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
dated 9 December 1985,7 LOS Bulletin (April 1986) p. 111; For Singapore's protest, 
see Singapore Note dated 5 December 1986,9 LOS Bulletin (April 1987) p. 53. 
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Map 9 Vietnam's Straight Baselines Claim 
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Source: Francalanci, Romano, and Scovazzi, eds., Atlas of the Straight 
Baselines (1986) p. 135. 
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Vietnam's claims overlap the PRC's claim in the Gulf of Tonkin, Indonesia's 
north of the Natuna Islands, Malaysia's in the Southern Gulf of Thailand, and 
Thailand's and Cambodia's in the eastern Gulf of Thailand. 151 Besides, Vietnam has 
maritime overlapping problems with the PRC and Taiwan concerning the Paracel 
Islands, and with Malaysia, the PRC, the Philippines, and Taiwan on the Spratly 
Islands. 152 
4. LITTORAL STATES' CLAIMS TO THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
The current political situation of the islands in the South China Sea is as follows: 
A. The Pratas Islands (Dong-sha-chun-dao in Chinese), 240 nm southwest of Taiwan 
at 20°30' to 210311 north latitude and 116° to 117° east longitude, consists of two 
banks and an island. 153 This group of islands are under the administration of the 
ROC government. A Taiwanese garrison is located on the biggest island, Pratas 
Island (Dong-sha-dao). Pratas has had a concrete runway, 4,500 meters in length, 
since July 1987, which is capable of accommodating C-130H cargo planes. 154 The 
sovereignty of these islands is not contested. 
151 Valencia, "Vietnam's Maritime Disputes: Hydrocarbon Resource Potential 
and Possible Solutions, " 16 Energy (1991) p. 1158. 
152 Cf. infra Sub-Section 4.4. 
153 Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of South 
China Sea Islands (1989) pp. 5-6; Buchholz, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific 
Ocean (1987) p. 49; Valero, supra note 27, p. 315. 
154 Yu, "Issues on the South China Sea: A Case Study, " 11 CYILA (1991-92) 
pp. 170-171. ' 
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B. Macclesfield Bank is a wholly and permanently submerged atoll which situated at 
15°20' to 16°20' north latitude and 113°40' to 115° east longitude. 155 The 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone and the 1982 
LOSC have some provisions concerning such a situation. 156 In the 1958 Geneva 
Convention, Articles 10 and 11 read: 
Article 10(1) 
An island is a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is 
above water at high tide. 
Article 11(1) 
A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide ... 
Article 6 of LOSC reads 
In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing reefs, 
the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the seaward 
low-water line of the reef... 
Article 13(1) of LOSC is verbatim from Article 11(1) of the 1958 Geneva 
Convention mentioned above, 
A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land which is 
surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide. 
Obviously, Macclesfield Bank does not fall properly into any of the above articles. 
Thus its limited value makes the question of who exercises control over it 
comparatively unimportant. 157 
155 Valero, supra note 27, p. 315. 
156 Also see O'Connell, supra note 66, pp. 195-196; Nordquist, et al., eds., 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary, Vol. 2 (1993) 
pp. 91-94. 
157 Lo, supra note 153, p. 26. 
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C. The Paracel Islands (Hsi-sha-chun-dao) is an archipelago lying approximately 
150-200 nm from both Hainan Island and Vietnam. It consists of about 130 barren 
uninhabited islands, all clustered in two groups, the Crescent group to the west and 
the Amphritite group to the east. 158 The largest island, Woody Island (Yung-hsin- 
dao), situated on the northeast, is about 1,950 metres long and 1,350 metres 
wide. 159 The PRC has been in possession of the entire Paracel archipelago 
following a battle between the PRC and the former South Vietnam in January 
1974.160 
D. The Spratly Islands (Nan-sha-chun-dao) are located approximately 300 run west of 
the Philippine island of Palawan, 300 nm east of Vietnam and 650 nm south of 
Hainan. The Spratlys consist of twenty-six reefs, twenty-one shoals, ten banks, five 
islands, and three cays. 161 These islands and islets are in the middle of a much 
more complicated dispute than the aforementioned island groups. The ROC, the 
PRC, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines all lay claim to one or more 
parts of this disputed area. <See Map 10> 
158 Keesing's (1974) p. 26388; Chao, "South China Sea: Boundary Problems 
Relating to the Nansha and Hsisha Islands. " 9 CYILA (1989) pp. 68-69; Greenfield, 
supra note 64, p. 151. 
159 Anderson, An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of 
Geopolitical Crisis (1993) pp. 160-161; Park, supra note 18, p. 203. 
160 For information on the battle, see Lo, supra note 153, pp. 53-63. 
161 Anderson, supra note 159, pp. 193-195; Park, supra note 18, p. 203. 
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Map 10 The Spratly Islands 
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Source: Valencia, "Spratly Solution Still at Sea, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) p. 156. 
Amended by the author. 
Owing to the delicate political situation and abundant natural resources, almost 
all littoral states claim sovereignty over the whole or part of the island group. The basis 
of the claims are as follows: 
183 
4.1. CHINA 
Basically, the two Chinese governments have similar attitudes towards the islands in 
South China Sea, because they draw on the same historic evidence: 162 
1. More than 2,000 years ago, Chinese people were already sailing on the South China 
Sea, as recorded in ancient Chinese literature. By the time of the Western and Eastern 
Han dynasties (206 B. C. -220 A. D. ), the South China Sea had become an important 
navigation route for the Chinese people. 163 
2. In order to commemorate the reigns of the two Ming Emperors, Cheng-tsu (1403- 
1424 A. D. ) and Hsuan-tsung (1426-1435 A. D. ), Yung-lo and Hsuan-teh were attached 
to the Paracels' two sub-groups of islands, Amphitrite and Crescent. 164 
3. An official statement was made in 1877 by China's first ambassador to Britain, Kuo 
Sung-tao, to the effect that the Paracel Islands 'belong to China'. 165 
4. In 1883, Germany carried out surveys on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, but ceased 
these operations after the Ching government protested. 166 
162 Yu, supra note 12, pp. 5-6; Being Review (12 December 1975), quoted 
from Park, supra note 18, p. 212. For the history of Chinese people in the South China 
Sea, see Chao, supra note 158, pp. 73-77; Samuels, supra note 15, pp. 9-50. 
163 Beging Review (12 December 1975). See Park, ibid. 
164 Heinzig, supra note 20, p. 23. 
165 Samuels, supra note 15, p. 52. 
166 Ibid.; Chao, supra note 158, pp. 76-77; Heinzig, supra note 20, pp. 25-26. 
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5. According to the 1887 Sino-French 'Convention Respecting the Delimitation of the 
Frontier Between China and Tonkin', France recognised that the Paracel (and Spratly) 
Islands were part of China. 167 
6. The Ching Dynasty's first official patrol of the Paracels was launched in 1902 by . 
three warships from its Canton fleet, which was led by Admiral Li Chun and Vice- 
Admiral Wu Ching-yung. During their stay on the Paracel Islands, they planted 
imperial flags and a stone tablet commemorating the arrival of formal Chinese 
authority. This tablet was discovered in 1979 by the PRC's People Liberation Army 
stationed on the North Island. 168 
7. After the Pratas incident of 1907,169 the second official patrol was launched in 1908 
by a 'Special Provincial Commission for the Management of the Area'. - The 
Commission was instructed to perform a formal reconnaissance of the islands and to 
establish sites for the construction of houses, roads, a radio station, and phosphate 
processing plants. Upon their return after a one-month stay on the Paracels, the 
Commission submitted an Eight-Point-Program Report recommending, inter alia, the 
administrative absorption and economic development of the Paracel Islands. This 
167 Chiu and Park, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, " 3 ODIL 
(1975) pp. 11-13; Samuels, supra note 15, p. 71. 
168 Samuels, ibid, p. 53; Hongkong Standard (6 March 1979) p. 5. 
169 In 1907, a Japanese entrepreneur-adventurer named, Nishizawa Yoshiji, 
together with one hundred followers, occupied Pratas Island and renamed it for 
himself. The occupation ended in 1908 when China paid Nishizawa an indemnity of 
130,000 silver dollars and Japan formally recognised Chinese sovereignty over the 
Pratas group. See Samuels, ibid., p. 53. 
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Report was later approved first by Governor-General Chang of Kwangtung, then by 
Kwan-Hsu Emperor, and finally, carried out by the Chinese government in 1911 by 
incorporating the Paracels into Kwangtung Province, to be administered by the 
Prefectural Authority of Hainan Island. t70 
8. The issuance and withdrawal of licenses for exploitation of the Paracel 
Archipelago: From 1921-1932, five such licenses were issued by the ROC Provincial 
government of Kwangtung. 171 
9. Early in 1928, the ROC government appointed a commission to investigate the 
Paracel Islands. On 22 May 1928, members of the commission boarded a navy 
battleship and sailed to the Paracels. Upon their return, they published a final report 
titled 'Text of the Report on the Investigation of the Paracel Archipelago (Tiao-Cha 
Hsi-sha Chun-tao pao-kao shu)'. According to this Report, the whole area around the 
Paracles, especially Woody Island, had been investigated thoroughly. 172 
Therefore, both Chinese governments claim that the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands has always belonged to China in their entirety. This attitude has been shown on 
several occasions, although never jointly. Thus, protecting and defending Chinese 
territory had been the common argument of both Chinese governments. The 
170 Samuels, ibid., pp. 53-54; Yu, supra note 12, pp. 5-6. 
171 Yu, ibid., p. 6. 
172 Samuels, supra note 15, pp. 57-60. 
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following two sub-sections will discuss the two Chinese governments' separate actions 
concerning the South China Sea after 1949. 
A. THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN) 
The ROC government was the first in the twentieth century to claim complete 
sovereignty over the Pratas Islands, Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel Islands, and the 
Spratly Islands, basing its claim on first discovery and continuous patronage of these 
islands dating back to the first century. 173 When the Spratly Islands were retroceded to 
the ROC in 1946, the Kwangtung Provincial government was given jurisdiction over 
them. 174 In 1947, the ROC Ministry of Interior's subsequent proposal to the central 
government to "temporarily transfer jurisdiction of the islands to the ROC Navy" was 
approved. 175 In addition, an official map was released, which showed the Pratas 
Islands, Macclesfield Bank, Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands within its 
boundaries. <See Map 11> 
173 Chang, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands, " 12(4) 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (1990) p. 22. 
174 Government Information Office, ROC, "The Republic of China's 
Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, " Reference: ROC on Taiwan, No. RR-93-02,30 
April 1993, p. 2. 
175 Ibid. 
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Map 11 The ROC's Claim on the South China Sea 
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Source: KMT Central Committee, Problems concerning the Various 
Islands in the South China Sea (1974). 
In 1948, the ROC dispatched warships to the archipelago to conduct surveys 
and erect landmarks. 176 In 1949, the ROC President promulgated the 'Organisational 
176 Chang, supra note 173, p. 22. 
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Statutes Governing the Office of the Special Administrator of Hainan' and transferred 
the jurisdiction of the Spratly Islands from the Kwangtung Provincial government to 
the Hainan Special Administrative District. 177 Owing to its defeat in the civil war in 
May 1950, the ROC government withdrew its forces on Hainan Island and the Paracel 
and the Spratly Islands to Taiwan. In the 1952 Treaty of Peace between the ROC and 
Japan, 178 Japan "renounces all right, title, and claim to the Spratly Islands, Paracel 
Islands, Pratas Islands, and Macclesfield Bank. "179 Although no sovereign successor 
was named in the Peace Treaty, the ROC claims that this Treaty is substantive proof 
that the ROC henceforth exercised complete sovereignty over these island groups. 180 
When, on 15 May 1956, a Philippine named Tomas Cloma claimed ownership, 
by discovery and occupation, of'Freedomland', 181 the ROC government immediately 
protested to the Philippine government. A naval contingent was sent to patrol the 
Spratly Islands but found the Philippine had already left. Later a Taiwanese garrison 
force of about 600 troops was sent to Itu Aba Island (Tai-pin-dao in Chinese), the 
177 Supra note 174. 
178 138 LINTS 38. 
179 See discussion in Valero, supra note 27, p. 319; also compare the 
discussion in Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.1. 
180 Chiu and Park, supra note 167, p. 14. 
181 See infra Sub-Section 4.3. 
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biggest island in the Spratly Islands, 182 and has remained there since then. 183 The 
Taiwanese Navy patrol Itu Aba Island and supply the garrison there every three or four 
months ever since. 184 In 1990, the Executive Yuan placed Tung-sha-dao (Pratas 
Island) and Tai-ping-dao (Itu Aba Island) under the temporary jurisdiction of the 
Kaohsiung City government, set up a postal system on the islands, and brought them 
under a unified administrative system. 185 
Itu Aba island is the only one of the Spratly Islands which is under Taiwanese 
control. <See Map 10> 
B. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Chinese leaders of the PRC maintain that China has 'undisputable sovereignty' over all 
the islands in the South China Sea. Although the PRC was not invited to attend the San 
Francisco Peace Conference in 1951 and did not sign the Treaty of Peace with Japan, 
its Foreign Minister, Zhou En-Lai, emphasised that186 
" 182 Itu Aba Island is 1,358 meters long and 350 meters wide, the total area is 
about 0.5 sq. km. See Shen, The Strategic Status of the South China Sea (1983) p. 6. 
However, according to other scholars, the biggest island is Thi Tu Island. See Samuels, 
supra note 15, p. 189; Jenkins, "The Spratlys: A 2000-year-old Claim, " FEER (7 
August 1981) pp. 30-33. 
183 Central Daily News (2 December 1992) p. 4. 
184 Shen, supra note 182, p. 6. 
185 Supra note 174. 
186 Collected Documents on the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of 
China, Vol. 2 (Peking, 1961) p. 32. For discussion, see Valero, supra note 27, p. 319 et 
seq. 
190 
[T]he Paracel Archipelago and Spratly Island, as well as the whole Spratly 
Archipelago, and the Chung-sha (Macclesfield Bank), and Tung-sha 
(Pratas) archipelagos have always been Chinese territory ... 
The Central 
People's Government of the People's Republic of China declares herewith: 
The inviolable sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Spratly 
Island and the Paracel archipelago will by no means be impaired, 
irrespective of whether the American-British draft for a peace treaty with 
Japan should make any stipulations and of the nature of any such 
stipulations. 
On 4 September 1958, in its Declaration on Territorial Sea, 187 the PRC 
proclaimed that the Pratas Islands, the Paracel Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the 
Spratly Islands belonged to it. 188 
On 30 January 1980, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a document 
entitled 'China's Indisputable Sovereignty over Xisha and Nansha Islands', 189 which 
argued that the Chinese were the first to discover, develop, and administer the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands. Hence, China has historical rights to those islands. 
The latest action taken by the PRC was on 25 February 1992, when it adopted 
the 'Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone' to legalise its claim. In this 
Law, it provides that the Dongsha Islands (the Pratas Islands), the Xisha Islands (the 
187 See this Chapter, Sub-Section 3.1. B. 
188 Declaration on China's Territorial Sea, Article 4. 
189 Beijing Review (4 February 1980) pp. 15-24. 
191 
paracel Islands), the Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), and the Nansha Islands 
(the Spratly Islands) are a part of its land territory. 190 
The PRC declared that it would resort to any measure to solve the territorial 
issues with other littoral states in the South China Sea region. The PRC Premier, Li 
Peng, made it known in Singapore in 1990 that China was willing to shelve the 
sovereignty issue and co-operate with the concerned countries in Southeast Asia to 
develop the resources around the Spratly Islands. 191 Likewise, the PRC President 
Yang Shangkun proposed in his ASEAN trip in June 1991 that there should be 
consultations among the rival countries for joint economic exploitation of the South 
China Sea. According to Yang, China 'in due time', would be prepared to solve the 
dispute over the islands 'through friendly consultations with the other countries. '192 
190 Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (1992), Article 2. Text reproduced in 21 LOS Bulletin (August 1992) 
p. 24. For the analysis of the Chinese territorial sea law, see Kim, supra note 112, p. 
894; Wang and Pearse, "The New Legal Regime for China's Territorial Sea, " 25 ODIL 
(1994) pp. 431-442. 
191 Lee, "Domestic Changes in China since the 4 June Incident and their 
Implications for Southeast Asia, " Contemporary Southeast Asia (June 1991) p. 39. 
192 Straits Times (9 June 1991) p. 6. 
192 
Map 12 The PRC's Claim on the South China Sea 
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Source: Institute of South China Sea Oceanography, PRC, Basic Atlas (1981). 
Basically, the PRC claims the same area as the ROC does. <See Map 12> The 
PRC currently occupies the whole Paracel Islands and the following seven islands in 
the Spratlys: Crarteron Reef, Fiery Cross, Gaven Reefs, KennanIsland, Landsdowne 
193 
Reef, Mischief Reef, Prince of Wales Bank, and Subi Reef. 193 The PRC has a total of 
about 260 troops stationed on these islets. 194<See Map 10> 
4.2. MALAYSIA 
Malaysia did not claim any section of the Spratly Islands until 1978, when a senior 
Malaysian official visited and claimed a number of islands in the southern region of the 
Spratlys, including Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and Swallow Reef. 195 The next 
year, maps published by Kuala Lumpur showed the continental shelves off the east 
coast of the Malaysian peninsula, Sarawak, and Sabah as well as the boundary 
enclosing the Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and Swallow Reef. 196 In May 1983, 
Kuala Lumpur, for the first time, landed troops on the Swallow Reef and has since 
maintained a platoon of soldiers there. 197 Since November 1986, two more platoons 
193 Ji, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement (1992) p. 2; 
Valencia, "All-for-Everyone Solution, " FEER (30 March 1989) pp. 20-21. For the 
recent development about Mischief Reef, see Chapter 5, notes 75-76 and the 
accompanying text. 
194 Central Daily News (2 December 1992) p. 4. 
195 Derek, "Boundary and Resource Disputes in the South China Sea, " 5 OY 
(1985) p. 260. 
196 Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes (1982) p. 126; Jenkins, supra 
note 182, p. 30. 
197 FEER (28 September 1983) pp. 40-41. 
194 
have been dispatched, one to Mariveles Reef and another to Dallas Reef. 198 At present, 
a total force of 70 troops are garrisoned on those three reefs. 199 
The legal grounds for the Malaysian claim to these islands are not very clear. 
Nonetheless, two assumptions could be justified. First, that Malaysia considers those 
islands as a part of its territory. This attitude can be seen in its document defending its 
action in garrisoning Swallow Reef. The Malaysian Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement on 9 September 1983 claiming that whilst "the Malaysian Government has 
no claim whatsoever over the 'Spratly Islands', " the Swallow Reef "has always been 
and is part of the territory of Malaysia. 11200 Secondly, according to the Malaysian 
Continental Shelf Act of 1966,201 those islands and reefs are located within the 
continental shelf of Sabah, thus, Malaysia's rights to them are a simple matter of 
geography. To reinforce such claims, Malaysia erected obelisks on the Louisa and 
Commodore reefs 202 
198 Straits Times (29 June 1988) p. 11. 
199 Central Daily News (2 December 1992) p. 4. 
200 Statement of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, 9 September 1983; Hamzah, 
The Spratlies: What Can Be Done to Enhance Confidence (1990) p. 7. Similar attitude 
can be seen from Malaysian Foreign Ministry's statement in 1988 after the armed 
conflict between the PRC and Vietnam. New Straits Times (25 February 1988), cited 
from Haller-Trost, The Spratly Islands: A Study' on the Limitations of International 
Law (1990) p. 65. 
201 See this Chapter, Sub-Section 3.2. 
202 Although it is believed that these monuments on Commodore Reef were 
destroyed by the Philippines authorities. See Prescott, supra note 7, p. 222. 
195 
Malaysia occupies Amboyna Cay, Commodore Reef, and Swallow 
Reef. 203<See Map 10> 
4.3. THE PHILIPPINES 
The Philippine government claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is based on 
occupation, which has been one of the important methods to seize sovereignty on a 
particular piece of terra nullius land sinccthe nineteenth century. The Philippines 
considered the archipelago as a terra nullius till 1956 when a Philippine fisherman and 
navigator, Tomas Cloma, claimed discovery of the archipelago. 204 Tomas Cloma, the 
owner of a fishing fleet and the Philippine Maritime Institute, set out with his brother 
and a crew of forty men to take formal possession of some of the Spratly Islands on 11 
May 1956. They raised the Philippine flag on various islands, most of them being the 
major islands of the Spratlys, including Spratly Island, Itu Aba Island, Nam Yit Island, 
and Thi Tu Island. A few days later he proclaimed their new possession as the 
'Archipelago of Freedomland (Kalayaan). '205 He emphasised that the claim was based 
on rights 
d discovery and/or occupation', because those islands are outside Philippine 
203 Cf. Haller-Trost, supra note 200, pp. 67-70. 
204 From the Philippine point of view, the Spratly Islands were terra nullius 
because, in the 1951 Peace Treaty, Japan only renounced its rights to the islands, but 
did not specify recipients of the abandoned title. Cf. supra note 179-180 and the 
accompanying text. 
205 "Freedomland: Government States Position on Imbroglio over Isles, " New 
Philippines (6 February 1974) p. 7; Results of Naval Patrols in the Spratly Island 
Frontier (1975) p. 89. Also, Samuels, supra note 15, pp. 81-82. 
196 
waters and not within the jurisdiction of any country. 206 In other words, res nullius 
naturalfiter fit primi occupantis is Cloma's view on the occupation of those islands. On 
6 July 1956, Cloma declared the establishment of a separate government for the 'Free 
Territory of Freedomland', with a capital at Pag-asa Island (Flat Island), and with 
himself as'Chairman, Supreme Council of State'. 207 
In response to Cloma's proclamation, in December 1956, Filipino Vice- 
President Garcia announced the Philippine government's position: 208 
Insofar as the Department of Foreign Affairs is concerned, it regards the 
islands, islets, coral reefs, shoals, and sand cays comprised within what 
you call 'Freedomland', with the exclusion of those belonging to the 
. seven-island group known internationally as the Spratlys, as res nullius, 
some of them being newly-risen, others marked on international maps as 
uncharted and their existence doubtful, and all of them being unoccupied 
and uninhabited; which means, in other words, that they are open to 
economic exploitation and settlement by Filipino nationals, who have as 
much right under international law as nationals of any other country to 
carry on such activities, so long as the exclusive sovereignty of any 
country over them has not been established in accordance with the 
generally accepted principles of international law, or recognised by the 
international community of nations. 
As regards the seven-island group known internationally as the Spratlys, 
the Philippine government considers these islands under the de facto 
trusteeship of the victorious Allied Powers of the Second World War, as a 
result of the Japanese Peace Treaty, signed and concluded in San 
Francisco on September 8,1951, whereby Japan renounced all its rights, 
title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands, and there 
being no territorial settlement made by the Allied Powers, up to the 
present with respect to their disposition. It follows, therefore, that as long 
as this group of islands remain in that status, it is equally open to economic 
exploitation and settlement by nationals or any members of the Allied 
Powers on the basis of equality thereto. 
206 Cited from Samuels, ibid., p. 82. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
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In view of the geographical location of these groups of islands and islets 
embraced within 'Freedomland', their proximity to the western territorial 
boundaries of the Philippines, their historical and geological relations to 
the Philippine archipelago, their immense strategic value to our national 
defence and security, aside from their economic potential which is 
admittedly considerable in fishing, coral and sea products, and in rock 
phosphate, assuredly the Philippine government does not regard with 
indifference the economic exploitation and settlement of these 
uninhabited and unoccupied groups of islands and islets by Philippine 
nationals so long as they are engaged in furtherance of their legitimate 
pursuits. [emphasis added] 
The- Philippines took an equivocal position in dealing with Cloma's 
proclamation. In order to avoid any possible confrontation with other concerned states, 
Garcia combined 'the seven-island group known internationally as the Spratlys' with 
'Freedomland' in order to imply that they were res nullius on the assumption that. the 
status of the Spratly Islands was still undetermined. The Philippine attempt is 
understandable if we examine its geographical situation. The Philippines has virtually 
no physical continental shelf along its western coast. The 200-meter isobath line on the 
southeast running very close along Palawan and Luzon islands, 209 which made the 
'natural prolongation' principle is simply unhelpful to the Philippines if it wants to 
claim its jurisdiction over the Spratly Islands. Thus, based on the theories of 
'occupation' and'proximity', the Philippine government could be better placed to claim 
control over those islands 210 Obviously, Garcia's announcement is a tactful 
arrangement for any further claim in the future. 
209 Park, supra note 18, p. 179. 
210 Meyer, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic (1965) p. 198; 
also, Drigot, supra note 128, pp. 41,44. 
198 
On 10 July 1971, the Philippine government, claiming that an unarmed 
Philippine vessel operating in the Spratly Islands had been fired upon by an ROC naval 
patrol unit, 211 sent a diplomatic note to Taipei demanding the withdrawal of a Chinese 
garrison from Itu Aba on the grounds that: 212 
1. The Philippines has a legal title to the island group as a consequence of 
the occupation by Tomas Cloma; 
2. The presence of the Chinese forces in Itu Aba constituted a serious threat 
to the security of the Philippines; 
3. The Chinese occupation of some islands in the Spratly group constituted 
de facto trusteeship on behalf of the World War II allies which precluded 
the garrisoning of the islands without the allies' consent; 
4. The Spratly group is within the archipelagic territory claimed by the 
Philippines. 
This was the first time that the Philippines articulated an official claim to part of the 
Spratly Islands. 
On 11 June 1978, President Ferdinand E. Marcos declared Presidential Decree 
No. 1596, which enclosed an area constituting a distinct and separate municipality of 
the Province of Palawan and which was to be known as Kalayaan. 213<See Map 8> 
Up to the present, Manila has seven Spratly islands under its control. They are 
Flat Island, Lankiam Cay, Loaita Island, Nanshan Island, Northeast Cay, Thi Tu Island, 
211 Samuels, supra note 15, p. 89. 
212 "Government States Position, " New Philippines (10 July 1971) p. 10; 
Coquia, "Philippine Position on the South China Sea Issues, " in Carino, ed., The South 
China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspections (1992) p. 53. 
213 Castro, ed., supra note 127, pp. 38-39. 
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and West York Island. 214 The Philippines has stationed over 480 marines on these 
islands. 215 On the Thi Tu Island, Manila maintains a runway which is capable of 
landing C-130H Hercules plane. 216<See Map 10> 
4.4. VIETNAM 
Vietnam is situated on the eastern coast of the Indochina Peninsula, and has a 2,828 nm 
of coastline. 217 Given this geographical location, it is easy to understand that Vietnam 
is eager to extend its claim on the vast maritime waters in the South China Sea. On 21 
October 1956, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) assigned the Spratlys to 
Phuoc Tuy Province by Decree No. 143/NV. 218 This was followed by two more 
decrees, No. 76BNV/HC 9 ND of 21 March 1958 and No. 34/NV of 27 January 1959, 
whereby the 1956 decree was either reconfirmed or adjusted. 219 In order to counter 
South Vietnam's claim, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North 
Vietnam) supported the PRC's claim to the Spratly Islands. Also on the occasion of the 
PRC's declaration on territorial sea in 1958, the then Prime Minister Pham Van Dong 
214 Prescott, supra note 7, p. 218. 
215 Central Daily News (2 December 1992) p. 4. 
216 South China Morning Post (18 March 1987) p. 21. 
217 Valencia and Van Dyke, supra note 149, p. 217. 
218 Chiu and Park, supra note 167, p. 9. 
219 Ibid. 
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again repeated this attitude. 220 This statement by the North Vietnamese government 
seriously weakened its position on its claim of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. 
The Vietnamese attitude to the Paracel and the Spratly island groups is that 
they have 'from time immemorial' been part of their territory. They argue that: 221 
From time immemorial, these islands have been frequented by 
Vietnamese fisherman who went there for tortoises, sea slugs, and other 
marine creatures ... the Spratlys are closest to Vietnam geographically and have been part of her territory early in history. In 1834, under the reign of 
Emperor Minh Mang, the Spratlys appeared in the first Vietnamese map as 
an integral part of the national territory. 
In order to strengthen its position, on 28 September 1979, the Vietnamese 
government released a White Book, 'Vietnam's Sovereignty Over Hoang Sa and 
Truong Sa Archipelagos', which listed nineteen items of evidence, including official 
records, maps, decrees, administrative decisions, and statements made by the former 
French colonial government and the South Vietnamese government. Furthermore, it 
stated that Vietnam was the first country to survey, explore, occupy, and claim 
sovereignty over those islands 222 
Vietnam currently occupies the following islands in the Spratly Islands: Baijiao 
(close to Investigation Shoal), Bombay Castle, Cornwallis S. Reef, Discovery 
220 The PRC was then a strong ally of the North Vietnam. See Haller-Trost, 
supra note 200, pp. 50-51. 
221 Fact Sheet, No. 2/74, South Vietnamese Embassy, Washington, D. C., 28 
January 1974. Cited from Park, supra note 18, p. 212. 
222 Chang, "Sino-Vietnam Territorial Dispute, " 28 Asia Pacific Community 
(1985) pp. 74-87. 
201 
Small Reef, Dunqianshazhou (nearby Andadao), Eldad Reef, Lizzie Weber Reef, 
Loaita Island, Namyit Island, Pearson Island, Sin Cowe Island, Southwest Cay, and 
Spratly (or Storm) Island. 223 Six hundred Vietnamese soldiers are deployed on these 
islets. 224 <See Map 10> 
5. OBSERVATIONS 
Given that the South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea and the distance from one 
headland or island to another is not over 400 nm, therefore the littoral states' maritime 
claims inevitably create overlapping areas. 225 According to the above five states' 
declarations on the continental shelf and the EEZ, the following overlapping areas 
have emerged: 
1. Malaysia - Brunei: a triangular area outside of Brunei's coast. 
2. Malaysia - Indonesia: an area extending northeast from Sarawak to Kalimantan. 
3. Malaysia - the Philippines - the PRC - Taiwan - Vietnam: most of the northern and 
" central area, i. e. the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands. 
4. Malaysia - the Philippines: a triangular area off northeast Sabah in the Celebes Sea. 
5. Malaysia ; Vietnam - Kampuchea - Thailand: a large part of the eastern Gulf of 
Thailand. 
6. Taiwan - The Philippines: a triangular area in the Bashi Channel. 
7. The Philippine - Indonesia: a small triangular area south of Mindanao. 
8. Vietnam - Indonesia: an area north of the Natuna Islands. 
9. Vietnam - Kampuchea: an area extending southwest from the disputed Phu Quoc 
Island. 
223 Jenkins, supra note 182, p. 30; South China Morning Post (18 March 
1987) p. 21. 
224 Central Daily News (2 December 1992) p. 4. 
225 Park, supra note 87, p. 120. 
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10. Vietnam - the PRC: an area in the Gulf of Tonkin. 
In view of the purpose of this research, the following chapters will focus on the 
areas in which the ROC is involved; that is, the disputed areas of the Bashi Channel 
and the Spratly Islands. With regard to the former, in trying to gain access to the South 
Pacific and South China Sea fishing grounds, Taiwanese fishing vessels have been 
captured by the Philippine navy on the grounds of 'illegal intrusion'. Problems have 
been compounded by the Philippine government's unwillingness to discuss or 
negotiate with Taiwan about the disputes, because they do not enjoy diplomatic 
relations. Regarding the latter, the island groups in the South China Sea are full of 
economic resources and strategic advantages. Because of this, the littoral states wish to 
control these islands, which makes the South China Sea a flash-point in the post-cold 
war era. Basically, the motivation for extending jurisdiction over maritime zones is 
control of economic resources. However, political factors, such as state recognition 
and sovereignty struggle, have led to the resolution being postponed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FISHERIES PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
From the geographical viewpoint, if all coastal states claim the establishment of a 
200-mile EEZ, the extent of the ocean area under national jurisdiction would reach 
approximately 31.9 million nm2, or about 30% of the world's marine surface. 1 More 
importantly, over 90% of the world commercial catch in volume terms is estimated 
as being taken within 200 miles of land. 2 So the establishment of the EEZ is a serious 
matter for any distant-water fishing nation. More seriously, in a semi-enclosed sea, 
such as the South China Sea, the establishment of the EEZ from the littoral states 
creates vast and various overlapping areas. Chapter 4 explains the littoral states' 
maritime claims and the overlapping situations. This chapter will examine fishery 
disputes, one of the results from overlapping claims. Secondly, the concept of 
I Smith, Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An Analysis and Primary 
Documents (1986) p. 3. 
2 Alexander and Hodgson, "The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on 
the Law of the Sea, " 12 SDLR (1975), p. 586. Also see Carroz, "The Living 
Resources of the Sea, " in Dupuy, ed., The Management of humanity's Resources: The 
Law of the Sea (1982) p. 199; McLean and Sucharitkul, "Fisheries Management and 
Development in the EEZ: The North, South, and Southwest Pacific Experience, " 63 
NDLR (1988) p. 492. 
'provisional arrangements' will be introduced as a resolution to conflict settlement. 
Thirdly, we will examine the motivation and potential for co-operation between 
states in the South China Sea region. According to the analysis in this chapter, fishery 
co-operation is the most feasible means for beginning to resolve fishery disputes 
resulting from overlapping claims. Finally, we shall look at what sort of 
accomplishments fishery co-operation can offer in the South China Sea region. 
1. FISHERY DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: 
A CASE ON THE TAIWANESE FISHERIES 
In a semi-enclosed sea like the South China Sea, littoral states' extending their 
maritime jurisdiction inevitably create overlapping claims and areas. This has lead to 
fishery disputes. Several fishery disputes between Thailand and other states are a 
good example to illustrate this overlapping situation. As a zone-locked state, 
Thailand has lost 300,000 km2 of area where its fishing boats had traditionally fished 
due to its neighbouring states' claims to EEZs. 3 Moreover, Thai fishermen were 
detained by other states when they were operating in the other states' EEZs. The 
Malaysian National Maritime Co-ordinating Centre reports an average of 200 foreign 
boats fishing in Malaysia's EEZ every month. In 1986,117 foreign vessels were 
3 McDorman, "Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim of 200-mile Zones, " 16 
ODIL (1986) p. 190. Also, Saisunthorn, "Impact of 200-mile EEZ Claims on the 
Access of Thailand's Distant-Fishing Fleet to Foreign EEZs, " Paper presented at the 
Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, 
Indonesia, 15-18 July 1991. 
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Unit: Metric Tons 
Source: Taiwan Fishery Yearbook: 1991. 
caught while up to November 1987,93 vessels had been apprehended .4 The 
Vietnamese records reveal that, between 1983 and 1986, the Vietnamese arrested and 
detained 1,000 Thai fishermen. Besides, in 1992, more than 800 Thai fishermen 
remained in Vietnamese jails after arrests for fishing in Vietnamese waters. 5 
Taiwanese fishermen are involved in similar situations. As a distant-water 
fishing nation and heavily dependent on distant-water fisheries, Taiwan has 
4 Mohamed, "National Management of Malaysian Fisheries, " 15 Mar. Pol. 
(1991) p. 11. 
5 Valencia and Van Dyke, "Vietnam's National Interests and the Law of the 
Sea, " 25 ODIL (1994) p. 231. 
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encountered difficulties in its fisheries development both in the South China Sea 
region and other fishing grounds. 6 
In the case of Taiwanese fisheries, trawl is a traditional and important fishing 
method for Taiwan fishing industry, but trawl fishing has to operate in sea areas . 
where the depth is less than 200 metres. Most of these areas are now under the 
exclusive jurisdiction of coastal states. Obviously, owing to the international 
establishment of the EEZ, the operating areas of Taiwanese trawl fishery has been 
effectively reduced. This is demonstrated in <Figure 2>, which shows that the 
distant-water fisheries maintained their increasing trend from 1976-1990. 
Nonetheless, the growth of trawl fishery has been relatively flat. 
More importantly, the extension of jurisdiction over maritime area has 
resulted in the seizure of Taiwanese fishing vessels by other states, especially by its 
neighbouring states, in areas which used to be Taiwanese traditional fishing grounds. 
Table 2> shows the instances of Taiwanese fishing vessels being seized by 
other countries. In terms of ocean area, there were 503 Taiwanese vessels, or the 
equivalent of 58.4% of the total number, seized by the Southeast Asia countries. This 
has proved relevant to the development of expanding jurisdiction since 1970's. The 
Taiwanese maintain their fishing operations in Taiwan's traditional fishing grounds 
6 It is reported that the announcements of 200-mile EEZs and/or fishing 
zones by various coastal states threaten to decrease about 50% of the fish catching of 
Taiwan's distant water fisheries. See Dellapenna and Wang, "The Republic of China's 
Claims Relating to the Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic 
Zones: Legal and Economic Aspects, " 3(2) Boston College ICLR (1980) p. 365. 
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but those grounds are declared to be EEZs or fishery zones under its neighbouring 
states' jurisdiction. The Philippines claimed its EEZ in 1978 while Indonesia claimed 
its in 1980.7 This corresponds to the number of Taiwanese vessels seized between 
1979 and 1980 when the number of seizures peaked. 
The records show that those seized vessels were impounded for 'illegal 
intrusion to territorial sea', 'illegal fishing in the exclusive economic zone', or 
'smuggling'. 8 On the other hand, fishermen defended themselves by claiming to have 
been 'drifting into territorial sea because of engine breakdown', 'being arrested in high 
seas', and force majeure from bad weather. '9 The ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Fu-Sung Chu, gave several reasons why Taiwanese fishing vessels were seized by 
other countries: A. entry into territorial sea by accident; B. seizure on the high seas 
by mistake; C. illegally intruding into territorial sea or EEZ; D. operation not in 
accordance with the initial agreement; E. illegal fishing methods, i. e. electric shock 
or bombing; F. non payment of fees; G. a small minority of crewmen being suspected 
of breaching local law. '° According to the statistics by the Overseas Fisheries 
7 For Philippine declaration, see Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1599 
of 11 June 1978, Establishing An EEZ and for Other Purposes, in UN, The Law of 
the Sea: National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone (1993) pp. 268-269; 
for discussion on the Philippine maritime claims, see supra Chapter 4, Sub-Section 
3.3. For Indonesian declaration, see Indonesian Declaration concerning the Exclusive 
Economic Zone of 21 March 1980, in UN, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction 
(1992)p. 66. 
8 China Times (24 January 1989) p. 3. 
9 Ibia. 
10 Report of the Minister in the Foreign Affairs Committee, Legislative 
Yuan (10 June 1986). 
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Development Council of the ROC, the most common reason was intruding into 
territorial sea or EEZ without the consent of the foreign goverrunent. Over 90% of 
the cases were based on this. I i 
With respect to the discussion above, it is clear that 'illegal fishing' or 
'reckless intrusion' is a common phenomenon in the South China Sea region. This 
stems primarily from the littoral states extending their jurisdiction claims and the 
inevitable overlapping of maritime areas. The following sections focus on feasible 
solutions to these problems and the possibilities for co-operation in this region. 
11 Chang, "Prevent the Fishing Vessels Being Seized, " Fisheries Extension 
(June 1991) pp. 9-10. For example, in People of the Philippines v. Kwan Un Diong 
case; a Taiwanese fishing vessel, Bien Dim Huet, and five accused fishermen were 
found within the Philippine territorial sea about ten miles northwest of Dequey 
Island, Sabtang, Batanes, the northernmost province of the Philippines. On 6 June 
1988, the accused pleaded guilty to the charge of illegal entry. Under this, the Court 
found the accused guilty and sentenced each of the accused to a penalty of forty-five 
days imprisonment and imposed a fine of five hundred pesos. See Criminal Case No. 
584, Republic of the Philippines, Regional Trial Court, Second Judicial Region, 
Branch XIII, Batanes, 22 June 1988. Cited from Fu, "Trespassing Taiwanese Fishing 
Vessels in Some ASEAN States Waters, " 24(1) UBCLR (1990) pp. 109-110. Cf. 
Indonesia v. Twenty-three Taiwanese Fishermen on Chiao Tai No. 1&2, The 
Supreme Court of Indonesia, 1338 K/PID/1988,8 September 1988; Indonesia v. 
Sixteen Taiwanese Fishermen on The Kn Hsu Chun No. 1, Local Court of Ambon, 
Pasal 193 ayat (1) KUHAP, No. 39/PID. B. /1987/PN. AB, 3 February 1988. 
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Table 2 Seizure of Taiwanese Fishing Vessels (1977-1994) 
1 771 78 179 1 80 1 81 1821 831 841 851 86 1871 881 891 901 911 921 931 94 TOTAL 
SOU THEASTA SIA AREA 503 
Indonesia 23 10 12 52 18 12 13 3 12 10 19 4 4 2 6 4 4 10 218 
Malaysia 2 2 11 11 1 31 1 20 
Philippines 13 6 15 59 21 4 14 9 5 5 6 21 13 5 9 9 15 6 235 
Thailand + f 3 3 
Vietnam 2 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1_51 5 2 2 27 
NORTHPACIFIC OC EANAREA 171 
Japan 34 23 113 1 91 14 1 71 141 5 9 1 4 1 2 11 4 4 144 
U. S. A. 
- - 
12 121 1 11 11 6 
Russia 
f + +1 
1 2 2 21 
__ 
1 2 2 3 2 3 3 1 1 21 
SOUTH PACIFIC OC EAN AREA 114 
Australia 11 8 9 3 4 1 4 2 4 2 31 1 1 3 55 




Micronesia 1 3 6 3 1 1 15 
Palau 3 1 4 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 18 
Papua New 
Guinea 
2 1 1 2 4 1 11 
Solomon 
Islands 
1 1 1 1 4 
Tonga 3 




Ban ladesh 2 2 





an Pakist 2 2 11 
Somalia 2 2 1 5 
A 10 
Ar entina 4 . 1 3 1 9 
Brazil 1 1 
Annual Total 41 58 40 30 31 25 34 26 868 
Source: Overseas Fisheries Development Council of the ROC. 
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2. PROVISIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THE RESOLUTION 
OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 
Theoretically, states with maritime jurisdiction disputes should seek agreements to 
reach an equitable solution, a delimitation would be preferable. However, reality is 
not at all like this. Some of the disputes, like the disputes that have occurred in the 
South China Sea are highly political, which hampers resolution. At the same time, 
however, the relevant parties in the South China Sea region are trying their best to 
consolidate their positions in the disputed area, especially the Spratly Islands. 
Moreover, without appropriate co-operation, the utilisation of resources cannot be 
maximised. All these are diametrically opposed to the spirit of the EEZ. In order to 
resolve the disputes and utilise the resources, a provisional arrangement or a modus 
vivendi, pending final resolution seems most feasible. The 1982 LOSC offers a 
working procedure for this. According to the stipulation in Article 74 of the LOSC, 
1. The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between States with 
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis 
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statue of the 
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable 
solution. 
2. If no agreement can be reached within a reasonable period of time, the 
States concerned shall resort to the procedures provided for in Part 
Xv. 
3. Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States 
concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make 
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical 
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardise or hamper 
the reaching of the final agreement. Such arrangements shall be 
without prejudice to the final delimitation. 
4. Where there is an agreement in force between the States concerned, 
questions relating to the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone 
shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of that 
agreement. 
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At this stage, it seems that none of the relevant parties would like to refer to 
the time-consuming judicial settlement. Nonetheless, the current situation in the 
South China Sea could hinder the development and management of resources. Much 
worse, the military build-up could have the practical effect of creating a moratorium 
on economic activities in such an area. 12 On the other hand, once boundaries are 
fixed, they are, in general, final and permanent. Hence, it would be unwise to 
conclude 9 delimitation in haste without adequate consideration of all the potential 
effects upon the national interest of the states involved. 13 Accordingly, entering into 
a provisional arrangement becomes the most practical way to solve the problem. 
It is noteworthy that, during the period of provisional arrangements, not only 
the arrangement itself should not hamper the final resolution, but also each of the 
parties should control itself so that a provisional arrangement could operate between 
states in dispute to keep the disputes under control or, at least, to avoid any 
aggravation of conflict. The conflict should be managed so that every incident 
happening during the provisional period can be treated as juridical neutral. In other 
words, those incidents, if any, would not harm or help the position of either side. 
Furthermore, if the states in dispute agree, they could explore and exploit the 
resources without touching upon the issues of delimitation or sovereignty, that is, 
distinguishing the issue of sovereign rights from the one of sovereignty. Therefore, 
for the best result, states in dispute should: 
12 See infra Sub-Section 4.1. 
13 Kittichaisaree, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation 
in South-East Asia (1987) p. 103. 
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A. Initiate negotiations in good faith or bona fide. Under the first part of Articles 74 
and 83, paragraph 3, the states concerned, in a spirit of understanding and co- 
operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature. The phrase, 'in a spirit of understanding and co-operation', reveals 
that the parties concerned should negotiate with a spirit of good faith or bona fide. 
The obligation to seek agreement in good faith is defined in many well-established 
precedents 'of international juridical cases. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases, the Court stated, 14 
[T]he parties are under an obligation to enter into negotiations with a 
view to arriving at an agreement and not merely to go through a formal 
process of negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the automatic 
application of a certain method of delimitation in the absence of 
agreement; they are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that 
the negotiations are meaningful. [emphasis added] 
The Court went on to state that this obligation "is moreover recognised in Article 33 
of the Charter of the United Nations as one of the methods for the peaceful settlement 
of international disputes. "15 Nonetheless, the Court also mentioned that an obligation 
to negotiate, did not imply an obligation to reach an agreement. 16 
14 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I. C. J. Reports 1969, para. 85(a). 
Similarly, in the Gulf of Maine Case, the court said that the parties were under duty to 
negotiate "and to do so in good faith, with a genuine intention to achieve a positive 
result. " See I. C. J. Reports 1984, paras. 87,112. Cf. White, "The Principle of Good 
Faith, " in Lowe and Warbrick, eds., The UN and the Principles of International Law 
(1994) p. 230. 
15 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, para. 86. 
16 Ibid., para. 87. 
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Furthermore, the words, 'shall make every effort', indicate that this 
requirement is not merely a recommendation or encouragement, but a mandatory rule 
whose breach would represent a violation of international law. The states concerned 
are obliged not to undertake specific actions but to endeavour to reach an agreement 
on interim measures. 17 
B. Self-restraint. Needless to say, even if the parties reach a final agreement, they still 
have to control themselves not to take any action which would make the dispute 
much worse. That is to say, mutual restraint should be exercised pending final 
agreement or settlement in order not to impede the completion of the final 
delimitation-18 Only under such presumption, can the arrangement correspond to the 
spirit of the provision, 'not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final 
agreement'. 
In addition, two aspects of the provisional arrangements should not be 
overlooked: 
A. Transitional nature. For international peace, the states concerned shall enter into 
Provisional arrangements so as not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final 
delimitation. Thus, the obligation to seek a solution of the dispute through peaceful 
17 Lagoni, "Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, " 
78 AJIL (1984) p. 354. 
18 Report by the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7 on the Work of the 
Group at Its 17th-27th Meetings, NG7/24,14 September 1978, in UNCLOS III, 
Official Records, Vol. X (1978) p. 171. 
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means has not been eliminated by that interim agreements. 19 Because they are 
characterised as 'provisional', the arrangements are interim and they are preliminary 
or even preparatory to the final agreed status of the area and the utilisation of its 
resources. The interim measures could not be interpreted as constituting a bar to, or 
setting up any limitation on, the pursuit before the court. 20 
In the case of 'Interim Agreement in the Fisheries Dispute between the UK 
and Iceland, 13 November 1973', the Court said that21 
[The Interim Agreement] was an interim agreement, that it related to 
fisheries in the disputed area, that it was concluded pending a settlement 
of the substantive dispute, and that it was without prejudice to the 
substantive dispute. 
Thus, so long as the dispute continues or exists, the final settlement is 
regarded as pending. The parties meanwhile maintain their legal rights and claims as 
well as their respective positions in the conflict. 22 In the absence of the express 
consent of the parties, one cannot assume that they accept or acquiesce in the 
arrangements as final; and they are not prevented from taking any position in the 
negotiations on the final agreement that cannot be squared with the provisional 
arrangement. 23 
19 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, 1. C. J. Reports 1974, para. 76. 
20 Ibid., para. 37. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid 
23 Lagoni, supra note 17, p. 359. 
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B. Practical nature. Because the provisional arrangement is of a practical nature, it 
focuses on the practical issues, i. e. utilisation of resources, and puts the delimitation 
and sovereignty issues aside. Additionally, owing to its practical nature, a 
provisionally arranged fishing zone would have no relevance, for example, to a 
hydrocarbon area in question. To be specific, the utilisation of living resources is 
separate from the utilisation of non-living resources. 
3. MOTIVATION TO PROCEED CO-OPERATION 
3.1. ECONOMIC INTERACTIONS 
In view of the multilateral relations among the South China Sea littoral states, current 
trends should favour greater co-operative engagement and the avoidance of further 
conflict. Since the mid-1980's, economics has played an increasingly important role 
in the relations among the littoral states, which is an important catalyst in boosting 
co-operation. 24 
Among the South China Sea littoral states, the PRC has the greatest capacity 
to undermine strategic stability in the region should it resort to force to assert its 
authority over the remaining South China Sea territories which it claims but does not 
24 Klintworth, "Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New 
Opportunities, " 5 P. Rev. (1992) pp. 221-231; Rosencrance, The Rise of the Trading 
State (1986). 
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occupy. 25 Nonetheless, the PRC has little to gain by resorting to military force in 
- pursuit of its South China Sea claims but much to lose. In addition, conflict could 
further complicate its modernisation efforts at a time of great domestic stress. 
Conflict would also have wider ramifications for the regional economy by negatively 
impacting shipping, telecommunications, and resource exploration and exploitation. 
It would reduce transnational coalition opportunities among regional states and could 
lead to the diversion of scarce capital resources away from economic development to 
defence. Finally, it could encourage Japan to pursue a regional security role, a 
possibility which because it would create a challenging new regional security 
dynamic, has become Beijing's main external security concern. 26 
Vietnam is the other state which claims all the islands in the South China Sea 
and has clashed with all the others involved in the conflict. Its military encounter 
with the PRC in March 1988 in the Spratlys27 signalled to the world that the area 
could be a major flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region. Nonetheless, in view of 
Vietnam's internal affairs, it seems that the tension between Vietnam and the other 
25 For the discussion on military build-up in this area, see discussion in 
infra Sub-Section 4.1. 
26 Polomka, "Strategic Stability & the South China Sea: Beyond 
Geopolitics" (1990) pp. 3-5. 
27 In March 1988, the PRC navy encountered Vietnamese supply forces in a 
brief naval engagement, sinking three transport vessels and killing 72 Vietnamese 
troops. The PRC subsequently took possession of several insular features. Garver, 
"China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic . and 
National Interests, " 132 China Q. (1992) pp. 1012-1014. 
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claimants in the South China Sea conflicts could be contained with the situation there 
being less explosive. Hanoi would need peace in order to focus on its domestic 
economic and social development. As a result, Vietnam has embarked upon a 
comprehensive renovation of its economic, political, and foreign policies. As far as 
foreign policy is concerned, Vietnam is seeking more trade and investment, and a 
peaceful environment for its socio-economic development. It is in this context that 
overtures were made to normalise relations with the US and improve relations with 
the ASEAN states and the PRC. In the case of the ASEAN states, it seems that 
Vietnam is keen to concentrate on steps in confidence building by having contacts at 
all levels and different forms of co-operation with ASEAN states. 28 In the case of. the 
PRC, it was known that Hanoi was ready to hold high-level talks with Beijing on 
officially reopening their common border. Vietnam also wanted to re-establish the 
rail link between Hanoi and Beijing. 29 
3.2. RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO CHINESE GOVERNMENTS 
i 
As far as relations between the PRC and ROC are concerned, it is interesting to see 
that' they have taken on a co-operative, yet delicate, character. In some ways, the 
Taiwanese presence on Itu Aba Island since the 1950's has helped the Chinese claims 
in the area. The PRC government stated, more than once, that the Taiwanese garrison 
28 Tran, "For A New Southeast Asia" (1991) p. 5. Vietnam had been 
accepted as a new member of the ASEAN in July 1995. See Gallagher, "China's 
Illusory Tlueat to the South China Sea, " 19(1) IS (1994) p. 192. 
29 Foreign Broadcast Monitor, No. 145/91 (27 June 1991) p. 5. 
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on Itu Aba island had maintained the interests for all Chinese 30 Obviously, the 
PRC's position on the Taiwanese garrison implied that the troops from Taiwan are a 
legitimate Chinese occupation force which enforces Chinese claims. 31 It should be 
noted that Taipei's Defence Minister at one point during the 1988 Sino-Vietnamese 
clash in the Spratlys said that if Taiwan were asked by China to help defend the 
Spratly Islands against a third party, it would be prepared to do so. 32 Since both 
Beijing and Taipei maintain that there is only one China, it is possible that there is 
room for co-operation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait for the benefit of 
both when coming to the claims to the isles in the South China Sea. In fact, it has 
been noted that Taiwan by itself cannot be expected to protect its interests on- the 
Spratlys and that "it may well have to seek some kind of agreement with the PRC" on 
the Spratly issue. 33 
This possibility is reflected in the increased relations between the two Chinas 
in recent years 34 In October 1987, the late ROC President Chiang Ching-Kuo agreed 
to lift the ban on Taiwan residents' visits to their relatives on the Chinese mainland 35 
30 Being Review (4 February 1974) p. 3 and (18 February 1980) p. 18. 
31 Muller, China as a Maritime Power (1984) pp. 220-221. 
32 Hoon, "Blood Thicker than Politics, " FEER (5 May 1988) p. 26. 
33 Yu, "Reasons for not Negotiating and Negotiating (Away) the Spratlys: A 
Chinese View from Taiwan" (1990) p. 11; Gao, "The South China Sea: From 
Conflict to Cooperation? " 25 ODIL (1994) p. 354. 
34 Jai, "Changing Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, " 32 AS (1992) pp. 
277-289. 
35 Ma, "Thousands of Taiwan Residents Packing for Trip to Mainland, " 
4(42) FCJ (26 October 1987) p. 1. 
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On 13 January 1988, President Chiang passed away and Vice-President Lee Teng- 
Hui succeeded to the Presidency. President Lee extended the aforementioned policy, 
under which the mainland residents are allowed to visit their sick relatives in Taiwan 
or to attend their funeral services. Mail exchanges through Hong Kong were 
permitted 36 Under this pretext, thousands of Taiwanese businessmen rushed to 
China, causing Taiwanese trade and investment in China to soar. The total volume of 
trade between 1979 and 1986 was about four billion US dollars. Between 1987 and 
1992, total indirect trade between Taiwan and China was over 20 billion US dollars, 
with Taiwan enjoying a trade surplus of 16 billion dollars. However, this figure is 
misleading because it fails to take into account the money spent by Taiwan people on 
their 4.2 million visits to China, and the money remitted by Taiwan residents to help 
their relatives or friends in China. 37 As for Taiwanese investment in China, it is 
difficult to estimate, but it is believed that total investment may be as high as 10 
billion dollars, with growth expected to continue 38 
Changes in economic relations between Taiwan and China have accompanied 
other transformations. A formal channel for official communication, the Straits 
36 The Chinese Nationalist Party's Policy toward the Mainland at the 
Present Stage (Chinese Nationalist Party's Council on Culture Affairs of the Central 
Committee: Taipei, 1988). Cited from Chiu, "The International Order and Intra- 
Chinese (Taiwan-Mainland) Relations, " 10 CYILA (1990-91) pp. 14-15. 
37 Chiu, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and 
Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (1993) p. 7. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. In 1990, Beijing announced that Taiwan has replaced the US 
and Japan as the largest investor in China. See Hickey, "China's Threat to Taiwan, " 5 
P.. Rev. (1992) p. 255. Cf. Huan, "China's Foreign Economic Relations, " 519 Annals 
AAPSS (January 1992) pp. 176-190. 
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Exchange Foundation (SEF), although claimed by the ROC government to be non- 
official, was established on 28 April 1991.39 According to the ROC government, the 
SEF was established to carry out non-official contacts and negotiations with the 
Chinese communist authorities in the mainland. 40 In response to Taipei's SEF, the 
PRC decided to establish a counterpart organisation to the SEF, the Association for 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), on 6 December 1991. According to 
the Deputy Chairman of the ARATS Tang Shu-Pei, 41 the Association would work to 
strengthen non-official contacts and exchanges, team up with the relevant organs in 
Taiwan to crack down on maritime smuggling and piracy, and settle disputes between 
the two sides. 42 Basically, SEF and ARATS are official organisations but with non- 
official cover. Under this structure, both parties can avoid sensitive political issues, 
such as the 'One China Policy', and concentrate on the resolution of practical affairs, 
39 The SEF is funded two-thirds by the ROC government and one-third by 
private contributions. 
40 "Co-ordinating Mainland Affairs, " 8(14) FCJ (25 February 1991) p. 1. 
The SEF is authorised specifically to undertake the following tasks: 
1. Accepting, ratifying, and forwarding entry and exit documents 
from the two sides of the Straits; 
2. Verifying and delivering documents issued on the mainland; 
3. Deporting fugitives on the two sides of the Straits; 
4. Arbitrating trade disputes; 
5. Promoting cultural and academic exchanges; 
6. Providing consultation on general affairs; 
7. Helping protect the legal rights of ROC citizens during their visits 
to the mainland; 
8. Dealing with other affairs commissioned by the ROC 
government. 
41 Tang Shu-Pei is the former PRC consul-general at San Francisco. 
42. "Association Founded for Taiwan Contacts, " Beijing Review (30 
December 1991) p. 5. 
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such as resolving trade disputes and promoting cultural exchanges. This 'private' 
character is evident in the first talks between chairmen Koo and Wang of the two 
organisations in 1993.43 
On 3 April 1993, the secretary-general of the SEF Chiu Chin-I44 led a 
delegation to Beijing to hold a preparatory meeting with the ARATS. At the 11 April 
1993 preparatory meeting, both parties agreed that the Koo-Wang Talks would be 
non-governmental, practical, economic, and functional in nature. The purpose of the 
talks would be to establish a channel for liaison and negotiation to resolve problems 
evolving from private exchange, and to boost economic, cultural, and technological 
interaction. 45 The talks took place in Singapore from 27 to 28 April 1993. At the 
conclusion of the talks, four agreements were reached: the Agreement on the Use and 
Verification of Certificates of Authentication (Notarisation) Across the Taiwan 
Straits, the Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for Lost 
Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits, the Agreement on the System for 
Contacts and Meetings Between the SEF and ARATS, and the Joint Agreement of 
43 The first talk is also known as 'Koo-Wang Talks'. Koo Chen-Fu is the 
Chairman of the SEF, the Chairman of the ROC National Association of Industry and 
Commerce, and a member of the KMT Central Standing Committee. Wang Tao-Han 
is the Chairman of the ARATS and the former Mayor of Shanghai. 
44 Chiu Chin-I is a former diplomat and former deputy secretary-general of 
the ROC Presidential Office. 
45 Yu, "Singapore Koo-Wang Talks Date Set, " 10(26) FCJ (13 April 1993) 
p. 1. 
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the Koo-Wang Talks. 46 Although the core issue separating the PRC and the ROC, 
which is the reality of two separate entities, has not been solved officially, the 
establishment of the SEF and the ARATS can be treated as a stage in building 
confidence, which is positive for regional stability. 
However, owing to Taiwan's first presidential election by direct vote in March 
1996 and its democratic development, China launched a series of military exercises 
in waters adjacent to Taiwan. 47 Although China's intimidation did not work and a 
Taiwanese president was elected as scheduled, the conflict between Taiwan and 
China had become a major issue in Southeast Asia. 
3.3. CONSENSUS ON PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
Regarding peaceful settlement of disputes in the South China Sea, the parties 
concerned have expressed a willingness to settle disputes through peaceful means, 
particularly after the 1988 clash between the PRC and Vietnam. 48 In January 1990, 
Indonesia hosted a non-governmental workshop of academics and officials from the 
ASEAN states to discuss the management of potential conflicts in the South China 
46 For English translation of the four Agreements, see 32 ILM (1993) p. 
1217. For the discussion on Koo-Wang Talks, see Chiu, supra note 37. 
47 Hsinhua (Beijing, 5 March 1996 and 10 March 1996). 
48 Chang, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands, " 12(4) 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (1990) pp. 30-31. 
223 
Sea. 49 An agreement was reached at this meeting that all relevant South China Sea 
parties should be invited to a second workshop. 50 Besides, this kind of workshop 
mechanism is essentially an unofficial process, not constituting formal or informal 
negotiation. Hosted and co-chaired by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, the invited 
participants were academics and officials, participating in their personnel capacities, 
from the six ASEAN states, Laos, the PRC, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 51 The agenda 
covers a broad range of South China Sea topics, thus avoiding undue attention being 
given to the most contentious issue, the Spratly islands. The process is designed to 
allow for a full and frank discussion of issues without the restrictions imposed by 
formal negotiations. Therefore, the process could provide an innovative format for 
exploring sensitive issues. 52 
The second informal workshop was held in July 1991 in Bandung, Indonesia. 
At this meeting, both the PRC and Taiwan were invited to participate. 53 A statement 
49 Djalal, "Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: In Search of 
Cooperation; " 18 JQ (1990) pp. 127-132. 
50 Vatikiotis and Cheung, "Maritime Hegemony, " FEER (10 January 1991) 
p. 1 i; "Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts on the South China 
Sea, " 5 FRJ(1990) pp. 125-145. 
51 Spa, "South China Sea Conflict: A Challenge to Indonesia's Active 
Foreign Policy, " 19 IQ (1991) pp. 303-309; McDorman, "The South China Sea 
Islands Dispute in the 1990s -A New Multilateral Process and Continuing Friction, " 
8 IJMCL (1993) pp. 274-275. 
52 McDorman, ibid.; Agoes, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea: An ASEAN Venture, " (1990) pp. 1-3. 
53 Although the PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman states the participation of 
Chinese experts in the talks did not signal any change on China's 'indisputable' 
sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. See Keesing's (1991) p. 38346. 
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was released after this meeting in which the participants agreed to recommend to the 
relevant governments that54 
[I]n areas where conflicting territorial claims exist, the relevant states 
may consider the possibility of undertaking co-operation for mutual 
benefit, including exchanges of information and joint development, ... 
any territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea area 
should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue and 
negotiation, ... 
force should not be used to settle territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes, and ... the parties involved in such disputes are 
urged to exercise self-restraint in order not to complicate the situation. 
A Third Workshop was convened on 29 June 1992, the participating states 
reaffirmed the points agreed to at the Second Workshop. 55 
On 22 July 1992, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting issued a joint Declaration 
on the South China Sea issues56 which again calls on the relevant states to 
resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South 
China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force; exercise restraint 
with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of 
all disputes; and explore possibility of co-operation in the South China 
Sea. 
The six member states of the ASEAN also declared that they recognised that 
the. South China Sea issues involved sensitive questions of sovereignty and 
jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned. They were conscious that any adverse 
54 Statement of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, July 1991. (mimeo. ) 
55 Statement of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 2 July 1992. (mimeo. ) 
56 Reprinted in McDorman, supra note 51, p. 285; also see Gao, supra note 
33, p. 351. 
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developments in the area may directly affect peace and stability in the region. 57 
Therefore, the meeting urged all claimants to settle disputes peacefully and called for 
regional co-operation in furthering safety of navigation and communication, pollution 
prevention, search and rescue, and combating piracy and drug smuggling. 
As regards the peaceful atmosphere in this region, it is encouraging for the 
littoral states to construct a co-operative environment and solve disputes peacefully. 
Indeed, that states should solve their disputes through peaceful means rather than 
military measures is an important and absolute requirement of international law. 58 
Co-operation, not confrontation, becomes the main trend of international politics in 
the post-cold war era. The South China Sea region cannot be out of keeping with this 
main trend. In view of this, the messages from the PRC and the ROC are 
encouraging. PRC Premier Li Peng declared, on the First Meeting of the Eighth 
National Assembly of 15 March 1993, that the PRC would like to take the position of 
"shelving the disputes, jointly developing the resources. "59 A couple of days later, 
interviewed by a CNN correspondent on 26 March, ROC President Lee Teng-hui also 
announced 
that "[The littoral states] could take joint development of resources into 
consideration so that the potential factors of conflict can be eliminated. "60 Until now, 
57 Viewing the military build-up in the region, the 'adverse developments' 
might imply the strengthening of naval power. See infra Sub-Section 4.1. 
58 UN Charter, Articles 2(3) and 33. 
59 China Times (16 March 1993) p. 1. Also see Lee, "Domestic Changes in 
China Since the 4 June Incident and Their Implications for Southeast Asia, " 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (June 1991) p. 39. 
60 China Times (6 April 1993) p. 1. 
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all relevant parties have shown their interest in peacefully eliminating conflicts 
through co-operation. 
4. THE POSSIBILITIES OF CO-OPERATION 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
In the conclusion of the 1990 Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the 
South China Sea, several areas were identified as most practicable for developing co- 
operation in the South China Sea including: protection of the marine environment, 
particularly the expansion of contingency plans for marine pollution control; marine 
scientific research; navigational safety; and marine resource management. 61 In other 
words, these suggestions and efforts at co-operation can be divided into the following 
groups: those concerning environmental protection, such as contingency plans for 
marine pollution control; those concerning economic factors, such as marine resource 
management; and others concerning scientific research. If each single item can be 
linked, a basic co-operation structure can be constructed. Apart from these 
suggestions, many scholars also suggest using transparency in military activities as a 
means of confidence building. 62 A Working Group Meeting on Marine Scientific 
Research in the South China Sea had already been organised in Manila from 30 May 
61 "Report of the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South 
China Sea", Bali, 22-24 January 1990. 
62 Hamzah, The Spratlies: What Can "Be Done to Enhance Confidence 
(1990) p. 15. 
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to 3 June 1993.63 The following discussions will examine three potential areas of co- 
operation from a political and economic perspective so as to select the most feasible 
area to start working on. 
4.1. MILITARY CO-OPERATION 
Following the commencement of the post-cold war era, the PRC, which seeks to fill 
the power vacuum, seems to be the potential threat to the stability and the security of 
this region. 64 The PRC, as a major regional power, has always played an important 
role in international politics in this region, and every move it makes carries 
tremendous political significance. Since 1985 the PRC has accelerated its naval 
modernisation programme and increased its naval activities in the South China Sea 
region. 65 The PRC's military budget increased by 15.5% in 1990, by nearly 13% in 
1991, by 12% in 1992, by 22.4% in 1994, and by 21% in 1995. Besides, the PRC 
63 See 'Statement of the Working Group Meeting on Marine Scientific 
Research in' the South China Sea', Manila, Philippines, 30 May -3 June 1993. 
(mimeo. ) 
64 Burton, "What Kind of Defence? " Time (17 May 1993) pp. 48-49; 
Chanda, "South China Sea: Treacherous Shoals, " FEER, 13 August 1992, pp. 14-17; 
Cheung, "Loaded Weapons: Spree in Former Soviet Union, " FEER (3 September 
1992) p. 21; Haller-Trost, The Spratly Islands: A Study on the Limitations of 
International Law (1990) pp. 6-9; Leong, "The Changing Political Economy of 
Taiwan - Southeast Asia Relations, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) p. 38; Simon, "The Two 
Southeast Asias and China, " 24 AS (1984) p. 519. Also, Frieman, "China's Defence 
Industry, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) p. 50-62. 
65 You and You, "In Search of Bule Water Power: The PLA Navy's 
Maritime Strategy in the 1990s, " 4 P. Rev. (1991) pp. 137-149; Mak, "The Chinese 
Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment, " 4 P. Rev. (1991) pp. 150- 
161. 
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also spends an increasing greater share of its defence budget on the navy. 66 In an 
assertive tone, Beijing has declared that China 'reserves the right to recover' the 
Spratlys 'at an appropriate time. '67 Its South China Sea fleet has developed Hainan as 
one of its forward bases not only to project power in the area but also as a staging 
base for naval patrols 68 Furthermore, the PRC's acquisition of aerial-refuelling 
technology, the newly completed military air base on Woody Island in the Paracel 
Islands, and the purchase of a squadron of twenty-four long-rang SU-27 fighters from 
Russia have enabled it to extend its air cover over the Spratly Islands area. 69 It is 
clear that the PRC has acquired the necessary capabilities to extend its influence in 
this region. 
In view of the PRC's actions in the South China Sea, it suggests that the PRC 
is working to obtain control of the islands in this area. In a swift military operation in 
1974, the PRC captured the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam. 70 Construction in 
66 Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions 
and Regionäl Implications (1990) pp. 58-59; Gao, supra note 33, p. 348; Kristof, 
"China's Military Outlays Fan the Region's Fears, " International Herald Tribune (19 
March 1993) p. 6; Park, "Multilateral Security Cooperation, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) p. 258; 
Pringle, "Fears Grow in the South-East Asia: China Increases Military Spending, " 
The Times (7 March 1995) p. 11. 
67 Straits Times (16 April 1987) p. 36, and (23 April 1987) p. 19; "Senior 
Officer Outlines China's Naval Ambitions, " FEER (16 April 1992) p. 14. 
68 Straits Times (7 April 1992) p. 4; AP, Manila, 6 April 1992. Lee, 
"Chinese Maritime Power and Strategy in the South China Sea, " (1990). 
69 Gao, supra note 33, p. 348; Zang, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The 
Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea, " 17 JSS (1994) pp. 198-199. 
70 Lo, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of South 
China Sea Islands (1989) pp. 53-63. 
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the Paracel Islands was given top priority, supported by the Central Military 
Commission and the People's Liberation Army General Logistics Department, which 
guaranteed the necessary financial and material resources. 71 This would make the 
Paracel Islands the stepping stones for the PRC's advance further south to the Spratly 
Islands. In late April 1987, the New China News Agency further revealed that the 
Chinese navy had already acquired the capability to patrol the Spratly Islands and in 
fact had completed a comprehensive tour of the archipelago and even conducted a 
modern amphibious exercise on one of the islands. 72 Furthermore, from mid-October 
to the end of November 1987, the Chinese navy carried out a series of exercises in 
the Spratlys which extended as far as James Shoal. The series of naval exercises was 
explicitly designed "to enhance the navy's capacity to carry out medium- and long- 
distance operation" and demonstrated China's capability to wage battle away from its 
home shores. 73 In 1988, the PRC captured six atolls of the Spratly Islands from the 
Vietnamese again. 74 On 8 February 1995, the Philippine President Fidel Ramos 
protested to Beijing that the Chinese forces had set up a base on one of the reefs of 
the Spratly Islands, Mischief reef, over which the Philippines also claims 
sovereignty. Chinese warships were also in the area, 135 nm west of the Philippine 
island of Palawan. 75 The PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Chen Jian confirmed 
71 Garver, supra note 27, p. 1005. 
72 United Morning Post (22 April 1987) p. 17. 
73 Straits Times (4 December 1987) p. 3. 
74 Garver, supra note 27, pp. 1012-1014.. 
75 Keesing's (1995) p. 40412. 
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that structures had been built on the reef by China. But he said that they were aimed 
at ensuring the safety and lives, as well as production operations, of the fishermen 
who work in the waters of the Spratly Islands. Besides, he emphasised that the 
Chinese side never established any military base on Mischief reef. 76 
All these actions illustrate the PRC's interests and ambition in the South 
China Sea. As Table 3> illustrates, the PRC seems to be steadily building the kind 
of blue-water navy capability which is much stronger than that of other littoral states, 
and which could enable it to assert its claim on jurisdiction over the South China Sea. 
Inevitably, the PRC's action provoked a counter response from other littoral 
states, because they are concerned that the PRC might resort to its predominant 
military force to resolve long-standing boundary disputes in its favour. Therefore, 
military build-up has become an unavoidable and important phenomena in Southeast 
Asia. Based on the potential threat from the PRC, the other littoral states would resort 
to buying modern frigates, combat aircrafts, and other weapons incorporating 
advanced high technology as a counter measure. 77 
76 Chanda, et al., "Territorial Imperative, " FEER (23 February 1995) p. 14. 
The PRC and the Philippines held a three-day bilateral talks on the disputed Spratly 
Islands in Beijing from 20 March 1995, but no agreement was achieved. Reuters, 
Beijing, 22 March 1995; Tasker, "A Line in the Sand, " FEER (6 April 1995) p. 14. 
77 Ball, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective 
on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asia/Pacific Region (1991) p. 
16; Ching, "China's Military Spurs Concern, " FEER (11 May 1995) p. 11; 
Klintworth, "Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities, " 5 
P. Rev. (1992) p. 226; Lee, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: 
Political and Security Issues, " 18 IQ (1990) pp. 154-158; Park, supra note 66, pp. 
258-259. 
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Table 3 Southeast Asian Naval Capabilities, 1993 
NATION MANPOWER COMBAT 
TONNAGE 
SUBMARINES PSC AFLOAT 
SUPPORT RATIO 
CHINA 202 245 45 56 0.63 
INDONESIA 31 42.3 2 17 0.12 
MALAYSIA 12 7.8 0 4 0 
PHILIPPINES 14.5 1.75 0 1 0 
SINGAPORE 4.5 0 0 0 0 
TAIWAN 30 116 4 33 0 
THAILAND 40.8 15.9 0 9 0.11 
VIETNAM 12 10.4 0- 17 0 
Note: 1, Combat Tonnage: all submarines and surface combatants above 1,000 
tonnes displacement. 
2. PSC (Principal Surface Combatants, ships with 1,000 tonnes 
displacement). 
3. Afloat Support Ratio: the sustainability of the nation's surface forces in a 
prolonged conflict remote from their national bases. A ratio of 0.20 or 
better indicates a good level of sustainability; 0.10 or less, poor. 
Source: The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies: London, 1993). 
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a London 
based academic institute, major naval orders have been placed or are being planned 
by Indonesia (corvettes, mine countermeasure vessels, amphibious craft and possibly 
j 
submarines), Malaysia (two British-built frigates), Taiwan (submarines and French 
frigate hulls), and Thailand (two more Chinese frigates, perhaps some coastal 
submarines and one, possibly two, helicopter carriers). 78 In addition, the IISS 
wrote: 79 the PRC is acquiring an aircraft carrier from the Russian Pacific Fleet; the 
78 IISS, The Military Balance, 1993-1994 (1993) p. 146. 
79 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 
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Indonesian Navy, over the next two years, will take delivery of the bulk of the 
remaining ships of the former East German Navy; 80 the Malaysian Navy took 
delivery of six more Wasp HAS-I armed helicopters in 1993; 81 the Philippine Navy 
has increased its aviation inventory with three more BN-2A Defender maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft; 82 the Singaporean Navy has acquired a British Sir Lancelot- 
class LST; 83 the Taiwanese Navy has commissioned its first Cheng Kung-class 
(Taiwanese-built) GW frigate which carries a helicopter, five more ships in this class 
and two of a larger class are planned, and two ex-US Knox-class frigates have been 
purchased; 84 the Thai Navy has commissioned a second Chinese-built Jianghu-IV- 
class frigate and improved its maritime reconnaissance and ASW capability with'the 
procurement of three P-3A Orion aircraft. Furthermore, the ASEAN states are slowly 
moving in the direction of increased military co-operation, with the PRC being the 
only possible target. 85 The situation may have deteriorated after Vietnam joined the 
ASEAN in July 1995, with the PRC becoming more isolated. 86 
80 Asian Defence Journal (March 1991) p. 10. 
81 About Malaysian arms purchase, see Da Cunha, "Major Asian Powers 
and the Development of the Singaporean and . 
Malaysian Air Forces, " 13 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (1991) pp. 67-69; Vatikiotis, "Mix and Match: Russia 
and US Split Order for Combat Aircraft, " FEER (8 July 1993) p. 13. 
82 Also see The Manila Chronicle (10 April 1991) and (22 April 1991). 
83 Da Cunha, supra note 81, pp. 61,63,64. 
84 Hickey, "China's Threat to Taiwan, " 5 P. Rev. (1992) pp. 254-255. 
85 Gallagher, supra note 28. 
86 Reuters, Hanoi, 31 March 1995. 
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Some littoral states responded in a more serious manner by occupying islands 
and developing their naval capacity to patrol newly claimed zones so as to exercise 
their rights over these zones or rights in the future. In November 1986, Malaysia 
decided to dispatch troops to two more atolls, Mariveles Reef and Dallas Reef. 
Another example, in April 1987, Vietnam also proceeded to occupy a new island, 
Barque Canada Reef. 87 These actions can be seen as a response to the PRC's military 
build-up. And more importantly, the occupation of the South China Sea islands by 
littoral states is a display of force rather than its use. 88 
Under such circumstances, a military build-up could be the most dangerous 
factor which deteriorates the regional security in this 'flash point' area. In fact, a 
military build-up is only the tip of the iceberg. The real core issue is that all the 
littoral states are competing for resources in the region. Consequently, military co- 
operation would not be achieved unless the issues of resource utilisation can be 
resolved first. The following two sub-sections discuss the issues of resource 
utilisation. 
4.2. CO-OPERATION IN HYDROCARBON RESOURCES EXPLORATION 
In a semi-enclosed sea like the South China Sea, whose width is less than 400 nm, an 
immediate implication of the 200 nm extended EEZ is that there will be no high seas 
87 Straits Times (16 April 1987) p. 36. 
88 Leifer, "The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia, " 4 P. 
Rev. (1991) p. 132. 
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in this region. 89 Under normal circumstances, they should have endeavoured to 
resolve the maritime zones issue through diplomatic or legal approaches. On the 
contrary, the possibility of exploitation of hydrocarbon resource is the main obstacle 
to construct a co-operation regime. In the light of dependence on petroleum, whether 
importing it or exporting it for economic development, some of the littoral states 
prefer to achieve sole access to this resource. In the case of the PRC, oil accounted 
for 27% of export in value in 1985, but only 5% in 1991.90 In this respect, it is 
difficult to envisage that the relevant countries will withdraw from those occupied 
islands voluntarily, even though they are not sure whether hydrocarbon resources are 
exploitable in the continental shelf they claimed. Furthermore, this attitude makes 
maritime delimitation arduous, because delimitation concerns the issue of definition 
of sovereignty which highlights the sensitivity of the issue. 
Take the disputed area between the PRC and Vietnam for instance, neither 
party would like to give up its claim or control on the disputed area. 91 Furthermore, 
each party has tried to co-operate with a third party to explore the hydrocarbon 
resources. When the Sino-foreign seismic survey agreements in the South China Sea 
89 Marr, "Southeast Asian Marine Fishery Resources and Fisheries, " in 
MacAndrews and Sien, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development 
(1981) p. 79. 
90 Chanda, supra note 64, p. 16. 
91 Johnston and Valencia, Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and 
Solutions (1991) pp. 144-151; Valencia, "Vietnam's Maritime Disputes: Hydrocarbon 
Resource Potential and Possible Solutions, " 16 Energy (1991) pp. 1174-1180 
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were announced in 1979, Vietnam protested the proposed surveys as "a brazen 
violation of the territorial integrity of Vietnam and its sovereignty over its natural 
resources". It further issued a warning to foreign oil companies involved that they 
must "bear the consequences" of their actions. 92 
A similar argument erupted when the US Crestone Energy Company signed 
an offshore contract with China National Offshore Oil Company that covered an area 
of 25,155 km2 in the Vanguard Bank area (Wanan Tan in Chinese) on 8 May 1992. It 
is reported that China pledged to use its full naval force if necessary to protect 
Crestone's concession 93 The Chinese leasing is believed to be a reaction to the fact 
that Vietnam has delineated all the offshore area it claims into offshore concession 
blocks. On 16 May 1992, the Vietnamese government strongly protested in a 
statement that "the agreement between the Chinese and US company has seriously 
violated Vietnam's sovereign rights over its continental shelf and exclusive economic 
zone. " Therefore, the Vietnamese government "demands the Chinese side stop 
immediately the illegal exploration and exploitation arrangements with the Crestorie 
92 Harrison, "Conflicting Offshore Boundary Claims, " China Business 
Review (May-June 1983) pp. 51-53. Cited from Gao, supra note 33, p. 349. 
93 Gao, ibid.; Kristof, "China Signs US Oil Deal for Disputed Waters, " New 
York Times (18 June 1992) p. A8; Vatikiotis, "China Stirs the Pot, " FEER (9 July 
1992) pp. 14-15; also Tuan, "For a Peaceful Sea, " (1992). 
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company in the area of Vietnam's continental shelf. "94 In response, it is reported that 
Vietnam had entered into a contract with a Norwegian company to conduct seismic 
work in the vicinity of the area of the Crestone concession 95 
Following the relaxation of the US trade embargo on Vietnam in early 1993, 
the Vietnamese waters became one of the places that western oil companies showed 
interest in. It was reported that two tracts close to the Crestone concession soon may 
be leased to international oil companies. 96 The response from the PRC about 
Vietnam's actions was that the PRC sent a seismic survey vessel on 5 May 1993 into 
Vietnam's Block 5-2, which is under lease to British Petroleum and Norway's Statoil. 
The PRC explained that "the seismic operations conducted by the Chinese survey 
vessel in the waters off the Spratly Islands are normal scientific exploration 
activities. "97 
Obviously, any offshore hydrocarbon resource development activity by any 
party is considered as a provocation or an act of hostility towards other parties. Under 
94 "Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the Agreement between Chinese and US Oil Companies for the 
Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf of Vietnam, " 
16 May 1992. Cited from Gao, supra note 33. Also see Valencia, "The South China 
Sea: Potential Conflict and Cooperation, " Paper presented at the Third Workshop on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 29 
June-2 July 1992. 
95 Reuters, Hanoi, 4 September 1992; "Hanoi's Quiet Oil Move, " FEER (20 
August 1992) p. 6. 
96 Chanda, "Stampede for Oil: US Firms Rush to Explore Vietnamese 
Waters, " FEER (25 February 1993) p. 48. 
97 People's Daily (14 May 1993) p. 1. 
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such circumstances, it is still difficult for all parties to co-operate on the development 
of hydrocarbon resources. 
4.3. FISHERY CO-OPERATION 
Trawlers were introduced to the Southeast Asian countries in the 1960's. With their 
efficiency and higher production rate, trawlers became a popular fishing method. At 
the outset, there neither a fishing policy nor the concept of fishery resources 
management for these countries to limit the occurrence of fishing efforts. When 
fishing efforts were not under control, more and more fishermen tended to compete 
with each other for the same stocks in the same fishing grounds. Hence, this 
eventually led to overfishing in the South China Sea region. 98 
Each individual country in the South China Sea region had already become 
aware of the overfishing problem in their fishing zones. In the case of Malaysia, the 
Malaysian government had noticed that the stocks of both demersal and pelagic fish 
in the inshore fishing areas were overexploited, especially off the east coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia. This is especially serious in the inshore areas where the 
k 
competition for the same fishery resources is intense. 99 
98 Menasveta, "A Regional Approach to the Development of Living Aquatic 
Resources in the Southeast Asian Region, " in Johnston, Gold, and Tangsubkul, eds., 
International Symposium on the New Law of the Sea in Southeast Asia: 
Developmental Effects and Regional Approaches (1983) p. 36. Also Christy, "The 
State of Food and Agriculture, " (1981) p. 83. 
99 Majid, "Controlling Fishing Effort: Malaysia's Experience and Problems" 
(1985) p. 319. 
238 
In the Philippine waters, especially in the inland and inshore marine fishing 
grounds, overfishing is also a serious problem. Catch rates have substantially 
declined owing to excessive fleet sizes and number of fishermen. 100 
In the case of Indonesia, the increasing number of fishermen has caused heavy 
fishing pressure on the living resources, especially in those areas where concentration 
of fishermen occurs such as in the north coast of Java and Malacca Straits. According 
to statistics, the fishery resources in these two areas have already been exploited 
beyond the level of maximum sustainable yield. 101 
With regard to Thailand's fisheries, the exploitation of fishery resources in the 
Gulf of Thailand has gone beyond the level of maximum sustainable yield. Many 
species, such as round scads, mackerels, and anchovy, within the 50-metre depth 
from the coast in the Gulf of Thailand have been seriously overexploited. 102 
In the Sixth Session of the Committee for the Development and Management 
of Fisheries in the South China Sea, the Secretariat of FAO reviewed the current 
status of resources and fisheries in the coastal waters of the South China Sea 
100 IPFC, Exploitation and Management of Marine Fishery Resources in the 
Philippines, IPFC/87/Symp/III/WP. 4, IPFC Symposium on the Exploitation and 
Management on Marine Fishery Resources in Southeast Asia, Darwin, Australia, 16- 
19 February 1987, p. 2. 
101 IPFC, Indonesian Country Experience, IPFC/87/Symp/III/WP. 3, IPFC 
Symposium, ibid., p. 2. 
102 Hongskul, "The Allocation of Scads and Mackerels, " in Christy, Law of 
the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of Fisheries in Southeast Asia (1978) 
p. 6; Menasveta, supra note 98, p. 38. 
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region: 103 (i) most of the demersal fish and shrimps/prawn stocks in the region had 
= been fully exploited and partly overfished; (ii) the coastal pelagic fish stocks had 
been intensively exploited in many waters in the region but that ample room still 
existed for further intensification of fishing; and (iii) the cephalopod resources still 
remained under-utilised with the exception of the Thai waters in the Gulf of 
Thailand. 
Another report by FAO/SEAFDEC also stated that most of the demersal fish 
stocks in nearshore waters has already been heavily exploited, while some offshore 
stocks still retained room for further intensified fishing. However, a large increase in 
the total catch could not be expected. 104 
In view of the geographical features of the South China Sea, it fits the 
definition of'semi-enclosed sea' in Article 122 of the LOSC, which provides 
"[E]nclosed or semi-enclosed sea" means a gulf, basin or sea surrounded 
by two or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a 
narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and 
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States. 
Because the South China Sea is semi-enclosed, any change in the ecosystem 
of the semi-enclosed sea will have significant impact on the whole area. It is 
generally recognised that the living resources in the -South China Sea area migrate 
103 IPFC, Report of the Sixth Session of the Committee for the Development 
and Management of Fisheries in the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 6-9 
December 1988, p. 4. 
104 Isa and Noordin, 'The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China 
Sea, ' Paper presented at the First Working Group Meeting on Marine -Scientific 
Research in the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 30 May -3 June 1993, p. 6. 
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from one EEZ to another, particularly those highly migratory species, such as tuna 
and other shared stocks. <See Map 6> Each country may already have its own 
assessment of its living resources in its EEZ, assuming that the definition and 
delineation of each EEZ is clear. The problems are that many of those EEZ 
boundaries are not well defined or mutually agreed upon by the relevant parties. 
Likewise, there are various conflicting claims to islands which complicate and defer 
the determination of the EEZ boundaries. For this reason, many experts and scholars 
are convinced of the need to co-operate on the assessment of the living resources in 
the South China Sea area without regard to jurisdictional boundaries. The basis for 
this endeavour would be Article 123 of the LOSC regarding enclosed and semi- 
enclosed seas-105 The LOSC has foreseen this problem, since in Article 123, it 
stipulates, 
States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should co-operate 
with each other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of 
their duties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavour, 
directly or through an appropriate regional organisation: 
(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and 
exploitation of the living resources of the sea; 
(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with 
respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
(c) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake where 
appropriate joint programmes of scientific research in the area; 
(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested states or international 
organisations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the 
provisions of this article. 
Therefore, all parties concerned should have been aware that fish is a migratory and 
exhaustible resource so that rational use of the South China Sea and the preservation 
105 Djalal, Issue Paper for Technical Working Group on the Resources 
Assessment of the South China Sea Informal Workshop (1993) pp. 1-2. 
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of its marine environment are important to all parties. Thus co-operation among 
nations in the region is essential. In order to avoid overfishing or depletion of 
resources, conservation measures have to be taken. Such measures are not possible 
without regional co-operation and require close co-ordination by the countries 
concerned. This is especially true in a semi-enclosed sea. 106 
Indeed, a semi-enclosed sea concept could conceivably provide the catalyst to 
promote co-operation and co-ordination of the management of resources in the South 
China Sea. 107 Under such circumstances, for all the littoral states to make the 
boundary delimitation issue the first priority seems unwise. Rather, concentrating 
upon their common interests will be an essential motivation to solve the issues 
rationally. 
Therefore, it makes sense in such a situation to view the resolution of 
conflicts in this region from a co-operational viewpoint in order to satisfy the mutual 
needs and interests. After examining several possible means of co-operation, fishery 
co-operation is the most feasible and the most urgent course of action for the littoral 
states. This is because the fishery resources should be properly exploited to avoid 
economic waste or over-exploitation. In fact, the relevant governments and quite a 
106 Some scholars suggest that this co-operation is best carried out within the 
framework of existing regional mechanisms. See Menasveta, supra note 98, p. 44. 
This will be discussed later, see infra Sub-Section 5.2. 
107 Cordner, "The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, " 25 ODIL 
(1994) p. 71. 
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few scholars have been aware of the importance of co-operation. Nonetheless, 
sovereignty conflicts have delayed all forms of co-operation. 
Accordingly, co-operation in the utilisation of fishery resources is a feasible 
and practical way to start a regional co-operation regime, because it sidesteps the . 
issue of sovereignty and focuses upon common interests, namely the utilisation of 
living resources. In the meantime, it can also overcome the delay in resources 
utilisation. This delay is caused by the long-term negotiation about delimitation of 
continental shelf, which relates to hydrocarbon resources. Additionally, fishery 
resources management is more important to prevent over-exploitation or 
overfishing. 108 Therefore fishery resources management may be a touchstone of the 
littoral states' sincerity, or it can be treated as a confidence-building method, for 
further co-operation in other fields or even solving the issues of delimitation in the 
future. 
Without affecting the jurisdictional boundary as laid down in the LOSC, it is 
certainly possible to have regional joint fishery management in the South China Sea 
as the starting point for further co-operation. If all states in this region treat co- 
operation as the key step to mutual benefit, then the future for such regional co- 
operation mechanism will be positive. 
108 LOSC, Articles 61 and 62. 
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5. FISHERY CO-OPERATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
In a semi-enclosed sea like the South China Sea, there are numerous areas for co- 
operation between the 'littoral states to proceed. However, under the situation of 
lacking of confidence between them, it is difficult for them to start any co-operation. 
The author highlights several possible co-operations and examines their feasibility. 
From the discussion above, fishery co-operation is the most feasible one. Fishery co- 
operation can also serve as a starting point whose effect can spill over into other 
areas. 
5.1. LIST OF WORKS IN A FISHERY CO-OPERATION SCHEME 
From the discussion above, it is obvious that even though some fishery resources of 
the South China Sea are still under-exploited, most are heavily exploited. Therefore, 
fisheries development should be accompanied by a rational resource management 
mechanism. Up to the present, however, there has been no single resource 
managemeni which is efficient for the whole area. Even within the zones of each 
coastal state's jurisdiction, a rational resource management seems to be lacking. One 
of the reasons for this is the problem of overlapping claims among the coastal states 
and the other reason is that each coastal state does not have sufficient stock 
assessment data available to support a rational resource management. 109 
109. Dwiponggo, Project Proposal on Regional Fisheries Stock Assessment in 
the South China Sea (1993) pp. 1-2. 
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In view of the situation of living resources in the South China Sea, the 
activities of management and conservation of fishery resources can be categorised as 
follows: 
A. Defining and minimising disputed areas. 110 The first task for the states concerned 
might be to define and minimise the disputed area. Then, a joint committee could be 
established to manage the issues of fishing vessels, either from the relevant states or 
other states, operating in the disputed area. 
B. Definition and determination of stocks and allowable catch of living resources in 
the region. According to tagging studies, changes in hooking-rates, and size of catch, 
bluefin tuna, yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, and mackerels are the highly migratory 
species in South China Sea region. 111 Because some of their migrating routes are 
through two or more countries, they are also shared stocks. Therefore, in order to get 
the maximum benefit from managing, it is necessary to categorise those shared 
species into: 112 
(A)'Joint stocks which live partly within South China Sea waters and 
partly within the 200 nm fisheries zone of a country which is not 
within South China Sea region; 
110 Valencia, "Southeast Asian Seas: National Marine Interests, 
Transnational Issues, and Marine Regionalism, " in MacAndrews and Sien, eds., 
supra note 89, p. 341. 
111 Morgan and Valencia, eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian 
Seas (1983) p. 58. Cf. supra Chapter 4, Sub-Section 2.3. 
112 Holden, "Management of Fisheries Resources: The Experience of the 
European Economic Community, " in OECD, Experiences in the Management of 
National Fishing Zones (1984) pp. 114-116. 
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(B) Autonomous stocks which live entirely within South China Sea 
waters and the whole littoral states can manage as they wish. 
Then a further stock analysis can be performed. 
C. Data collection and surveillance. The required information or data for fisheries 
management may include the following: 113 
(A) Biological information: such as status of stocks, trends in catches per 
" unit of fishing effort; 
(B) Technical information: such as numbers and kinds of fishing vessels 
and gear; 
(C) Economic information: such as trends in fish prices; incomes to 
fishermen; 
(D) Social information: such as trends in numbers of fishermen, mobility 
into and out of fisheries; 
D. Determination of maintaining or restoring populations of harvested species at 
levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield. This concerns the 
limitation of the amount of fishing efforts by setting total allowable catches (TAC), 
the limitation of access, the regulation of the methods, and technical aspects of 
fishing. Minimising mesh size is the case. 114 
E. Allocating quotas among littoral states. Allocating quotas is important because: 115 
113 FAO, "Information Needed for Management, " Paper presented at the 
Symposium on the Exploitation and Management of Marine Fishery Resources in 
Southeast Asia held in conjunction with the Twenty-second Session of the Indo- 
Pacific Fishery Commission, Darwin, Australia, 16-26 February 1987, p. 495. Also, 
see Report of the First Working Group Meeting on Marine Scientific Research in the 
South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 30 May-3 June 1993, Conclusion Point 4. 
114 Holden, supra note 112, p. 114. 
115 Ibid, p. 116. 
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(A) Effective management is impossible if the TAC is not divided into 
quotas, because the fishing vessels of each state would otherwise 
compete each other in order to maximise their share of the TAC 
before it is exhausted, the result would lead to the depletion of the 
resources; 
(B) Littoral states can plan their fishing vessels development, marketing, 
etc., if they have guaranteed shares of the TACs. 
F. Regional/extra-regional joint ventures involving technology transfers and 
-development. 
116 Joint ventures have become increasingly important to fishery 
management, because it is a good approach to upgrade the host country's fishing 
industry through personnel training and technology transfers. 
G. Harmonising or standardising legislations. For fishery management, standardised 
laws might be established for the licensing of foreign fishing vessels for access to the 
South China Sea waters. Distant-water fishing nations of the region could be given 
privileged access. In a semi-enclosed sea, it is important to have laws harmonised so 
that a legislation vacuum can be avoided. 117 
H. All relevant parties should be invited. This is the spirit of co-operation in the 
semi-enclosed sea. Although it can be argued that Taiwan is not a state, Taiwan is 
116 Valencia, supra note 110, p. 341. 
117 Kent, "Harmonizing Extended Zone Legislation in.. Southeast Asia, " 13 
ODIL (1983) pp. 247-268. 
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nevertheless a powerful and able party in the South China Sea. 118 Without its 
participation, any co-operation would be imperfect. 119 
5.2. PRESENT MECHANISMS FOR CO-OPERATION 
Several regional organisations exist among the South China Sea states, which reflects 
the general willingness to resolve mutual problems through co-operation. They are: 
A. The Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council (IPFC) of the FAO is a permanent treaty-based 
advisory body, established in 1948, comprising nineteen member states including 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and Philippine. Its headquarters is in 
Bangkok. 
The IPFC's original objectives were: (1) to identify fisheries problems in the 
Indo-Pacific area and to seek solutions oriented towards improved nutritional 
standards by encouraging, co-ordinating, and where appropriate undertaking 
research; (2) to exchange and disseminate information; and (3) to encourage and 
organise training courses on subjects related to fisheries. 120 
q 
118 According to the UN document, Taiwan is one of the six largest distant 
water fishing states which took almost 90% of the total non-local catch. See FAO, 
The State of Food and Agriculture 1992, FAO Agriculture Series, No. 25, p. 143. 
119 A similar situation happened in the South Pacific Wellington Convention 
for driftnet fishing, see infra Chapter 8, Section 1. Also, Chapter 2, notes 100-107. 
120 Carroz, "Institutional and Financial Aspects of Time Management in the 
IPFC and IOFC Areas, " No. TC/79/10 in Tuna Consultation Meeting, Manila, the 
Philippines, 26-30 June 1979. 
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B. The UNDP/FAO South China Sea Fisheries Development and Co-ordinating 
Programme (South China Sea Programme, or SCSP) is a fixed-term executive project 
which includes the development of pelagic resources. SCSP was established in 1974 
by the IPFC to formulate national and regional programmes for the South China Sea. 
Its headquarters is in Manila. The Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and 
Brunei are the member states. 121 The principal objectives of the SCSP are: (1) to 
stimulate fish production in the region; (2) to encourage regional stock management 
policies; (3) to facilitate the establishment of a suitable regional co-ordinating 
mechanism to ensure the most efficient use of limited national and international 
funds available for the development of fisheries, particularly those of coastal. and 
high seas; and (4) to provide a focal point for fishery development, to stimulate 
investment in fisheries and to introduce management systems and methods to 
increase protein supplies required to meet national objectives. '22 
C. The Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC). An inter- 
governmental body comprising Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, 
Vietnam, and Thailand sponsors a fishermen's training centre in Thailand, a 
research/training facility in Singapore, and an aquaculture research and training 
centre in the Philippines. 123 It was designed as an autonomous regional technical 
121 Mme, Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia (1976) p. 52; 
SCSP, The South China Sea Fisheries: A Proposal for Accelerated Development, 
SCS/Dev. /73/1,1973, p. 102. 
122 SCSP, ibid., p. 104. 
123 Mme, supra note 121, p. 53. 
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body to promote fisheries development including small-scale fisheries in the 
Southeast Asian region. 124 
D. The International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM). 
A Rockefeller-initiated scientific centre created to carry out research and stimulate 
discussion and the flow of information on fisheries and other living aquatic resources 
relevant to meet the nutritive, economic, and social needs in economically 
developing countries. 125 ICLARM is committed to co-operating with other 
institutions. ICLARM sees its ultimate success as depending to "a considerable 
extent on the organisation's ability to establish good lines of communication with 
governments in the region ... In all of 
its activities,... ICLARM should remain open 
and responsible to locally expressed needs in order to learn how it can best serve in 
the development and management of aquatic resources. "126 
As far as these four organisations' objectives are concerned, their functions 
should have covered the need for regional fishery management. However, in practice, 
none of them, either taken alone or collectively, is actually in a position to serve as a 
base for effective fisheries management in the South China Sea region both because 
of their limited membership, and because the areas covered are either too broad or 
124 IPFC, Proceedings of 19th Session (1980) Section III. Cited from 
Saisunthorn, Fisheries of the ASEAN States: Transition in the 200-Mile EEZ Regime 
(1988) p. 305. 
125 ICLARM, Report of the First Meeting of the ' ICLARM, Program 
Advisory Committee (1977) p. 18; ICLARM, ICLARM's Strategy for International 
Research on Living Aquatic Resources Management (1992) p. 9. 
126 MacLean, ed., ICLARM Report, No. 1 (1977) p. 1. 
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too narrow, and lack of authority over the living resources within the 200-mile EEZ 
now subject to the coastal state's sovereign rights. 127 Take the IPFC for instance. 
According to FAO, the IPFC's boundary extends from the vicinity of 150° west 
longitude to about 60° east longitude. This would extend the area from east of the 
Hawaiian Islands to the east-central Indian Ocean. 128 On the other hand, another 
study points out that the Indo-Pacific area extends from somewhere about Easter 
Island, i. e. - 109° east longitude, in the east to the African east coast in the west, and 
from the Asiatic mainland in the north to points in New Zealand, Australia, and 
Africa somewhere slightly south of the Tropic of Capricorn. 129 Therefore, the IPFC 
area overlaps considerably the area of competence of another FAO regional fisheries 
body, the Indian Ocean Fishery Commission. 130 In order to avoid the overlapping 
competence of these organisations, a suggestion was made to redefine the area of the 
IPFC roughly between 30° north latitude to 50° south latitude, and between 100° east 
longitude and 130° west longitude. This new defined area will include the western 
central Pacific and the chain of archipelagos stretching into central and south Pacific. 
Reconstructed in this concept, the area involves three different subregions: the 
127 Alexander, Marine Regionalism in the Southeast Asian Seas (1982) p. 46. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Goncalves, Analysis of the Concept of 'Region' in the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text (1978). 
130 Alexander, supra note 127, pp. 46-47. 
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Andaman-Malacca area, the South China Sea, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific 
Islands. 131 
Membership is another constraint to the function of regional organisations. 
Take SEAFDEC for instance, although it was designed as an autonomous regional 
technical organisation to promote fisheries development, its membership lacks some 
of the important fishing states, such as China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Obviously, 
without the participation of these states, its ability to co-ordinate fisheries activities in 
the Southeast Asian Seas area would be almost non-existent. 132 
6. OBSERVATIONS 
The establishment of the EEZ/EFZ offers all states an excellent opportunity to access 
resources within the areas adjacent to their coasts. In other words, changing the 
existing situation in which the great powers manage the seas, to a situation in which 
an important share may go to developing states. The EEZ/EFZ will not make all 
states equal, but it would allow developing states to gain control over whatever 
resources they might have within the areas adjacent to their coasts that were 
previously subject to the freedom of fishing. 133 Therefore, the EEZ/EFZ is a 
131 Miles, "An Assessment of the Impact of Proposed Changes in the Law of 
the Sea on Regional Fisheries Commissions, " in FAO Technical Assistance 
Programmes in Fisheries, and on the FAO Committee on Fisheries and Department 
of Fisheries, COFI/C/4776/INF. 3; Saisunthorn, supra note 124, p. 298. 
132 Alexander, supra note 127, p. 51. 
133 Dahmani, The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (1987) 
p. 23. 
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reflection of the socio-economic relationship existing between the coastal state and 
its offshore areas. The insertion of 'economic' in the concept's name, the contents and 
substance of its regime, and the retention of the contiguous zone confirm the EEZ's 
economic function. 134 
Nonetheless, following the extension of jurisdiction and of maritime areas by 
coastal states, overlapping claims are an inevitable consequence, although their target 
is the resources within. The pursuit of national interests is very easy to convert to a 
dispute of sovereignty. As a result, such development would lead to complicating the 
dispute and delaying the final resolution. In view of this, it is necessary to turn back 
to the original intention of the EEZ, which is resources utilisation. 
Under these circumstances, the design of provisional arrangements provides 
an alternative. In dealing with the problem of the boundaries, delimitation is the 
ultimate goal. However, before this can be achieved, exploration, exploitation, 
conservation, and management of the resources within the disputed area still can 
occur. And in the complicated case concerning the utilisation of resources, a 
functional solution is needed. 
From the discussion on provisional arrangements, it is clear that all parties 
concerned should proceed in good faith. This principle applies not only to the actual 
134 Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (1987) p. 
264. 
253 
performance of legal obligations properly undertaken but also to any other aspect of 
legal relations such as the earliest stages of negotiations. 135 
When provisional arrangements are formalised, they are almost without 
exception predicated on compromise provisions which provide that the arrangements 
entered into are without prejudice to the position of the parties in the future 
negotiations or adjudications concerning the legal nature of the dispute. 
The concept of provisional arrangements also can be applied in the South 
China Sea region. In other words, the littoral states of the South China Sea should, on 
the basis of provisional arrangements and freezing claims, commence functional co- 
operations. The discussion in Sections 3 and 4 indicates that fishery co-operation, 
within others such as military co-operation and co-operation in hydrocarbon 
resources exploration, could be the basic and best choice to start. However, according 
to the unsuccessful experience of the present regional organisations, it should be 
borne in mind that all the parties concerned should be included in the co-operation 
mechanism,, otherwise the new mechanism would fall into the same inefficient 
result. 136 
135 Mosler, "The International Society as a Legal Community, " 140 Hague 
Recueil (1974-N) p. 145; also 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Articles 18 and 26. 
136 Cf. Mark Valencia once drafted a 'Spratly Treaty', which was based on 
international co-operative exploration, development and management of the living 
and non-living resources of the disputed area. However, this draft Treaty' fails to 
include Taiwan in it. See Valencia, "Spratly Solution Still at Sea, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) 
Appendix 1, p. 164. In a latter research report, Valencia corrects this defect. See 
Valencia, Van Dyke, and Ludwig, "The South China Sea: Approaches and Interim 
Solution, " (26 April 1995, mimeo. ) 
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PART III. 
THE IMPACT OF NON-RECOGNITION ON TAIWAN 
Part Three is going to analyse three impacts of non-recognition on Taiwan. This 
discussion leads to the fact that Taiwan is capable of negotiating with other states 
although it is not recognised as a state and is capable of being a party to regional co- 
operation. 
Part Three includes three chapters. Chapter 6 inspects the origins of 
statelessness of vessels in international law. Chapter 7 examines the situation that 
Taiwan is unable to officially participate in international conferences, mainly because 
it is not a member of the UN. In view of this, the focus of this chapter is on Taiwan's 
applying for membership in the UN. Finally, Chapter 8 analyses, with the illustration 
of two cases, those situations that Taiwan are unable to conclude agreements with 
other states. All three of these chapters suggest that international law guides how to 
solve international conflicts, but political will and wisdom decide when the conflicts 




In international law, a fishing vessel without an effective nationality is not allowed to 
continue its operation and is without any diplomatic protection. To maintain public 
order on the high seas, the right to navigate should be restricted to those ships with 
effective nationality. As the International Law Commission pointed: 1 
The absence of any authority over ships sailing the high seas would lead to 
chaos. One of the essential adjuncts to the principle of the freedom of the 
seas is that a ship must fly the flag of a single State and that it is subject to 
the jurisdiction of that State. 
As explained in Chapter 3,2 three conditions make a vessel stateless, namely 
(A) When a vessel sails under two or more different flags and uses them according to 
convenience; (B) When a vessel has been deprived of the use of a flag by a country 
which the vessel claims as its flag or the vessels claimed state of nationality denies that 
sucli is the case; and (C) When the state of the vessel is not recognised by the 
questioning state. 
1 YILC 1956, Vol. II, p. 279. 
2 See Chapter 3, Sub-Section 5.1. 
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Condition (C), which had already been discussed in Chapter 3, could apply to 
Taiwan's situation. Nonetheless, there has never been a case in which Taiwanese 
vessels have been rejected by port states because they do not recognise Taiwan. 3 In this 
chapter, we are going to discuss other relevant conditions which could make a vessel. 
stateless. 
1. CONDITIONS OF BEING STATELESS VESSELS 
First of all, a vessel has one and only one nationality thus placing it under one 
jurisdiction. This condition is concerned with the responsibility of the flag state so that 
a vessel cannot avoid jurisdiction from any other state. In 1956, the International Law 
Commission had taken the view that the practice of sailing under the flags of two or 
more states, using them according to convenience, might give rise to abuse and was a 
'practice which cannot be tolerated'. 4 An essential element in the public order of the 
oceans is that ships enjoying freedom of navigation should be subject exclusively to 
the jurisdiction of one flag state. They are then entitled to its protection and required to 
comply with the shipping legislation through which the flag state gives effect to rules 
of international law governing such matters as safety and protection of the 
environments O'Connell gives his opinion that a ship without nationality is a ship 
3 An interview with a staff member of the Overseas Fisheries Development 
Council of the Republic of China on 15 February 1996. 
4 "Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, " 
YILC 1956, Vol. IL, p. 280. 
5 Brown, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. 1 (1994) p. 291. 
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without diplomatic protection. 6 Obviously, flying only one flag is a precondition for 
enjoying protection under international law. Otherwise, this vessel loses its nationality 
and become stateless.? 
Under this scenario, the vessel cannot enjoy any protection on the high seas. 
This is provided in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 6 and the 
LOSC, Article 92. In practice, Naim Molvan v. A. G. for Palestine case reveals this 
principle. 8 The ship Asya was sighted by a British destroyer 100 miles south-west of 
Jaffa, flying no flag. When interrogated it hoisted the Turkish flag, but on arrival of a 
boarding party this was hauled down and a Zionist flag hoisted. The Privy Council 
rejected the proposition that freedom of the seas gave the Asya the right to sail, 
because9 
the freedom of the open sea, whatever those words connote, is a freedom 
of ships which fly, and are entitled to fly, the flag of a State which is within 
the comity of nations. 
6 O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. II (1984) p. 755. Also, 
Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law (1992) p. 731. 
7 LOSC, Article 92(2) provides: 
A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using them 
according to convenience, may not claim any of the nationalities in 
question with respect to any other State, and may be assimilated to a ship 
without nationality. 




A state has the right to decide the conditions of granting nationality to a ship, as Article 
91 of LOSC provideslo 
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its 
flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled to 
fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship. 
Because conditions for granting nationality to ships are left to each nation, this 
leads to the issue of 'flag of convenience'. Flag of convenience indicates the states 
whose shipping policies have three properties in common: they permit registration of 
ships which actually belong to foreigners and which are actually operated by foreigners 
staying abroad; they levy exceptionally low taxes on the shipping business; as 
compared with the traditional maritime countries, and they allow the operator a great 
measure of freedom to arrange his affairs as he thinks fit. The flags are thus primarily 
convenient for operators. l l The leading 'flag of convenience' states are Liberia and 
Panama, owing to their large registered tonnage which are larger than some leading 
shipping states. 12 
Another issue related to flag of convenience is the 'genuine link' between the 
ship and the country that this ship claims nationality to. The concept of'genuine link' is 
commonly accepted by international practice. This can be seen from the Nottebohm 
10 Cf. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article S. 
11 Meyers, The Nationality of Ships (1967) p. 57, note 1. 
12 Annex III of the 1986 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of 
Ships, Merchant Fleets of the World Ships of 500 GRT and Above as at 1 July 1985,26 
ILM (1987) p. 1246. 
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case, 13 the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 14 and the LOSC. 15 In the Nottebohm 
case, 'genuine link' was the sole evidence used to identify the relation between 
Nottebohm and Liechtenstein. This concept was expanded to other fields, such as the 
nationality of ships. 
It is still arguable, however, that 'genuine link' is a vague concept. If we have a 
close comparison of the article in 1958 High Seas Convention with the one in the 
LOSC, it is clear that the text of Article 5, High Seas Convention is kept in the LOSC, 
except the wording'in particular' onwards is omitted. 16 It seems that lack of a genuine 
link between the vessel and the registering-state does not necessarily create the 
situation of a stateless vessel. 17 
13 Nottebohm Case, L CJ Reports (1955) p. 4. Nottebohm Case originally 
concerns the relationship between a person and a state, but this concept has been 
expanded to other fields, such as the nationality of a ship. 
14 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 5. 
is LOSC, Article 91. 
16 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 5(1) stipulates: 
Each state shall fix the condition for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. 
Ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to fly. 
There must exist a genuine link between the state and the ship; in 
particular, the state must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag. 
In the LOSC, it provides: 
Each state shall fix the condition for the grant of its nationality to ships, for 
the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. 
Ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to fly. 
There must exist a genuine link between the state and the'ship. 
17 McDorman, "Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the High 
Seas Fisheries Conference, " 25 JMLC (1994) p. 534; Jennings and Watts, eds., supra 
note 6, pp. 730-731. 
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In order to prove the nationality of the ship and verify the 'genuine link', some 
evidence should be presented to this effect. 18 Article 5 of the Geneva Convention on 
the High Seas stipulates, 
1. Each state shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly 
its flag. Ships have the nationality of the state whose flag they are 
entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the state and 
the ship; in particular, the state must effectively exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters 
over ships flying its flag. 
2. Each state shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly its 
flag documents to that effect. 
Similarly, LOSC Article 91 reads as follows: 
1. Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to 
ships, for the registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly 
its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are 
entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and 
the ship. 
2. Every State shall issue to ships to which it has granted the right to fly 
its flag documents to that effect. 
According to LOSC Article 91(2), "Every State shall issue to ships to which it 
has granted the right to fly its flag documents19 to that effect. " Therefore, those 
documents that the flag state issues to ships are important proof of genuine link. In the 
18 Cf. During the Armillo naval patrols of the Gulf during the war between 
Iran and Iraq, there was a question about the 'reflagging' of certain Kuwait merchant 
vessels by giving them the right to US flags. A request for similar action by the UK was 
apparently also made by Kuwait. There was some debate whether this was in 
accordance with the genuine link. UKMIL, 58 BYIL (1987) pp. 613-614. 
19 There is no explicit regulation on what kind of document is necessary in 
international law, but is instead left to the different states' discretion. However, the 
following are the usual documents: 1. Certificate of Registry; 2. The Muster Roll; 3. 
The Logbook; 4. The. Manifest of Cargo; 5. The Bills of Lading; and 6. The Charter 
Party. See Jennings and Watts, supra note 6, p. 734. 
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1986 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 20 the elements of a 
genuine link were provided, but this Convention has not entered into force yet 21 
According to the UN Convention on the Conditions for Registration of Ships, two 
criteria, ownership and manning, were stipulated to strengthen the genuine link 
between a state and ships flying its flag. The ownership criterion is provided in Article 
8 of the 1986 Convention, which requires the flag state to include in its shipping 
legislation -'appropriate provisions for participation by that State or its nationals as 
owners of ships flying its flag or in the ownership of such ships and for the level of 
such participation'. It is further regulated that '[T]hese laws and regulations should be 
sufficient to permit the flag State to exercise effectively its jurisdiction and control 
over ships flying its flag. ' Obviously, there is no clear provision for the compulsory 
settlement of any dispute which might arise from differing interpretations of the 
requirement. 22 
20 UN Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, 1986. Text 
reprinted in 26 ILM(1987) p. 1229. 
21 Brown, supra note 5, pp. 289-291. 
22 Brown, ibid., p. 289. Article 8 of the UN Convention on Conditions for 
Registration of Ships, 1986 reads: 
1. Subject to the provisions of article 7, the flag State shall provide in 
its laws and regulations for the ownership of ships flying its flag. 
2. Subject to the provisions of article 7, in such laws and regulations 
the flag State shall include appropriate provisions for participation 
by that State or its nationals as owners of ships flying its flag or in 
the ownership of such ships and for the level of such participation. 
These laws and regulations should be sufficient to permit the flag 
State to exercise. effectively its jurisdiction and control over ships 
flying its flag. 
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'Manning of ships' is another criteria regulated in Article 9 of the 1986 
Convention. Paragraph 1 starts out by requiring the state of registration to observe the 
'principle' that a 'satisfactory part' of crew should be nationals or persons domiciled or 
lawfully in permanent residence in that state. However, not only is there no indication 
of what constitutes a 'satisfactory part' but the 'principle' is further weakened also by 
the provision of paragraphs 2 and 3. Pursuant to paragraph 2, in pursuing the 
'satisfactory part' goal, the flag state may 'have regard to', inter alia, the availability of 
qualified seafarers within that state and the sound and economically viable operation of 
its ships. Moreover, that fact that, under paragraph 3, the principle laid down in 
paragraph 1 may be implemented on a ship, company or fleet basis, means that there is 
no guarantee whatsoever that the manning criterion will be met in relation to any 
particular vessel. 23 
23 Brown, ibid., pp. 289-290. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 8 of the 1986 UN 
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships. It reads: 
1. Subject to the provisions of article 7, a State of registration, when 
implementing this Convention, shall observe the principle that a 
satisfactory part of the complement consisting of officers and crew 
of ships flying its flag be nationals or persons domiciled or 
lawfully in permanent residence in that State. 
2. Subject to the provisions of article 7 and in pursuance of the goal 
set out in paragraph 1 of this paragraph, and in taking necessary 
measures to this end, the State of registration shall have regard to 
the following: 
(a) the availability of qualified seafarers within the State of 
registration, 
(b) multilateral or bilateral agreements or other types of 
arrangements valid and enforceable pursuant to the legislation 
of the State of registration, 
(c) the sound and economically viable operation of its ships. 
3. The State of registration should implement the provision of 
paragraph 1 of this article on a ship, company of fleet basis. 
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Apart from those conditions we have discussed, another situation could result 
in a stateless vessel, that is a vessel which has been deprived of the use of a flag by a 
country which the vessel claims as its flag or the vessel's claimed state of nationality 
denies that such is the case. Some states employ loss of nationality as a sanction of 
their national law against unlawful conduct at sea. In such a case, cancellation of 
nationality may thus cause statelessness. 24 However, a state cannot relinquish its 
responsibilities in connection with a ship by the fact that it made the ship stateless after 
those responsibilities had arisen. 25 
2. PRACTICE 
Exercise of enforcement measures over the stateless vessels is justified on the ground 
that the stateless vessel is not entitled to the protection of international law. 26 Having 
examined above the conditions for being a stateless vessel, in this section, we will 
examine if a Taiwanese fishing vessel would be treated as a stateless vessel. In line 
with the purpose of this research, the following discussion focuses on the condition 
resulting from non-recognition. 
24 Meyers, supra note 11, pp. 313-315. 
25 LOSC, Articles 31 and 42(5). 
26 United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 1985,765 Fed. 2d. 1259,1265. Tousley, 
"United States Seizure of Stateless Drug Smuggling Vessels on the High Seas: Is It 
Legal? " 22 Case W. Res. J. Intl L. (1990) p. 375. 
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In international practice, a stateless vessel is only of concern on the high seas, 
because within EEZ/EFZ and territorial sea the adjacent coastal state has unquestioned 
authority to deal with all vessels engaged in fishing activities. 27 According to T. L. 
McDorman, 28 
It has been reported that high seas driftnetters originally from Taiwan are 
continuing to operate on the high seas. Taiwan has legislation making 
such activity illegal and has imposed "de-certification" for non-complying 
vessels. Hence, the vessels still driftnetting on the high seas ... are no longer respecting Taiwanese law and ... may be considered as stateless 
vessels. 
One question arises from McDorman's wording: If a Taiwanese fishing vessel 
operating on the high seas is suspected of being involved in driftnetting, can another 
state treat it as a stateless vessel and visit and search it? The answer might be in the 
negative because it concerns legal procedure. Pursuant to Taiwanese law: 29 
In the event of the violation of the regulations, (all Taiwanese driftnet 
fishing will be prohibited on the high seas from 1 January 1993) the vessel 
will be punished with the withdrawal of the fishing certificate, while the 
captain and other officers will be imposed the revoke of the professional 
certificates and a penalty of maximum six months in prison. [brackets 
added] 
Therefore, the Taiwanese government does not abandon its jurisdiction if a Taiwanese 
fishing vessel is identified as driftnetting on the high seas. Moreover, any Taiwanese 
fishing vessel which violates Taiwan's driftnet fishery ban will be punished with de- 
27 See supra Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3. 
28 McDorman, supra note 17, p. 532. 
29 High Seas Pelagic Driftnet Fishery Policy and Enforcement Measures of 
the Republic of China, COA Nung-Yu Tzu No. 1040971 A, 18 December 1992. Text 
translated and reprinted in 11 CYILA (1991-1992) pp. 297-299. 
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certification. In other words, under 'de-certification, a Taiwanese fishing vessel could 
be treated as 'stateless' if it continues its driftnet fishing operations on the high seas, 
because it does not have legal document for its registry. 30 Thus, in the case of a 
Taiwanese fishing vessel suspected of involvement in driftnetting, statelessness only 
comes about as a result of the application of legal sanction. Hence, suspicion alone is 
not enough, and cannot justify the arrest of the Taiwanese vessels by a third state. 
In practice, Taiwanese fishing vessels have never been treated as stateless 
vessels 31 In the case of driftnet fisheries, visiting and searching a Taiwanese fishing 
vessel on the high seas still needs agreement between Taiwan and the questioning 
state. This can be illustrated by the following agreement signed by Taiwan and the US. 
In order to ban driftnet fisheries in the North Pacific, the US, through AIT, and 
Taiwan, through CCNAA, reached a driftnet monitoring and enforcement agreement 
on 30 June 1989, which entered into force on 24 August 1989 through an exchange of 
notes 32 Under the agreement, Taiwan agreed to the following: 
1. The squid driftnet fishery is pushed further south from 40° north latitude to 36° 
north latitude. 
2. At no cost to the US, Taiwan is to install automatic real-time vessel location 
devices (transmitter) on its driftnet vessels and transports. The installation should 
cover 10% of all vessels in 1989 and reach 100% coverage by 1990. 
3. All harvest must be landed in Taiwan before transferred to other ports. 
30 Supra note 19. 
31 Supra note 3. 
32 Agreement between the Coordination Council for North American Affairs 
and the American Institute in Taiwan regarding the High Seas Fishing in the North 
Pacific Ocean. See US, 135 Congressional Record §9474-75 (2 August 1989). Cf. 
Chapter 3, note 134 and its accompanying text. 
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4. Taiwan is to introduce legislation to restrict its vessels from carrying both large- 
and small-meshed driftnet gear. All such nets are to be marked for identification. 
5. Taiwan consents to US Coast Guard visiting and verifying of all driftnet vessels 
detected outside the approved fishing area. Vessels inside the approved area may 
also be boarded, if under suspected fishing violations. 
6. Taiwan is to introduce high seas enforcement patrol (two vessels for 200 patrol 
days in 1989, three vessels for 310 days in 1990). 
7. Deployment of one US scientific observer in 1989. In 1990, the observation 
programme will expand pending further consultation. 
The signing of this Agreement provoked domestic arguments in Taiwan. The 
arguments centred on two points: restrictions on Taiwanese fishing operations and 
allowing the US Coast Guard to board and inspect Taiwanese fishing vessels on the 
high seas. 
At-sea transfer is a common method of fishery operation. In order to promote a 
fishing vessel's efficiency in remote fishing grounds, transport vessels are sent to 
transfer the harvest for sell in other countries, thus permitting fishing vessels to 
continue operating on the high seas. The Agreement establishes strict restrictions on 
at-sea transfer and regulates that all harvest must be landed in Taiwan ports before 
transferring elsewhere. Obviously this raises the cost to the fishing company and 
interferes with foreign nationals' commercial activities. 
The most contentious issue during the TaiwanUS negotiations was that of the 
Taiwanese government allowing its fishing vessels to be boarded and inspected by the 
US Coast Guard in the high seas area of the North Pacific Ocean. From the outset of 
the negotiations, Taiwanese officials claimed, "Fishing vessels on the high seas are 
extensions of a state's territory. Therefore, it is impossible to allow US boarding on our 
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vessels on the high seas. "33 But the result was not what the government claimed. This 
provision stirred up Taiwanese people's anti-American sentiment34 and also their 
mistrust of government 35 
Nonetheless, challenged by the US embargo on its fishery exports, the 
Taiwanese government had to conclude this Agreement. Statistics show that the US 
was the second largest market for Taiwanese fishery products export. Taiwan exported 
more than US$320 million worth of fishery products to the US, which constituted 
about 25% of its overall fishery export in 1988.36 These figures showed that the US 
market is very important to the Taiwanese fishing industry. Taiwan had to compromise 
between domestic pressure and external relations. 
In terms of inspecting Taiwanese fishing vessels, Taiwan consented to US 
enforcement authorities visiting Taiwanese squid driftnet vessels on the high seas for 
the purpose of verifying fishing violations under the following circumstances: 37 
(a) Outside the Fishing Area Authorised by the Party Represented by 
CCNAA: personnel from the party represented by AIT may visit driftnet vessels of the territory represented by CCNAA wherever 
found if detected outside the authorised fishing area upon 
transmission of prior notification to CCNAA. 
33 Council of Agriculture press conference, Taipei, 10 July 1989. 
34 American Institute in Taiwan, Media Summary: 14 July-15 August, Taipei, 
Taiwan (11 August 1989) p. 2. 
35 Chou, "What Did the Government Achieve? " China Times Weekly (15 
July 1989) p. 56. 
36 Fisheries Yearbook; Taiwan Area: 1988. 
37 Supra note 32, Article V. 
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(b) Inside the Fishing Area Authorised by the Party Represented by 
CCNAA: personnel from the party represented by AIT may visit 
driftnet vessels of the territory represented by CCNAA inside the 
authorised fishing area upon the notification to CCNAA: 
(1) Prohibited species are observed on board; 
(2) Transfer of catch is observed in progress where there is reason to 
believe that catch being transferred is of anadromous species; 
(3) Identification of the vessel is obscured in any way; 
(4) Transmitter is not operating; 
(5) Vessel is not on the list provided by CCNAA of registered driftnet 
vessel; or 
(6) Vessel is evading detection or fleeing. 
This agreement expired on 31 December 1990. The two states met in Honolulu 
to discuss renewal of the 1989 Agreement on 19-22 March 1991. Under the terms of 
the renewed agreement, Taiwan would actively invite American scientific observers to 
board Taiwan's driftnet fishing vessels to collect information on the impact of driftnet 
fishing on the marine ecosystem. The US enforcement officials were required to 
present a request to the Taiwanese authorities to visit the Taiwanese fishing vessels on 
the high seas. Only after obtaining permission from the Taiwanese authorities, could 
the US enforcement officials, together with the Taiwanese enforcement agents, board 
the suspected vessel to verify whether fishing violations had occurred. Moreover, the 
evidence regarding fishing violations provided by the US would not be considered as 
valid proof unless confirmed by Taiwan's enforcement authorities 38 Hence, 
permission from the Taiwanese government constituted the basic requirement. 
On a completely different issue, as Taiwan is not recognised by most states, 
will Taiwanese fishing vessels be treated as stateless vessels when they are operating 
38 Song, "United States Ocean Policy: High Seas Driftnet Fisheries in the 
North Pacific Ocean, " 11 CYILA (1991-92) pp. 114-115. 
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on the high seas? The answer to this question can be deduced from the following 
discussion. 
During the period of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, Poland questioned the use of the word 'entities' at the end of 
Article 1(3) of the Revised Negotiating Text39 and said that the paragraph should 
reflect the reality that 'entities' must also include those fishing in EEZs. In response, the 
Conference Chairman pointed out that paragraph (3) is a particular reference to the 
status of China. Article I is written in this way to secure compliance and observation of 
the standards as set forth by this agreement. 40 In the final draft Agreement of the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, 41 Article 1(3) keeps the main spirit of what was mentioned in Revised 
Negotiating Text and provides: "This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other 
fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas. " It is clear that the 'fishing entities' 
here refers to Taiwan. Under this circumstance, it is understandable that Taiwanese 
fishing vessels should not be treated as stateless vessels. Furthermore, Taiwanese 
fishing vessels should be included in the global fishery resources management 
mechanism so that the compliance and observation of the UN Agreement on the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
39 Revised Negotiating Text, UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. UN Doc. A/CONF: 164/13/Rev. 1,30 March 1994. 
40 ENB, at http: //www. iisd. ca/linkages/voIO7/0741014E. html. However, no 
document of the Conference makes it clear on what basis an entity can profit from the 
1995 Agreement. It still needs international practice to build up explanations. 
41 UN Doc. A/CONF. 164133,3 August 1995. 
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Stocks can be secured. However, given political circumstances, i. e. recognition issue 
and the international status of Taiwan, Taiwan can be considered a 'fishing entity' but 
not a state 42 
Under such a 'fishing entity' status, Taiwan should be included in the 1995 
Agreement mechanism. According to the 1995 Agreement, an important designation is 
the function of subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or 
arrangement: 
Article 8 
3. Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or 
arrangement has the competence to establish conservation and 
management measures for particular straddling fish stocks or highly 
migratory fish stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas and 
relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to co-operate by 
becoming a member of such organisation or a participant in such 
arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and management 
measures established by such an organisation or arrangement ... 
4. Only those States which are members of such an organisation or 
participants in such an arrangement, or which agree to apply the 
conservation and management measures established by such 
organisation or arrangement, shall have access to the fishery resources 
to which those measures apply. 
Nonetheless, it seems normal that Taiwan would be excluded from 
membership of a regional fishery organisation because of its international status. 
However, the 1995 Agreement envisages this concern. Firstly, Article 34 of the -1995 
Agreement requires states "shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this 
Agreement and shall exercise the rights recognised in this Agreement in a manner 
42 For this reason, at the final session of the Conference, China delegate 
states that 'Province of Taiwan enjoys abundant fishing' to reiterate its position on'One 
China Policy'. See ENB, at http: //www. iisd. ca/linkages/vo107/0754027E. html. 
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which would not constitute an abuse of right. " If, in a given region, a group of states 
tried to exclude another responsible state whose vessels had a history of fishing there 
or that had some other equitable claim to participate in the fishery, this state could well 
give rise to a claim under Article 34.43 
Secondly, Article 8(3) of the 1995 Agreement, reflecting Articles 63(2) and 64 
of the LOSC, 44 calls for regional organisations for straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks to accept as members all states with a legitimate stake in the 
fishery concerns: 
43 Balton, "Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, " 27 ODIL (1996) p. 139. 
44 Article 63(2): 
Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the 
exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, 
the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area 
shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional 
organisations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation 
of these stocks in the adjacent area. 
Article 64 
1. The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region 
for the highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall co-operate 
directly or through appropriate international organisations with a view 
to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilisation of such species throughout the region, both within and 
beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no 
appropriate international organisation exists, the coastal State and 
other States whose nationals harvest these species in the region shall 
co-operate to establish such an organisation and participate in its 
work. 
2. The provisions of paragraph I apply in addition to the other provisions 
of this Part. 
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States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become 
members of such organisations or participants in such arrangements. The 
terms of participation of such organisations or arrangements shall not 
preclude such States from membership or participation; nor shall they be 
applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or group of 
States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned. 
Therefore, all states having a legitimate stake in a fishery have the opportunity 
to develop the relevant conservation and management measures. This principle should 
apply to Taiwan. 
3. OBSERVATIONS 
From the discussion above, the possibilities for Taiwanese fishing vessels to be 
considered as stateless vessels on the high seas can be looked at from three aspects: 
Firstly, a vessel is stateless when it has two or more flags/nationalities. No such 
situation has ever happened before. 
Secondly, a Taiwanese vessel is stateless when its nationality is deprived or cancelled 
by the Taiwanese government if it violates Taiwan's municipal law, such as continuing 
driftnet operations on the high seas after 1 January 1993. Under such a circumstance, a 
vessel would lose its Taiwanese registry and become stateless. 45 However, no such 
case has ever happened. On the other hand, in the case when the US Coast Guard wants 
to visit and search Taiwanese fishing vessels on the suspicion that the latter are 
catching certain anadromous species or operating driftnetting outside of the agreed 
45 Supra note 29. 
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areas, the former still has to obtain permission from the latter. Moreover, such action is 
provided for in an agreement concluded between the two parties. Therefore, the whole 
visiting procedure will be implemented under international law but not under the 
hypothesis that the Taiwanese vessels are stateless. 
Thirdly, a vessel is stateless when other states do not recognise it. It is true that most of 
the states do not recognise Taiwan, but this does not necessarily mean that the 
Taiwanese fishing vessels are stateless. In order to avoid any political implication and. 
secure compliance and observation of the standards of the straddling and highly 
migratory stocks agreement, 'fishing entity' is subtly designed to imply Taiwan. 
Therefore, the issue of whether the Taiwanese fishing vessel is stateless or not 
is basically the same as the issue of Taiwan's international status. They both carry 
highly political implications. International law and theories only can serve as a 
guideline. However, practice does not follow it. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
Since the ROC withdrew from the UN in 1971, several important international or 
regional conferences have been held for regulating the order of activities on the sea. 1 
Taiwan did not participate in these meetings, partly because it is not a member of the 
relative international organisation, such as the UN, partly because it is not recognised 
by most of the states. In terms of the participating states, take UNCLOS III for 
instance, Taiwan was not allowed to attend any session. 2 As a coastal state and one of 
the powerful distant-water fishing nations, Taiwan's voice should have been heard and 
thus this is a flaw for the international society. Therefore, being a member of the UN 
becomes a, basic requirement to attend official international conferences. In this 
chapter, we shall use Taiwan's application for the membership in the UN as an 
1 These conferences include international and regional ones. In terms of 
international conference, there were UNCLOS III (from 1974 to 1982) and the UN 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (from 1993 to 
1995). As for regional conferences, the Wellington Conference on the Prohibition of 
Long Driftnets in the South Pacific (November 1989) is one example. For Wellington 
Conference, see infra Chapter 8, Section 1. 
2 Appendix of the LOSC. Cf. Chapter 3, note 146. 
example to identify the situation that Taiwan is unable to participate in international 
organisations which cause it absent in international conferences. 
1. TAIWAN'S UN MEMBERSHIP BID 
The ROC government and the Taiwanese people have never given up the hope of re- 
joining the. UN since the withdrawal from the UN in 1971. To avoid being completely 
isolated from international society, Taiwan has continuously tried to re-join the UN 
since 1993.3 First, the ROC President Lee Teng-Hui announced on 9 April 1993 that 
Taiwan would actively seek membership in the UN, and he hoped the international 
community would seriously consider Taiwan's bid. ` 
On 8 May, the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a position paper 
entitled The Membership of the Republic of China in the United Nations'? In this 
paper, the ROC government delicately presented the divided situation between Taiwan 
and the PRC. It reads: 
The Republic of China insists upon its rightful international status prior to 
national reunification. Under circumstances that would not hinder the 
future reunification of China, the Republic of China should be represented 
in the United Nations, thereby allowing for appropriate and effective 
representation of the rights and interests of the 20.8 million Chinese 
people who live in the area under the control of the Republic of China. 
3 Klintworth, "Taiwan's United Nations Membership Bid, " 7 P. Rev. (1994) 
p. 283. 
Taiwan Communique, No. 59 (September 1993). 
5 "The Membership of the Republic of China in the United Nations, " 
Gazette of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 496,8 May 1993. English translation in 
11 CYILA (1991-1992) pp. 271-276. 
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The ROC's participation in the United Nations would be consistent with 
the principles of the universality of the United Nations' membership and of 
respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the 20.8 million 
people living in the Taiwan area. Moreover, it would be conductive to the 
final reunification of China. [emphasis added] 
Obviously, the ROC government understands that its most serious obstacle to 
membership comes from the PRC. In the interim, the ROC sticks to its 'One China 
Policy' whilst applying for membership. 
On 6 August 1993, the seven Central American countries that recognised the 
ROC, 6 sent a letter to the UN Secretary-General, urging him to place Taiwan's 
membership in the UN on the agenda of the 48th Session of the UN General 
Assembly.? They mentioned that "consideration of the exceptional situation of the 
Republic of China in Taiwan in the international context, based on the principle of 
universality and in accordance with the established model of parallel representation of 
divided countries at the United Nations, " the ROC should be accepted as a member. 
6 These countries are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. They recognise the ROC as a state and they neither 
recognise the PRC nor have formal diplomatic relations with the PRC. 
7 UN Doc. A/48/191,9 August 1993. On 19 July 1994, twelve UN member 
states proposed another similar letter, see UN Doc. A/49/144. On 17 July 1996, 
another document, discussing the situation that people in Taiwan cannot participate 
UN activities, was filed by sixteen UN member states, see UN Doc. A/51/142. 
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On 11 August 1993, the Permanent Representative of the PRC to the UN sent a 
note to the UN, opposing the aforementioned proposed resolution by saying that 
Taiwan's attempt to return to the UN is 'actually trying to split China, obstruct and 
sabotage the great undertaking of China's reunification' and '[this] attempt has been. 
and will continue to be resolutely opposed by the entire Chinese people, including 
people in Taiwan, and is, therefore, doomed to failure. '8 The proposal was not placed 
on the agenda of the General Assembly's 48th Session in September 1993. It was 
discussed, however, by the 28-member committee which sets the agenda with three 
nations, that is, Guatemala, Grenada, and Nicaragua, speaking in favour. Opposing the 
request was a solid bloc comprised of Bangladesh, Benin, Egypt, India, Iran, Pakistan, 
the PRC, Russia, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. 9 
It is understandable that the ROC cannot win its bid in one go. The problem is 
that the ROC was a charter member of the UN and one of the five permanent members 
of the Security Council-10 Although the PRC government occupied most of the 
Chinese mainland and was recognised by most of the states, the ROC government in 
8 UN Doc. A/48/306,11 August 1993. Chinese representative's opinion 
pulls back the same debating on the issue of'One China Policy'. See Chapter 3, Section 
3. 
9 Klintworth, supra note 3, p. 283. 
10 See Charter of the United Nations, Article 23(1). It provides that "the 
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall 
be permanent members of the Security Council. " 
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Taiwan continued to be recognised by other states. 11 Thus, unlike the recent case of the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the ROC did not in fact cease to exist. 
The Soviet Union, consisting of fifteen republics, used to be one of the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. Following the failed coup d'etat in 
Moscow in August 1991, the republics in turn proclaimed independence. On 21 
December 1991, the republics, in the Alma-Ata, declared that the Soviet Union had 
ceased to exist as a subject of international law and that they would henceforth 
constitute the Commonwealth of Independent States. 12 In contrast, the ROC did not 
declare that it ceased to exist as a state. On the contrary, it continues to exercise every 
function as a state, including diplomatic and economic relations, with other states. 
Furthermore, in the case of the Soviet Union, on 24 December 1991, a letter to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations from the Permanent Representative of the 
USSR to the UN stated that: 13 
[T]he membership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the 
United Nations, including the Security Council and all other organs and 
organisations of the United Nations system, is being continued by the 
Russian Federation with the support of the countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
11 For discussion on recognition by states, see Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.3. 
12 Tass, Moscow, 22 December 1991. About Russia succeeded the USSR's 
seat in the United Nations, see Chapter 3, note 71 and the accompanying text. 
13 Appendix to UN Doc. 199 1 /RUSSIA, 24 December 1991. Cf. Simma, ed., 
The Charter of the UN: A Commentary (1994) p. 173. 
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The Russian Federation then succeeded to the UN membership of the Soviet Union 
without opposition, whereas it took twenty-two years to settle the issue of Chinese 
representation in the UN. Thus, it is necessary to examine the requirements for UN 
membership. This will be discussed in the following section. 
2. CONDITIONS OF BEING A UN MEMBER 
Pursuant to the UN Charter, the members of the UN consist of original members and 
members admitted in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Charter. 
Article 3 
The original Members of the United Nations shall be the states which, 
having participated in the United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation at San Francisco, or having previously signed the 
Declaration by United Nations of January 1,1942, sign the present Charter 
and ratify it in accordance with Article 110. 
Article 4 
1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving 
states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in 
the judgement of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations . 2. The admission of any such state to membership in the United Nations 
will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. 
The ROC is one of the original member states of the UN. However, according 
to General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI), the Chinese representative seat was 
replaced by the PRC. 14 Theoretically, the ROC can apply to have its seat restored, but 
this would inevitably raise objections and induce pressure from the PRC. Therefore, 
14 Chapter 3, Sub-Section 3.2. 
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the alternative falls to applying for membership in accordance with Article 4 of the UN 
Charter. 
According to Article 4(1) of the UN Charter, membership is open to "all other 
peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, 
in the judgment of the Organisation, are able and willing to carry out these 
obligations. " In the Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Membership in the United 
Nations, 15 the ICJ gave Article 4(1) a further interpretation that the five conditions for 
any new applicants would be (A) a state; (B) peace-loving; (C) accept the obligations 
of the Charter; (D) able to carry out these obligations; and (E) willing to do so. 
Condition (A), namely statehood, had been discussed in the Sub-Section 4.1 of 
Chapter Three. The other conditions form a rather vague concept, as they are easily 
connected with political considerations. From 1946 until 1955, when the Cold War 
between the Soviet Union and the western powers was at its height, political wrangling 
prevented the admission of a large number of UN applicants. The reasons given by 
members of the Security Council were sometimes disguised in legal terms. For 
example, a state's independence was in doubt (Jordan, Ceylon), a state was not peace- 
loving or willing to carry out obligations under the Charter (Albania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Romania); or a state would be unable to carry out such obligations 
(Mongolia). 16 
15 ICJ Reports 1948, p. 57. 
16 Fenwick, International Law, 4th Edition (1965) pp. 207-208; Greig, 
International Law, 2nd Edition (1976) pp. 699-702. 
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Nonetheless, it is still worthy to see whether the ROC fulfils the other 
_ conditions. The ROC, despite not having been a member of the UN since 1971, has 
continued to support the activities and resolutions of the UN. Thus, on 6 August 1990, 
after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 661 
to impose economic sanctions against Iraq. 17 The ROC government soon issued an 
order to implement this resolution by suspending the issuance of export licenses to 
Iraq. 18 
On 30 May 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 757,19 
imposing economic sanctions on Yugoslavia (Serbia/Montenegro) for its intervention 
in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 16 November 1992 and 17 April 1993, 
the Security Council continued to adopt Resolutions 78720 and 820,21 to strengthen its 
economic sanctions against Yugoslavia. For this matter, on 10 June 1993, the ROC 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications issued an order prohibiting the entry 
of Yugoslavian ships to ports in the ROC. 22 
17 S/RES/661 (6 August 1990). 
18 Public Notice of Mao (79) Fa No. 21592 of the Bureau of Foreign Trade of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
19 S/RES/757 (30 May 1992). 
20 S/RESI787 (16 November 1992). 
21 S/RES/820 (17 April 1993). 
22 Letter of Chiao-Han (82) No. 016274 to the port authorities of Keelung, 
Taichung, Hualien, Kaohsiung, and Suao. 
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As for accepting and carrying out the obligations of the UN Charter, the ROC 
has long demonstrated its ability to do so. In 1990 it set up an International Disaster 
Relief Fund to provide emergency aid to many countries. 23 In addition, the ROC's 
International Economic Co-operation Development Fund (IECDF) offers low interest 
loans to support economic development in developing countries. By May 1995, 
IECDF had promised loans to developing countries totalling US$331.1 million, 
including those agreements already signed and those to be signed in the near future. 24 
Thus, although the ROC has been excluded from participation in the UN and its 
specialised agencies, it has continued to support the UN's activities and goals. 
3. OBSERVATIONS 
Excluding Taiwan or the ROC from any international organisation is an inappropriate 
attitude and goes against protecting the fundamental rights of Taiwanese people. 
Article 55 of the UN Charter provides: 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which 
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on 
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, 
the United Nations shall promote: 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion. 
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Tui-wai kuan-hsi yu Wai-chiao hsing- 
cheng (External Relations and Foreign Affairs Administration) (1992) pp. 320-326. 
24 11 The IECDF Newsletter (July 1995) pp. 6-7. 
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Article 56 continues to stipulate that 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co- 
operation with the Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set 
forth in Article 55. 
Since the ROC fulfils the requirements of being a member of the UN, the 
continual denial of the fundamental rights of the people in Taiwan to be represented in 
the UN is an injustice treatment of those people. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
INABILITY TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS 
We shall look at the practical situation that Taiwan is unable to conclude agreements 
with other states, even on topics that concern its own interests. The first case illustrates 
this difficulty. However, the second case demonstrates that Taiwan is still capable of 
concluding agreements with its neighbouring state. The paradoxical point will be 
identified in the observation. 
1. THE WELLINGTON CONVENTION 
The Wellington Convention is an important convention in opposing drifinet operation 
in the world. It is not only a regional document, but it also has influence on the UN to 
recommend a global moratorium on all high seas driftnet fishing. l It is extraordinary to 
know that as a major driftnet fishing state, Taiwan was not invited to sign the 
Wellington Convention. However, Taiwan did try its best to comply with the requests 
from the South Pacific island states. Taiwan's interaction with these states is the main 
theme of this first section. 
I See Chapter 2, Sub-Sections 5.1. A. (B) and 5.1. C. 
The Wellington Convention was open for signature by the member states of the 
FFA and any Territory situated within the Convention Area. 2 Two protocols were also 
prepared to further the Convention's objectives. Protocol I is "open for signature by any 
State whose nationals or fishing vessels documented under its laws fish within the 
Convention Area or by any other State invited to sign by the Parties to the 
Convention. "3 Therefore, Protocol I is provided for any distant-water fishing nation, 
such as Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan, whose nationals or vessels fish within the 
Convention Area. Protocol II is "open for signature by any State the waters of which 
are contiguous with or adjacent to the Convention Area or by any other State invited to 
sign by the Parties to the Convention. "4 According to the Final Acts of the Wellington 
Convention, the words "adjacent to the Convention Area" in Article 7 of Protocol II 
relate to countries on or within the Pacific Rim. Presumably this includes Russia, 
Japan, North Korea, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, 
Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, the US, and Canada. 
Accordingly, under the provisions of Protocols I and II of the Wellington 
Convention, Taiwan should be eligible to sign the two Protocols. In fact, a South 
Pacific delegation had visited Taiwan to see if Taiwan would be willing to sign the 
2 Wellington Convention, Article 10(1), supra Chapter 2, note 100. 
3 Protocol I of the Wellington Convention, ibid, Article 7(1). 
4 Protocol II of the Wellington Convention, ibid., Article 7(1). 
5 Final Act of the Wellington Convention, ibid. 
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protocols. Taiwan indicated that it would participate in negotiations towards a fisheries 
management regime, providing it could participate as the Republic of China. 6 
However, due to problems of international recognition of Taiwan,? Taiwan can not 
join the Wellington Convention with its official title, the Republic of China. This is 
despite the Taiwanese delegation having attended the Conference as an official 
government representation. The Taiwanese representative's claim that it should be 
recognised as the ROC was rejected and they were denied access to the Conference. 8 
To enable Taiwan to accept the Wellington Convention provisions, a mechanism was 
adopted whereby the Director of the FFA was to exchange letters with the Taiwan 
Deepsea Tuna Boat Owners and Exporters Association. The letter from the Director of 
the FFA invited the Association to "undertake to ban its members and prevent their 
fishing vessels from using driftnets within the Convention Area. " A further letter from 
the Chairman of the Taiwan Deepsea Tuna Boat Owners and Exporters Association to 
the Director of the FFA simply accepted the proposal of the Director. 9 
Immediately after the Conference for Wellington Convention, the first 
consultation to consider a management regime for the South Pacific was held in 
6 Wright and Doulman, "Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific: From 
Controversy to Management, " 15 Mar. Pol. (1991) pp. "320-321. 
7 Only four states, Nauru, Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Tuvalu, officially 
recognise ROC in the South Pacific region. For the ROC's recognition issues, see 
supra Chapter 3. 
8 New Scientist (9 December 1989) p. 8. Cited from Hewison, "The 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, " 25 
Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. (1993) pp. 456-457. 
9 Ibid., p. 528. 
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Wellington, New Zealand in November 1989. A Taiwanese delegation had travelled to 
New Zealand, but it failed to participate in the consultations because of political 
difficulties associated with its international status. 10 
The second consultation was held in March 1990 in Honiara. Again, Taiwan 
did not attend because of political difficulties. Nonetheless, informal briefings on the 
consultations by the FFA helped to keep Taiwan abreast of discussions about the 
development of a management regime for South Pacific albacore tuna. 11 
Before the third consultation in October 1990 in New Caledonia, all the 
participants at the previous consultations reached consensus on a title for the ROC, 
Taiwan-China, which enabled Taiwan to participate in the New Caledonia 
consultation. 12 
This was a common sense solution to the problem, because Taiwan is one of 
parties in the conflict. With Taiwan's continued exclusion from the process, the 
probability of securing a lasting regime for the fishery would have been low. 13 
10 Wright and Doulman, supra note 6, p. 323. Also, Sydney Morning Herald 
(28 November 1989) p. 4. 
11 Wright and Doulman, ibid., p. 323. 
12 Ibid., p. 324. 
13 Ibid. 
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As regards Taiwan's reaction to the Wellington Convention and other actions 
taken by the South Pacific island states, Taiwan gave them all serious consideration. 
The reasons for this are twofold: 
A. The South Pacific Ocean is an important fishing ground for the Taiwanese fishing 
industry. Since tuna is the main fishery resource in the South Pacific, the Taiwanese 
fisheries in this region are involved mainly in tuna fishing which can be divided into 
three sectors: Firstly, Tuna Longliner: until the end of 1988, almost all Taiwanese 
vessels were longliners targeting albacore. 14 Take the albacore fishery for instance. 
Since the 1970's, Taiwanese longliners have become one of the most important 
fisheries in the exploitation of South Pacific albacore. 15 Taiwanese South Pacific tuna 
longliner fisheries always shows a rather high percentage (over 70%) of albacore catch 
composition in their total catch. 16 According to South Pacific Commission statistics, 
the number of Taiwanese longliner vessels equalled 109 in 1987 and increased to 124 
in 1988.17 In addition, Taiwanese purse seine vessels started to operate in the south- 
western Pacific. Skipjack and yellowfin tuna are their target species. 18 The number of 
the Taiwanese purse seine grew from about 10 at the beginning of 1988 to 17 by the 
14 South Pacific Commission, Report of the Second South Pacific Albacore 
Research Workshop, Suva, Fiji, 14-16 June 1989, p. 4. 
15 Wang, "Seasonal Changes of the Distribution of South Pacific Albacore 
Based on Taiwan's Tuna Longline Fisheries, 1971-1985, " 20 Acta Oceanographica 
Taiwanica (1988) pp. 13-14. 
16 Ibid., p. 38. 
17 South Pacific Commission, supra note 14, p. 12. 
18 ]bid., p. 4. 
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end of 1988, to 26 by 1989, and grew to over 30 by early 1990.19 Therefore, the South 
Pacific fishing ground is important to Taiwanese fishing industry. 
B. Owing to its isolated international status, the Taiwanese government has to take 
care of any possibility which could cause further isolation. Facing pressure that it 
abandon driftnet fisheries, the Taiwanese government had to take some measures to 
comply with the requests of the South Pacific countries. 
2. THE AGREEMENT ON SEA LANE PASSAGE 
AND MEMORANDUM ON AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES 
CO-OPERATION 
From the above discussion, it is clear that the disputes between Taiwan and the 
Philippines began with problems of resource utilisation, especially fishery resources, 
and then developed into issues of delimitation of the overlapping EEZs. Thus, the 
essential aspects of the dispute concern economic factors, i. e. resource utilisation. The 
legal aspect; delimitation of maritime zone, becomes a secondary aspect. 
Unfortunately, political considerations have played a decisive role and because there 
are no official relations between Taiwan and the Philippines, the progress of resolution 
19 Narasaki, "Structure of DWFN's Purse Seiner Fleets and their Production 
Volumes, " in Herr, ed., The Forum Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges and 
Prospects (1990) p. 315. 
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has been retarded. Twenty-three years after the first fishery dispute, 20 the 'Agreement 
on Sea Lane Passage and Memorandum on Agriculture and Fisheries Co-operation', 
was concluded, the essence of which is its pragmatic and co-operative nature. 
2.1. THE INITIATION 
From March through April 1991, the Philippines detained several Taiwanese fishing 
vessels. The most serious incident happened on 27 April 1991, when the Philippine 
navy sunk a Taiwanese fishing vessel. According to the Philippine government's 
statement, the sinking resulted from the Taiwanese fishing vessels' illegal intrusion 
----- into the Philippine territorial sea. At the same time, another seven vessels were 
detained for illegally intruding into the Philippines' EEZ. 21 
These incidents provoked an angry response from Taiwan. The Taiwanese 
Premier, Hau Pei-Tsun, ordered the ROC Representative to the Philippines22 to assert 
Taiwan's position that it hoped to initiate negotiations immediately. 
20 On 21 July 1968, a Taiwanese fishing vessel, the Lien-Chun-Tsai, was 
seized by the Philippines in the waters of the Bashi Channel and charged with 'illegal 
intrusion and fishing'. See Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, Vol. 68, No. 82,13 October 
1979, p. 67. 
21 Central Daily News (28 April 1991) p. 2. 
22 Despite no official relations, Taipei and Manila still maintain un-official 
relations under which two countries sending un-official representatives to each country 
and performing a certain level of official tasks, such as processing visa applications. 
See supra Chapter 3, note 101 and the accompanying text. 
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Both the ROC and the Philippine declarations on EEZ provide rules which 
refer to international law for the resolution of overlapping EEZ claims. In the ROC 
declaration, Paragraph 2(B) provides: 
Where the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China extends over 
any part of the exclusive economic zones as proclaimed by other States, 
the boundaries shall be determined by agreement between the States 
concerned or in accordance with generally accepted principles of 
international law on delimitation. 
On the Philippines side, according to its Presidential Decree No. 1599, Section 1, 
[W]here the outer limits of the zone as thus determined overlap the 
exclusive economic zone of an adjacent or neighbouring' State, the 
common boundaries shall be determined by agreement with the State 
concerned or in accordance with pertinent generally recognised principles 
of international law on delimitation. (brackets added] 
Besides, it was a good time to propose a negotiated settlement for a number of reasons 
as follows: 
First, Taiwan plays an important role in the Philippine economy. Taiwan is the 
Philippines' second largest trading partner with a bilateral trading amount of US$1,047 
million dollars in 1991. Taiwan was also the second largest foreign investor country in 
the Philippines at US$140 million dollars in 1991. The Philippines needs Taiwanese 
investment to alleviate its economic difficulties 23 
23 Straits Times (24 August 1991) p. 16. Also Gazette of the Legislative 
Yuan, Vol. 81, No. 15,11 July 1991, pp' 12-46. Cf. Leong, "The Changing Political 
Economy of Taiwan - Southeast Asia Relations, " 6 P. Rev. (1993) pp. 32-35. 
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Secondly, Taiwan had embarked on a Six-Year National Development Plan, which 
needs a large amount of labour. The Philippines is keen to export labour to Taiwan to 
resolve its serious unemployment problem. 24 
Thirdly, the eruption of the volcano Mount Pinatubo in 1991 increased the Philippine 
government's need for foreign capital and technical assistance to put its domestic 
economy on the road to recovery. 
Fourthly, following a prolonged period of isolation from international society, Taiwan 
was eagerly seeking opportunities to re-enter the international arena. Maintaining good 
relations with the regional organisation, ASEAN, 25 has been important to Taiwan. 
Starting negotiations or concluding an agreement, if possible, could mark a victory and 
enable Taiwan to break out of its long-term diplomatic isolation. 
Given this background, the Philippine government organised an internal ad hoc 
committee, the South China Fishery Dispute Settlement Committee, to negotiate with 
countries with which it had fishery disputes. 26 The Chairman of the Committee and 
also the Assistant Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Philippine Presidential 
24 Straits Times (4 May 1991) p. 14. 
25 Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam are the member states of ASEAN. None of them has diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. 
26 Reuters, Manila, 7 May 1991.27 Report of Sino-Philippine Fishery 
Negotiation. (In Chinese text) A special report to Foreign Affairs Committee and 
Economics Committee of the Legislative Yuan by the Agricultural Council Chairman, 
Yu Yuh-Hsien, 11 July 1991, p. 3. 
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Office, Roberto R. V. Lucila, invited Taiwanese Agricultural Council Chairman, Yu 
Yuh-Hsien, to the Philippines to negotiate the disputes between the two countries. 27 
2.2. FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The first round of negotiations took two days, 21 and 22 May 1991. The main issues 
were: (1) Designating sailing routes for Taiwanese fishing vessels exercising right of 
innocent passage in the Luzon Strait. Once such routes were designated, Taiwanese 
fishing vessels could safely exercise the right and, as a result, avoid arrest. (2) Joint 
development of the fishery resources in the area where the EEZs of the two countries 
overlap. A difficulty arose over this point, in that under the Philippine Constitution, 
fishing within the Philippine territorial sea is limited only to Filipino people 28 This 
would limit the range of joint development, therefore considerations would be on the 
conservation methods as well as the exploitation of fishery resources. (3) Fishery co- 
operation. This concerns the ROC government encouraging its people to invest in the 
facilities and construction of the Philippine fishing ports, and a training programme for 
Philippine fishermen. 
As this was their first formal contact and due to the limited time, both parties 
did not expect to reach any agreement, instead intending just to convey their positions 
28 The Philippine Constitution, Article XII, Section 2(2). 
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and exchange views on the above issues. 29 After the negotiations, both parties issued a 
joint statement: 30 
1. Both Parties agree to meet again on 4-7 July 1991 in Taipei; 
2. Due to the lack of time, there is no any agreement reached between 
Parties, but both Parties had conveyed their positions on designating 
sailing routes for innocent passage in the Luzon Strait, joint 
development of the fishery resources in the area of overlapping EEZs, 
and fishery co-operation. And they agree that it takes time to draw up 
appropriate proposals which benefit both Parties; 
3. Under the basis of reciprocity, both Parties emphasise that any Party's 
decision or proposal should satisfy the demands about the national 
security and economical benefits of both Parties; 
4. If a justified and reasonable resolution can be reached, the ROC, in 
order to assist the Philippines to develop its fishing industry, will 
provide fishery assistance, training programs, fishing vessels to the 
Philippines, to encourage the ROC nationals to construct fishing ports 
in the Philippines, and to provide technical suggestions; 
5. The Philippines agrees to seek resolutions, under the presumption that 
comply with the Philippine Constitution, about designating sailing 
routes for innocent passage in the Luzon Strait and provisional 
arrangements in the overlapping EEZs, so that both Parties can share 
the benefits. 
As the Manila meeting was the first official contact between the Philippines 
and the ROC since termination of their diplomatic relations in 1975, a great deal of 
concern, especially coming from Taiwanese domestic pressure, surrounded the 
meeting. On the one hand, it was good for policy making, because the government's 
public policy-making process could be monitored by the public. On the other hand, this 
could put too much pressure on the Taiwanese delegates and push them into making 
wrong decisions. However, as it had been twenty-three years since the first 
29 Report of Sino-Philippine Fishery Negotiation, supra note 27, p. 5. 
30 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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fishery dispute occurred, too many influential factors were involved in this issue. At 
this stage, it would be practical if both Parties could exchange their opinions and 
understand their respective positions rather than attempting to resolve the issues in a 
two-day meeting. 
2.3. SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS 
The second round of Sino-Philippine fishery negotiation was held in Taipei from 3 to 7 
July 1991. After the talks, Taiwan and the Philippine delegates signed an inter- 
governmental agreement, 'Agreement on Sea Lane Passage and Memorandum on 
Agriculture and Fisheries Co-operation', on 7 July. This Agreement, the first one 
between them since Taiwan and the Philippines suspended diplomatic relations in 
1975, was signed by Chiu Mao-Ying, Vice Chairman of the Agricultural Council, and 
Roberto R. V. Lucila, Assistant Executive Secretary of the Chief of Staff Office under 
the Philippine Presidential Office, on behalf of the two governments. The main themes 
of the Agreement are: 31 
1. The Philippines will designate two sea lanes in its territorial waters for 
innocent passage of the ROC fishing boats on their way to the south and 
southwest Pacific Ocean. <See Map 13> The ROC will require its 
fishing vessels to abide by the Philippine regulations about innocent 
passage, which includes: 
(A) proceed without delay; 
(B) not perform any fishing activities; 
(C) refrain from use of force of any kind, or any other acts in violation 
of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the 
United Nations; 
31 Ibid., pp. 8-11. 
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(D) refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal 
modes of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered 
necessary by force majeure or by distress; 
(E) comply with generally. accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices for safety at sea; 
(F) not pollute the Sea Lanes; 
(G) not carry out research or survey activities without the prior 
authorisation of both Governments; and 
(H) stow the fishing gear of the vessels. 
2. The ROC agrees to offer a semi-annual estimate of fishing vessels 
which use the Sea Lanes and offer the statistics data in the next year. 
3. The ROC Council of Agriculture will immediately dispatch a team of 
agricultural experts to the Philippines to survey areas affected by the 
Mount Pinatubo eruption and provide technical suggestions and assist 
the Philippines in reconstructing its agriculture system damaged by the 
eruption. Both Parties will reach an arrangement about long-term 
agricultural co-operation. 
4. Under the condition of provisions of the Philippine Constitution and 
law, both Parties seek the arrangement of fishery co-operation in the 
off-shore areas, which includes: 
(A) encouraging the ROC private entrepreneur's investment; 
(B) conservation, management and utilisation of fishery resources; 
(C) scientific research on fisheries; 
(D) aquaculture on fresh and sea water living organisms in the 
Philippines; 
(E) processing and marketing of fishery products; and 
(F) such other items that are mutually agreeable to both Parties. 
5. The Philippines will allow the ROC fishing vessels, except for driftnet, 
shellfishes, lobsters, and other species which are restricted by the 
Philippine government, to operate in the waters which depth is over 
seven fathoms and to land and sell catches, supply, repair, transport, 
and employ crews in the Philippine ports. 
6. In response to the Philippine bona fide, the ROC will offer assistance: 
(A) encourage the entrepreneur to co-operate with the Philippines in 
fishing industry, crew training, and crew employment. 
(B) donating five used fishing vessels, equipped with necessary 
facilities, to the Philippines. 
(C) improving the construction of Aparri fishing port in Luzon. 
(D) sending lecturers to Regional Fishermen's Training Centre in the 
port of Aparri to elevate the Philippine fishery techniques. 
(E) employing the fishermen from Aparri aboard the ROC fishing 
vessels. 





(A) in case that the ROC fishing vessels are arrested or detained due to 
alleged violations of the applicable laws of the Philippines in the 
future, the Philippines agrees that it will release the vessels and 
crews after the ROC gives bail; 
(B) both Parties agree to hold annual consultations on matters 
concerning implementation of this Agreement; 
(C) all the provisions of this Agreement are inter-dependent and this 
Agreement shall remain in force as a whole; 
(D) both Parties agree that this Agreement shall not be deemed as, and 
shall be without prejudice to, the final delimitation of any maritime 
boundaries or jurisdictions of both Parties. 
8. This Agreement and Memorandum shall enter into force 30 days after 
the date of signature. 
Basically, this Agreement had accomplished the three tasks mentioned in the 
first round of negotiations in Manila in May. Both Parties obtained what they wanted. 
The Philippines gained economic support. The ROC gained sea lanes for its fishermen 
and ensured their safety, and most importantly, it signed an official agreement with 






Map 13 Two Sea Lanes Agreed by the ROC and the Philippines in 
Agreement of 1991 
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However, further analysis shows that the ROC obtained a right, the right of 
innocent passage, that it is entitled to have by the international law of the sea. 
Designation of the two sea lanes for the Taiwanese fishermen pass two maritime zones 
of the Philippines' are as follows: the first one is the territorial sea as defined by its 
'Treaty Limits' and the other is the archipelagic waters based on its straight baselines. 
Therefore, the rights of other states in these two zones are worthy of examination. 
According to the provisions of the LOSC, ships of all states enjoy the right of 
innocent passage through territorial sea32 and archipelagic waters 33 There is no clear 
and exact definition on innocent passage in the LOSC, but just mentions that in the 
context of certain activities, the passage might not be treated as innocent 34 In fact, the 
32 LOSC, Article 17. 
33 LOSC, Article 52(1). 
34 These activities are: 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in any 
other manner in violation of the principles of international law 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security 
of the coastal State; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person 
contrary to the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and 
regulations of the coastal State; 
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this 
Convention; 
(i) any fishing activities; 
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
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provisions in the Sino-Philippine Agreement are covered by similar provisions in the 
LOSC, thus making the provisions in the Agreement are nothing but declaration. In 
other words, the Taiwanese fishing vessels are entitled to enjoy innocent passage even 
without having to conclude this Agreement as long as they comply with the 
regulations, such as not engaging in any fishing activities during passage. 
Nevertheless, the Agreement is a significant achievement in the context of the 
relations between Taiwan and the Philippines. It not only provides the Taiwanese 
fishermen vital passage to the south Pacific fishing grounds, but also offers Taiwan 
and the Philippines the opportunity to co-operate. It also provides an example of how 
to solve maritime problems between Taiwan and its neighbours peacefully, which 
helps to maintain a peaceful and co-operative environment in the area. 
2.4. RESPONSE FROM THE PRC 
In customary fashion, the PRC opposed the conclusion of this Agreement saying that it 
was 'resolutely against' the Taiwan authorities holding talks with Manila on territorial 
waters, adding that any move "to treat Taiwan as an independent political entity" was 
definitely not acceptable to Beijing. 35 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication 
or any other facilities or installations of the coastal State; 
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
See LOSC, Article 19(2). Also, O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea, Vol. I 
(1982) pp. 272-274. 
35 AP, Beijing, 8 July 1991. 
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Beijing formally protested the Agreement, claiming it violated the 'One China 
Policy' which Manila adhered to when it switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei 
to Beijing in 1975.36 The Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Duan Jin said that 
Beijing opposed any official exchange between Taiwan and countries that had 
diplomatic ties with China, 37 
We hope that the Filipino government will, proceeding from the larger 
interest of safeguarding the China-Philippine friendship, take resolute 
measures to stop forthwith its activities of an official nature with 
Taiwan ... Any official agreement signed between a country and Taiwan is illegal and null and void. 
At this stage, the Philippine government's attitude is important. On the one 
hand, the Philippine President Aquino said she would wait for the recommendation of 
a Cabinet committee before commenting on the Agreement. "In the meantime, suffice 
it to say that we do not believe that an economic agreement runs counter to the 
Philippine policy of recognising only one China. "38 Moreover, "it is mere measure 
designed to forge peace, economic co-operation and friendship with neighbouring 
peoples. "39 On the other hand, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, 
36 In the Joint Communique between the Philippines and the PRC of 9 June 
1975, the Philippine government agrees to recognise not only the PRC government as 
"the sole legal government of China, " but also stated that it "fully understands and 
respects the position of the Chinese Government that there is but one China and that 
Taiwan is an integral part of Chinese territory. " Lotilla, "Reflections on the Framework 
of Manila-Taipei Relations and Current Bilateral Ocean-Use Disputes, " 64 Philippine 
Law Journal (1989) pp. 1-2. 
37 AP, Beijing, 11 July 1991. 
38 AP, Manila, 12 July 1991. 
39 Straits Times (6 August 1991) p. 14. 
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stated that the group of Philippine officials who signed the agreement with Taiwanese 
officials in Taipei might have exceeded their authority. 40 
After reviewing the Agreement, a presidential study group called by President 
Aquino, urged Manila to consider the Agreement a mere 'record of discussion' instead 
of a bilateral pact, because formal recognition of the agreement would have seriously 
damaged current and long-term relations with Beijing. Moreover, this might have 
provoked Beijing into abandoning its vow to refrain from supporting local communist 
guerrillas and into hardening its claim over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea 
which are also claimed by Manila. 41 The Philippine presidential study group also 
revealed such anxiety and warned against outright disavowal of the Agreement since 
this could trigger a pull-out by Taiwan investors, who had been amongst the most 
active in recent years. 42 Such a situation demonstrates the dilemma of the Philippine 
'One China Policy'. It needs economic support from Taiwan but is afraid of political 
pressure from China. 
Despite this, Taiwan remained optimistic, chiefly because it felt that it was in a 
stronger position to influence the Philippines since it could prohibit the employment of 
Philippine workers as well as slow or stop economic aid. 43 M ROC Foreign 
40 China Times (13 July 1991) p. 1. 
41 AP, Manila, 24 July 1991. Cf. Lotilla, supra note 36, pp. 29-30. 
42 AP, Manila, 24 July 1991. 
43 Straits Times (15 July 1991) p. 12. 
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Ministry official said that the Philippine government should have already considered 
the possible reaction from the PRC before it sent a delegation to Taiwan. 44 Chiu, Vice 
Chairman, Council of Agriculture, said, "Representatives of Taiwan and the 
Philippines were both solemn when they negotiated the fishery agreement since the 
agreement benefits two countries. "45 An official of the Council of Agriculture said that 
what Manila was doing was probably a tactical move in dealing with the PRC. 46 
Surprisingly, on 5 August 1991, the Philippine President issued the Executive 
Order No. 473,47 replacing the Agreement signed by the Taiwanese and Philippine 
delegates. The Executive Order No. 473 stipulates that Taiwan fishing vessels granted 
the right of innocent passage in designated sea lanes should notify the Philippine naval 
or coastal authorities in advance. 48 This provoked a strong protest from Taiwan. Not 
only because this stipulation was not included in the Agreement, but also because it 
may be considered as tantamount to recognition of the designated sea lanes as lying in 
Philippine territorial waters which would hamper the ROC's position in future 
negotiations on maritime delimitation. 
The ROC Agriculture Council Chairman Yu, on 19 August, told Manila's 
Economic and Cultural Office Representative Joaquin Roces that Taiwan would not 
44 AP, Manila, 12 July 1991. 
45 China Times (26 July 1991) p. 1. 
46 United Evening News (25 July 1991) p. 2. 
47 China Times (6 August 1991) p. 4. 
48 Part II of the Executive Order No. 473, ibid. 
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accept any conditions unilaterally added to the Agreement. He said, "Before Taiwan 
receives a written response from the Philippines, Taiwan will suspend all fishery and 
agricultural assistance promised to the Philippines in the Agreement. Taiwan hopes the 
Philippines will take the Agreement seriously, otherwise other talks and agreements 
between the two nations will be affected. "49 
On 20 August, J. Roces delivered three letters from the Philippine government 
to the ROC Agricultural Council Chairman as proof of the Philippines' intent to abide 
by a fishery agreement signed with Taiwan. The letters claim that Executive Order No. 
473, which stipulates that fishing boats passing through sea lanes must first notify the 
Philippine authorities, does not apply to Taiwan but was a management method 
applicable to other states' fishing vessels which used these two sea lanes. 50 Thus, the 
Agreement automatically came into force on 6 August 1991. Up to now, the 
Agreement has worked well. No further fishery disputes have arisen in the Agreement 
area. 
3. OBSERVATIONS 
Due to its international legal status, Taiwan has been unable to conclude agreements 
with other states. Nonetheless, Taiwan has been accepted as a counterpart during 
49 China Times (10 August 1991) p. 1. Also Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, 
Vol. 80, No. 80,1 October 1991, p. 74. 
50 China Times (21 August 1991) p. 4. ' 
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negotiation or a party that has to be included in an agreement under certain 
circumstances. In the case of the Wellington Convention for the purpose of prohibiting 
the use of driftnet, the Convention had to be disguised as an exchange of letters 
between the Director of the FFA and the Taiwan Deepsea Tuna Boat Owners and 
Exporters Association, because the FFA knows that the Wellington Convention cannot 
be successfully implemented without Taiwan's participation. Similarly, the Philippines 
would like to take Taiwan as its negotiation counterpart because agricultural and 
fisheries co-operations can generate significant economic benefits. 
Therefore, pursuing national interests is a definite consideration in the 
intercourse between states. Under such circumstances, international law serves as a 
tool to satisfy a state's national interests. Consequently, Taiwan's inability to conclude 
agreements with other states is an international political issue. International law has the 
theoretical capacity but not the practical ability. Under such circumstances, whether 
Taiwan can be accepted as a party to certain negotiations or agreements depends on 





As shown earlier, provisional arrangements in fishery co-operation could be an ideal 
resolution to the maritime conflicts of the South China Sea. To illustrate that hostilities 
between parties concerned cannot and should not be an obstacle to co-operation, the 
author highlights the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas conflict and resolution in the, 
next section. 
There are several similarities between the disputes of island groups in the 
South China Sea and the Falkland Islands in the southwest Atlantic Ocean. Firstly, 
sovereignty dispute is the main issue in both regions. As explained in Chapter 4, the 
littoral states of the South China Sea claim all or part of the islands which cause 
overlapping areas, especially in the Spratly Islands region. In the southwest Atlantic 
region, both the UK and Argentina claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands based 
on their own respective interpretations of historic evidence and international law. 
Secondly, economic interests, fishery resources and hydrocarbon resources, are the 
'background' that trigger their claiming sovereignty over those islands. This was 
discussed in Chapter 4, Section 2 for the South China Sea region. We shall have a look 
at the same interests for the southwest Atlantic in the following discussion. 
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1. FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTES 
The Falkland Islands, with a total population of about 1,800, consist of two main 
islands (East Falkland and West Falkland) together with about 200 other small islands . 
and islets situated about 350 miles North-East of Cape Horn in the South Atlantic. 1 
Apart from building stone, the Falklands themselves have no known useful mineral 
resources. The economy of the Falklands in 1984 depended almost entirely on the high 
quality wool of its 650,000 sheep. 2 
Both the UK and Argentina claim sovereignty over the Falkland Islands .3 The 
debate over ownership of the Falklands is potentially interminable because of 
contending versions of the history of the islands. As Sir Anthony Parsons remarked, 
"[M]y Argentine colleague and I could debate endlessly the rights and wrongs of 
history, and I doubt whether we would agree. "4 
I : House of Commons, Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Falkland Islands, 268-I (1984) para. 10. 
2 Ibid., para. 11. Also, Strange, The Falkland Islands (1972). 
3 Beck, The Falklands As An International Problem (1988) Chapters 2 and 
3; Dabat and Lorenzano, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule 
(1984); Destefani, The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: 
The Conflict with Britain (1982); Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for 
North-South Crisis Prevention (1987); Gravelle, "The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: 
An International Law Analysis of the Dispute Between Argentina and Great Britain, " 
107 ML (1985) pp. 5-69; Rubin, "Historical and Legal Background of the 
Falklands/Malvinas Dispute, " in Coll and Arend, eds., The Falklands War: Lessons for 
Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law (1985) pp. 9-21. 
4 British Government, Britain and the Falklands Crisis: A Documentary 
Record (1982) p. 24. Brackets added. 
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The Falkland Islands are clearly not prosperous islands, at least from an 
economic viewpoint. Then, why did both the UK and the Argentina want these islands 
-. so badly, and even went to war over them? The answer to this has to do with the 
potential natural resources existing there and their possible exploitation in the future. 
The anticipation to exploit intensified when the EEZ had become an international 
fashion and more foreign fishing vessels came to the waters around the Falklands. 
1.1. THE POTENTIALITY OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Two natural resources are important in the area surrounding the Falkland Islands, 
namely, fishery resources and hydrocarbon resources. The fishery resources in the 
offshore waters of the Falkland Islands mainly are southern blue whiting, hake 
(Merluccius polylepis), and squid (shortfin squid and common squid). According to an 
FAO report, in the period of 1984-1985, the average annual catch of these species was 
105,000 tonnes for Southern blue whiting, 30,000 tonnes for hake, 178,000 tonnes for 
shortfin squid, and 50,000 tonnes for common squid. Among them, squid and hake are 
already commercially important. 5 Owing to its great potential, fishing effort in the 
5 Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982, Cmnd. 8653, p. 69; Csirke, The 
Patagonian Fishery Resources and the Offshore Fisheries in the South-West Atlantic, 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 286 (1987). Also see Bisbal, "The Southeast 
South American Shelf Large Marine Ecosystem, " 19 Mar. Pol. (1995) pp. 21-38. 
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Falkland Islands waters had built up rapidly in the early 1980's, as did the total annual 
catches and total number of countries and fishing vessels. 6 
In terms of the hydrocarbon resources, detailed geophysical surveys are still 
needed to assess the presence of potentially hydrocarbon-bearing structures. So far, it . 
is believed that the sediments are thinner on the Falklands Plateau to the east of the 
Islands and that the area between the Falklands and South Georgia is not considered as 
one of great potential by the oil industry.? Nonetheless, preliminary results from 
seismic surveys conducted in 1993 around the Falklands suggested the possibility of 
finding oil across a zone 25% larger than the North Sea. 8 
These resources are part of the reasons which caused conflicts between the UK 
and Argentina. Since Argentina sent troops to the Falkland Islands in April 1982, a 
great deal of changes took place in UK-Argentina relations since the war. These 
changes resulted in the establishment of different zones around the Falkland Islands. 
We shall take a look at these changes which are from hostility to co-operation. 
6 Csirke, ibid., pp. 1-3. Also, working paper prepared by the UN Secretariat 
on the "Falkland Islands (Malvinas)", UN Doc. A/AC. 109/878,6 August 1986, pp. 
16-17, cited from Symmons, "The Maritime Zones Around the Falkland Islands, " 37 
ICLQ (1988) pp. 284-285. 
Cmnd. 8653, pp. 95-96. 
8 Financial Times (2 December 1993) p. 1; Owen and Barham, "British 
Offer Over Falkland Oil, " Financial Times (26 January 1994) p. 3. 
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1.2. PHASE ONE: DISPUTE ON SOVEREIGNTY 
A. MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE (MEZ) 
After Argentina deployed a military force to take control of the Falkland Islands on 2. 
April 1982, the UK government, on 7 April 1982, announced the establishment of a 
Maritime Exclusion Zone (MEZ) on 12 April 1982 around the islands, in the form of a 
200 run circle from the co-ordinates of 51°40' south latitude and 59°30' west 
longitude. 9<See Map 14> 
The MEZ was directed at Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries. Argentine 
ships found within the zone would be treated as hostile and were liable to be attacked 
by British forces. 10 In reply to the Britain declaration, on the same day, Argentina 
declared a Maritime Defence Zone (MDZ), which covered the same area as the 
MEZ. 11 
i 
9 UKMIL, 53 BYIL (1983) p. 539. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Bisbal, "Fisheries Management on the Patagonian Shelf: A Decade After 
the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, " 17 Mar. Pol. (1993) p. 215. 
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Map 14 Maritime l: xclusion lone and Total Exclusion Zone 
Source: Churchill, "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 12 
Mar. Pol. (1988) p. 347. Amended by the Author. 
B. TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE (TE ) 
The UK's MEZ was further extended to a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) on 30 April 
1982. <See Map 14> Although TEZ covered the same area as MEZ, it applied not only 
to Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries but also to any other ship, whether naval or 
merchant vessel, operating in support of the occupation forces. The TEZ also applied 
to any aircraft, military or civil, operating in support of the occupation. Any such ship 
or any aircraft found in the TEZ without authorisation would be regarded as hostile and 
liable to be dealt with accordingly. 12 
12 UKMII., 53 BYIL (1983) p. 546. 
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Source: Churchill, "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 
12 Mar. Pol. (198S) p. 347. Amended by the Author. 
On the Argentine side, Argentina announced that all UK naval and air forces 
within 200 miles of Argentina or the Falklands/Malvinas would be considered hostile 
and referred to this area as the Exclusionary Zone. 13 
C. EXTENI)F I) TOTAL EXCLUSION ZONE 
From 8 May 1982, the UK TEZ was again extended up to 12 nm from the Argentine 
coast. <See Map 15> According to the UK government, this was necessary because of 
13 Bisbal, supra note 11. 
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the proximity of Argentine bases and the distances that hostile forces could cover 
undetected, particularly at night and in bad weather. Argentine warships or military 
aircraft found more than 12 rim off the Argentine coast would be regarded as hostile 
and dealt with accordingly. 14 
1.3. PHASE TWO: CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND CO-OPERATION 
A. FALKLAND ISLANDS PROTECTION ZONE (FIPZ) 
On 23 July 1982, following Argentina's acceptance of a cease-fire, the UK government 
replaced the extended TEZ with a 150 nm Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ), 
from which Argentine warships and military aircraft were excluded. Argentine civil 
aircraft and shipping were also requested not to enter this zone unless by prior 
agreement. ls<See Map 16> 
14 UKMIL, 53 BYIL (1983) p. 549. 
15 Ibid., p. 556. 
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Source: Churchill. "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 
12 Par. Pol. (1988) p. 147. Amended by the Author. 
The lifting of the extended TEZ was regarded as the first step to a gradual 
ending of the conflict and a return to normal relations which would necessitate the 
removal of the continuing military and economic sanctions and the resumption of 
diplomatic relations. 16 
B. FALKLAND ISLANDS INTERIM CONSERVATION AND 
MANAGEMENT ZONE (FICZ) 
Although the fishing resources are abundant around the Falklands, the Falkland 
16 Barston and Birnie. "The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict. " 7 
Mar. Pol. (1983) p. 23. 
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Islanders do not eat a great deal of fish and have little tradition of fishing, even on a 
part-time basis. 17 Nonetheless, owing to the international practice of establishing 
extended jurisdiction zones, 18 the Falkland Islanders exhibited enormous enthusiasm 
for the establishment of a Fishing Zone for the following reasons: A. Due to abundant 
fishery resources, fishing vessels coming from distant-water fishing states are attracted 
to operate around the islands. Such a zone can control the existing unlimited fishing in 
Falklands waters by devising and enforcing effective measures for the long-term 
conservation of the stocks. B. A licensing system can be created to provide revenue 
which will guarantee a balanced budget in the future and provide funds for the further 
development of these Islands. 19 
However, the British government is not convinced that the establishment of an 
Exclusive Fishing Zone in Falklands waters is justified. It holds that the sovereignty 
dispute still exists between the UK and Argentina. It is necessary to have some 
agreements with Argentina in order to operate the zone successfully. Besides, on the 
sovereignty issue, the establishment of such a zone might provoke instability in the 
south-western Atlantic region. 20 
17 Cmnd. 8653, p. 66. 
18 See supra Chapter Two, Section 3. 
19 Cmnd. 8653, p. 72; Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
268-I, supra note 1, para. 144. 
20 HC Debs., vol. 9, Written Answers, col. 544: 31 July 1981; HL Debs., vol. 
426, col. 230: 16 December 1981; Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Falkland Islands, 268-I, ibid., paras. 145-147. 
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Nonetheless, the UK changed its policy on this matter with the increase of 
foreign fishing vessels in the neighbouring waters and the conclusion of bilateral 
fishery agreements between Argentina and the USSR and between Argentina and 
Bulgaria concerning the regulation of fisheries within 200 miles of the Falkland 
Islands in July 1986.21 Under these agreements, Soviet and Bulgarian trawlers were 
granted access rights to Argentine waters, allowed to participate in joint ventures, and 
allowed to extract surplus resources as determined by Argentine authorities. 
Argentina, in turn, was to receive 3-5% of the catch revenues, and its nationals were to 
be offered employment either as on-board inspectors or crew members. 22 
The British government responded to Argentina's fishing negotiations by 
declaring a 150 nm Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone 
(FICZ) around the Islands on 29 October 1986.23<See Map 17> The essential part of 
the Declaration reads: 
Within these limits [200 nautical miles], legislative measures will be taken 
shortly in the Falkland Islands to ensure the conservation and management 
of living resources in accordance with international law. Such measures 
will be intended to ensure conservation of the stocks on an interim basis 
pending internationally agreed arrangements for the South West Atlantic 
fishing as a whole, and taking into account the best scientific evidence. 
[emphasis added] 
21 HC Debs., vol. 103, col. 326-7: 29 October 1986; Churchill, "The 
Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 12 Mar. Pol. (1988) p. 348; Evans, "The 
Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom, " 40 
ICLQ (1991) p. 476. 
22 Bisbal, supra note 11, p. 225. 
23 The Falkland Islands: Recent Declarations and Bilateral Arrangements 
and Agreements between the United Kingdom and Argentina, Cm 1824 (1992) p. 5. 
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Source:: Churchill, "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 12 
. blur. Pol. (1988) p. 347. Amended by the Author. 
Obviously, fishery is the main purpose for establishing an FICZ. In a later 
explanation, the UK government stated that fishing within the FICZ will be licensed by 
the Falkland Islands government and the licensing will reflect conservation needs. 24 
The reason for confining the FICZ to 150 miles is that the main fishing grounds were 
included within the I ICZ and that it was much more practical and economic to patrol 
and police a 150-mile zone than a 200-mile zone. 25 Besides, the British government 
had declared that the Falklands Islands were entitled under international law to fishery 
24 HC Debs., vol. 103, cols. 323-4: 29 October 1986; HL Debs., vol. 500, col. 
382: 28 July 1988. 
25 UKMIL, 57 BYIL (1986) p. 591. 
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limits of a maximum of 200 nm, 26 it seems safe to presume that the FICZ might be 
extended from its present breadth of 150 nm to 200 run in the future. 27 Therefore, a 
shorter claim and a restrained approach could avoid upsetting Argentinian feelings and 
maintain peace and stability in the region. 28 
Analysts in Argentina saw that "the fishing accords of 1986 were the cause of 
the British reaction, a reaction which in turn has aggravated the conflict over the South 
Atlantic islands. "29 Likewise, the Argentine government challenged the 'illegal' action 
from Britain and stated that its non-entry in the FICZ should not be interpreted as 
recognition of the zone but merely reflected an anxiety to avoid any potentially 
destabilising event. 30 
Since coming into operation, the FICZ has proved successful both in 
conserving and regulating fish stocks and in diversifying the Falklands economy. 
During the first year after Britain established the FICZ, a reported fishing catch worth 
over £500 million and amounting to over 300,000 tons, licence revenues of £13.5 
million and transhipment fees of £0.8 million, have created the impression of clear 
economic progress in 'an exciting new fishing ground' after a long period of decline. 
26 Cm 1824, p. 5. 
27 House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence Commitment in the - 
South Atlantic (1987) pp. 45-46. 
28 Symmons, supra note 6, p. 291. 
29 Gamba-Stonehouse, A Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American 
View (1989) p. 119. 
30 GAOR, UN Doc. A42/118. 
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Besides, its role in the transhipment of fish has prompted descriptions of Berkeley 
Sound as both 'a floating industrial city' of 6,000 people and one of the busiest ports in 
the southern hemisphere. 31 
C. FALKLAND ISLANDS OUTER FISHERY CONSERVATION ZONE 
Following on the increasing revenue from fishing, the issue of Falkland Islands 
sovereignty disputes is highlighted. 32 Negotiation is inevitable, but the agenda is 
arguable. Argentina insisted that sovereignty of the islands should be incorporated in 
the Falkland Islands sovereignty negotiations agenda, but the UK disagreed. 33 The 
British government hold that it is convinced of its sovereignty over the islands and the 
sovereignty issue should be frozen for a substantial number of years while both sides 
reserving their position. 34 Additionally, the British government asserted that it takes 
account of the Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination. On the other hand, 
Argentina wanted the transfer of sovereignty irrespective of the wishes of the Falkland 
Islanders 35 Their attitude complicated the situation and obscured the objective of the 
FICZ - exploitation and conservation of fishery resources. Most of the fish stocks on 
the part of the Patagonian Shelf adjacent to the Falklands almost certainly extend over 
those parts of the Shelf adjacent to Argentina and are what is known to fisheries 
31 The Times (30 July 1987) p. 4; Financial Times (31 July 1987) p. 6. 
32 Beck, supra note 3, p. 188. 
33 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Background Brief (March 1990). 
34 UKMIL, 51 BYIL (1980) p. 443 and 52 BYIL (1981) p. 448. 
35 Evans, supra note 21, pp. 475-476. 
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scientists and administrators as shared stocks. The implication is that effective 
conservation and management, to ensure continuing economic benefits, will not be 
possible without the co-operation of both parties, at least to the extent of exchanging 
scientific information and statistics relating to the operations of commercial fishing 
vessels in the area. 36 
After some preparatory diplomatic contacts, the newly elected Argentine 
President Carlos Menem conciliated his government's position because he knew that 
all territorial disputes should be peacefully negotiated and, more importantly, that 
border tensions should be lowered so as to permit the government to concentrate on the 
issues of social and economic development. Therefore, a series of substantive 
meetings with Britain were initiated. This could be regarded as the start of the 
confidence-building period between the two parties. Both parties, at the meeting in 
October 1989. in Madrid, noted that all hostilities between them had ceased and agreed 
to re-establish consular relations at the level of Consul General 37 In addition, the UK 
and Argentina agreed in principle to an'umbrella formula', which is38 
2. Both governments agreed that: 
(1) Nothing in the conduct or content of the present meeting or of 
any similar subsequent meetings shall be interpreted as: 
(a) A change in the position of the United Kingdom with regard 
to sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over 
the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands and the surrounding maritime areas; 
36 Cmnd. 8653, p. 73. 
37 Cm 1824, p. 7. 
38 Ibid. 
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(b) A change in the position of the Argentine Republic with 
regard to sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction 
over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands and the surrounding maritime areas; 
(c) Recognition of or support for the position of the United 
Kingdom or the Argentine Republic with regard to 
sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the 
Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich 
Islands and the surrounding maritime areas. 
(2) No act or activity carried out by the United Kingdom, the 
Argentine Republic or third parties as a consequence and in 
implementation of anything agreed to in the present meeting or in 
any similar subsequent meetings shall constitute a basis for 
affirming, supporting, or denying the position of the United 
Kingdom or the Argentine Republic regarding the sovereignty or 
territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland Islands, 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the 
surrounding maritime areas. 
Under such a formula, the sovereignty issue would for the time being be put 
aside with each side reserving its position. The parties would then proceed to negotiate 
settlements on other issues, such as fishery conservation and future co-operation on 
fisheries, involved in restoration of normal bilateral relations 39 In other words, both 
parties arrived at an implied understanding that neither would raise any claim 
concerning sovereignty or territorial and maritime jurisdiction over the Falkland 
Islands. At' this meeting, Argentina confirmed that hostilities between the two 
adversaries had ceased. Both governments reaffirmed their commitment under the UN 
Charter to settle disputes exclusively by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat 
or use of force. Working groups were also set up on the difficult issues of fisheries and 
security matters in the South Atlantic. 40 
39 Ibid.; Smith, ed., Toward Resolution?: The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute 
(1991) p. 111. 
40 Cm 1824, pp. 7-8. 
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A meeting in Madrid on 15 February 1990 reflected the spirit of the 'umbrella 
formula' again. In the joint statement after that meeting, 41 both parties agreed that, 
first, embassies would be re-opened shortly and ambassadors appointed in accordance 
with international practice. Secondly, an Interim Reciprocal Information and 
Consultation System would be established for movements of units of their armed 
forces in areas of the South West Atlantic. The System's aims are to increase 
confidence between the UK and Argentina and to contribute to achieving a more 
normal situation in the region without unnecessary delay. Thirdly, both parties agreed 
to co-operate on improving the marine safety in the South West Atlantic. In order to 
achieve this, a mechanism for emergencies aimed at facilitating air and maritime 
search and rescue operations in the region, as well as a system will be established to 
exchange information on the safety and control of air and maritime navigation. 
Fourthly, both parties would exchange available information on the operations of the 
fishing fleets, appropriate catch and effort statistics and analyses of the status of the 
stocks of the most significant off-shore species in the maritime area of the Atlantic 
Ocean between latitude 45° south latitude and 60° south latitude. They also agreed to 
assess such information jointly, and to explore bilaterally the possibilities for co- 
operation and conservation. 
41 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
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Source: Churchill, "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 12 
Mar. Pol. (1988) p. 347. Amended by the Author. 
In addition, the British and Argentine governments gave greater attention to the 
conservation of fishery resources. In a joint statement issued on 28 November 1990,42 
they established an Anglo-Argentine fisheries regime, namely the South Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission to assess the state of fish stocks in the South Atlantic. This 
Commission was to be composed of a delegation from each of the two states, and 
would meet at least twice a year for joint control and conservation of the most 
significant off-shore species in the South Atlantic fishing grounds between 45° south 
42 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
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latitude and 60° south latitude. 43 Another agreement reached at this meeting was that, 
for conservation purposes, a zone of temporary total prohibition of commercial fishing 
by vessels of any flag was established. 44<See Map 18> It is noteworthy that this 
prohibition zone corresponds to those areas lying outside of the 150 nm FICZ which 
are within a 200 nm zone drawn from the Falklands but excluding those parts of this 
'doughnut' which would fall with the 200 nm EEZ of Argentina. 45 This arrangement 
again shows the practical attitude of both parties. The establishment of a fisheries 
regime represented a considerable step for both parties in co-operation. 
2. FINAL REMARKS 
It is now time to conclude what we have analysed and discussed in the preceding 
chapters. Under the circumstances that EEZ has become a customary international law, 
all the littoral states of the South China Sea had claimed different maritime zones to 
extend their jurisdiction over living and non-living resources of these zones. This then 
is the central element with regard to the disputes in the South China Sea. Three 
motivating factors behind the conflicts have been examined: the first one relates to 
strategic or political concerns, whilst the other two relate to resource utilisation or 
economic considerations. These factors are interrelated, which further complicates the 
issue. However, the detente in regional international relations has helped the littoral 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., pp. 12,14. This prohibition came into force on 26 December 1990 by 
Proclamation No. 2 of 1990. See Cm 1824, pp. 15-16. 
45 Evans, supra note 21, p. 481. 
327 
states to consider the issue from a pragmatic viewpoint. The idea of co-operation has 
gradually come to play an important role in a semi-enclosed region like the South 
China Sea. Therefore, unless a state is ready to go to war over its terra irredenta, the 
best solution is the will to arrive at a non-boundary-based settlement that guarantees 
peace and progress for all parties concerned. 46 
Chapter 5 discussed the possibilities for co-operation and identified the 
management of fisheries resources as especially significant because fish are migratory, 
while some of them are highly migratory. 47 Moreover, overfishing is a serious and 
pressing problem in the region. Under such circumstances, a maritime boundary 
cannot entirely protect a state's fishery resources from encroachment, because not only 
can the fishery resources migrate beyond the state's territorial or fishing zones, but also 
overfishing outside the borders can affect the fish stocks within its territorial 
boundaries. Therefore, a proper management mechanism, subject to natural 
conditions, is necessary for the coastal states to keep a certain stock at a sustainable 
level. 48 This is especially important for the littoral states around the South China Sea. 
Because it is a semi-enclosed sea, any change in the fishery policy-making could have 
far=reaching effects on the fishery resources in this area. Therefore, a rational future 
46 Chamey, "Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the 
Sea, " 89 AJIL (1995) p. 746; Villacorta, "The Philippine Territorial Claim in the South 
China Sea, " Paper presented in International Academic Conference on Territorial - 
Claims in the South China Sea, December 4-6 1990, pp. 11-12. 
47 Supra Chapter 2, Sub-Section 5.2. 
48 Hey, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries 
Resources: The United Nations Law of the Sea Convention Cooperation between 
States (1989) p. 15. 
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co-operation is above all dependent on all the littoral states adopting co-operative 
measures to conserve their fishery resources. 
This is reflected in the discussion of the Falkland Islands disputes. According 
to the UK and Argentina's experience on the disputes over the Falkland Islands, . 
claiming sovereignty played an important role in the outbreak of war in 1982. 
Nonetheless, the post-war development encourages both parties to concentrate on co- 
operating in the conservation and management of living resources, although they still 
maintain their own claims to the islands. 
If we turn our focus back to the South China Sea, we would find that many 
opportunities for co-operation exist, such as military co-operation, joint development 
on hydrocarbon resources, and fishery co-operation. Nevertheless, disputes 
surrounding possible hydrocarbon resources in the area and mistrust among relevant 
parties, actions in favour of conservation and management of fishery resources has 
been delayed. Paradoxically, conservation and management of fishery resources could 
be the starting point for co-operation in this field and could have a'spill-over effect' on 
other areas of co-operation. 
Another consideration which should be born in mind is all the relevant states 
should be included in the co-operation mechanism no matter how deep the political 
concerns are among them. Hence, Taiwan, as one of the littoral states of the South 
China Sea, cannot be ignored because of its international status. This is not only 
because Taiwan occupies the biggest island in the Spratly Islands, but also because it is 
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one of the most important distant-water fishing states in the world and in the region. 
Due to the civil war between the two Chinese governments, Taiwan is not recognised 
by most countries of the world. Thus, a paradoxical situation arise in the international 
arena. On the one hand, because of the political recognition issue, Taiwan can not be 
invited as a participant in negotiations. On the other hand, Taiwanese fishing 
capabilities are too important to be ignored. Therefore, many dubious ways have been 
devised to solve this problem temporarily just to avoid the sensitive issue of 
international recognition. 
Accordingly, under the circumstances that all littoral states of the South China 
Sea take note of the importance of the conservation and management of the fishery 
resources in the region, the next step depends on their will and determination to pursue 
co-operation on this matter. Furthermore, every party concerned should be included in 
the co-operation regime so that the system can work effectively. In view of Taiwan's 
capabilities, it should not be left out of the co-operation mechanism or arrangements so 
that a near-perfect co-operation mechanism can be reached and the disputes in the 




1805 The Anna (1805) 165 E. R. 809. 
1923 The Wimbledon Case, PCIJ, Series A, No. I (1923) p. 25. 
1923 Tinoco Concessions Arbitration, 1 RIAA (1923) p. 369. 
1929 Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v. Polish State, 5 Annual Digest of 
Public International Law Cases (1929-1930) p. 11. 
1933 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case (1933) PCIJ, Ser. A/B, no. 53. 
1948 Molven v. Attorney General for Palestine Case, [1948] AC 351. 
1955 Nottebohm Case. Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, International Court of Justice 
Reports 1955, p. 4. 
1955 Voting Procedure Case. Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and 
Petitions Concerning the Territory of South-West Africa. International Court of 
Justice Reports 1955, p. 67. 
1956 LuigiAfonta of Genoa v. Cechofracht Co. Ltd., [1956] 2 QB 552. 
' 
1959 International Registration of Trade-Mark (Germany) Case, 28 International 
Law Reports (1959) p. 82. 
1959 Sheng v. Rogers (1959) 54 American Journal-of International Law (1960) p. 
189. 
1967 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd., [1967] 1 AC 853. 
1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, 
International Court of Justice Reports 1969, p. 3. 
1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case. Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland) 
Merits, Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1974, p. 3. 
1978 Hesperides Hotels Ltd. v. Aegean Turkish Holidays Ltd. Case, [1978] Q. B. 205 
(C. A. ) at 218. 
1981 Reel v. Holder and Another [1981] 3 A11 England Law Reports. 321, C. A. 
1982 United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 Fed. 2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982). 
1982 United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 Fed. 2d. 1259 (11th Cir. 1982). 
1982 Tunisia-Libya Case. Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 
Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1982, p. 18. 
1984 Gulf of Maine Case. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine 
Area, Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1984, p. 246. 
1985 Libya-Malta Case. Continental Shelf (Libyan- Arab Jamahiriyal Malta) 
Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1985, p. 13. 
1985 Arbitration Tribunal For the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between 
Guinea and Guinea-Bissau Award of 14 February 1985,25 International Legal 
Materials (1986) p. 251. 
1988 Indonesia v. Sixteen Taiwanese Fishermen on The Kn Hsu Chun No. 1, Local 
Court of Ambon, Pasal 193 ayat (1) KUHAP, No. 39/PID. B. I1987/PN. AB, 3 
February 1988. 
1988 Criminal Case No. 584, Republic of the Philippines, Regional Trial Court, 
Second Judicial Region, Branch XIII, Batanes, 22 June 1988. 
. 
1988 Indonesia v. Twenty-three Taiwanese Fishermen on Chiao Tai No. 1& No. 2, 
The Supreme Court of Indonesia, 1338 K/PID/1988,8 September 1988. 
1988 Danish Bottles Case. Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of 
Denmark, Case 302/86, European Court Reports (1988) p. 4607. 
1992 Republic of Somalia v. Woodhouse Drake & Carey (Suisse) SA case. Warbrick, 
Colin, "Recognition of Governments, " 56 Modern Law Review (1993) p. 92. 
1993 Jan Mayen Case. Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen, Judgment, International Court of Justice Reports 1993, p. 38. 
1993 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, International 
Court of Justice Reports 1993, p. 325. 
332 
II. International Agreements 
A. Bilateral Agreements 
1844 China/US. Sino-American Trading Agreement of 1844, in Treaties,. 
Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States, Vol. 1,2nd Edition (1917) 
p. 67. 
1847 China/Norway. Sino-Norwegian Trading Agreement of 1847, in Treaties, 
Conventions, etc., between China and Foreign States, Vol. 2 (1917) p. 58. 
1858 China/UK. Sino-Anglo Tientsin Treaty of 1858, in Treaties, Conventions, etc., 
between China and Foreign States, Vol. 1,2nd Edition (1917) p. 410. 
1899 China/Mexico. Sino-Mexican Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
of 1899, in Hertsiet, ed., Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, 3rd Edition (1908) p. 
403. 
1934 USSR/US. USSR-US Exchange of Communications between the President of the 
US and the President of the All Union Central Executive Committee, October 
1933. See 28 Supplement to the American Journal of International Law (1934) 
Official Documents, p. 1. 
1952 Japan/ROC. Treaty of Peace between the ROC and Japan, 28 April 1952. In 138 
United Nations Treaty Series 38. 
1961 UK/Iceland. Exchange of Note, 11 March 1961. In National Legislation and 
Treaties relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Continental 
She, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the Sea (United Nations: New York, 1970) pp. 898-900. 
1980 AIT(US)/CCNAA(ROC). Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and 
Immunities between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination 
Council for North American Affairs, 2 October 1980. In 1 Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law and Affairs (1981) p. 235. 
1989 AIT(US)/CCNAA(ROC). Agreement between the Coordination Council for 
North American Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan regarding the 
High Seas Driftnet Fishing in the North Pacific Ocean, entered into force on 24 




1989 Korea/US. Agreement regarding the High Seas Squid Driftnet Fisheries in the 
North Pacific Ocean, with record of discussions and exchange of letters between 
the United States and the Republic of Korea, effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington on 13 September 1989, entered into force on 26 September 1989 
(KAV 1202). 
1990 Japan/US. Agreement regarding Squid and Large-mesh Driftnet Fisheries, 
effected by exchange of letters at Tokyo and Silver Spring, 12 April 1990, 
entered into force on 12 April 1990 (KAV 1091). 
1990 FRG/GDR. Treaty on the Establishment of German Unity, 31 August 1990,30 
International Legal Materials (1991) p. 498. 
1993 SEF(ROC)/ARATS(PRC). Agreement on the Use and Verification of 
Certificates of Authentication (Notarisation) Across the Taiwan Straits, 
Agreement on Matters Concerning Inquiry and Compensation for Lost 
Registered Mail Across the Taiwan Straits, Agreement on the System for 
Contacts and Meetings Between the SEF and ARATS, Joint Agreement of the 
Koo-Wang Talks, 28 April 1993.32 International Legal Materials (1993) p. 
1217. 
B. Multilateral Agreements 
1943 The Cairo Declaration. US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. IX, No. 232 (4 
December 1943) p. 393. 
1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Final Act, 55 United Nations Treaty 
Series 194. 
1951 Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Japan on 8 September 1951.136 
United Nations Treaty Series 48. 
1952 Declaration of Santiago, 18 August 1952. Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. 
and eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 231. . 
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Continuous Zone, UN Doc. 
A/CONF. 131L. 52. 
1958 Convention on the High Seas, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 53. 
1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 54. 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, UN Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55. 
334 
1959 Antarctic Treaty. 402 United Nations Treaty Series 71. 
1960 Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, 
Geneva, 17 March-26 April 1960. 
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 500 United Nations Treaty Series 
95; UN Doc. A/CONF. 20/13. 
1964 Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora of 13 June 
1964. Bush, ed., Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State 
and National Documents, Vol. I (1982) p. 146. 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 8 International Legal Materials 
(1969) p. 679. 
1970 Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, 8 May 1970. Lay, Churchill, and 
Nordquist, comp. and eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 
235. 
1970 Lima Declaration of the Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, 8 August 
1970. Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. and eds., New Directions in the Law 
of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 237. 
1971 Report of the Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea of the Asian-African Legal 
Consultative Committee, Colombo, 27 January 1971, in ST/LEG/SER. B/16, p. 
594. 
1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals of 1 June 1972.11 
International Legal Materials (1972) p. 251. 
1972 Declaration of Santo Domingo, 7 June 1972. Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, 
comp. and eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. 1 (1973) p. 247. 
1972 Conclusions in the General Report of the African States Regional Seminar on the 
Law of the Sea, Yaounde, 30 June 1972. Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. 
and eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 250. 
1973 Organisation of African Unity Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea, 
Addis Ababa, 24 May 1973. UN Doc. A/AC. 138/89. 
1978 International Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean, 25 
April 1978,205 United Nations Treaty Series 80. 
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources of 20 
May 1980.19 International Legal Materials (1980) p. 838. ' 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. UN Doc. A/CONF. 62/121 of 
7 October 1982. 
335 
1986 United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships. UNCTAD 
Doc. TD/RS/CONF/23,13 March 1986; 26 International Legal Materials 
(1987) p. 1229. 
1988 Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities of 2 
June 1988.27 International Legal Materials (1988) p. 859. 
1989 Resolution concerning Pelagic Driftnet Fishing in the South Pacific Commission 
Area, 29th South Pacific Conference, Guam, October 1989. Reprinted in Wright, 
Andrew and Doulman, David J., "Drift-net Fishing in the South Pacific: From 
Controversy to Management, " 15 Marine Policy (1991) p. 329. 
1989 Tarawa Declaration, reprinted in 14 Law of the Sea Bulletin (December 1989) p. 
29. 
1990 Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South 
Pacific (Wellington Convention), reprinted in 29 International Legal Materials 
(1990) p. 1449; Final Act to the Wellington Convention, text reprinted in 29 
International Legal Materials (1990) p. 1453; Protocol 1 to the Wellington 
Convention reprinted in 29 International Legal Materials (1990) p. 1462; 
Protocol 2 to the Wellington Convention reprinted in 29 International Legal 
Materials (1990) p. 1463. 
1991 Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on Environmental Protection of 1991.30 
International Legal Materials (1991) p. 1455. 
1992 Declaration of Cancun. UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/15, Annex. 
1993 FAO, Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (1993). 
1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in the 
Central Bering Sea, 16 June 1994, Washington, USA. 34 International Legal 
Materials (1994) p. 67. 
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/37 (8 September 1995). 
336 
111. Official Documents 
A. United Nations 
1. General 
1950 Communication from Secretary-General of United Nations Regarding China, 
GATT Document, GATT/CP/54,6 March 1950. 
1970 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749(X V). Declaration of 
Principles Governing the seabed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof 
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. UN Doc. A/8028,17 December 
1970, p. 24. 
1970 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2750 (XXV). Reservation 
Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present 
National Jurisdiction, and Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind, 
and Convening a Conference on the Law of the Sea. UN Doc. A/8028,17 
December 1970, p. 25. 
1989 Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/44/650,1 November 1989. 
1989 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/225 on Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's 
Oceans and Sea. UN Doc. A/C. 2/44/L. 81,22 December 1989. 
1991 Report of the Secretary-General, Large-Scale Driftnet Fishing and its Impact on 
Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, UN Doc. A/46/615 (8 
November 1991). 
1991 GATT, Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on 
Imports of Tuna. In 30 International Legal Materials (1991) p. 1594. 
1991 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/215 on Large-Scale Pelagic 
Driftnet Fishing and Its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World's 
Oceans and Seas, 20 December 1991. In 31 International Legal Materials 
(1992) p. 241. 
1992 Statement by GATT Council Chairman, Ambassador B. K. Zutshi, on Accession 
of Chinese Taipei, Agenda Item No. 2, GATT Council of Representatives 
Meeting, 29 September 1992. In 11 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and 
Affairs (1991-1992) p. 270. 
337 
1992 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/192 of 22 December 1992, 
United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, UN Doc. A/RES/47/192. In 23 Law of the Sea Bulletin (June 1993) p. 14. 
2. Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FAO Agriculture Series, No. 12 (1981). Christy, F. T., Jr., "The State of Food and 
Agriculture, World Review: Marine Fisheries in the New Era of National 
Jurisdiction, " p. 83. 
FAO Agriculture Series, No. 25 (1992). The State of Food and Agriculture 1992. 
FAO Fisheries Report, No. 3(6) (1963). Kamimura, T. and Honma, M., "Distribution 
of the Yellowfin Tuna in the Tuna Longline Fishing Grounds of the Pacific 
Ocean, " p. 1299. 
FAO Fisheries Report, No. 289 (1985). Majid, S. bin A., "Controlling Fishing Effort: 
Malaysia's Experience and Problems, " p. 319. 
FAO Fisheries Report, No. 434 (1990). Report of the Expert Consultation on Large- 
Scale Drfftnet Fishing. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 278 (1986). Chullasorn, Somsak and 
Martosubroto, Purwito, Distribution and Important Biological Features of 
Coastal Fish Resources in Southeast Asia. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 286 (1987). Csirke, The Patagonian Fishery 
Resources and the Offshore Fisheries in the South-West Atlantic. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 320 (1991). Northridge, Driftnet Fisheries and 
Their Impacts on Non-Target Species: A Worldwide Review. 
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 337 (1994). World Review of Highly Migratory 
Species and Straddling Stocks. 
FAO Legislative Study, No. 26 (1982). The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Impacts on Tuna Regulation. 
FAO Legislative Study, No. 47 (1991). The Regulation of Driftnet Fishing on the High 
Seas: Legal Issues. 
FAO Technical Assistance Programmes in Fisheries, and on the FAO Committee on 
Fisheries and Department of Fisheries, COFUC14776/INF. 3. 
FAO Yearbook: Fishery Statistics. 
ýýs 
Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC), Indonesian Country Experience, 
IPFC/87/Symp/IIUWP. 3. IPFC Symposium on the Exploitation and 
Management on Marine Fishery Resources in Southeast Asia, Darwin, Australia, 
16-19 February 1987. 
Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC), Exploitation and Management of Marine 
Fishery Resources in the Philippines, IPFC/87/Symp/lll/WP. 4. IPFC 
Symposium on the Exploitation and Management on Marine Fishery Resources 
in Southeast Asia, Darwin, Australia, 16-19 February 1987. 
Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC), Information Needed for Management, IPFC 
Symposium on the Exploitation and Management on Marine Fishery Resources 
in Southeast Asia, Darwin, Australia, 16-19 February 1987. 
Indo-Pacific Fishery Commission (IPFC), Report of the Sixth Session of the Committee 
for the Development and Management of Fisheries in the South China Sea, FAO 
Fisheries Report No. 422, Manila, Philippines, 6-9 December 1988. 
Indo-Pacific Tuna Development and Management Programme (IPTP), Collective 
Volume of Working Documents, Presented at the Expert Consultation on Stock 
Assessment of Tunas in the Indian Ocean, Bangkok, Thailand, 2-6 July 1990. 
Indo-Pacific Tuna Development and Management Programme (IPTP), Report of the 
Fifth Southeast Asia Tuna Conference, IPTP/92/GEN/21. General Santos City, 
Philippines, 1-4 September 1992. 
South China Sea Fisheries Development and Co-ordinating Programme (SCSP), The 
South China Sea Fisheries: A Proposal for Accelerated Development, 
SCS/Dev. /73/1,1973. 
Simpson, A. C. and Chikuni, S., Progress Report on Fishing For Tuna in Philippine 
Waters by FAO Chartered Purse Seiners, SCS/76/WP/35,1976. 
i 
South China Sea Fisheries Development and Co-ordinating Programme (SCSP), 
Report of the Workshop on the Biology and Resources of Mackerels 
(Rastrelliger spp. ) and Round Scads (Decapterus spp. ) in the South China Sea, 
Part I, SCSP/GEN/78/17,1978. 
3. International Court of Justice 
ICJ, International Court of Justice Communique. 
ICJ, International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and 
Orders. 
339 
4. Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
Law of the Sea Bulletin. 
Archipelagic States, Legislative History of Part IV of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (United Nations: New York, 1990). 
Baselines: National Legislation with Illustrative Maps (New York: United Nations, 
1989). 
National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction: Excerpts of Legislation and Table of 
Claims (United Nations: New York, 1992). 
National Legislation and Treaties relating to the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, 
the Continental Shelf, the High Seas and to Fishing and Conservation of the 
Living Resources of the Sea (United Nations: New York, 1970). 
National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone (United Nations: New York, 
1993). 
Practice ofArchipelagic States (United Nations: New York, 1992). 
The Regime for High-Seas Fisheries, Status and Prospects (United Nations: New 
York, 1992). 
5. Conferences 
A. United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Geneva, 24 
February'- 27 April 1958. Seven Volumes. 
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Summary 
Records of Plenary Meetings of the Committee on the Whole, Annexes and Final 
Act, Geneva, 17 March -26 April 1960. 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records. Seventeen 
Volumes. 
340 
B. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks 
Negotiating Text of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. UN A/CONF. 164/13 (30 July 1993). 
Revised Negotiating Text of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. UN A/CONF. 164/13/Rev. 1 (30 March 
1994). 
Statement of the Chairman, Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, on 4 August 1995, Upon 
the Adoption of the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating 
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks. UN Doc. A/CONF. 164/35 (20 September 1995). 
6. Resolutions concerning the Question of Chinese Representative in the UN 
(1) GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
UN Resolution 490(V), 19 September 1950. 
UN Resolution 501(V), 5 November 1951. 
UN Resolution 800(VIII), 15 September 1953. 
UN Resolution 903(IX), 21 September 1954. 
UN Resolution 990(X), 20 September 1955. 
UN Resolution 1108(XI), 16 November 1956. 
UN Resolution 1135(XII), 24 September 1957. 
UN Resolution 1239()UII), 23 September 1958. 
UN Resolution 1351(XIV), 22 September 1959. 
UN Resolution 1493(XV), 8 October 1960. 
UN Resolution 1668(XVI), 15 December 1961. 
UN Resolution 2025(XX), 17 November 1965. 
UN Resolution 2159(XXI), 29 November 1966. 
UN Resolution 2271(X II), 28 November 1967. 
UN Resolution 2389(XXIII), 19 November 1968. 
UN Resolution 2500(XXIV), 11 November 1969. 
UN Resolution 2642(X0{V), 20 November 1970. 
(2) SECURITY COUNCIL 
Resolution 82(S/1 501), 25 June 1950. 
341 
7. Other Publications 
Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas (United Nations: New York, 
1951). 
Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea (United Nations: New 
York, 1957). 
International Law Commission, Yearbook of International Law Commission. 
Security Council, United Nations Security Council Official Records. 
United Nations Treaty Series. 
Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 25(197 1) (United Nations: New York, 1973). 
B. Republic of China (Taiwan) 
Annual Report of Council of Agriclulture (Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan: 
Taipei). 
Fisheries Yearbook Taiwan Area (Fisheries Bureau, Taiwan Provincial Government: 
Taipei). 
Gazette of Council of Agriculture (Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan: Taipei). 
Gazette of the Legislative Yuan (Legislative Yuan: Taipei). 
Gazette of the Ministry of Communications, No. 244 (1931). 
Gazette of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Executive 
Yuan: Taipei). 
Gazette of the Presidential Office (Presidential Office: Taipei). 
Government Information Office, ROC, The Republic of China's Sovereignty over the 
Spratly Islands, Reference: ROC on Taiwan, No. RR-93-02,30 April 1993. 
Letter of Chiao-Han (82) No. 016274 to the port authorities of Keelung, Taichung, 
Hualien, Kaohsiung, and Suao. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ed., Tui-wai kuan-hsiyu Wai-chiao hsing-cheng (External 
Relations and Foreign Affairs Administration) (Cheng-Chung Book Company: 
Taipei, 1992). 
342 
National Income of the Republic of China: 1985 (Ministry of Treasury: Taipei, 1985). 
Public Notice of Mao (79) Fa No. 21592 of the Bureau of Foreign Trade of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
Report of Sino-Philippine Fishery Negotiation, A Special Report to Foreign Affairs 
Committee and Economics Committee of the Legislative Yuan by the 
Agricultural Council Chairman, Yu Yuh-Hsien, 11 July 1991. 
Statistics of International Trade Bureau: 1993 (Ministry of Economy: Taipei, 1993). 
Statistics of the Squid Fisheries (1973-1984) (Institute of Fishery Biology, National 
Taiwan University: Taipei, 1984). 
Taiwan Agricultural Yearbook: 1993 (Department of Agriculture, Taiwan Province 
Government). 
Taiwan Food Balance Sheet: 1990 (Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan: Taipei, 
1990). 
Taiwan Statistical Data Book: 1993 (Council for Economic Planning and 
Development, Executive Yuan: Taipei, 1994). 
The Second Four-Year Plan for Economic Development in Taiwan, Objective of the 
Plan: Fishery Production See Economic Stabilisation Board, Executive Yuan, 
Highlights of the Second Four-Year Plan for the Economic Development in 
Taiwan (Economic Stabilisation Board, Executive Yuan: Taipei, 1957). 
Treaties and Conventions between China and Foreign States, Two Volumes, 2nd 
Edition (Inspector General of Customs: Shanghai, 1917). 
Treaty between the Republic of China and Foreign States (1927-1957) (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs: Taipei, 1958). 
C. United Kingdom 
British Government, Britain and the Falklands Crisis: A Documentary Record 
(HMSO: London, 1982). 
British Government, The Falkland Islands: Recent Declarations and Bilateral 
Arrangements and Agreements between the United Kingdom and Argentina, Cm 
1824 (HMSO: London, 1992). 
Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982, Cmnd. 8653 (HMSO: London, 1982). 
343 
Fisheries Dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland, 14 July 1971-19 May 
1973. Cmnd. 5341 (HMSO: London, 1973). 
House of Commons, Session 1983-84, Fifth Report from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Falkland Islands, 268-I and 168-II, 25 October 1984 (HMSO: 
London, 1984). 
House of Commons Defence Committee, Defence Commitment in the South Atlantic 
(HMSO: London, 1987). 
House of Commons, Session 1993-94, First Report from the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Relations Between the United Kingdom and China in the Period Up 
to and Beyond 1997,37-I and 37-II (HMSO: London, 1994). 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, First Report from the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1993-94, Relations Between the United 
Kingdom and China in the Period Up to and Beyond 1997, Cm. 2608 (HMSO: 
London, 1994). 
D. United States of America 
American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents (Department of State: 
Washington, D. C., 1957). 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan (1931-1941), Vol. II (US Government 
Printing Office: Washington, D. C., 1943). 
History and Digest of the International Arbitration to which the United States Has 
Been A Party. Ed. by Moore, J. B., (Department of State Publications: 
Washington, D. C., 1898). 
Limits in the Seas, US Department of State, Office of the Geographer. 
United States Department of States Bulletin. 
United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949 
(Department of State: Washington, D. C., 1949). 
344 
IV. Legislation and Practice 
Antigua and Babuda 
1982 Maritime Areas Act, 1982. In United Nations, Baselines: National Legislation 
with Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 13. 
Argentina 
1946 Argentina Decree No. 14708 of 11 October 1946. In United Nations, Laws and 
Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, Vol. 1 (1951) p. 4. 
Australia 
1979 Fisheries Notice No. 88 (19 July 1979) (Australia). 
1983 Fisheries Notice No. 113 (4 August 1983) (Australia). 
1986 Fisheries Notice No. 182 (2 December 1986) (Australia). 
1989 Fisheries Notice No. AFZ 1 (20 July 1989) (Australia). 
1991 Fisheries Notice No. AFZ 2 (19 July 1991) (Australia). 
Cape Verde 
1977 Decree Law No. 126/77,31 December 1977. In United Nations, Baselines: 
National Legislation with Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 99. 
Chile 
1947 Presidential Declaration Concerning the Continental Shelf, 23 June 1947. In 
United Nations, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High Seas, Vol. 1 
(1951) p. 6. 
China, People's Republic 
345 
1958 Declaration on China's Territorial Sea. Peking Review, No. 28 (28 September 
1958); 8 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1959) p. 182. 
1986 Communication from the People's Republic of China, GATT Document, 
L/6017,14 July 1986. 
1992 Law of the People Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone (Beijing: Legislative Affairs Commission of the Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress, 1992). Text also reproduced in 21 
Law of the Sea Bulletin (August 1992) p. 24. 
China, Republic (Taiwan) 
1911 Chinese Ministry of Marine Force suggested extension of the territorial sea, 
Files on Foreign Relations, Vol. 31, No. C-1-6 (10 July 1911). 
1931 The ROC government declaration on the three nautical miles territorial sea, 
Gazette of the Ministry of Communications, No. 244,9 May 1931, p. 1. 
1958 The ROC's stand on the regime of the continental shelf at the UNCLOS II, UN 
Doc. A/CONF. I 3/5/Add 2,29 January 1958. 
1970 The ROC's reservation to Article 6 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf of 
1958, Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, Vol. 59, No. 64,22 August 1970, p. 3. 
1971 The ROC's ratification of the Convention of the Continental Shelf of 1958,10 
International Legal Materials (1971) p. 452. 
1979 The ROC Presidential Decree No. 5046, Declaration on the 12 nautical miles 
territorial sea and two hundred nautical miles exclusive economic zone, in 
Gazette of the Presidential Office, No. 3575,10 October 1979, p. 2. 
1990 "Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime of the Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu Submitted by the Republic of China to the General 
Agreement on Tarrifs and Trade (January 1,1990)" in 9 Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law and Affairs (1991) p. 224. 
1992 High Seas Pelagic Drifinet Fishery Policy and Enforcement Measures of the 
Republic of China, COA Nung-Yu Tzu No. 1040971 A, 18 December 1992. Text 
translated and reprinted in 11 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and 
Affairs (1991-1992) p. 297. 
1993 "The Republic of China's Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands, " Government 
Information Office, Reference: ROC on Taiwan, No. RR-93-02,30 April 1993. 
346 
1993 "The Membership of the Republic of China in the United Nations, " Gazette of 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, No. 496 (8 May 1993). English translation in 11 
Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1991-1992) p. 271. 
Comoros 
1982 Law No. 82-005 Relating to the Delimitation of the Maritime Zones, 28 July 
1982. Excerpts in United Nations, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction: 
Excerpts of Legislation and Table of Claims (1992) p. 31. 
Cook Islands 
1989 Marine Resources Act, No. 33,1989. 
El Salvador 
1950 Constitution of 1950,7 September 1950. In United Nations, Laws and 
Regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea (1957) p. 14. 
European Community 
1991 Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, 16 December 1991.31 International Legal Materials 
(1992) p. 1485. 
Fiji 
1977 Marine Spaces Act, 1977. Excerpts in United Nations, National Claims to 
Maritime Jurisdiction: Excerpts of Legislation and Table of Claims (1992) p. 45. 
1981 Marine Spaces (Archipelagic Baselines and Exclusive Economic Zone) Order, 
27 November 1981. In United Nations, Baselines: National Legislation with 
Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 157. 
Indonesia 
347 
1957 Announcement on the Territorial Waters of the Republic of Indonesia of 14 
December 1957. In Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law, Vol. 4 
(US Government Printing Office: Washington, D. C., 1965) p. 284. 
1980 Declaration concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone, 21 March 1980. In 
United Nations, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction (1992) p. 66. 
Malaysia 
1966 Continental Shelf Act, 1966, Act No. 57 of 28 July 1966. In Lay, Churchill, and 
Nordquist, comp. and eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 
322. 
1969 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance No. 7,1969. Excerpts in UN, National 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction: Excerpts of Legislation and Table of Claims 
(1992) p. 78. 
1984 Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984, ACT No. 311. Excerpts in UN, National 
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction: Excerpts of Legislation and Table of Claims 
(1992) p. 78. 
New Zealand 
1991 Driftnet Prohibition Act, 1991 NZ Stat. No. 18 (1991). In 31 International Legal 
Materials (1992) p. 214. 
Papua New Guinea 
1977 National Seas Act, 7 February 1977. In Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. and 
eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. VII (1980) p. 485. 
Peru 
1947 Presidential Decree No. 781 of 1 August 1947. In United Nations, Laws and 




1955 Note verbale of 7 March 1955 from the Philippines government to the United 
Nations Secretary-General about its territorial sea. In 2 Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission (1956) p. 69. 
1978 The Philippine Presidential Decree No. 1599, Establishing An Exclusive 
Economic Zone and For Other Purposes. In United Nations, National 
Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone (1993) p. 268. 
Sao Tome and Principe 
1983 Decree-Law No. 48/82. In United Nations, Baselines: National Legislation with 
Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 271. 
Singapore 
1986 Singapore Note in protest Vietnam's straight baselines claims. 5 December 1986. 
In 9 Law of the Sea Bulletin (April 1987) p. 53. 
Solomon Islands 
1978 The Delimitation of Marine Waters Act No. 32 of 1978: Declaration of 
Archipelagic Baselines. In United Nations, Baselines: National Legislation with 
Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 277. 
1979 Declaration of Archipelagos of Solomon Islands of 1979. In United Nations, 
Practice of Archipelagic States (United Nations: New York, 1992) p. 105. 
1979 Declatation of Archipelagic Baselines of 1979. In United Nations, Practice of 
Archipelagic States (United Nations: New York, 1992) p. 105. 
Thailand 
1985 Statement by Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs protest Vietnam's straight 




1950 Note from the British Foreign Secretary Mr. Bevin, to Chou En-lai Announcing 
the Recognition of the Central People's Government as the DE JURE 
Government of China by the Government of the United Kingdom, 6 January 
1950. Text reprinted in Cohen and Chiu, eds., People's China and International 
Law: A Documentary Study, Vol. 1 (1974) p. 213. 
UK Government Opinion to the Status of Taiwan --- 
HC Debs., vol. 536, Written Answers, col. 159: 4 February 1955. 
HC Debs., vol. 833, Written Answers, col. 32: 13 March 1972. 
HC Debs., vol. 988, Written Answers, col. 41: 7 July 1980. 
HC Debs., vol. 17, Written Answers, col. 279: 8 February 1982. 
HC Debs., vol. 55, Written Answers, col. 226: 29 February 1984. 
HC Debs., vol. 71, Written Answers, col. 549: 24 January 1985. 
HC Debs., vol. 81, Written Answers, col. 149: 19 June 1985. 
HC Debs., vol. 82, Written Answers, col. 190: 19 March 1986. 
HC Debs., vol. 159, Written Answers, col. 348: 3 November 1989. 
IIC Debs., vol. 160, Written Answers, col. 119: 14 November 1989. 
HC Debs., vol. 170, Written Answers, col. 705: 4 April 1990. 
HHC Debs., vol. 184, Written Answers, col. 692: 1 February 1991. 
HC Debs., vol. 191, Written Answers, col. 342: 20 May 1991. 
HC Debs., vol. 196, Written Answers, col. 293: 18 October 1991. 
HC Debs., vol. 201, Written Answers, col. 712: 17 January 1992. 
HL Debs., vol. 521, col. 1786: 26 July 1990. 
United States of America 
1945 US Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, In Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, eds., 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 106. 
1945 US Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, In Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, eds., 
New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. I (1973) p. 95. 
195,0 President Truman's Statement on the Mission of the U. S. Seventh Fleet in the 
Formosa Area, June 27,1950. In American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic 
Documents, Vol. 2 (US Government Printing Office: Washington, D. C., 1957) 
p. 2468. 
1954 US Secretary of State Dulles' talk about the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. In 
31 Department of State Bulletin (1954) p. 896. 
1967 Fishermen's Protection Act of 1967.22 U. S. C. 1978. 
1971 US draft resolution on Dual Representation of China, UN. Doc. A/8442.10 
International Legal Materials (1971) p. 1100; 11 International Legal Materials 
(1972) pp. 561-573. 
350 
1973 Endangered Species Act of 1973.16 USC 1531-1543 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
1979 US Announcement of the recognition of the government of the PRC. 18 
International Legal Materials (1979) pp. 272-275. 
1979 Taiwan Relations Act 1979.18 International Legal Materials (1979) p. 873; 73 
American Journal of International Law (1979) pp. 669-677. 
1982 Magnuson Act. 16 U. S. C. 1801-1882 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
1983 The US Presidential Proclamation 5030 of 10 March 1983, Exclusive Economic 
Zone of the United States ofAmerica. 22 International Legal Materials (1983) p. 
465. 
1987 Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment, and Control Act of 1987.16 U& C 
1822 (Supp. V 1987). 
Vanuatu 
1981 The Maritime Zones Act No. 23 of 1981. In United Nations, Baselines: National 
Legislation with Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 376. 
Venezuela 
1956 Act on the Territorial Sea, the Continental Shelf, Protection of Fisheries and Air 
Space of 22 July 1956. 
Vietnam 
1975 White Paper on the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) islands 
. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Vietnam: Saigon, 1975). 
1977 Statement of 12 May 1977 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, and the Continental Shelf. In Lay, Churchill, and Nordquist, comp. and 
eds., New Directions in the Law of the Sea, Vol. VIII (1980) p. 36. 
1982 Statement of 12 November 1982 by the Government of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the Territorial Sea Baseline of Vietnam. In United Nations, 
Baselines: National Legislation with Illustrative Maps (1989) p. 384. 
351 
1992 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam on the Agreement between Chinese and US Oil Companies for the 
Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf of 
Vietnam, 16 May 1992. 
V. Articles 
Agoes, Etty R., "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: An ASEAN 
Venture, " Paper submitted at the International Academic Conference on 
Territorial Claims in the South China Sea, Centre of Asian Studies, University of 
Hong Kong, 4-6 December 1990. 
Aikman, C. C., "Island Nations of the South Pacific and Jurisdiction over Highly 
Migratory Species, " 17 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review (1987) p. 
101. 
Alexander, Lewis M., "Indices of National Interests in the Ocean, " 1 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1973) p. 21. 
--------, "The Ocean Enclosure Movement: Inventory and Perspective" 20 San Diego 
Law Review (1983) p. 561. 
-------- and Hodgson, Robert D., "The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the 
Law of the Sea, " 12 San Diego Law Review (1975) p. 569. 
Anand, R. P., "Role of the New Asian-African Countries in the Present International 
Legal Order, " 56 American Journal of International Law (1962) p. 383. 
Anderson, D. H., "Further Efforts to Ensure Universal Participation in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, " 43 International and Comparatively 
Law Quarterly (1994) p. 886. 
Applebaum, B., "The Straddling Stocks Problem: The Northwest Atlantic Situation, 
International Law, and Options for Coastal -State Action, " in Soons, ed., 
Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through International 
Institutions (1990) p. 282 
Amason, Ragnar, "Ocean Fisheries Management: Recent International 
Developments, " 17 Marine Policy (1993) p. 334. 
Ball, Wayne S., "The Old Grey Mare, National Enclosure of the Oceans, " 27 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1996) p. 97. 
352 
Balton, David A., "Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, " 27 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1996) p. 125. 
Bardach, J. E. and Matsuda, Y., "Fish, Fishing, and Sea Boundaries: Tuna Stocks and 
Fishing Politics in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific, " 4.5 Geojournal (1980) 
p. 467. 
Barston, R. P., "United Nations Conference on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, " 19 Marine Policy (1995) p. 159. 
-------- and Birnie, P. W., "The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas Conflict, " 7 Marine 
Policy (1983) p. 14. 
Baum, Julian, "Drifting Downstream, " Far Eastern Economic Review (29 August 
1991) p. 39. 
Beller, Richard D., "Analysing the Relationship between International Law and 
International Politics in China's and Vietnam's Territorial Dispute Over the 
Spratly Islands, " 29 Texas International Law Journal (1994) p. 293. 
Bernhardt, R., "Custom and Treaty in the Law of the Sea, " 205 Recueil des cours, 
Academie de droit international de la Hague (1987-V), p. 247. 
Bieber, Roland, "European Community Recognition of Eastern European States: A 
New Perspective for International Law? " Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, 86th Annual Meeting (1992) p. 374. 
Bingham, J. W., "The Continental Shelf and the Marginal Belt, " 40 American Journal 
of International Law (1946) p. 173. 
Bisbal, Gustavo A., "Fisheries Management on the Patagonian Shelf A Decade After 
the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, " 17 Marine Policy (1993) p. 213. 
______, "The Southeast South American Shelf Large Marine Ecosystem, " 19 Marine 
Policy (1995) p. 21. 
Bowring, Philip and McBeth, John, "Basis of Dependence, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review (12 April 1990) p. 20. 
Brief, "Senior Officer Outlines China's Naval Ambitions, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review (16 April 1992) p. 14. 
Brown, E. D., "The Continental Shelf and the EEZ: The Problem of Delimitation at 
UNCLOS III, " 4 Marine Policy and Management (1977) p. 307. 
Brownlie, Ian, "Recognition in Theory and Practice, " 53 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1982) p. 197. 
353 
Buchholz, fianns J., "Development Tasks of Peculiar States: The Small Island 
Countries of the South Pacific, " in Ibem., ed., New Approaches to Development 
Co-operation with South Pacific Countries (1987) p. 21. 
Burke, W. T., "Highly Migratory Species in the New Law of the Sea, " 14 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1984) p. 273. 
--------, "Fishing in the Bering Sea Donut: Straddling Stocks and the New International 
Law of Fisheries, " 16 Ecology Law Quarterly (1989) p. 285. 
--------, . Anadromous Species and the New International Law of the Sea, " 22 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1991) p. 95. 
--------, "Some Comments on High Seas Fishing and International Law, " in 
Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1993) p. 103. 
--------, "UNCED and the Oceans, " 17 Marine Policy (1993) p. 519. 
-_---_, Freeberg, M., and Miles, E. L., "United Nations Regulations on Driftnet 
Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries 
Management, " 25 Ocean Development and International Law (1994) p. 127. 
Burton, Sandra, "What Kind of Defence? " Time, 17 May 1993, p. 48. 
Cai, Wenguo, "China's GATT Membership: Selected Legal and Political Issues, " 26(1) 
Journal of World Trade (1992) p. 35. 
Canfield, Jeffrey L., "Recent Developments in Bering Sea Fisheries Conservation and 
Management, " 24 Ocean Development and International Law (1993) p. 257. 
Carroz, J. E., Institutional and Financial Aspects of Time Management in the IPFC 
and IOFC Areas, No. TC/79/10 in Tuna Consultation Meeting, Manila, the 
Philippines, 26-30 June 1979. 
--------, "The Living Resources of the Sea, " in Dupuy, ed., The Management of 
humanity's Resources: The Law of the Sea (1982) p. 193. 
Chanda, Nayan, et at., "South China Sea: Treacherous Shoals, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review (13 August 1992) p. 14. 
--------, "Stampede for Oil: US Firms Rush to Explore Vietnamese Waters, " Far 
Eastern Economic Review (25 February 1993) p. 48. 
--------, Tiglao, R., and McBeth, J., "Territorial Imperative, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review (23 February 1995) p. 14. 
Chang, Cheng-Sheng, "Prevent Our Fishing Vessels from Being Seized, " Yu-Yeh 
Tui-Kwan (Fisheries Extension) (June 1991) p. 9. 
354 
Chang, Pao-Min, "A New Scramble for the South China Sea Islands, " 12 
Contemporary Southeast Asia (1990) p. 20. 
--------, "Sino-Vietnam Territorial Dispute, " 28 Asia Pacific Community (1985) p. 74. 
Chao, John K. T., "South China Sea: Boundary Problems Relating to the Nansha and 
Hsisha Islands. " 9 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1989) p. 
66. 
Charney, Jonathan I., "Central East Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the 
Sea, " 89 American Journal of International Law (1995) p. 724. 
Chen, Jie, "China's Spratly Policy: with Special Reference to the Philippines and 
Malaysia, " 34 Asian Survey (1994) p. 893. 
Chen, Tsai-Fa, "Issues and Studies on the Development of Fishery Industry, " in 
Council of Agriculture, ROC, Annual Report of Council of Agriculture: 1989 
(1989)p. 258. 
Cheng, Tao, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea, " 63 American Journal of 
International Law (1969) p. 47. 
Ching, Frank, "China's Military Spurs Concern, " Far Eastern Economic Review (11 
May 1995) p. 11. 
Chiu, Hungdah, "Chinese Contemporary Practice and Judicial Decisions Relating to 
International Law, 1968-1970, " 7 The Annuals of the Chinese Society of 
International Law (1970) p. 84. 
-------, "The International Legal Status of the Republic of China, " 2 Chinese Yearbook ........... 
of International Law and Affairs (1984) p. 1. 
--------, "The International Order and Infra-Chinese (Taiwan-Mainland) Relations, " 10 
Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1990) p. 8. 
--------, "Taiwan's Membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, " 10 
Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1990) p. 198. 
-------- and Park, Choon-ho, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, " 3 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1975) p. 1. 
--------, Chen, Rong-jye, and Lee, Tzu-Wen, eds., "Contemporary Practices and 
Judicial Decisions of the Republic of China Relating to International Law: 
1979-1981" 1 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1981) p. 142. 
Chou, Hsin-Hsuen, "What Did the Government Achieve? " China Times Weekly (15 
July 1989) p. 56. 
355 
Christy, F. T., Jr., "The State of Food and Agriculture, World Review: Marine 
Fisheries in the New Era of National Jurisdiction, " FAO Agriculture Series No. 
12 (1981) p. 83. 
Churchill, R. R., "The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: The Contribution of the 
International Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States' Fisheries Rights, " 
24 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1975) p. 32. 
-------, "The Falklands Fishing Zone: Legal Aspects, " 12 Marine Policy (1988) p. 343. ........... 
Copes, Parzival, "The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, " 4 
Ocean Development and International Law (1977) p. 233. 
--------, "Optimising the Use of Ocean Fish Resources in the Context of Extended 
National Jurisdictions, " in English and Scott, ed., Renewable Resources in the 
Pacific, Proceedings of the 12th Pacific Trade and Development Conference 
(1982) p. 33. 
Coquia, Jorge R., "The Territorial Waters of Archipelagos, " Philippine International 
Law Journal (1962) p. 148. 
--------, "Analysis of the Archipelagic Doctrine in the New Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, " 8 Philippine Yearbook of International Law (1982) p. 28. 
--------, "Philippine Position on the South China Sea Issues, " in Carino, ed., The South 
China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspections (1992) p. 52. 
Cordner, Lee G., "The Spratly Islands Dispute and the Law of the Sea, " 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1994) p. 61. 
Craddock, C., "Antarctica and Gondwanaland, " in McWhinnie, ed., Polar Research 
(1978) p. 84. 
Da Cunha, Derek, "Major Asian Powers and the Development of the Singaporean and 
Malaysian Air Forces, " 13 Contemporary Southeast Asia (1991) p. 67. 
Dalton, Jane Gilliland, "The Chilean Mar Presencial: A- Harmless Concept or a 
Dangerous Precedent, " 8(3) Marine and Coastal Law (1993) p. 399. 
Das, K., "Perched on A Claim, " Far Eastern Economic Review (28 September 1983) p. 
40. 
Davidson, J. Scott, "New Zealand: Driftnet Prohibition Act 1991, " 6 International 
Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law (1991) p. 264. 
Dean, Arthur H., "International Law and Current Problems in the Far East, " 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (1955) p. 86. 
356 
--------, "The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for 
Freedom of the Sea, " 54 American Journal of International Law (1960) p. 751. 
Dellapenna, Joseph W., "The Philippines Territorial Water Claim in International 
Law, " 5 Journal of Law and Economic Development (1970) p. 45. 
-------- and Wang, A. -Y., "The Republic of China's Claims Relating to the Territorial 
Sea, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zones: Legal and Economic 
Aspects, " 3(2) Boston College International & Comparative Law Review (1980) 
p. 353. 
Djalal, Hasjim, "Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: In Search of Cooperation, " 
18 The Indonesian Quarterly (1990) p. 127. 
--------, "Issue Paper for Technical Working Group on the Resources Assessment of 
the South China Sea Informal Workshop, " Paper presented at the Second 
Working Group Meeting on Resource Assessment and Ways of Development in 
the South China Sea, Jakarta, Indonesia, 5-6 July 1993. 
Doulman, David J., "An Overview of the Tuna Fishery and Industry in the Pacific 
Islands Region, " in Buchholz, ed., New Approaches to Development Co- 
operation with South Pacific Countrie. (1987) p. 149. 
Drigot, Diane C., "Oil Interests and the Law of the Sea: the Case of the Philippines, " 12 
Ocean Development and International Law (1982) p. 23. 
Drysdale, Peter, "Taiwan's Approach to Pacific Economic Cooperation, " in 
Klintworth, ed., Modern Taiwan in the 1990s (1991) p. 131. 
DuBois, E. P., "Review of Principal Hydrocarbon-Bearing Basins of the South China 
Sea Area. " In Valencia, ed., The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon Potential and 
Possibilities of Joint Development (1981). 
Dwiponggo, A., "Project Proposal on Regional Fisheries Stock Assessment in the 
South China Sea, " Paper presented at the Second Working Group Meeting on 
Resource Assessment and Ways of Development in the South China Sea, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 5-6 July 1993. 
Dzurek, D. J., "Boundary and Resources Disputes in the South China Sea, " 5 Ocean 
Yearbook (1985) p. 254. 
Editorial Comment, "Recognition of Russia, " 28 American Journal of International 
Law (1934) p. 90. 
Eisenbud, R., "The Pelagic Driftnet, " 27(4) Oceanus (1985) p. 76. 
Elek, Andrew, "The Challenge of Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation, " 4 The 
Pacific Review (1991) p. 322. 
357 
-------, "Trade Policy Options for the Asia Pacific Region in the 1990s: the Potential of ........... 
Open Regionalism, " in Garnant and Drysdale, eds., Asia Pacific Regionalism 
(1994) p. 212. 
Emory, et al., "Geological Structure and Some Water Characteristics of the East China 
Sea and the Yellow Sea, " 2 Technical Bulletin, Technical Advisory Group 
Report (1969) p. 39. 
Evans, Malcolm, "The Restoration of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and the 
United Kingdom, " 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1991) p. 
473. 
Feng, Yu-Shu, "China's Membership of GATT: A Practical Proposal, " 22(6) Journal 
of World Trade (1988) p. 53. 
Ferdinand, Peter, "Take-off For Taiwan? " 6 The Pacific Review (1993) p. 321. 
Finch, Ronald, "Fishery Management under the Magnuson Act, " 9 Marine Policy 
(1985) p. 170. 
Freeberg, M., "A National and International Perspective on By-catch and By-catch 
Management, " in Schoning, et. al., Proceedings of the National Industry By- 
catch WVorkshop, Natural Resources Consultants, Seattle, Washington, 1992, p. 
1. 
Frieman, Wendy, "China's Defence Industry, " 6 The Pacific Review (1993) p. 50. 
Fu, Chu, "Concerning the Question of Our Country's Territorial Sea" (Peking, 1959) 
in Cohen and Chiu, eds., People's China and International Law: A Documentary 
Study (1974) p. 470. 
Fu, Kuen-Chen, "Delimitation of the Overlapping EEZs between the Republic of 
China and the Philippines, " 4 Soochow Law Review (1984) p. 1. 
--------, "Trespassing Taiwanese Fishing 
Vessels in Some ASEAN States Waters, " 
" 24(1) University of British 
Columbia Law Review (1990) p. 109. 
Fusillo, M. S., "The Legal Regime of Uninhabited 'Rocks' Lacking an Economic Life of 
Their Own" 4 Italian Yearbook of International Law (1978-79) P. 47. 
Gallagher, Michael G., "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea, " 19(1) 
International Security (1994) p. 169. 
Gao, Zhiguo, "The South China Sea: From Conflict to Cooperation? " 25 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1994) p. 345. 
Garcia-Amador, F. V., "The Latin American Contribution to the Development of the 




Gravelle, J. F., "The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: An International Law Analysis of 
the Dispute Between Argentina and Great Britain, " 107 Military Law (1985) p. 
5. 
Guggenheim, 80 Recueil des cours, Academie de droit international de la Hague 
(1952-I) p. 
Harrison, S. S., "Conflicting Offshore Boundary Claims, " China Business Review 
(May-June 1983) p. 51. 
Herre, A. W., "Check List of Philippine Fishes, " 20 United States Fish Wildlife Service 
Report (1953) p. 977. 
Hewison, Grant J., "The Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets 
in the South Pacific, " 25 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(1993) p. 449. 
Hey, Ellen, "The Provisions of the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention on 
Fisheries Resources and Current International Fisheries Management Needs, " 
FAO Legislative Study, No. 47 (1991) p. 1. 
Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken, "China's Threat to Taiwan, " 5 The Pacific Review 
(1992) p. 250. 
Holden, M. J., "Management of Fisheries Resources: The Experience of the European 
Economic Community, " in Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Experiences in the Management of National Fishing 
Zones (1984) p. 113. 
Hollick, A. J., "The Origins of 200-Mile Offshore Zones, " 71 American Journal of 
International Law (1977) p. 494. 
"Hong Kong Joins GATT, Separate Membership to Continue Even Under Chinese 
Sovereignty, " 3(18) International Trade Reporter (30 April 1986) p. 581. 
Hongskul, V., "The Allocation of Scads and Mackerels, " in Christy, Law of the Sea: 
Problems of Conflict and Management of Fisheries in Southeast Asia (1978) p. 
1. 
Hoon, Shim Jae, "Blood Thicker than Politics, " Far Eastern Economic Review (5 May 
1988) p. 26. 
Huan, Guo-Cang, "Taiwan: A View from Beijing, " 63(5) Foreign Affairs (1985) p. 
1064. 
--------, "China's Foreign Economic Relations, " 519 The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science (January 1992) p. 176. 
359 
Huang, Ilong-Yien, "Present and Future of Taiwan Trawl Fisheries, " in Council of 
Agriculture, Annual Report of Council of Agriculture: 1985 (1985) p. 204. 
Huang, Kan, "The Republic of China and the Regime of Continental Shelf, " 1 Man and 
Society (August 1973) p. 50. 
Infante, Maria Teresa, "The Continental Shelf of Antarctica: Legal Implications for a 
Regime on Mineral Resources, " in Vicuna, ed., Antarctic Resources Policy: 
Scientific, Legal and Political Issues (1983) p. 253. 
Isa, Mansor Mat and Noordin, Raja Mohammad, "The Status of the Marine Fisheries 
in the South China Sea, " Paper presented at the First Working Group Meeting on 
Marine Scientific Research in the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 30 May 
-3 June 1993. 
Islam, M. Rafiqul, "The Proposed 'Driftnet-Free Zone' in the South Pacific and the 
Law of the Sea Convention, " 40 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
(1991) p. 184. 
Jacobson, Jon L., "Future Fishing Technology and Its Impact on the Law of the Sea" in 
Christy, et al., eds., Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond, Proceedings of the 
Annual Meeting of the Law of the Sea Institute, 1975, p. 237. 
--------, "International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, " 45 Louisiana Law Review 
(1985) p. 1162. 
Jagota, S. P., "Asia and the Developments in the Law of the Sea: 1983-1992, " in 
Macdonald, cd., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (1993) p. 367. 
Jai, Qingguo, "Changing Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, " 32 Asian Survey (1992) 
p. 277. 
Jain, J. P., "The Legal Status of Formosa, " 57 American Journal of International Law 
(1963) p. 25. 
Jenkins, David, "The Spratlys: A 2000-year-old Claim, " Far Eastern Economic 
Review (7 August 1981) p. 30. 
Jennings, R. Y., "General Course on Principles of International Law, " 121 Recueil des 
cours, Academie de droit international de la Hague (1967-II) p. 380. 
Jessup, P. C., "The Pacific Coast Fisheries, " 33 American Journal of International 
Law (1939) p. 129. 
Johnston, D. M., "The Driftnetting Problem in the Pacific Ocean: Legal 
Considerations and Diplomatic Options, " 21 Ocean Development and 
International Law (1990) p. 5. 
360 
Joyner, Christopher and Frew, Scot, "Plastic Pollution in the Marine Environment, " 22 
Ocean Development and International Law (1991) p. 33. 
Joyner, Christopher C. and De Cola, Peter N., "Chile's Presential Sea Proposal: 
Implications for Straddling Stocks and the International Law of Fisheries, " 24 
Ocean Development and International Law (1993) p. 99. 
Juda, Lawrence, "World Marine Fish Catch in the Age of Exclusive Economic Zones 
and Exclusive Fishery Zones, " 22 Ocean Development and International Law 
(1991) p. 1. 
Kaczynski, Vladimir, "Alternatives Facing Distant-waters Fishing States in the 
North-East Pacific, " 6 Ocean Development and International Law (1979) p. 73. 
Kamimura, T. and Honma, M., "Distribution of the Yellowfin Tuna in the Tuna 
Longline Fishing Grounds of the Pacific Ocean, " FAO Fishery Report No. 3(6) 
(1963) p. 1299. 
Katz, S. R., "Issues Arising in the Icelandic Fisheries Case, " 22 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1973) p. 83. 
Kent, George, "Harmonizing Extended Zone Legislation in Southeast Asia, " 13 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1983) p. 247. 
Kent, H. S. K., "The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, " 48 American Journal 
of International Law (1954) p. 537. 
Kim, Hyun-Soo, "The 1992 Chinese Territorial Sea Law in the Light of the UN 
Convention, " 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) p. 894. 
Kimball, Lee A., "UNCED and the Oceans Agenda: The Process Forward, " 17 Marine 
Policy (1993) p. 491. 
Klintworth, ' Gary, "Asia-Pacific: More Security, Less Uncertainty, New 
Opportunities, " 5 The Pacific Review (1992) p. 221. 
--------, "Taiwan's Asia-Pacific Policy and Community, " 7 The Pacific Review (1994) 
p. 447. 
"Taiwan's United Nations Membership Bid, " 7 The Pacific Review (1994) p. 
283. 
Kou, Chi, "The Most Important Move in Protecting the Nation's Sovereignty, " 5 
Cheng Fa Yen Chiu (The Study of Political science and Law) (1958) p. 9. 
Kristof, Nicholas D., "China Signs US Oil Deal for Disputed Waters, " New York Times 
(18 June 1992) p. A8. 
361 
--------, "China's Military Outlays Fan the Region's Fears, " International Herald 
Tribune (19 March 1993). 
Kwiatkowska, B., "Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 Miles in Light of the Law of the 
Sea Convention and State Practice, " 22 Ocean Development and International 
Law (1991) p. 153. 
--------, "Straddling and Migratory Fish Stocks in the New Law of the Sea: Reconciling 
Rights, Freedoms and Responsibilities, " in Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of 
Wang Ticya (1993) p. 463. 
Lagoni, Rainer, "Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation Agreements, " 78 
American Journal of International Law (1984) p. 345. 
Lauterpacht, "Recognition of Insurgents as a De Facto Government, " 3 Modern Law 
Review (1939) p. 1. 
Lee, Lai To, "Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea: Political and 
Security Issues, " 18 The Indonesian Quarterly (1990) p. 154. 
--------, "Domestic Changes in China Since the 4 June Incident and Their Implications 
for Southeast Asia, " 13 Contemporary Southeast Asia (June 1991) p. 39. 
Lee, Luke T., "The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, " 77 American Journal 
of International Law (1983) p. 541. 
Lee, Ngok, "Chinese Maritime Power and Strategy in the South China Sea, " Paper 
presented at International Academic Conference on Territorial Claims in the 
South China Sea, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 
December 1990. 
Leifer, Michael, "The Maritime Regime and Regional Security in East Asia, " 4 The 
Pacff c Review (1991) p. 126. 
Leong, Ho Khai, "The Changing Political Economy of Taiwan - Southeast Asia 
Relations, " 6 The Pacific Review (1993) p. 31. 
Lim, Joo-Jock, "The South China Sea: Changing Strategic Perspectives, " in 
MacAndrews and Sien, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development 
(1981) p. 126. 
Liu, Hsi-Chiang, "Present and Future of Taiwan Distant water Fisheries, " Chinese 
Fisheries (February 1988) p. 1. 
Liu, Philip, "The Rise and Fall of Driftnet Fishing, " 42(7) Free China Review (1992) p. 
18. 
362 
Liu, T. Y., "The Declaration on China's Territorial Sea: A Major Step to Protect 
China's Sovereign Rights, " Peking Review, No. 29 (16 September 1958) p. 11. 
Lo, Erh-kang, "The Question of Population Pressure in the Pre-Taiping Revolution 
Years, " 8 Collected Writings on Chinese Society and Economics, Academia 
Sinica (1939) p. 20. 
Lotilla, Raphael Perpetuo M., "Reflections on the Framework of Manila-Taipei 
Relations and Current Bilateral Ocean-Use Disputes, " 64 Philippine Law 
Journal (1989) p. 1. 
Lowe, A. V. and Warbrick, Colin, eds., "Current Development: Public International 
Law, " 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1992) p. 473. 
Ma, Hsia-Mian, "Thousands of Taiwan Residents Packing for Trip to Mainland, " 4(42) 
The Free China Journal (26 October 1987) p. 1. 
Ma, Ying-jeou, "Foreign Investment in the Troubled Waters of the East China Sea, " 1 
Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Af, f airs (1981) p. 35. 
Majid, S. bin A., "Controlling Fishing Effort: Malaysia's Experience and Problems, " in 
FAO, Expert Consultation on the Regulation of Fishing Effort (Fishing 
Mortality) FAO Fisheries Report No. 289 (1985) p. 319. 
Mak, J. N., "The Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment, " 4 
The Pacific Review (1991) p. 150. 
Marr, John C., "Southeast Asian Marine Fishery Resources and Fisheries, " in 
MacAndrews and Sien, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for Development 
(1981) p. 79. 
Marston, Geffrey, "Abandonment of Territorial Claims: The Cases of Bouvet and 
Spratly; Islands, " 57 British Yearbook of International Law (1986) p. 337. 
McBeth, John, "Troubled Waters: Proposed Sea Lanes Spark Concern, " Far Eastern 
Economic Review (29 December 1994) p. 18. 
McDorman, T. L., "Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim of 200-mile Zones, " 16 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1986) p. 183. 
--------- "The South China Sea Islands Dispute in the 1990s -A New Multilateral 
Process and Continuing Friction, " 8 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law (1993) p. 263. 
"-------, "Stateless Fishing Vessels, International Law and the 
High Seas Fisheries 
Conference, " 25 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce (1994) p. 531. 
3 63 
McElroy, Seamus, "Failure to Resolve Marine Boundary Disputes Raises Tensions in 
SE Asia, " 16 Marine Policy (1992) p. 488. 
McLean, William 0. and Sucharitkul, Sompong, "Fisheries Management and 
Development in the EEZ: The North, South, and Southwest Pacific Experience, " 
63 Notre Dame Law Review (1988) p. 492. 
Meltzer, Evelyne, "Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: 
The Nonsustainable Nature of High Seas Fisheries, " 25 Ocean Development and 
International Law (1994) p. 255. 
Menasveta, Deb, "A Regional Approach to the Development of Living Aquatic 
Resources in the Southeast Asian Region, " in Johnston, Gold, and Tangsubkul, 
eds., International Symposium on the New Law of the Sea in Southeast Asia: 
Developmental Effects and Regional Approaches (1983) p. 35. 
Mendoza, Estelito P., "The Base-lines of the Philippine Archipelago, " 46 Philippine 
Law Journal (1971) p. 628. 
Miles, Edward L., "An Assessment of the Impact of Proposed Changes in the Law of 
the Sea on Regional Fisheries Commissions, " in FAO Technical Assistance 
Programmes in Fisheries, and on the FAO Committee on Fisheries and 
Department of Fisheries, COFI/C/4776/INF. 3. 
-------- And Burke, William T., "Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 1982 Arising from New Fisheries Conflicts: The Problem of 
Straddling Stocks, " in Clingan and Kolodkin, eds., Moscow Symposium on the 
Law of the Sea (1991) p. 217. 
Miller, Morton M., Hooker, Paul J., and Fricke, Peter H., "Impression of Ocean 
Fisheries Management under the Magnuson Act, " 21 Ocean Development and 
International Law (1990) p. 263. 
Miovski, L., "Solutions in the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the Problem of 
Overfishing in the Central Bering Sea: Analysis of the Convention Highlighting 
the Provisions Concerning Fisheries and Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, " 26 
San Diego Law Review (1989) p. 537. 
Mirovitskaya, Natalia S. And Haney, J. Christopher, "Fisheries Exploitation as a 
Threat to Environmental Security: The North Pacific Ocean, " 16 Marine Policy 
(1992) p. 243. 
Mizukami, Chiyuki, "Fisheries Problems in the South Pacific Region, " 15 Marine 
Policy (1991) p. 111. 
Mohamed, Mohd Ibrahim Hj, "National Management of Malaysian Fisheries, " 15 
Marine Policy (1991) p. 2. 
364 
Moore, Gerald, "Enforcement Without Force: New Techniques in Compliance Control 
for Foreign Fishing Operations Based on Regional Cooperation, " 24 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1993) p. 197. 
Morgan, A. L., "The New Law of the Sea: Rethinking the Implications for Sovereign 
Jurisdiction and Freedom of Action, " 27 Ocean Development and International 
Law (1996) p. 5. 
Morgan, Joseph, "Marine Regions and Regionalism in South-East Asia, " 8 Marine- 
Policy (1984) p. 299. 
Morley, James William, "The Japanese Formula for Normalisation and Its Relevance 
for US-China Policy, " in Chiu, ed., Normalising Relations with the People's 
Republic of China: Problems, Analysis and Documents (1978) p. 121. 
Mosier, Hermann, "The International Society As A Legal Community, " 140 Recueil 
des cours, Academie de droit international de la Hague (1974-N) p. 1. 
Mugerwa, Nkamabo, "Subjects of International Law, " in Sorenson, ed., Manual of 
Public International Law (1968) p. 247. 
Narasaki, Osamu, "Structure of DWFN's Purse Seiner Fleets and Their Production 
Volumes, " in Herr, ed., The Forum Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges 
and Prospects (1990) p. 315. 
O'Connell, D. P., "The Status of Formosa and the Chinese Recognition Problem, " 50 
American Journal of International Law (1956) p. 405. 
--------, "Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law, " 45 British Yearbook of 
International Law (1971) p. 1. 
Ouchi, Kazioumi, "A Perspective on Japan's Struggle for its Traditional Rights on the 
Ocean, " 5 Ocean Development and International Law (1978) p. 107. 
"Our Fishing Industry's Recommendation on the Law of the Sea, " 74 Yu-Yo 
(Fishermen's Friends) (Taipei, August 1957) p. 13. 
Owen, David and Barham, John, "British Offer Over Falkland Oil, " Financial Times, 
26 January 1994, p. 3. 
Oxman, Bernard H., "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The 1976 New York Session, " 71 American Journal of International Law (1977) 
p. 247. 
-------, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New ........... 
York Session, " 72 American Journal of International Law (1978) p. 57. 
365 
--------, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh 
Session (1978), " 73 American Journal of International Law (1979) p. 1. 
--------, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth 
Session (1979), " 74 American Journal of International Law (1980) p. 1. 
--------, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth 
Session (1980), " 75 American Journal of International Law (1981) p. 211. 
--------, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth 
Session (1981), " 76 American Journal of International Law (1982) p. 1. 
--------, "The Two Conferences, " in Oxman, Caron, and Buderi, eds., Law of the Sea: 
U. S. Policy Dilemma (1983) p. 138. 
Park, Choon-ho, "Oil under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed 
Controversy, " in Idem, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (1983) p. 1. 
Park, flee Kwon, "Multilateral Security Cooperation, " 6 The Pacific Review (1993) p. 
251. 
Pinto, M. C. W., "Governance of Antarctica, " in Macdonald, ed., Essays in Honour of 
{Yang Tieya (1993) p. 587. 
Polomka, Peter, "Strategic Stability & the South China Sea: Beyond Geopolitics, " 
Paper present at International Academic Conference on Territorial Claims in the 
South China Sea, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 
December 1990. 
Pringle, James, "Fears Grow in the South-East Asia: China Increases Military 
Spending, " The Times (7 March 1995) p. 11. 
Rabanal, H. R. and Ganaden, R., "The Contest for Fishery Resources in the South 
China Sea, " in Cariro, ed., The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine 
Perspections (1992) p. 37. 
"Recommendation for Holding United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, " 45 
Hsinhua Weekly (5 November 1973) p. 22. 
Redgwell, Catherine, "Environmental Protection in Antarctica: The 1991 Protocol, " 43 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994) p. 599. 
Report of the Workshop on "Managing Potential Conflicts on the South China Sea" in 
Proceedings of Managing Potential Conflicts on the South China Sea, Bali, 
Indonesia, 22-24 January 1990, p. 1. 
Rich, Roland, "Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet 
Union, " 4 European Journal of International Law (1993) p. 36. 
366 
Ronquillo, Inocencio A., "The Allocation of Tuna Fisheries, " in Christy, ed., Law of 
the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of Fisheries in Southeast Asia 
(1978) p. 11. 
Rubin, A. P., "Historical and Legal Background of the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute, " 
in Coll and Arend, eds., The Falklands Mar: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy, 
and International Law (1985) p. 9. 
Saguirian, Artemy A., "Russia and Some Pending Law of the Sea Issues in the North- 
Pacific: Controversies over Higher Seas Fisheries Regulation and Delimitation 
of Marine Spaces, " 23 Ocean Development and International Law (1992) p. 1. 
Saisunthorn, Jumpot, "Impact of 200-mile EEZ Claims on the Access of Thailand's 
Distant-Fishing Fleet to Foreign EEZs, " Paper presented at the Workshop on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Bandung, Indonesia, 15- 
18 July 1991. 
Scovazzi, Tullio, "Explaining Exclusive Fishery Jurisdiction, " 9 Marine Policy (1985) 
p. 120. 
Scully, Tucker, "Report on UNCED, " in Miles and Treves, eds., The Law of the Sea: 
New Worlds, New Discoveries (1993) p. 97. 
Selak, C. B., "Recent Development in High Seas Fisheries Jurisdiction under the 
Presidential Proclamation of 1945, " 44 American Journal of International Law 
(1950) p. 670. 
Sha, Chih-I, "Present and Future of the ROC Squid Fisheries, " in Council of 
Agriculture, Annual Report of Council ofAgriculture: 1985 (1985) p. 126. 
Shaw, Yu-Ming, "Modern History of Taiwan: An Interpretative Account, " in Chiu, 
ed., China and the Taiwan Issue (1979) p. 7. 
Shearer, I. ; A. "High Seas: Drift Gillnets, Highly Migratory Species, and Marine 
Mammals, " in Kuribayashi and Miles, eds., The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A 
Framework for Further International Cooperation (1992) p. 237. 
Shen, Lyushun, "The Taiwan Issue in Peking's Foreign Relations in the 1970s: A 
Systematic Review, " 1 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 
(1982) p. 74. 
Shen, Yuan, "Hung Hsiu-chuan and the Taiping Revolution, " I Historical Research 
(1963) p. 49. 
Simon, Sheldon W., "The Two Southeast Asias and China, " 24 Asian Survey (1984) p. 
519. 
367 
--------, "U. S. Interests in Southeast Asia: The Future Military Presence, " 31 Asian 
Survey (1991) p. 662. 
Sloan, Blaine, "General Assembly Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years After), " 58 
British Yearbook of International Law (1987) pp. 39-150. 
Soegiarto, Aprilani, "The South China Sea: Its Ecological Features and Potentials for 
Developing Cooperation in Marine Scientific Research and Environmental 
Protection, " Paper presented at the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts 
in the South China Sea, Bali, Indonesia, 22-24 January 1990. 
Song, Yann-Huei, "United States Ocean Policy: High Seas Driftnet Fisheries in the 
North Pacific Ocean, " I1 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs 
(1991-92) p. 64. 
Sorensen, Max, "The Territorial Sea of Archipelagos, " in Francois, Varia Juris 
Gentium, Lfber Amicorum (1959). Cited from Whiteman, Digest of 
International Law, Vol. 4 (1965) p. 286. 
'Statement of the Working Group Meeting on Marine Scientific Research in the South 
China Sea', Manila, Philippines, 30 May -3 June 1993. (mimeo. ) 
Stevenson, John R. and Oxman, Bernard H., "The Future of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, " 88 American Journal of International Law 
(1994) p. 488. 
Sukma, Rizal, "South China Sea Conflict: A Challenge to Indonesia's Active Foreign 
Policy, " 19 The Indonesian Quarterly (1991) p. 303. 
Sumi, Kazuo, "International Legal Issues concerning the Use of Driftnets with Special 
Emphasis on Japanese Practices and Responses, " in FAO, The Regulation of 
Driftnet Fishing on the High Seas: Legal Issues, FAO Legislative Study, No. 47 
(FAO; Rome, 1991) p. 60. 
Suzuki, T., "Description of Japanese Pelagic Driftnet Fisheries and Related 
Information, " in FAO, Report of the Export of the Expert Consultation on 
Large-Scale Pelagic Driftnet Fishing, FAO Fishery Report No. 434 (1990) p. 
37. 
Swan, Judith, "Highly Migratory Species: The South Pacific Forum Fishing Agency, " 
in Soons, ed., Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through 
International Institutions (1990) p. 318. 
Symmons, C. R., "United Kingdom Abolition of the Doctrine of Recognition of 
Governments: A Rose by Another Name? " [1981] Public Law p. 249. 
--------, "The Maritime Zones Around the Falkland Islands, " 37 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly (1988) p. 283. 
368 
Szekely, A., "A Study of the Contribution of the Latin American States to the 
Development of the International Law of the Sea Since 1945, " in Szekely, ed., 
Latin American and the Development of the Law of the Sea, Part I (1986) p. 1. 
Tai Ming Cheung, "Loaded Weapons: Spree in Former Soviet Union, " Far Eastern 
Economic Review (3 September 1992) p. 21. 
"Taiwan to Construct 160 New Vessels, " Fishing News International (June 1980). 
Talmon, Stefan, "Recognition of Governments: An Analysis of the New British Policy 
and Practice, " 63 British Yearbook of International Law (1992) p. 231. 
Tanaka, Shoichi, "Japanese Fisheries and Fishery Resources in the Northwest Pacific" 
6 Ocean Development and International Law (1979) p. 103. 
Tansubkul, P. and Fung-wai, F. L., "The New Law of the Sea and Development in 
Southeast Asia, " 23 Asian Survey (1983) p. 868. 
Tasker, Rodney, "A Line in the Sand, " Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April 1995) p. 
14. 
Taylor, M. J. and White, C., "A Meta-analysis of Hooking Mortality of Non- 
anadromous Trout, " 12 Northern American Journal of Fisheries Management 
(1992) p. 760. 
Thomas, Bradford L., "The Spratly Islands Imbroglio: A Tangled Web of Conflict, " in 
International Boundaries Research Unit, International Boundaries and 
Boundary Conflict Resolution 1989 Conference Proceedings (1990) p. 421. 
Tousley, Michael, "United States Seizure of Stateless Drug Smuggling Vessels on the 
High Seas: Is It Legal? " 22 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
(1990) p. 375. 
Tran Cong Truc, "For a Peaceful Sea, " Paper presented at the Third Workshop on 
Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 29 
June-2 July 1992. 
Tran Huy Chuong, "For A New Southeast Asia, " Paper presented at the Fifth Asia- 
Pacific Roundtable sponsored by the Institute-of Strategic and International 
Studies, Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 10-14 June 1991. 
Turgeon, Donna D., "Fishery Regulation: Its Use under the Magnuson Act and 
Reaganomics, " 9 Marine Policy (1985) p. 126. 
Turk, Danilo, "Recognition of States: A Comment, " 4 European Journal of 
International Law (1993) p. 66. 
369 
Valencia, Mark J., "The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism, " 2 
Marine Policy (1978) p. 87. 
--------, "Southeast Asian Seas: National Marine Interests, Transnational Issues, and 
Marine Regionalism, " in MacAndrews and Sien, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: 
Frontiers for Development (1981) p. 341. 
--------, "All-for-Everyone Solution, " Far Eastern Economic Review (30 March 1989) 
p. 20. 
--------, "Vietnam: Fisheries and Navigation Policies and Issues, " 21 Ocean 
Development and International Law (1990) p. 431. 
--------, "Vietnam's Maritime Disputes: Hydrocarbon Resource Potential and Possible 
Solutions, " 16 Energy (1991) p. 1157. 
-------, "The South China Sea: Potential Conflict and Cooperation, " Paper presented at ........... 
the Third Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia, 29 June-2 July 1992. 
--------, "Spratly Solution Still at Sea, " 6 The Pacific Review (1993) p. 155. 
-------- and Marsh, James Barney, "Access to Straits and Sealanes in Southeast Asian 
Seas: Legal, Economic, and Strategic Considerations, " 16 Journal of Maritime 
Law and Commerce (1985) p. 513. 
-------- and Van Dyke, J. M., "Vietnam's National Interests and the Law of the Sea, " 25 
Ocean Development and International Law (1994) p. 217. 
--------, Van Dyke, J. M., and Ludwig, Noel, "The South China Sea: Approaches and 
Interim Solution, " (26 April 1995, mimeo. ) 
Valero, Gerardo M. C., "Spratly Archipelago Dispute: Is the Quetion of Sovereignty 
Still Relevant? " 18 Marine Policy (1994) p. 314. 
Van Der Essen, Alfred, "The Application of the Law of the Sea to the Antarctic 
Continent, " in Vicuna, ed., Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and 
Political Issues (1983) p. 231. 
Van Dyke, Jon and Brooks, R. A., "Uninhabited Islands and the Ocean's Resources: 
The Clipperton Island Case, " in Clingan, ed., Law of the Sea: State Practice in 
Zones of Special Jurisdiction, Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference of the 
Law of the Sea Institute (1982) p. 351. 
Vatikiotis, M., "Mix and Match: Russia and US Split Order for Combat Aircraft, " Far 
Eastern Economic Review (8 July 1993) p. 13. 
370 
-------- and Cheung, T. M., "Maritime Hegemony, " Far Eastern Economic Review (10 
January 1991) p. 11. 
Vatikiotis, M., "China Stirs the Pot, " Far Eastern Economic Review (9 July 1992) p. 
14. 
Vicuna, F. 0., "Towards an Effective Management of High Seas Fisheries and the 
Settlement of the Pending Issues of the Law of the Sea: The View of Developing 
Countries Ten Years after the Signature of the Law of the Sea Convention, " in 
Miles and Treves, eds., The Law of the Sea: New Worlds, New Discoveries 
(1993) p. 415. 
Villacorta, Wilfrido V., "The Philippine Territorial Claim in the South China Sea, " 
Paper presented at the International Academic conference on Territorial Claims 
in the South China Sea, Centre of Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 
December 1990. 
Waldock, Humphrey, Sir, "General Course on Public International Law, " 106 Recueil 
des cours, Academie de droh international de la Hague (1962-II) p. 1. 
Walls, Sarah, "Oceans Apart over Tuna, " Far Eastern Economic Review (6 April 
1989) p. 89. 
Wang, Chien-Hsiung, "Seasonal Changes of the Distribution of South Pacific 
Albacore Based on Taiwan's Tuna Longline Fisheries, 1971-1985, " 20 Acta 
Oceanographica Taiwanica (1988) p. 1. 
Wang, Guiguo, "China's Return to GATT: Legal and Economic Implications, " 28(3) 
Journal of iVorld Trade (1994) p. 51. 
Wang, Li-Yu and Pearse, Peter H., "The New Legal Regime for China's Territorial 
Sea, " 25 Ocean Development and International Law (1994) p. 431. 
Warbrick, Colin, "Recognition of Governments, " 56 Modern Law Review (1993) p. 
92. 
Watts, Arthur D., "The Antarctic Treaty as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism, " in Polar 
Research Board, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (1986) p. 68. 
--------, "Antarctic Mineral Resources: Negotiations for a Mineral Resources Regime, " 
in Triggs, ed., The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and Resources 
(1987) p. 164. 
Weller, Marc, "The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, " 86 American Journal of International Law (1992) p. 
569. 
371 
Weng, Byron S., "Taiwan's International Status Today, " 99 The China Quarterly 
(September 1984) p. 465. 
White, Gillian, "The Principle of Good Faith, " in Lowe, V., and Warbrick, C., eds., 
The UN and the Principles of International Law (1994) p. 230. 
Williams, Frances and Moore, Jonathan, "Who Goes First? Taiwan's GATT 
Application Angers Peking, " Far Eastern Economic Review (1 February 1990) 
p. 36 
Wright, Andrew and Doulman, David J., "Drift-net Fishing in the South Pacific: From 
Controversy to Management, " 15 Marine Policy (1991) p. 303. 
Wright, Quincy, "Some Thoughts about Recognition, " 44 American Journal of 
International Law (1950) p. 106. 
--------, "The Status of Communist China, " 11 Journal of International Affairs (1957) 
p. 181. 
--------, "Non-Recognition of China and International Tensions, " 34 Current History 
(1958) p. 153. 
Wu, Samuel S. G. and De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, "Assessing the Dispute in the South 
China Sea: A Model of China's Security Decision Making, " 38 International 
Studies Quarterly (1994) p. 379. 
Yonezawa, Kunio, "Some Thoughts on the Straddling Stock Problem in the Pacific 
Ocean, " in Kuribayashi and Miles, eds., The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A 
Framework for Further International Cooperation (1992) p. 127. 
You, Ji and You, Xu, "In Search of Bule Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime 
Strategy in the 1990s, " 4 The Pacific Review (1991) p. 137. 
Yu, Peter kien-hong, "Reasons for not Negotiating and Negotiating (Away) the 
Spratlys: A Chinese View from Taiwan, " Paper presented at the International 
Academic conference on Territorial Claims in the South China Sea, Centre of 
Asian Studies, University of Hong Kong, 4-6 December 1990. 
--------, "Issues on the South China Sea: A Case Study, " 11 Chinese Yearbook of 
International Law and Affairs (1991-92) p. 138. 
Yu, Steven K. -T., "Who Owns the Paracels and Spratlys? - An Evaluation of the 
Nature and Legal Basis of the Conflicting Territorial Claims, " 9 Chinese 
Yearbook of International Law and Affairs (1989) p. 1. 
Yu, Susan, "International APEC Ministers Court ROC's Delegation, " 8(87) Free 
China Weekly (15 November 1991) p. 1. 
372 
--------, "Singapore Koo-Wang Talks Date Set, " 10(26) Free China Journal (13 April 
1993) p. 1. 
Zang, Jun, "China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the 
South China Sea, " 17 Journal of Strategic Studies (1994) p. 180. 
VI. BOOKS 
Alexander, L. M., Marine Regionalism in the Southeast Asian Seas (East-West 
Environment and Policy Institute: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1982). 
Allott, Philip, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 1990). 
Anand, R. P., Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: The Hague, 1983). 
Anderson, Ewan, An Atlas of World Political Flashpoints: A Sourcebook of 
Geopolitical Crisis (Pinter Reference: London, 1993). 
Andrassy, Juraj, International Law and the Resources of the Sea (Columbia University 
Press: New York and London, 1970). 
Aprieto, V. L., Fishery management and Extended Maritime Jurisdiction: The 
Philippine Tuna Fishery Situation, Research Report No. 4 (East-West 
Environment and Policy Institute: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1981). 
Asian Development Bank, Asian Development Outlook (Asian Development Bank: 
Manila, 1991). 
Attdrd, David Joseph, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1987). 
Auburn, F. M., Antarctic Law and Politics (C. Hurst & Company: London, 1982). 
Bailey, Sydney D., The Procedure of the UN Security Council, 2nd edition (Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, 1988). 
Ball, Desmond, Building Blocks for Regional Security: An Australian Perspective on 
Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Asia/Pacific Region, SDSC 
Canberra Paper No. 83 (Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia 
National University: Canberra, September 1991. 
373 
Beck, Peter, The Falklands As An International Problem (Routledge: London and New 
York, 1988). 
Bevans, Charles I., comp., Treaties and other International Agreements of the United 
States ofAmerica, 1776-1949 (Department of States: Washington, -D. C., 1974). 
Bokor-Szego, Hanna, The Role of the Untied Nations in International Legislation 
(North-Holland Publishing Company: Amsterdam, 1978). 
Booth, Ken, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (George Allen & Unwin: London, 
1985). 
Bowett, D. W., The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1967). 
Brenhardt, Rudolf ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. 10 (Elsevier 
Science Publishers B. V.: Amsterdam, 1987). 
Brierly, J. L., The Law of Nations, 6th Edition (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1963). 
Brown, E. D., Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol. 1, 
The Continental Shelf (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: London, 1992). 
--------, The International Law of the Sea, Two Volumes (Dartmouth: Aldershot, 
England, 1994). 
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 4th Edition (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1990). 
Buchholz, Hanns J., ed., New Approaches to Development Co-operation with South 
Pacific Countries (Verlag Breitenbach: Saarbrucken, 1987). 
--------, Law of the Sea Zones in the Pacific Ocean (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies: Singapore, 1987). 
Burke, William T., The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Impacts on Tuna 
Regulation, FAO Legislation Study No. 26 (FAO: Rome, 1982). 
--------, The New International Law of Fisheries: UNCLOS 1982 and Beyond 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1994). 
Bush, W. M., ed., Antarctica and International Law: A Collection of Inter-State and 
National Documents (Oceana Publications: London, 1982): 
Campell, William, Formosa under the Dutch (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner: London, 
1903). 
Cantlie, James, Sir, and Jones, C. Sheridan, Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China 
(New York, 1912). 
374 
Carino, Theresa C. ed., The South China Sea Disputes: Philippine Perspections 
(Philippine-China Development Resource Center and Philippine Association for 
China Studies: Manila, 1992). 
Carlyle, Margaret, ed., Documents on International Affairs 1949-1950 (Oxford 
University Press: London, 1953). 
Carr, James and Gianni, Matthew, High Seas Ecosystems, Large-Scale Driftnets and 
the Law of the Sea (Greenpeace International: Amsterdam, 1991). 
Cassese, A., ed., UN Peace-Keeping (Sijhoff & Nijhoff: The Netherlands, 1978). 
Castro, Pacifico A., ed., The Philippines and the Law of the Sea (Foreign Service 
Institute: Manila, 1983). 
Chen, Jerome, Mao and the Chinese Revolution (Oxford University Press: London, 
1965). 
Chen, L. T., The International Status of Taiwan, PhD Thesis, University College, 
Aberstwyth (1990). 
Cheng, Yen-Sheng, ed., Chung-Kuo nei-luan wai-huo li-shih tsung-shu (A Historical 
Series on China's Internal Disorder and External Trouble) Vol. 5 (Shanghai, 
1936). 
Cheung, Tai Ming, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions and 
Regional Implications (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, 1990). 
Chiu, Hungdah, ed., China and the Question of Taiwan: Documents and Analysis 
(Praeger Publishers: New York, 1973). 
--------, Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting 
Seabed in Southeast Asia (School of Law, University of Maryland: Baltimore, 
1977). 
-------, ed., Normalising Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, 
Analysis and Documents (School of Law, University of Maryland: Baltimore, 
1978). 
--------, ed., China and the Taiwan Issue (Praeger Publishers: New York, 1979). 
--------, The International Legal Status of the Republic of China, revised version 
(School of Law, University of Maryland: Baltimore, 1992). 
--------, Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable 
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (School of Law, University of Maryland: 
Baltimore, 1993). 
375 
Chiu, Kuang-Chung, A New Discussion on Fisheries Administration (Ta-Hsin Books: 
Taipei, 1983). 
Christy, Francis T., Jr., cd., Law of the Sea: Problems of Conflict and Management of 
Fisheries in Southeast Asia, Proceedings of the ICLARM/ISEAS Workshop on 
the Law of the Sea, Manila, Philippines, 26-29 November 1978. 
--------, Marine Fisheries and the Law of the Sea: A Decade of Change, FAO Fisheries 
Circular No. 853 (FAO: Rome, 1992). 
-------- and Scott, A., The Common Wealth in Ocean Fisheries (John Hopkins Press: 
Baltimore, 1965). 
Chullasorn, Somsak and Martosubroto, Purwito, Distribution and Important 
Biological Features of Coastal Fish Resources in Southeast Asia, FAO Fisheries 
Technical Paper No. 278 (FAO: Rome, 1986). 
Churchill, R. R. and Lowe, A. V., The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, 1988). 
Clingan, Thomas A. Jr., ed., Law of the Sea: State Practice in Zones of Special 
Jurisdiction, Proceedings of the 13th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea 
Institute (University of Hawaii: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1982). 
-------- and Kolodkin, Anatoly L., eds., Moscow Symposium on the Law of the Sea, 28 
November -2 December 1988, Proceedings of a Workshop Co-sponsored by the 
Law of the Sea Institute (University of Hawaii: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1991). 
Clough, Ralph N., Island China (Harvard University Press: London, 1978). 
--------, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait (Westview Press: Oxford, 1993). 
Cohen, Jerome Alan and Chiu, Hungdah, eds., People's China and International Law: 
A Documentary Study, Vol. 1 (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New 
Jersey, 1974). 
Coll, A. R. and Arend, A. C., eds., The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, 
Diplomacy, and International Law (Allen & Unwin: Boston, 1985). 
Collected Documents on the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China 
(People's Publishing: Peking, 1961). 
Colombos, C. J., International Law of the Sea, 6th rev, edition (Longmans: London, 
1967). 
Cooley, R. A., Politics and Conservation: The Decline of the Alaska Salmon (Harper 
& Row: New York, 1963). 
376 
Copper, John F., Taiwan: Nation-State or Province? (Westview Press: London, 1990). 
Coquia, Jorge and Defensor-Santiago, Miriam, Public International Law (University 
of the Philippines: Quezon City, 1934). 
Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 1979). 
Csirke, J., The Patagonian Fishery Resources and the Offshore Fisheries in the 
South-West Atlantic, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 286 (FAO: Rome, 
1987). 
Dabat, Alejandro and Lorenzano, Luis, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of 
Military Rule (Verso Editions: London, 1984). 
Dahmani, M., The Fisheries Regime of the Exclusive Economic Zone (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1987). 
Davidson, J. W., The Island of Formosa: Past and Present (AMS Press: New York, 
1977). 
Day, Alan J., cd., Border and Territorial Disputes (Longman: London, 1982). 
Destefani, Laurio H., The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich 
Islands: The Conflict with Britain (Edipress S. A.: Buenos Aires, 1982). 
Djonovich, Dusan J., ed., United Nations Resolutions (Oceana Publications, Inc.: 
Debbs Ferry, New York, 1990). 
Dubner, Barry Hart, The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagos and 
Archipelagic States (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1976). 
Dupuy, Rene-Jean, ed., The Management of humanity's Resources: The Law of the Sea 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1982). 
Eastman, Lloyd E., Chen, J., Pepper, s., and Van Slyke, L. P., The Nationalist Era in 
China 1927-1949 (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1991). 
Economic Stabilisation Board, Highlights of the Second Four-Year Plan for the 
Economic Development in Taiwan (Economic Stabilisation Board, Executive 
Yuan: Taipei, 1957). 
English, H. E. and Scott, Anthony, ed., Renewable Resources in the Pacific, 
Proceedings of the 12th Pacific Trade and Development Conference, Vancouver, 
Canada, 7-11 September 1981 (International Development Research Centre: 
Canada, 1982). 
377 
Evans, Malcolm D., Relevant Circumstances and Maritime Delimitation (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989). 
Everhart, W. 11., and Youngs, W. D., Principles of Fishery Science, 2nd edition 
(Comstock Pub. Associates: Ithaca, N. Y., 1981) 
Extavour, Winston Conrad, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Study of the Evolution 
and Progress Development of the International Law of the Sea (Institut 
Universitaire dc Iiautes Etudes Internationales: Geneva, 1979). 
Fairbank, J. K. and Reischauer, E. 0., China: Tradition and Transformation (George 
Allen & Unwin: Sydney, 1979). 
Fan, Wen-Lan, et al. eds., Mien-Chun (The Nien Army) (Shanghai, 1953). 
Fenwick, C. G., International Law, 4th Edition (Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 
1965). 
Ferndandez, H. C., The Philippines 200-Afile Economic Zone (Secretarial to the 
Cabinet Commission on the Law of the Sea by the Development Academy of the 
Philippine Press: Manila, 1982). 
Fisheries Agency of Japan, Marlin and others drift gillnet fishery, Document 
submitted to the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (1982). 
--------, Squid Drif? Gillnet Fishery, Document submitted to the International North 
Pacific Fisheries Commission (1982). 
Fitzgerald, C. P., Europe and China: An Historical Comparison, Annual Lecture 
delivered to Australian Humanities Research Council, November 1968 (Sydney 
University Press: Sydney, 1969). 
Francalanci,, G., Romano, D., and Scovazzi, T., eds., Atlas of the Straight Baselines 
(Doff. A. Giuffre Editore: Milano, 1986). 
Francois, J. P. A., Varia Juris Gentium, Liber Amicorum (A. W. Sijthoff: Leiden, 
1959). 
Friedman, Wolfgang G., et at, Cases and Materials in International Law (West 
Publishing Co.: New York, 1969). 
Fu, Kuen-chen, Law and National Affairs (Times Publishing Co.: Taipei, 1982). 
Gamba, V., The Falklands/Malvinas Mar: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention 
(Allen & Unwin: Winchester, MA, 1987). 
Gamba-Stonehouse, Virginia, A Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American 
View (Pinter Publishers: London, 1989). 
378 
Garnant, Ross and Drysdale, Peter, eds., Asia Pacific Regionalism (Harper 
Educational Publishers: Australia, 1994). 
Gold, Thomas, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk: New York, 1986) 
Goncalves, M. E., Analysis of the Concept of 'Region' in the Informal Composite 
Negotiating Text, COFI/78/INF. 10 (FAO: Rome, 1978). 
Gray, Jack, Rebellions and Revolutions (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1990). 
Green, N. A. Maryan, International Law, 3rd Edition (Pitman Publishing: London, 
1987). 
Greene, Fred, cd., The Philippine Bases: Negotiating for the Future (Council on 
Foreign Relations: New York, 1988). 
Greig, D. W., International Law, 2nd Edition (Butterworth: London, 1976). 
Greenfield, Jeanette, China's Practice in the Law of the Sea (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 
1992). 
Gross, Leo, ed. International Law in Twentieth Century (Appleton-Century-Crofts: 
New York, 1969) 
Gutteridge, J. A. C., The UN in a Changing World (Manchester University Press: 
Manchester, 1969). 
Hackworth, Green Haywood, Digest of International Law, 4 Vols. (Department of 
State Publications: Washington, D. C., 1940). 
Haller-Trost, R., The Spratly Islands: A Study on the Limitations of International Law, 
University of Kent at Canterbury, Centre of South-East Asian Studies, 
Occasional Paper No. 14 (University of Kent: Kent, 1990). 
liamzah, B. A., Malaysia's EEZ. " A Study in Legal Aspects (Pelanduk Publications: 
Kuala Lumpur, 1988). 
--------, The Spratlies: What Can Be Done to Enhance Confidence (Institute of 
Strategic and International Studies: Malaysia, 1990). 
Heinzig, Dieter, Disputed Islands in the South China Sea: Paracels-Spratlys-Pratas- 
Macclesfield Bank (0. Harrasowitz: Wiesbaden, 1976). 
Henkin, L., Pugh, R. C., Schachter, 0., and Smit, H., International Law: Cases and 
Materials, 2nd Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, Minn., 1987). 
Herr, Richard, ed., The Forum Fisheries Agency: Achievements, Challenges and 
Prospects (University of the South Pacific Press: Suva, Fiji, 1990). 
379 
Hertslet. G. E. P., cd., Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. I, 3rd Edition (HMSO: London, 
1908). 
Hey, Ellen, The Regime for the Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries 
Resources (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1989). 
Hsiang Ta, et al., eds., Tai ping tien-kuo (The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom), Vol. 2, 
(Shanghai, 1952). 
Hsieh, Chiao-Min, Taiwan - ilha Formosa: A Geography in Perspective 
(I3uttcrworths: Washington, D. C., 1964). 
Hsieh, Winston, Chinese Historiography on the Revolution of 1911 (Hoover 
Institution Press: Stanford, California, 1975). 
Hsiung, James C., ed., The Taiwan Experience, 1950-1980: Contemporary Republic of 
China (Praeger: New York, 1981). 
Hsu, Immanuel C. Y., The Rise of Modern China (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 
1990). 
Huang, Kan, China and Its Territorial Sea (Taiwan Shan-Wu Publishing Company: 
Taipei, 1970). 
International Boundaries Research Unit, International Boundaries and Boundary 
Conflict Resolution 1989 Conference Proceedings (University of Durham: 
Durham, 1990). 
International Centre for Living Aquatic Resources Management (ICLARM), Report of 
the First Meeting of the ICLARM, Program Advisory Committee (ICLARM: 
Metro Manila, Philippines, 1977). 
"------, ICLARM's Strategy for International Research on Living Aquatic Resources 
Management (ICLARM: Metro Manila, Philippines, 1992). 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 1993-1994 
(IISS: London, 1993). 
Jackson, J. H. and Davey, W. J., 1989 Documents Supplement to Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations, 2nd Edition (West Publishing Co.: St. Paul, 
Minn., 1989). 
Janis, Mark W., Sea Power and the Law of the Sea (D. C. Heath and Company: 
Toronto, 1976). 
Jennings, Robert, Sir and Watts, Arthur, Sir, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 
Vol. 1, Parts 2 to 4,9th Edition (Longman: Essex, 1992). 
380 
Ji, Guoxing, The Spratlys Disputes and Prospects for Settlement (Institute of Strategic 
and International Studies: Malaysia, 1992). 
Johnson, Stanley P., ed., The Earth Summit: The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) (Graham and Trotman Ltd.: London, 
1993). 
Johnston, D. M., The International Law of Fisheries: A Framework for Policy- 
Oriented Inquiries (New Haven Press: New Haven, 1987). 
--------, Gold, E., and Tangsubkul, P., eds., International Symposium on the New Law 
of the Sea in Southeast Asia: Developmental Effects and Regional Approaches 
(Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme: Halifax, 1983). 
-------- and Valencia, M. J., Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1991). 
Jbnsson, Hannes, Friends in Conflict: The Anglo-Iceland Cod Wars and the Law of the 
Sea (C. Hurst and Co. Ltd.: London, 1982). 
Joyner, C. C. and Chopra, Sudhir K., eds., The Antarctic Legal Regime (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1988). 
Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Weekly Diary of World Events (Keesing's 
Publication Ltd.: London, 1931- ). 
Kittichaisaree, Kriangsak, The Law of the Sea and Maritime Boundary Delimitation in 
South-East Asia (Oxford University Press: Singapore, 1987). 
Klintworth, Gary, ed., Modern Taiwan in the 1990s (Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australia National University: Canberra, 1991). 
--------, Australia's Taiwan Policy 1942-1992 (Australia National University: 
Canberra, 1993). 
Knapp, Ronald G., cd., China's Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography 
of Taiwan (University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1980). 
Knight, H. G., Managing the Sea's Living Resources (Lexington Books: Lexington, 
Mass., 1977). 
Koers, A. W., International Regulation of Marine Fisheries: A Study of Regional 
Fisheries Organizations (Fishing News: West Byfleet, UK, 1973). 
Kuribayashi, T. and Miles, Miles, eds., The Law of the Sea in the 1990s: A Framework 
for Further International Cooperation, Proceedings of the 24th Annual 
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, Tokyo, Japan, 24-27 July 1990 
(University of Hawaii: Honolulu, 1992). 
3si 
Kwci, Chung-gi, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1970). 
Kwiatkowska, Barbara, The 200 Mile Exclusive Economic Zone in the New Law of the 
Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: The Hague, 1989). 
Lattimore, Owen, Manchuria, Cradle of Conflict (The MacMillan Company: New 
York, 1932). 
Lauterpacht, E., ed., British Practice in International Law: 1962-1967 (British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law: London, 1963-1971). 
ed., Hersch Lauterpacht's International Law, Vol. 1 (The University Press: 
Cambridge, 1970). 
Lauterpacht, li., cd., Oppenheim's International Law: A Treatise, Vol. 1,7th edition 
(Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1952). 
Lay, S. It., Churchill, R. R., and Nordquist, N., comp. and eds., New Directions in the 
Law of the Sea, Vol. I-XI (Oceana Publications Inc.: Dobbs Ferry, New YQrk, 
1973-1981). 
Lee, Shih-Hao and Chu, Juo-Tsian, History of Chinese Fishery (Taiwan Shang-Wu 
Publishing Company: Taipei, 1970). 
Leifer, Michael, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (Routledge: London and 
New York, 1989). 
Leng, Lee Yong, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea (Singapore University Press: 
Singapore, 1978). 
Li, Victor H., cd., The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion (White Plains: New 
York, 1980). 
Lien, Chen-Tung, President Chiang and the Recovery of Taiwan (Chung-yang Wen- 
wu Kung-yin-sheh: Taipei, 1967). 
Lo, Chi-Kin, China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of South China 
Sea Islands (Routledge: London and New York, 1989). 
Loh, Pichon P. Y., The Kuomintang debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? (D. C. 
Heath & Co.: Boston, 1965). 
Ma, Ying-jeou, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China 
Sea (School of Law, University of Maryland: Baltimore, 1984). 
MacAndrews, Colin and Sien, Chia Lin, eds., Southeast Asian Seas: Frontiers for 
Development (McGraw-Hill International Book Company: Singapore, 1981). 
382 
MacDonald, R. St. J., cd., Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: London, 1993). 
MacLean, J. L., cd., ICLARAf Report, No. 1 (Makati: Metro-Manila, Philippines, 
1977). 
MacMurray, I. cd., Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894-1919 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: New York, 1921). 
Magoffin, R. Van Deman, trans., Grotius' Mar Liberum (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1916). 
Marr, John C., Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia, RFF/PISFA, 
Paper 7 (Resources for the Future: Washington, D. C., 1976). 
McDougal, M. and Burke, W., The Public Order of the Oceans (New Haven Press: 
New Haven, Conn., 1962). 
McWhinnie, M. A., ed., Polar Research (Boulder: Colorado, 1978). 
Merley, James William, ed., The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian 
Continent 1933-1941 (Columbia University Press: New York, 1983). 
Meyers, H., The Nationality of Ships (Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, 1967). 
Meyer, Milton Waller, A Diplomatic History of the Philippine Republic (University of 
Hawaii Press: Honolulu, Hawaii, 1965). 
Miles, Edward L. and Treves, Tullio, eds., The Law of the Sea: New Worlds, New 
Discoveries, Proceedings of the 26th Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea 
Institute, Genoa, Italy, 22-25 June 1992 (University of Hawaii: Honolulu, 1993). 
Mitchell, Barbara and Tinker, Jon, Antarctica and Its Resources (Earthscan: London, 
1980)'. 
Moore, J. B., History and Digest of the International Arbitration to which the United 
States Has Been A Party, Vol. 1 (Department of State Publications: Washington, 
D. C., 1898). 
Morello, Frank P., The International Legal Status of Formosa (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers: The Hague, 1966). 
Morgan, J. and Valencia, M., eds., Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas 
(University of California Press: Berkeley, California, 1983). 
Muller, D. G., China as a Maritime Power (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 
1984). 
383 
Mullerson, Rein, International Law, Rights and Politics: Developments in Eastern 
Europe and the CIS (Routledge: London and New York, 1994). 
Nicholas, H. G., The United Nations as a Political Institution (Oxford United Press: 
Oxford, 1971). 
Nordquist, Myron H., et al., eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
1982: A Commentary, Volumes I and II (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: London, 
1993). 
Northridge, Simon P., Driftnet Fisheries and Their Impacts on Non-Target Species: A 
Worldwide Review, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper, No. 320 (FAO: Rome, 
1991). 
O'Connell, D. P., International Law, Two Vols. (Stevens & Sons: London, 1970). 
--------, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester University Press: - 
Manchester, 1975). 
--------, The International Law of the Sea, Two Vols. (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1982, 
1984). 
Ogata, Sadako N., Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy: 
1931-1932 (University of California Press: Berkeley, 1964). 
Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. 1,8th Edition (Longmans: London, 1955). 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Experiences in 
the Management of National Fishing Zones (Paris: OECD, 1984). 
Oxman, B. H., Caron, David D., and Buderi, Charles L. 0., eds., Law of the Sea: US. 
Policy Dilemma (Institute for Contemporary Studies: San Francisco, 1983). 
Pai, Shou-I, ' ed., Hui-min chi-i (The Righteous Uprising of the Muslems) (Shanghai, 
1953). 
Park, Choon-ho, East Asia and the Law of the Sea (Seoul National University Press: 
Seoul, 1983). 
Parsons, Sir Anthony, Antarctica: The Next Decade (Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge, 1989). 
Pepper, Suzanne, Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (University 
of California Press: Berkeley, 1978). 
Polar Research Board, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment (National Academy 
Press: Washington, D. C., 1986). 
384 
Prescott, J. R. V., The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Methuen: London 
& New York, 1985). 
Rajaretnam, M., Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia, Field Report 
Series No. 6 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore, 1973). 
Reisman, W. Michael and Westerman, Gayl S., Straight Baselines in International 
Maritime Boundary Delimitation (MacMillan: London, 1992). 
Remz, Florene, comp., Annual Review of United Nations Affairs, 1971-1972 (Oceana 
Publications, Inc.: New York, 1973). 
Results of Naval Patrols in the Spratly Island Frontier (Taipei: Hsueh-Sheng Shu Jyu, 
1975). 
Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict, eds., United Nations, Divided World: the 
UN's Roles in International Relations (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1993). 
Rosencrance, Richard, The Rise of the Trading State (Basic Books: New York, 1986). 
Rowe, David Nelson, Informal Relations: The Case of Japan and the Republic of 
China, 1972-1974 (The Shoe String Press: Hamden, Conn., 1975). 
Saisunthom, Jumpot, Fisheries of the ASEAN States: Transition in the 200-Mile EEZ 
Regime, Ph. D. Thesis, University of Washington (1988). 
Samson, Elizabeth D., National Marine Interests in Fisheries in Southeast Asia, FIDC 
Technical Report Series 2 (July, 1983). 
Samuels, Marwyn S., Contest for the South China Sea (Methuen: New York and 
London, 1982). 
Schoning, R., et al., Proceedings of the National Industry By-catch Workshop, 
Natural Resources Consultants, Seattle, Washington (1992). 
Shzckleton, Lord, Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982, Cmnd. 8653 (HMSO: 
London, 1982). 
Shen, Mo, Japan in Manchuria: An Analytical Study of Treaties and Documents 
(Grace: Manila, 1960). 
Shen, Shyh-Lian, The Strategic Status of the South China Sea (Chinese Society for 
Strategic Studies: Kaohsiung, Taiwan, 1983). 
Shen, T. H., Agricultural Planning and Production (Economic Stabilisation Board, 
Executive Yuan: Taipei, 1958). 
385 
--------, Agricultural Development on Taiwan Since World Mar II (Comstock 
Publishing Associates: New York, 1964). 
Shih, Vincent Y. C., The Taiping Ideology: Its Source, Interpretations and Influences 
(University of Washington Press: Seattle, 1967). 
Sih, Paul K. T., Taiwan in Modern Times (St. John's University Press: New York, 
1973). 
Simma, Bruno, cd., The Charter of the UN. - A Commentary (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1994). 
Simpson, A. C., Progress Report on Fishing for Tuna in Philippine Waters by FAO 
Chartered Purse Seiners, SCS/GEN/77/1 1. 
Smith, Robert W., Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An Analysis and Primary 
Document (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Dordrecht, 1986). 
Smith, Sara, The Manchurian Crisis: 1931-1932 (Columbia University Press: New 
York, 1948). 
Smith, Wayne S., cd., Toward Resolution?: The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (Lynne 
Rienner Publishers: Boulder and London, 1991). 
Soons, A. H. A., ed., Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through 
International Institutions, Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the 
Law of the Sea Institute, 12-15 June 1989, Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands 
(University of Hawaii: Honolulu, 1990). 
Sorensen, Max, ed., Manual of Public International Law (MacMillan: London, 1968). 
South Pacific Commission, Report of the First Pacific Albacore Research Workshop, 
Auckland, New Zealand, 9-12 June 1986. 
----- ---, Report of the Second South Pacific Albacore Research Workshop, Suva, Fiji, 
14-16 June 1989. 
--------, Report of the Third South Pacific Albacore Research Workshop, Noumea, 
New Caledonia, 9-12 October 1990. 
Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Centre (SEAFDEC), SEAFDEC Fishery 
Statistical Bulletin for South China Sea Area, Bangkok, Thailand (1985). 
Spanier, J. W., The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Harvard 
University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1959). 
Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for Modern China (Hutchinson: London, 1990). 
386 
Strange, 1. J.. The Falk/and Islands (David & Charles: Newton Abbot, 1972). 
Sung, Dixson D. S. ed., Republic of China 1988: A Reference Book (Highlight 
International New York, Inc.: New York and Taipei, 1989). 
Szekely, A., ed., Latin American and the Development of the Law of the Sea, 2 
volumes (Oceana Publications: Debbs Ferry, New York, 1986). 
Tangsubkul, Phiphat, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies: Singapore, 1982). 
Teng, S. Y., New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion (Cambridge, Mass., 
1950). 
--------, The Nien Army and Their Guerrilla Warfare 1851-1868 (Mouton & Co.: La 
Ilaye, Paris, 1961). 
--------, The Taiping Rebellion and the Western Powers: A Comprehensive Survey 
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1971). 
The Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea (NILOS), International 
Organizations and the Law of the Sea: Documentary Yearbook 1989 (Graham & 
Trotman: London, 1991). 
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, 32 Volumes, 15th Edition (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica: Chicago, 1992). 
The Relationship between the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty (Chung-Hua-Min-Kuo Wai-Chiao Wen-Ti Yen-Chiu-Hui: Taipei, 
1966). 
Thorne, Christopher, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far 
Eastern Crisis of 1931-1932 (Hamish Hamilton: London, 1972). 
Tolentino, A. M., The Philippines and the Law of the Sea: A Collection of Articles, 
Statements, and Speeches (1982). 
Triggs, Gillian D., ed., The Antarctic Treaty Regime: Law, Environment and 
Resources (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1987). 
Tsai, Erh-Kang and Fu, Chi, eds., History of Sino-Japanese War, Vol. IV (Kuang 
Hsueh Hui: Shanghai, 1897). 
Valencia, M. J. ed., The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon Potential and Possibilities of 
Joint Development (Pergamon Press: New York, 1981). 
387 
--------, Southeast Asian Seas: Oil under Troubled Waters: Hydrocarbon Potential, 
Jurisdictional Issues, and International Relations (Oxford University Press: 
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 1985). 
Vicuna, Francisco Orrego, ed., Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal and 
Political Issues (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983). 
--------, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature Under International 
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
von Glahn, Gerhard, The Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International 
Law, 6th Edition (MacMillan Publishing Co.: New York, 1986). 
Wang, An-Yang and Liu, Hsi-Chiang, A Study on Issues and Policy of the Distant 
Water Fisheries of the Republic of China (Research, Development and 
Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, ROC: Taipei, 1979). 
Wang, Shu-huai, Hsien-Tung yun-nan hui-min shih-pien (The Yunnan Afuslem 
Rebellion During the Hsien feng and the Tung-chih Periods) (Taipei, 1968). 
Lowe, V., and Warbrick, C., eds., The UN and the Principles of International Law 
(Routledge: London, 1994). 
Whiteman, Marjorie M., Digest of International Law, 15 Volumes (Department of 
State Publication: Washington, D. C., 1964). 
Willoughby, W. W., The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations 
(Baltimore, 1935). 
Wright, Quincy, "The Chinese Recognition Problems, " in Gross, Leo, ed. 
International Law in Twentieth Century (Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 
1969). 
Wu, Y. L., 'ed., China -A Handbook: Theory and Practice of International Law with 
Respect to Selected Issues (Praeger Publisher: New York, 1973). 
Zacklin, Ralph, ed., The Changing of the Sea: Western Hemisphere Perspectives 
(Sijhoff: Leiden, 1974). 
Zametica, John, The Yugoslav Conflict: An Analysis of the Causes of the Yugoslav 
War, the Politics of the Republics and the Regional and International 
Implications of the Conflict (The International Institute for Strategic Studies: 
London, 1992). 
Zhong-kuo Bai-ke Nien-Chien: 1992 (Yearbook of Chinese Encyclopedia: 1992) 
(Yearbook of Chinese Encyclopedia Publishing Company: Shanghai, 1993). 
388 
VII. Documents from Internet 
CIA World Factbook At gopher: //hoshi. cic. sfu. ca: 70/00/dlam/cia/all. 
Draft Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 29 September 1995. At 
gopher: //gopher. undp. org: 70/00/unearch/organizations/fao/databases. 
Earth Negotiation Bulletin. At http: //www. iisd. ca/linkages/vo107/. 
"Statement of Spokesperson for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. " At 
http: //www. mailbase. ac. uk/lists-f-j/int-boundaries/I 996-05/0017. html. 
VIII. Selected Newspapers and Press References 
AP News Reports 
Beijing Review (Beijing) 
Central Daily News (Taipei) 
China Times (Taipei) 
China Time Weekly (Taipei) 
Chinese Fisheries (Taipei) 
Economist 
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Financial Times (London) 
Fishing News International (London) 
Foreign Broadcast Monitor (Singapore) 
Free China Weekly (Taipei) 
Great China Evening News (Taipei) 
Hongkong Standard (Hongkong) 
Hsinhua Press (Beijing) 
Hsinhua Weekly (Beijing) 
International Herald Tribune (Washington, D. C. ) 
The Manila Chronicle (Manila) 
New Philippines (Manila) 
389 
New York Herald Tribune (New York) 
New York Times (New York) 
Peking Review (Beijing) 
People's Daily (Beijing) 
Reuters News Reports 
South China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 
Straits Times (Singapore) 
Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 
Taiwan Daily News (Taipei) 
Tass News Reports 
The Times (London) 
Time 
United Daily News (Taipei) 
United Evening News (Taipei) 
United Morning Post (Singapore) 
Xinhua News Agency 
IX. Selected Interviews and Communications 
An interview with a staff in Fishery Bureau, Department of Agriculture and Forestry, 
Taiwan Provincial Government on 22 August 1991. 
An interview with a staff at the Overseas Fisheries Development Council of the 
Republic of China on 16 December 1993. 
An interview with an official of Marine Fisheries Division, Department of Fisheries, 
Council of Agriculture, Executive Yuan, ROC, 18 January 1994. 
A letter from Ms Mary Brandt, Office of the Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty 
Affairs, dated 3 May 1995. Answering my question about the present status of 
the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in 
the Central Bering Sea, 16 June 1994. 
An interview with a staff at the Overseas Fisheries Development Council of the 
Republic of China on 15 February 1996. 
390 
